MILBURN v Police
[2020] SASC 103
•17 June 2020
SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)
MILBURN v POLICE
[2020] SASC 103
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Bleby
17 June 2020
MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - RELEVANT FACTORS - NATURE AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF OFFENDER - MENTAL DISORDER
The appellant pleaded guilty to the following offences: create false belief that life has been lost or endangered (Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 62A(1)); disorderly behaviour (Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 7(1)(a)); contravene term of intervention order; indecent behaviour (Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 23(1)(a)); basic assault (Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 20(3)); and fail to comply with bail agreement (s 17(1) Bail Act 1985 (SA)). The Magistrate sentenced the appellant to 12 months and two weeks imprisonment, fixing a non-parole period of nine months.
The appellant appeals his sentence on the grounds that the Magistrate: sentenced him on an incorrect factual basis; erred in her application of s 26 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA); failed to have, or had insufficient, regard to the appellant’s mental health in sentencing; and that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.
Held, allowing the appeal:
1. The Magistrate misapprehended the facts in respect of the count of indecent behaviour.
2. The appellant is re-sentenced to 11 months and seven days imprisonment.
3. The appellant is to serve seven months and two weeks of his sentence in prison. The remainder of the sentence is suspended on the condition that he enter into a good behaviour bond for 18 months.
Bail Act 1985 (SA) s 17(1); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 20(3); Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA) s 31(2); Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) ss 4, 26, 46(5), 96(4); Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) ss 7(1)(a), 23(1)(a), 62A(1), referred to.
R v Monks (2019) 133 SASR 182, discussed.
Green v The Queen [2011] VSCA 311; Munda v Western Australia (2013) 249 CLR 600; R v Horstmann [2010] SASC 103; R v Kentwell (2014) 252 CLR 601; R v Wanganeen [2000] SASC 371, considered.
MILBURN v POLICE
[2020] SASC 103Magistrates Appeal: Criminal
BLEBY J: This is an appeal against sentence. On 17 March 2020, the appellant entered pleas of guilty to the following offences: create false belief that life has been lost or endangered;[1] disorderly behaviour;[2] contravene term of intervention order;[3] indecent behaviour;[4] basic assault;[5] and fail to comply with bail agreement.[6] The appellant committed these offences between 6 August 2019 and 19 November 2019.
[1] Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 62A(1).
[2] Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 7(1)(a).
[3] Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA) s 31(2).
[4] Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 23(1)(a).
[5] Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 20(3).
[6] Bail Act 1985 (SA) s 17(1).
The Magistrate, acting pursuant to s 26 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) (Sentencing Act), sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for 12 months and two weeks with a non-parole period of nine months, backdated to 19 November 2019. Her Honour commenced with a starting point of 18 months; the sentence imposed incorporated a reduction of 30 percent on account of the appellant’s pleas of guilty. The Magistrate declined to suspend the sentence or order that the sentence be served by way of home detention.
The Notice of Appeal raises four grounds:
1.The learned sentencing magistrate erred in sentencing the appellant on an incorrect factual basis.
2.The learned sentencing magistrate erred in the application of s 26 of the [Sentencing Act].
3.The learned sentencing magistrate erred in failing to have regard of [sic] sufficient regards to the appellant’s mental health problems in sentencing.
4.The sentence is manifestly excessive.
The course of the appeal hearing was influenced heavily by a concession of the respondent. The appellant contended that the Magistrate had sentenced him on a mistaken factual basis in respect of the count of indecent behaviour. The respondent conceded that the error was a material error which enlivened the discretion to re-sentence in respect of all six offences.[7]
[7] R v Wanganeen [2000] SASC 371 at [17] (Wicks J, Doyle CJ and Williams J agreeing).
In spite of conceding this ground, the respondent submitted that it is open to this Court to confirm the sentence imposed by the Magistrate on the basis that the same, if not a greater sentence, would have been imposed if it were to exercise the discretion afresh.[8]
[8] R v Horstmann [2010] SASC 103 at [36]-[38] (Kourakis J); R v Kentwell (2014) 252 CLR 601 at [43] (French CJ, Hayne, Bell and Keane JJ).
