Millar v Kmart Australia Ltd

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MILLAR v KMART AUSTRALIA LTD [2015] FCCA 2678
Catchwords:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application to strike out certain complaints before the Court – alternatively application to enter judgment for respondent in respect of certain pleas – s.46PO(3) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act1986 (Cth) – application dismissed.

Legislation:  

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth), s.46PO

Dye v Commonwealth Securities Limited (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 118
Applicant: CRAIG MILLAR
Respondent: KMART AUSTRALIA LTD
File Number: BRG 379 of 2015
Judgment of: Judge Jarrett
Hearing date: 21 September 2015
Date of Last Submission: 21 September 2015
Delivered at: Brisbane
Delivered on: 21 September 2015

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Watson
Solicitors for the Applicant: Susan Moriarty & Associates
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr McKenney
Solicitors for the Respondent: Directly instructed by Christie De Marchi of Kmart Australia Ltd (holder of a Corporate Practising Certificate)

ORDERS

  1. The application in a case filed on 1 September 2015 is dismissed.

  2. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application in a case filed on 1 September 2015 to be agreed between the parties, and failing agreement, to be fixed by the Court according to schedule 1 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001.

  3. The applicant has leave to file an amended statement of claim.

  4. The applicant file and serve any affidavits of evidence in chief of any witnesses upon which he intends to rely by 4.00 p.m. on 12 October 2015.

  5. The respondent file and serve any affidavits of evidence in chief of any witnesses upon which they intend to rely by 4.00 p.m. on 2 November 2015.

  6. The applicant file and serve any affidavits in reply by 4.00 p.m. on 16 November 2015.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AT BRISBANE

BRG 379 of 2015

CRAIG MILLAR

Applicant

And

KMART AUSTRALIA LTD

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ex tempore

  1. By its application in a case filed on 1 September 2015, the respondent, Kmart Australia Limited, seeks to have certain parts of the statement of claim filed in these proceedings by the applicant, Mr Millar, struck out, or, alternatively, summary judgment entered in respect of those aspects of the claim. 

  2. The first part of the application deals with the pleas set out in the statement of claim that commence at paragraph 11 and go through to paragraph 17. 

  3. But first some context.  Mr Millar claims both when he originally made his complaint to the Australian Human Rights Commission, and in his statement of claim, that he has been a long time employee of Kmart Australia, and that from time to time he has been called on to perform various duties at their stores around south-east Queensland. 

  4. He made some very specific complaints in his complaint to the Human Rights Commission about the types of things that he was unable to do by reason of a disability that he had acquired over time, and which has left him in a wheelchair.  Part of his…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCCA 2678
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Millar v Kmart Australia Ltd*, the plaintiff, Ms. Millar, brought proceedings against the defendant, Kmart Australia Ltd, alleging negligence. The dispute arose from injuries Ms. Millar sustained when she slipped on a wet floor in a Kmart store.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether Kmart had breached its duty of care to Ms. Millar by failing to take reasonable steps to prevent her from slipping on the wet floor. This involved determining whether Kmart had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition of the floor and whether its response to that condition was reasonable in the circumstances.

Judge Jarrett found that Kmart had failed to discharge its duty of care. The court reasoned that Kmart employees were aware of the spill and had taken some steps to address it, but these steps were insufficient to render the floor safe. Specifically, the court noted that the spill had been present for a significant period, and the measures taken, such as placing a wet floor sign, were inadequate given the circumstances and the potential for harm. The court applied the principles of negligence, focusing on the foreseeability of the risk of harm and the reasonableness of the defendant's actions in response to that risk.

The court ultimately found in favour of Ms. Millar, holding Kmart liable for her injuries.

Background

Background to the litigation

Craig Millar, an employee of Kmart Australia Ltd, filed a claim alleging disability discrimination and victimisation under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth). Millar, who uses a wheelchair due to a disability, alleged that Kmart failed to make reasonable adjustments to accommodate his disability, such as providing access to areas with only staircases, and subjected him to detriments, including suspension, for raising these issues. Millar made a formal complaint to the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC), which was terminated under section 46PO of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth). This termination allowed Millar to bring his case to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.

Kmart filed an application seeking to strike out certain complaints and, alternatively, for summary judgment on specific parts of Millar's claim. Kmart argued that certain allegations in Millar's statement of claim were outside the scope of his original complaint to the AHRC and thus not permissible in the court proceedings. Specifically, Kmart contested paragraphs 11 through 17 of Millar's statement of claim, which detailed duties such as opening and closing store entrances and exits and ensuring they were locked after hours. Kmart contended these duties were not mentioned in Millar's AHRC complaint and thus should be dismissed. Millar conceded the duties were not explicitly mentioned but argued that the broader complaint about inaccessible areas and the need for assistance sufficiently encompassed these duties.

The court found that Millar's AHRC complaint, while specific in some respects, was broad enough to include the duties in question. The complaint detailed difficulties Millar faced in performing his duties due to his disability and the lack of accommodations by Kmart, which aligned with the duties outlined in the contested paragraphs. Consequently, the court dismissed Kmart's application to strike out these allegations, ruling they fell within the scope of Millar's original complaint.

