SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Millar v Chief Executive, Department of Corrective Services [2005] QSC 009
PARTIES:
MILLAR
(applicant)v
CHIEF EXECUTIVE, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIVE SERVICES
(respondent)FILE NO/S:
S 4779 of 2004
DIVISION:
Trial Divison
PROCEEDING:
Hearing
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
2 February 2005
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
15 November 2004
JUDGE:
McMurdo J
ORDER:
1. The application is dismissed.
2. Parties to be heard as to costs.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – PROBATION, PAROLE, RELEASE ON LICENCE AND REMISSIONS – QUEENSLAND – where relevant term of imprisonment expired – where remission purported to be refused after expiry of term
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW LEGISLATION – QUEENSLAND – GROUNDS FOR REVIEW OF DECISION – BREACH OF RULES OF NATURAL JUSTICE – WHAT CONSTITUTES – whether denial of procedural fairness – where remission was refused – where psychological report was relied upon in statement of reasons for refusal – where report was offered to be released to the applicant – where applicant did not seek release of the report
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW LEGISLATION – QUEENSLAND – GROUNDS FOR REVIEW OF DECISION – BREACH OF RULES OF NATURAL JUSTICE – WHAT CONSTITUTES – where remission was refused – where evidence of misbehaviour not subject to formal proceedings was relied upon – whether evidence not put to the applicant was relied upon – whether applicant had been informed of matters and given an opportunity to respond
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW LEGISLATION – QUEENSLAND – GROUNDS FOR REVIEW OF DECISION – IMPROPER EXERCISE OF POWER – ERROR OF LAW – UNREASONABLENESS –where remission was refused – whether respondent satisfied applicant did not pose an unacceptable risk
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW LEGISLATION – QUEENSLAND – GROUNDS FOR REVIEW OF DECISION – IMPROPER EXERCISE OF POWER – RELEVANT AND IRRELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS – where remission was refused – where documents considered that post-dated initial eligibility date for remission
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW LEGISLATION – QUEENSLAND – GROUNDS FOR REVIEW OF DECISION – OTHER GROUNDS – where decision making powers of respondent were delegated – where delegate had power to make decisions relating to prisoners serving over two years – where applicant was sentenced to two years imprisonment and subsequently sentenced to a further two and a half years, to be served cumulatively – whether the delegate had power to determine the remission of the applicant
Corrective Services Act 2000 (Qld), s 75, s 77, s 81
Lynde v Chief Executive, Department of Corrective Services (2000) 116 A Crim R 430, distinguished
Kay v Chief Executive, Department of Corrective Services [2000] QSC 367, citedMcCasker v Queensland Corrective Services Commission [1988] 2 Qd R 261, cited
COUNSEL:
Applicant appeared on his own behalf
S McLeod for the respondent
SOLICITORS:
Applicant appeared on his own behalf
Crown Solicitor for the respondent
McMURDO J: On 26 March 2004 the respondent refused to grant the applicant remission of a term of imprisonment. The applicant seeks a statutory order of…
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- Case
- [2005] QSC 9
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the refusal of remission constituted a breach of natural justice by denying procedural fairness. It was argued that although a psychological report was considered in the decision-making process, the applicant did not seek to review the report, thus no procedural unfairness occurred. Additionally, the court addressed whether evidence of misbehaviour, not subject to formal proceedings, was improperly considered. The applicant had been informed of the matters and had the opportunity to respond, which the court found did not constitute a breach of natural justice.
Further, the court assessed whether the decision was an improper exercise of power, focusing on whether the decision-maker had satisfied themselves that the applicant did not pose an unacceptable risk. The court found that the respondent had adequately considered the evidence and made a reasoned decision. Additionally, the court scrutinised whether the decision-maker considered relevant and irrelevant documents, ultimately determining that the decision was not flawed due to the consideration of post-dated documents.
The court also evaluated whether the delegate had the authority to determine the remission, considering the applicant's total sentence and the delegate's powers. It was determined that the delegate had the requisite authority to make the decision regarding remission. The court concluded that the decision was not unreasonable or improperly exercised and dismissed the application.
The final orders of the court were to dismiss the application and to direct the parties to be heard regarding costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application is dismissed.
2. Parties to be heard as to costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
The Chief Executive relied on the psychological report and other evidence to determine that Millar did not pose an unacceptable risk and that the decision was not unreasonable. However, Millar argued that the refusal of remission was unlawful because it breached the rules of natural justice by not providing him with the psychological report or the evidence of misbehaviour, and by considering documents that post-dated the initial eligibility date for remission. Millar further argued that the decision-maker did not have the power to determine the remission as his sentence was over two years, and the delegate's power was limited to prisoners serving over two years.
This case came before the court as an application for judicial review of the decision of the Chief Executive, Department of Corrective Services, to refuse the applicant's remission. The matter was heard by the court on the papers and submissions of the parties. The court considered the relevant legislation, including the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) and the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), as well as the applicable common law principles.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the refusal of remission breached the rules of natural justice by not providing the applicant with the psychological report or the evidence of misbehaviour, and by considering documents that post-dated the initial eligibility date for remission.
2. Whether the decision-maker had the power to determine the remission as the applicant's sentence was over two years, and the delegate's power was limited to prisoners serving over two years.
3. Whether the refusal of remission was an improper exercise of power, error of law, or unreasonable.
Held
1. The court concluded that the refusal of remission did not breach the rules of natural justice by not providing the applicant with the psychological report or the evidence of misbehaviour, and by considering documents that post-dated the initial eligibility date for remission.
2. The court held that the decision-maker did not have the power to determine the remission since the applicant's sentence was over two years, and the delegate's power was limited to prisoners serving over two years.
3. The court found that the refusal of remission was not an improper exercise of power, error of law, or unreasonable.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the first issue regarding whether the refusal of remission breached the rules of natural justice. The court found that the applicant was not entitled to the psychological report or the evidence of misbehaviour as he did not seek their release. Furthermore, the applicant was informed of the matters relied upon and had an opportunity to respond. In addition, the court considered that the evidence of misbehaviour, although not subject to formal proceedings, was still a relevant consideration for the decision-maker. The decision to consider documents that post-dated the initial eligibility date for remission was not found to be a breach of natural justice.
In relation to the second issue, the court held that the decision-maker did not have the power to determine the remission since the applicant's sentence was over two years, and the delegate's power was limited to prisoners serving over two years. The court found that the delegate had exceeded their authority by making the decision on remission.
Lastly, the court concluded that the refusal of remission was not an improper exercise of power, error of law, or unreasonable. The court found that the decision-maker was satisfied that the applicant posed an unacceptable risk and had properly considered the relevant and irrelevant considerations. The ratio decidendi of this case is that a decision-maker must adhere to the powers delegated to them, and they must not make decisions outside their jurisdiction. Additionally, the court found that the refusal of remission was not an unreasonable exercise of power, as the decision-maker had considered the relevant factors and the applicant was given an opportunity to respond.