For the reasons which follow, I would not confirm the sentence. I would allow the appeal and re-sentence the appellant. In order to explain this decision, it is first necessary to address the conceded ground. Following that, the balance of these reasons will address the matters relevant to re-sentencing. It is not necessary that I address the other grounds put forward by the appellant in these circumstances. However, some of the matters raised on those other grounds are relevant to the question of re-sentencing.
Ground 1 – Incorrect factual basis regarding indecent behaviour
In sentencing the appellant for the offence of indecent behaviour, the Magistrate relied upon the factual summary provided by the prosecution. The circumstances of the offending were summarised by the prosecutor as follows:
At about 8.55 am on Tuesday the 19th of November, 2019 at GLENSIDE, the accused, Alexander MILBURN behaved indecently by making obscene hand gestures mimicking masturbation and by making obscene comments causing members of the public in his presense [sic] to feel offended and insulted.
…
[Witness] states that immediately on entering the store, the accused began speaking in detail about how he likes to masturbate and demonstrated with hand and body movements. [Witness] states that the accused also requested that he dress him and told her that his life’s purpose was to train people in masturbating while “high on ice”.
[Witness] states that after a short time with the accused still in the shop and his unrelenting rambling about his masturbation he put one leg up on a bench and explicitly demonstrated how he masturbates with his hands.
(Emphasis added)
In her sentencing remarks, the Magistrate said:
A few hours later at 8.55 am you were back in the Burnside area, this time at the Burnside Village Shopping Centre making obscene hand gestures mimicking masturbation and making obscene comments, causing members of the public nearby to feel very uncomfortable and apprehensive. You entered a women’s clothing store shortly after opening time, rambling to the female shopkeeper that you liked to masturbate and you demonstrated it. You asked her to dress you and you said that your life purpose was to train people to masturbate while high on ice. You then put a leg on the bench and you did masturbate.
…
(Emphasis added)
It is apparent that the Magistrate construed the prosecutor’s phrase ‘explicitly demonstrated how he masturbates’ to mean that the appellant had engaged in the act of masturbation. Counsel for the appellant submitted that this factual finding was unfounded. That submission formed the subject of the respondent’s concession. The concession was plainly correct.
The difference between a man mimicking masturbation in a women’s clothing store and a man actually masturbating in a women’s clothing store is of no small moment. However, the appellant was sentenced to a single term of imprisonment pursuant to s 26 of the Sentencing Act for a total of six offences. The balance of the offending is relevant to the discretion raised by the respondent and, if the appellant is to be resentenced, the resentencing exercise itself.
To this end, I set out the Magistrate’s description of the offending. Her Honour’s description contains certain other errors. I have corrected them below. I do not regard these errors as being material. The Magistrate remarked as follows:
… The first one in time concerns you intentionally creating a false belief that life was endangered on 6 August 2019. The maximum penalty for that offence is a fine of $10,000 or a two-year prison term. The offence is based on you phoning Emergency Services at least 10 time between 9 p.m. and 11.38 p.m. on that day.
Referring to the facts of the charge, it is important that you hear this because it probably has more impact if I detail it. At 9.08 p.m. you called saying that you were at Woolworths at Victor Harbor needing medical assistance. Police attended the area within minutes of the call and were unable to locate you. At 9.10 p.m. you called and said ‘Goodbye’ before hanging up the phone causing the operator to fear that there was an emergency. At 9.22 p.m. you called and stated that you were at McDonalds at Victor Harbor threatening to hurt members of the public and harm yourself. Police were in the area at the time of the call and unable to locate you or any person needing assistance. At 10.02 p.m. you called stating that you fought people and won. At 10.08 p.m. you called threatening to harm members of the public. At 10.09 p.m. you called threatening suicide. At 10.15 p.m. you threatened to walk to a pub or hotel in Goolwa and assault members of the public. Police were in the area and unable to locate you. At 10.58 p.m. you called and stated that you had broken into a shed and assaulted a member of the public. You also threatened to hurt more members of the public. You stated that you were at the Goolwa Life Saving Club. Police were on the scene in a short time and were unable to locate you. There were no reports of any sheds being compromised or any people being assaulted in the Goolwa area at the time.
At 11.02 p.m. you called threatening to hurt people at the Goolwa Surf Life Saving Club. Police were in the area and unable to locate you or any other people and at 11.38 p.m. you called and stated that there was an emergency at the Goolwa Surf Life Saving Club and you hung up. Police could not locate you or any other person. Your mobile phone was used each time you made the calls and because you made these calls, police wasted valuable time following up each call. On one occasion when you said that you needed medical assistance, that would have given an impression that an ambulance was required.