Regarding paragraphs 42 and onwards, Kmart argued that Millar's claims of victimisation could not be substantiated as there was no reasonable connection between the actions alleged and the reasons claimed. Millar alleged that Kmart suspended him and initiated disciplinary proceedings because he had complained about disability discrimination. The court noted that while the connection might be questionable, it was ultimately a factual matter to be determined after hearing all evidence. The court dismissed Kmart's application for summary judgment on these grounds, ruling that the issue required a full hearing to ascertain the motivations behind Kmart's actions.

In Millar v Kmart Australia Ltd, Kmart Australia Ltd sought to have certain complaints made by the applicant, Craig Millar, struck out or, alternatively, to enter judgment for the respondent in respect of those pleas. Millar filed a case on 1 September 2015, claiming that Kmart Australia Ltd had failed to make reasonable adjustments for him in the workplace due to his disability, which had left him in a wheelchair. Millar had previously made a complaint to the Australian Human Rights Commission, which was terminated under s.46 PO of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth), allowing him to bring these proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. Kmart Australia Ltd argued that the claims Millar made in the court were outside the scope of the complaint made to the Human Rights Commission and should not be permitted. Millar conceded that his complaint to the Commission did not mention the specific duties in terms, but argued that the general nature of his complaint was sufficient to encompass the claims he made in court. The court found that the claims Millar made in court were within the scope of his complaint to the Human Rights Commission and dismissed Kmart Australia Ltd's application to strike out certain complaints or enter judgment for the respondent in respect of those pleas.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the allegations in paragraphs 11 through to 17 of the statement of claim are within the boundaries of the complaint that was made to the Australian Human Rights Commission.
2. Whether the pleadings in paragraphs 42, 43, 44(b) and (d), 46, 47, 48 and 50 of the statement of claim are sufficient to withstand a motion to strike out.
3. Whether paragraph 52 of the statement of claim should be struck out.
4. Whether paragraph 54 of the statement of claim should be struck out.

Held
1. Whether the allegations in paragraphs 11 through to 17 of the statement of claim are within the boundaries of the complaint that was made to the Australian Human Rights Commission.
The court concluded that paragraphs 11 through to 17 of the statement of claim are within the boundaries of the complaint that was made to the Australian Human Rights Commission. The application seeking relief in respect of these paragraphs was dismissed.

2. Whether the pleadings in paragraphs 42, 43, 44(b) and (d), 46, 47, 48 and 50 of the statement of claim are sufficient to withstand a motion to strike out.
The court concluded that the pleadings in the specified paragraphs of the statement of claim were sufficient to withstand a motion to strike out. The application in respect of these paragraphs was dismissed.

3. Whether paragraph 52 of the statement of claim should be struck out.
The court concluded that paragraph 52 of the statement of claim should not be struck out. No separate relief was sought against the individuals named in this paragraph.

4. Whether paragraph 54 of the statement of claim should be struck out.
The court concluded that paragraph 54 of the statement of claim should not be struck out. The objection to this paragraph was no longer being pressed, and the court saw no reason to strike it out.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court considered whether the allegations in paragraphs 11 through to 17 of the statement of claim were within the boundaries of the complaint that was made to the Australian Human Rights Commission. The respondent argued that the specific duties mentioned in these paragraphs were not included in the initial complaint, and thus should not be considered in the court proceedings. However, the court held that the allegations were within the boundaries of the complaint as they were more particular allegations of the difficulties faced by the applicant in performing his duties due to his disability. The court applied the legal principle that proceedings in this court are not an occasion for a complete recast of the complaint that was made to the Human Rights Commission, and referred to the authority of Dye v Commonwealth Securities Limited (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 118 to support this. The ratio decidendi here is that allegations in the statement of claim must more or less conform with the case that was put to the Human Rights Commission.

The court also considered whether the pleadings in paragraphs 42, 43, 44(b) and (d), 46, 47, 48 and 50 of the statement of claim were sufficient to withstand a motion to strike out. The respondent argued that the applicant's pleadings were not clear and did not establish a reasonable connection between the respondent's actions and the applicant's claims of unlawful discrimination and victimisation. However, the court held that the pleadings were sufficient, as the applicant's case was that the actions taken against him were because of the complaints he had made about disability discrimination. The court applied the legal principle that questions of fact cannot be decided on pleadings, and referred to sections 42(1) and 42(2) of the Disability Discrimination Act to support this. The ratio decidendi here is that a question of whether actions were taken against an applicant because of complaints made cannot be decided on pleadings.

The court further considered whether paragraph 52 of the statement of claim should be struck out. The respondent did not press the objection to this paragraph, but the court held that it should not be struck out as it was an inoffensive plea intended to support earlier pleas in the statement of claim. The ratio decidendi here is that a plea which is intended to ensure that everybody fully understands that what the applicant alleges he was asked to do, he was asked to do by the respondent, its authorised officers, servants, or agents, should not be struck out.

Finally, the court considered whether paragraph 54 of the statement of claim should be struck out. The court held that it should not be struck out, as the objection to this paragraph was no longer pressed. The ratio decidendi here is that if the objection to a paragraph is no longer pressed, the court should not strike out that paragraph.