Millar v Queensland Police Service

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Millar v Queensland Police Service [2021] QDC 304

PARTIES:

ANDREW JOHN MILLAR

(Appellant)

v

QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE

(Respondent)

FILE NO:

4469/19

DIVISION:

Appellate

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Magistrates Court, Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

2 December 2021

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

26 October 2020

JUDGE:

Dann DCJ

ORDER:

1.     I dismiss the application for leave to adduce new evidence.

2.     The appeal is dismissed.

3.     I make no order as to costs.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – s 222 JUSTICES ACT 1880 – where the appellant was convicted after trial of one count of common assault – where the appellant’s grounds of appeal are that the decision was against the weight of evidence, the Magistrate made findings of fact contrary to the established evidence and the Magistrate took into account immaterial considerations – where the appellant did not proceed with an application for leave to adduce new evidence – whether the learned Magistrate was right to convict the appellant

LEGISLATION:

Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, ss 382, 433-437

CASES:

Allesch v Maunz (2003) 214 CLR 180-181 cited

Forrest v Commissioner of Police [2017] QCA 132 cited

George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104 applied

Teelow v Commissioner of Police [2009] 2 Qd R 489 cited

White v Commissioner of Police [2014] QCA 121 cited

SOLICITORS:

The appellant appeared in person

N. Kljiac (Legal Officer) for the respondent

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal against a decision of a Magistrate made on 6 December 2019. The appellant, Mr Millar, was convicted after a trial of one count of common assault pursuant to s 335 of the Criminal Code (“Code”). The oral evidence in the trial was heard on 3, 4, 23 and 24 July 2019 and 24 and 25 September 2019. The learned Magistrate dealt with a significant number of applications by the appellant during the trial including a no case submission at the close of the prosecution case. After this application was dismissed, the appellant gave evidence.

  2. The grounds of the appeal are:

    1.The decision was against the weight of evidence.

    2.The Magistrate made findings of fact contrary to the established evidence.

    3.The Magistrate took into account immaterial considerations.

  3. The appellant drafted his own Notice of Appeal and appeared for himself on the appeal.  He appeared for himself at the trial.

  4. The appeal was filed on 7 December 2019, prior to the date Mr Millar was sentenced, which was 16 January 2020. The appellant was fined $1,000 and ordered to pay $500 compensation to the complainant. A conviction was recorded[1]. There has been no challenge to the sentence on this appeal.

    [1]Respondent’s outline of submissions at paragraph 2. The sentence did not feature in any way in the appeal.

    Relevant legal principles

  5. An appeal under s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (‘Justices Act’) is by way of re-hearing.

  6. For such an appeal:

    “the powers of the appellate court are exercisable only where the appellant can demonstrate that, having regard to…

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Details
Case
[2021] QDC 304
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Millar v Queensland Police Service involves the appellant appealing his conviction of one count of common assault. The appeal was heard in the Queensland Court of Appeal. The appellant argued that the decision was against the weight of evidence, the Magistrate made findings of fact contrary to the established evidence, and the Magistrate took into account immaterial considerations. The appellant did not proceed with an application for leave to adduce new evidence.

The legal issues before the court were whether the learned Magistrate was right to convict the appellant, and if the arguments presented by the appellant had any merit. The court found that the arguments presented by the appellant were not substantiated by the evidence. The court found that Dr Stanley's evidence was consistent with the complainant's account of the events that led to her injuries, and that there was no basis to impugn Constable Palmer's credit arising from the decision not to try to prove the scar beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court concluded that the appellant's arguments failed to impugn the credit of the witnesses, and that the learned Magistrate was right to convict the appellant. The court dismissed the appeal and made no order as to costs. This decision affirms the importance of the trial judge's role in assessing the credibility of witnesses and the weight of evidence presented in court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. I dismiss the application for leave to adduce new evidence.