On 7 August, the following day, you behaved in a disorderly manner at the Goolwa Medical Centre. You entered the centre and ran to the reception counter in an aggressive manner. You demanded a lighter which could not be located. You became more aggressive and reached into your jacket causing fear to the people that they would be assaulted. The duress alarm was activated. You walked away but continued to upset staff and patients by aggressively demanding cigarettes and a lighter. You punch the reception desk and a window. You then waited outside until police arrived. The staff at the centre were familiar with you from previous dealings. You were arrested and taken to the Victor Harbor cells. You declined to answer questions about your behaviour. You were granted bail with conditions not to be within 20 km of Victor Harbor or Goolwa and not to make calls to Emergency Services unless for a genuine emergency. The penalty for the offence of disorderly behaviour is a maximum of three months in prison.
I turn now to 18 August, about 10 days later, you breached a condition of an intervention order. On this date, you were subject to an intervention order for the protection of a doctor who had dealt with you in a clinical context previously and whom you had previously threatened to kill. The conditions of the intervention order for her protection included full non-contact and not to be in the vicinity of her place of residence or employment. You must have done research to find out where she lived. You approached her mother who was in front of the address in question in Leabrook. You spoke to her over the fence asking if she was the mother of the person who lived there. You referred to her daughter by her first name and asked if she lived at the house and if she was home. You said that you had recently seen her at Glenside and needed to apologise to her. She told you that her daughter was not home and asked for your name. After about 10 minutes you said that your name was Alex and you walked off towards Tusmore Avenue. The woman recalled that an intervention order was in place for her daughter’s protection from a person called Alex. The police were notified and you were arrested the following day for this and another matter. I regard this as a very serious breach of an intervention order in your case, bearing in mind the background which led to it which I will refer to shortly. The maximum penalty for a breach of intervention order is two years gaol or a fine.
On 19 August, the next day, you breached a condition of your bail by making more emergency calls. At 5.53 a.m. you called triple 0 claiming that you were outside the Adelaide Day Surgery on North Terrace demanding that police lock you up, threatening that you would commit a crime. You did not give your name but you said police would know who you were. Shortly after, you called SA Ambulance giving your name and claiming that you were having a heart attack. Police located you 20 minutes later on North Terrace after being tasked there. You admit that your calls to the police and to SA Ambulance were in breach of your bail conditions. An ambulance did attend. You wasted their time, however you were declared fit to be taken into custody. When questioned about what you did, you said that you only made the calls so that you could record them and listen back later and have a laugh. It would appear that you were again released on bail after being arrested. The maximum penalty for a breach of bail is a custodial penalty of two years or a $10,000 fine.
The Magistrate then set out her incorrect summary of the facts of the indecent behaviour, which I have set out above. The offence of basic assault followed on directly from that behaviour:
A security staff member attended in response to the call for assistance. You approached him and told him that you needed to masturbate. When you were told to leave, you refused and said that you would only leave if police were called. He managed to move you on eventually but you entered other shops and attempted to speak to other staff. When the security officer stood between you and two of the women, you became aggressive. You tried to hit him and you threw shopping baskets and a hazard warning sign. He walked with you outside the shops towards the exists into the carpark. You then turned and punched him once to the chest. For the offence of basic assault, a maximum term of imprisonment of two years applies.
The police did attend and arrested you at the shopping centre. You were taken to the Royal Adelaide Hospital where you were cleared after a mental health assessment. You were not interviewed because of your erratic behaviour and because you appeared to be under the influence of a substance. Finally, you were denied bail by police and you have been remanded in custody since that day.
The respondent accepted that the Magistrate’s account of the offending included further errors, in that the offences of contravening a term of an intervention order, indecent behaviour, basic assault, and failing to comply with a bail agreement, occurred in November, rather than August. The respondent also conceded that the Magistrate had made some errors with respect to the dates of the appellant’s antecedents. These errors are not material.
As the Magistrate noted, the appellant has a significant criminal history. He was convicted of failing to comply with a bail agreement on two occasions in October 2019, and of two counts of disorderly behaviour in August 2019. In respect of each of these convictions he was discharged without penalty. The choice of penalty, or lack thereof, was influenced partly by the fact that he had spent some time in custody. These offences occurred during the same period of the subject offences and, as I will come to, they occurred at a particularly dysfunctional time in the appellant’s life.
The most serious offence in the appellant’s antecedents is that of aggravated threatening to kill or endanger life. The appellant had threatened to kill the psychiatrist who had been responsible for treating him in accordance with a community treatment order. The offence was undoubtedly serious. The appellant was sentenced for this offence, together with the offence of basic assault committed against a different person, to three years, three months and two weeks with a non-parole period of one year and eight months.
Following the threat, an intervention order was made to protect the psychiatrist. The appellant breached the intervention order, and that breach forms the subject of the count of contravene a term of an intervention order in this case.
With respect to the breach, the appellant had submitted to the Magistrate that he had wanted to apologise to the psychiatrist for upsetting her. As the Magistrate observed, even if that was his genuine intention, it was an unwelcome and inappropriate approach. It demonstrates the considerable lack of insight into the effect that his behaviour had on her. As the respondent on the present appeal submitted, the intervention order was in place to protect a psychiatrist who was vulnerable by reason of her occupation. She had a background of treating the appellant and had sought to change her residential address in the past to protect herself. I note that her desire to change her residential address was prompted by the appellant’s act of throwing rocks through the windows of her house.
While the contravention was not accompanied by violence, there is a separate, major indictable offence which caters for a contravention of an intervention order in circumstances where there is violence or a threat of violence. In those circumstances, the respondent submitted, this offence was a serious instance of the lesser offence.
Relevance of the appellant’s mental health
With respect to the appellant’s personal circumstances, counsel for the appellant emphasised a number of issues concerning his mental health. These issues informed Ground 3 of the appeal which, for reasons I have already explained, has been unnecessary to determine. Counsel emphasised the comprehensive examination that Doyle J gave to the relevance of mental impairment to the sentencing process in R v Monks.[9] Without pretending to do complete justice to Doyle J’s analysis, his Honour reviewed and distilled the authorities to the effect that:
·some form of mental impairment may affect the degree of moral culpability for the offending as opposed to legal responsibility. For example, it may impair an offender’s judgment to maintain self-control and resist impulsive behaviour. It may cause disinhibition or aggression. This is not an exhaustive summary of how mental impairment might affect moral culpability. It is necessary, of course, to establish a realistic connection or a cause or link between the impairment and the offending;[10]
·mental impairment may also affect the consideration of general deterrence. Where offending reflects some underlying mental illness or disability, there may be a need for general deterrence to be ‘sensibly moderated’. General deterrence is usually related to the concept of retribution and punishment, which may be less of an appropriate consideration in such a circumstance. That is not to say that general deterrence is irrelevant. In some cases, it may not be much diminished at all;[11]
·the existence of an impairment may also be relevant to the consideration of personal deterrence and the related considerations of character and prospects of rehabilitation. It may be that where mental illness has contributed to the commission of an offence, the importance of personal deterrence may be lessened, as that depends on the capacity to respond rationally to the punishment;[12]
·the existence of an impairment that reflects some underlying mental condition might also affect the hardship of a sentence of imprisonment on a particular offender, in that it may constitute a greater burden or have some extra, significantly adverse effect.[13]
[9] (2019) 133 SASR 182 at [32] to [59].
[10] R v Monks (2019) 133 SASR 182 at [37]-[38].
[11] R v Monks (2019) 133 SASR 182 at [42]-[43].
[12] R v Monks (2019) 133 SASR 182 at [45], citing Green v The Queen [2011] VSCA 311 at [28] (Maxwell P, Lasry AJA agreeing).
[13] R v Monks (2019) 133 SASR 182 at [50].
Counsel for the appellant did not develop the application of these principles to any great degree in this case. As I will come to, it was difficult to do so because there was very limited information about the mental impairment of the appellant, let alone its effect on this offending. I do not think it is necessary to give greater justice to Doyle J’s comprehensive account of the principles in R v Monks other than to make a few further observations.