2. The appeal is dismissed.

3. I make no order as to costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

There is no basis to the appellant’s arguments in respect of Mr Thompson. Appellant’s argument 7: Dr Stanley’s evidence Dr Stanley, a general practitioner, gave evidence that he’d never seen the complainant as a patient before she came to see him on 21 May 2018 and she was quite upset and distressed[52]. The complainant said her neck was sore, he examined her and she had some muscle spasm present in her neck and on getting her to do head movements she was a bit sore around the base of the neck on both sides, where the neck joins the shoulders[53]. It seemed to be some sort of muscle or soft tissue injury; there was no obvious bruising but the muscles were sore to touch[54].[52]Transcript 24 July 2019 page 7 lines 12 – 15.[53]Transcript 24 July 2019 page 7 lines 30 – 43.[54]Transcript 24 July 2019 page 7 line 45 - page 8 line 6. The injuries were consistent with how the complainant said they were caused[55], which was that there was some disagreement with a man who grabbed her by the throat and pushed her up against a wall[56]. The soft tissue injury was consistent with being grabbed around the throat and could be a likely cause of those injuries[57]. The complainant told him she had been assaulted the day before the consultation[58]. [55]Transcript 24 July 2019 page 8 lines 8 – 12. [56]Transcript 24 July 20i9, page 8 lines 20 – 21. This evidence was not led for the truth of its contents but to establish that what he was told was consistent with what he observed.[57]Transcript 24 July 2019 page 8 lines 27 – 29.[58]Transcript 24 July 2019 page 8 lines 32 – 33. In cross examination Dr Stanley’s evidence was that the complainant had a tremor in her voice and was visibly upset[59]. He confirmed the injury he found was consistent with someone causing soft tissue injury to the neck[60]. It was not strange she would have a tremor in her voice the next day; this could be delayed reactions[61]. He agreed there were other mechanisms that could cause tension in the neck[62]. (In that regard I note the scenarios which the appellant put to Dr Stanley were many other types of physical activities, like playing rugby, getting dumped in the surf, falling over or taking bumps[63]. There was no evidence that any of those things had occurred to the complainant prior to her consultation with Dr Stanley). He agreed there was no visible bruising. His evidence was that there can be deep seated bruises where there’s no marking on the skin but the deeper tissues are sore[64]. His further evidence was that bruising appearing on the neck would depend on the degree of pressure and that some people can take several days for bruising to appear[65]. You would not necessarily expect to see bruising if there was such a level of choking that the person choked could not get their words out and there were three episodes of choking[66]. You wouldn’t expect to see any red marks[67]. He confirmed he did not see any red marks or bruises[68]. Dr Stanley’s evidence was that he saw the scratch on examination, but the complainant did not tell him about the scratch[69]. The pain was the neck movement forwards and backwards on the neck and what she said was getting sore fitted the movements[70]. [59]Transcript 24 July 2019 page 9 lines 28 – 31. [60]Transcript 24 July 2019 page 9 lines 45 – 46. [61]Transcript 24 July 2019 page 11 lines 4-9.[62]Transcript 24 July 2019 page 11 line 31.[63]Transcript 24 July 2019 page 11 lines 27 – 31.[64]Transcript 24 July 2019 page 11 lines 44 – 46. [65]Transcript 24 July 2019 page 12 lines 18 – 23. [66]Transcript 24 July 2019 page 12 lines 25 – 30.[67]Transcript 24 July 2019 page 13 lines 15 – 16. [68]Transcript 24 July 2019 page 14 lines 28 – 29.[69]Transcript 24 July 2019 page 15 lines 13 – 27, 40 – 45. [70]Transcript 24 July 2019 page 16 lines 19 – 34.

Decision

Reasons for decision

These arguments by the appellant fail. Appellant’s argument 3: challenges to the credit of the investigating officer arising from the decision not to try to prove the scratch On the first morning of the trial the Magistrate refused an application by the appellant for information from the prosecution as to how the prosecution determined not to prove the scar (or scratch) beyond a reasonable doubt, so as to found a charge of assault occasioning bodily harm. He further ruled that the issues could be raised in cross examination of the arresting officer, the complainant and, for the nature of the injury, the doctor. Each of these parties was cross examined by the appellant. Relevantly to this argument by the appellant, Constable Palmer was the arresting officer. He was recalled to give further evidence. His evidence was that he and the prosecutor discussed pursuing common assault versus assault occasioning bodily harm and that if the appellant was found guilty of common assault that would still be an appropriate punishment in the circumstances of the case, so it was appropriate to downgrade the charge to a common assault[31]. That evidence was not shaken in cross examination. Further, his evidence was that he believed the scar was fresh when he looked at it on the morning of the incident and the version of events he was provided with seemed plausible[32]. [31]Transcript 24 September 2019 page 38 lines 29 – 36.[32]Transcript 24 September 2019 page 41 lines 26 – 27. There is no basis to impugn Constable Palmer’s credit arising from this passage of his evidence. The Magistrate had the opportunity of watching and listening to the witnesses give their evidence and his assessment should be given weight. Further, I agree with the learned Magistrate’s observations the other general attacks the appellant made on Constable Palmer’s integrity were without foundation. Nothing raised in it has any relevance to the determination by the learned Magistrate that the assault occurred. The appellant’s argument fails. Appellant’s argument 4: the animus of Mr Darby towards the appellant The appellant opened his cross-examination of Mr Darby at trial with the proposition that Mr Darby disliked him. Mr Darby gave evidence that he did not dislike the appellant, rather he thought that the appellant bullied his employer, Mr Thompson, into buying things from him, which Mr Darby thought was wrong[33]. He accepted that, on occasion, he did block the appellant’s path into the shop a few times, because Mr Thompson did not want to speak with the appellant then, because he had other things on[34]. He did not accept that he didn’t want the appellant to have dealings with Mr Thompson[35]. [33]Transcript 23 July 2019 page 43 lines 27 – 28.[34]Transcript 23 July 2019 page 43 lines 33 – 35.[35]Transcript 23 July 2019 page 43 lines 44 – 45. The learned Magistrate expressly addressed in his decision that the inconsistencies in Mr Darby’s evidence as against other witnesses did not make the whole of his evidence unreliable, nor did the undercurrent of dislike which the witness felt for the appellant because of how the appellant treated his employer[36]. [36]Decision page 7 lines 44 – 46.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established