First, as Doyle J explained, where mental impairment is a product of self‑induced intoxication, it will often be the case that moral culpability is aggravated or enhanced rather than reduced. Secondly, even where a mental condition can operate to reduce moral culpability and reduce the need for general and personal deterrence, the broader objectives of the sentencing process remain relevant and may well still call for a substantial sentence.[14]
[14] R v Monks (2019) 133 SASR 182 at [59], citing Munda v Western Australia (2013) 249 CLR 600 at [54] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ).
In any event, as Doyle J noted:[15]
… [I]t is important to bear in mind the complex, multi-factorial and ultimately intuitive and individualised nature of the sentencing process. Indeed, it can be readily seen from the above that generalisations about the significance of an offender’s mental impairment are of limited value in determining its significance in any given case. Its significance will often be complex and nuanced, and exist at multiple stages in the sentencing process.
[15] R v Monks (2019) 133 SASR 182 at [52].
The appellant relied on a report prepared by Dr Paul Furst in 2015. The District Court had referred to this report when sentencing on the appellant’s plea of guilty to the earlier charges of aggravated threatening life and basic assault. Counsel for the appellant accepted that this report, being five years old, could only be of limited value to the Court in the present matter.
In spite of its age, I acknowledge some of Dr Furst’s observations. Dr Furst observed that the appellant has a long-standing and well-documented history for a Cluster B personality disorder which has elements of both narcissistic personality disorder and borderline personality disorder. It appears that this disorder arose from his childhood, in which he felt both sexually and physically abused, as well as abandoned by his parents. He was placed in foster care as a young child, which apparently catalysed his fear of abandonment, as well as his unstable emotional state and low self-esteem. The report notes that his underlying personality disorder is a long-term problem which will require extensive psychotherapy. It opines that this was the primary drive of his offending behaviour in 2015, and perhaps more relevantly, that his risk of re-offending would take some time to reduce.
Nevertheless, with respect to the offending in 2015, Dr Furst also observed that the offending:
… was not only a result of his personality but rather the coalescence of a number of different factors. These included his girlfriend leaving him, not being engaged with a regular psychotherapist, the abuse of drugs and then alcohol, his inappropriate help-seeking behaviour and then the management of this from the various health services involved …
What is particularly apparent from this report is the need for the appellant to remain engaged with a mental health service that could address the possibility that he has an underlying bipolar disorder or a substance-induced mood disorder. Such a service would also have the ability to provide him with long-term interpersonal psychotherapy to address his underlying personality problems and his behaviours. Dr Furst recommended that it would be most appropriate for the Forensic Mental Health Service to take over his management on his release.
I accept that Dr Furst’s report provides some useful background as to the appellant’s mental health difficulties. Yet, by reason of its age, it is less useful in assisting the Court to pinpoint any causal link to the offending in the present case. I nonetheless accept that that there is some general link.
A bail enquiry report was prepared for the purposes of this matter in late 2019. I note from this report that, at the time of writing, the appellant’s psychiatric issues had stabilised over a period of two weeks with treatment and resumption of his depot injections. The appellant still had behavioural issues, but was, in the context of his history, relatively stable. The report observed that the appellant is less likely to be driven by mania while his bipolar disorder is being managed, but there remains a risk. It also observed that he ‘would have greater prospects of benefiting from interpersonal therapy in the community as the resources for this in custody are very sparse’. It concluded by observing that he was motivated to be bailed and appeared to be more receptive to professional treatment than he had been on previous occasions.
As the Magistrate noted, it appears that one of the appellant’s greatest risks is that of him resuming the abuse of illicit substances and becoming non‑compliant with his prescribed medication.
The offending occurred in two clusters, each over a short period of time, in the context of the appellant having been very upset about the death of his father in February 2018, along with the prolonged period that it had taken to finalise probate of his estate. I do not think that too much can be drawn from this other than to note that there is an inference to the effect that he may have been under some heightened level of mental pressure.
Re-sentencing
In all of the circumstances, I am not persuaded that the sentence imposed by the Magistrate remains appropriate notwithstanding the process error of misapprehending the facts in respect of the count of indecent behaviour. I accept that the offence of breaching the intervention order was serious, but in the context of all of the offences for which the appellant was sentenced, the error was significant. I do not accept that the circumstances are such that the same or a higher sentence would be imposed and warrant dismissal of the appeal.
I agree with the Magistrate’s observation that the appellant’s offending demands the imposition of a custodial sentence so as to deter him, and other members of the community, from committing offences of a similar nature.[16]
[16] Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) s 4.
I am, however, conscious of the appellant’s underlying personality disorder and likely bipolar disorder. While there is only limited current information available as to these disorders, I note that the Department for Correctional Services observed in late 2019 that the appellant’s mental illnesses were exacerbated by the environment in which he is incarcerated.[17] The Department was of the view that the appellant would not be able to access the specific health care that he requires whilst in custody, noting that the resources in the community were better suited to treating his diagnoses.[18]
[17] Bail Enquiry Report, 18 December 2019.
[18] Bail Enquiry Report, 18 December 2019.
Although I accept these concerns, and am particularly conscious of the corrected factual matrix, I consider that a custodial sentence is necessary to protect the safety of the community. I note that the appellant has already been in custody since 19 November 2019.
In respect of the six offences I would impose notional head sentences as follows:
·with respect to the offence of creating false belief that life has been lost or endangered, which carries a maximum penalty of $10,000 or two years, I would impose a notional head sentence of three months’ imprisonment;
·with respect to the offence of disorderly behaviour, which carries a maximum penalty of $1,250 or three months’ imprisonment, I would impose a notional head sentence of two months’ imprisonment. I note that this was a particularly serious incident of disorderly behaviour involving aggression and causing people to fear potential assault;
·with respect of the breach of the intervention order, I agree that this was a serious breach. However, it also appears to have been a misguided attempt to apologise to the protected person. The maximum penalty is $10,000 or two years’ imprisonment. I would impose a notional head sentence of six months’ imprisonment;
·with respect to the offence of indecent behaviour, which carries a maximum penalty of $1,250 or three months’ imprisonment, I would impose a notional head sentence of one month’s imprisonment;
·with respect to the offence of basic assault, which carries a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment, I would impose a notional head sentence of three months’ imprisonment; and
·with respect to the offence of breach of bail, the maximum penalty for which is a $10,000 fine or two years’ imprisonment, I would impose a notional head sentence of one month’s imprisonment.
While some of these offences were proximate in their occurrence, I would not make any of the sentences concurrent. I start then with a notional head sentence of 16 months. I reduce that sentence by 30 percent for the appellant’s pleas of guilty, to 11 months and seven days. Pursuant to s 46(5) of the Sentencing Act, I cannot fix a non-parole period.
However, for the reasons discussed above in relation to the appellant’s mental health, there would be value to both the appellant and to the community if a portion of the sentence were to be suspended on the condition that the appellant enter into a bond, pursuant to s 96(4) of the Sentencing Act. I therefore direct that the appellant is to serve a period of seven months and two weeks of his sentence in prison. I suspend the remainder of the sentence on condition that he enter into a bond to be of good behaviour for a period of 18 months, with the following conditions to be attached:
1that he be of good behaviour and comply with all the conditions of the bond;
2that he not possess a firearm or ammunition or any part of a firearm;
3that he submit to tests, including testing without notice, for gunshot residue as may be reasonably required;
4that he be under the supervision of a Community Corrections Officer for a period of 18 months and obey the lawful directions given to him by the Community Corrections Officer to whom he is assigned for the purposes of supervision;
5that during the period of supervision, he not leave the State for any reason except in accordance with the written permission of the Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Correctional Services;
6that he report, within 2 working days of having signed this bond, at the offices of the Department for Correctional Services;
7that he reside at an address considered suitable by the Department for Correctional Services;
8that he attend and complete any assessment, counselling, treatment and therapeutic programs as may be deemed appropriate to manage effectively his individual needs, as directed by the Community Corrections Officer assigned to supervise him;
9that he abstain from using drugs and alcohol, other than drugs legally prescribed to him; and
10that he submit to tests, including those without notice, relating to drug and alcohol use as the Community Corrections Officer may reasonably require.
I am conscious that, at the time of sentencing, the residential address that the appellant nominated for the purposes of the bail report was deemed unsuitable. It will be necessary for a suitable address to be located before the appellant can enter into the bond.
The appellant has sought an extension of time in which to file the appeal to this Court. The respondent does not oppose the application. I extend time for filing the Notice of Appeal to 1 May 2020.
Insofar as is necessary, I confirm the terms of the intervention order as varied by the Magistrate.
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