Milatos & Anor v Clayton Utz & Ors [2006] NTSC 47
PARTIES:MILATOS, George
MILATOS, Colleen Mary
v
CLAYTON UTZ
NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA
JAMES NAIRN & COMPANY PTY LTD
TITLE OF COURT: SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
JURISDICTION: SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY exercising Territory jurisdiction
FILE NO:184/02 (20219346) 83/03 (20308935)
DELIVERED: 15 June 2006
HEARING DATES: 2 March 2006
JUDGMENT OF: THOMAS J
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Plaintiffs:G James
First Defendant: R Bruxner
Second Defendant: M Grant
Third Party: R Millar
Solicitors:
Plaintiffs:Geoff James
First Defendant: Paul Maher
Second Defendant: Solicitor for the Northern Territory
Third Party: Cridlands
Judgment category classification: C
Judgment ID Number: tho200609
Number of pages: 13
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWINMilatos & Anor v Clayton Utz & Ors [2006] NTSC 47
Nos. 194/02 (20219346) 83/03 (20308935)
BETWEEN:
MILATOS, George
First Plaintiff
MILATOS, Colleen Mary
Second Plaintiff
AND:
CLAYTON UTZ
First Defendant
NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA
Second Defendant
JAMES NAIRN & COMPANY PTY LTD
Third Party
CORAM: THOMAS J
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered 15 June 2006)
On 2 March 2006, I made orders in accordance with the first defendant’s summons dated 22 December 2005. Order number 1 reads as follows:
“1.On defendant summons filed 22 December 2005, by consent:
(a)the affidavit of George Milatos sworn 17 November 2005 and titled ‘Fifth Affidavit of George Milatos’;
(b)the 4 affidavits of George Milatos sworn 17 November 2005 and titled ‘Clayton Utz Sequenced Paginated File’ volumes 1 - 4, including the annexures to those affidavits; and
(c)the affidavit of George Milatos sworn 21 November 2005 and titled ‘Sixth Affidavit of George Milatos’
be struck out and removed from the court file.”
On the same date I made a number of other orders including the following order by consent “On the plaintiff’s summons filed 23 February 2006 plaintiff to pay first and second defendant’s costs thrown away by virtue of the withdrawal of the affidavits of the plaintiff”.
Mr Bruxner, for the first defendant, seeks further orders in accordance with paragraphs (7) and (8) of the first defendant’s summons filed 22 December 2005:
(7) An order that the plaintiffs pay the first defendant’s costs of this application on the indemnity basis, taxable immediately.
(8) An order that the plaintiffs pay the first defendant’s costs thrown away arising from Order (1) on the indemnity basis taxable immediately.
On 8 February 2006, Mr James representing the plaintiffs, formally conceded substantially all of the orders sought on the first defendant’s summons filed 22 December 2005, except for the orders as to costs. This is in the form of an e-mail to solicitors for the first defendant which is Annexure AGJ9 to the affidavit of Mr James sworn 28 February 2006.
Mr Bruxner outlined in some detail the history of these proceedings that have culminated in the plaintiffs deciding to withdraw all of their affidavit material. The affidavit material is extremely extensive. The plaintiffs, with the consent of the defendants, have decided to proceed to a…
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- Case
- [2006] NTSC 47
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the plaintiffs should be ordered to pay the first defendant's costs on an indemnity basis, which would be taxable immediately, and whether such an order would be oppressive given the plaintiffs' health and financial circumstances. The first defendant argued that the plaintiffs' decision to withdraw the affidavit material was a result of it being so deficient that they should never have been filed. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, contended that they had acted in good faith and that imposing indemnity costs would be unfair and oppressive.
The court considered the extensive nature of the affidavit material, the defendants' consent to the withdrawal of the affidavits on the condition that the plaintiffs would pay the costs thrown away, and the plaintiffs' subsequent concession of substantially all orders sought by the first defendant. The court also examined the authorities and rules governing interlocutory costs and the discretion of the court to order immediate taxation of costs. Ultimately, the court determined that while the plaintiffs' approach was not appropriate, making an order for immediate indemnity costs would be oppressive given the plaintiffs' circumstances. The court concluded that the order already made for the plaintiffs to pay the costs thrown away was sufficient to do justice between the parties.
The final orders were that the application for costs on an indemnity basis, taxable forthwith, was refused. The plaintiffs were required to pay the first defendant's costs thrown away due to the withdrawal of the affidavits.
Background
Background to the litigation
The first defendant, represented by Mr. Bruxner, sought costs from the plaintiffs on the basis that the withdrawn affidavits were so poorly prepared that they should never have been filed. The first defendant argued that the plaintiffs' failure to properly prepare the affidavits led to a waste of time and resources and that the plaintiffs should be ordered to pay the first defendant's costs on an indemnity basis, which includes costs incurred due to the plaintiffs' actions, and taxable immediately. The first defendant cited the substantial effort required to digest the withdrawn material and the unlikelihood of these costs being offset by future costs orders against the first defendant.
The plaintiffs, represented by Mr. James, conceded that the affidavits were not prepared in an appropriate manner but argued that they had acted in good faith and withdrawn the affidavits to avoid further delay. They submitted that they had received advice from senior counsel to withdraw the affidavits and had acted to maintain a harmonious balance in the proceedings. The plaintiffs also pointed to their difficult health and financial circumstances as mitigating factors against an indemnity costs order.
The court considered the submissions from both sides and the extensive background of the case, which included a history of interlocutory applications and a breakdown in communication between the parties' legal representatives. Ultimately, the court found that while the plaintiffs' actions were regrettable, making an order for costs on an indemnity basis and taxable immediately would be oppressive, particularly given the plaintiffs' health and financial difficulties. The court deemed the order already made for the plaintiffs to pay the first defendant's costs thrown away due to the withdrawal of the affidavits to be sufficient to do justice between the parties, and thus refused the application for further costs.
This case before the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory involves an interlocutory application by the first defendant, Clayton Utz, seeking an order for indemnity costs following the withdrawal of certain affidavit material by the plaintiffs, George and Colleen Milatos. The matter came before the Court for a hearing on 2 March 2006, where several orders were made, including the withdrawal of specific affidavits by consent. The first defendant sought further orders for indemnity costs, arguing that the plaintiffs should bear the costs due to the poor quality and excessive nature of the withdrawn affidavits. The plaintiffs conceded the need to withdraw the affidavits, citing advice from senior counsel and difficulties in communication between the parties' legal representatives. The Court considered the submissions and the relevant rules and authorities but ultimately decided against making an order for indemnity costs, finding that such an order would be oppressive given the plaintiffs' health and financial circumstances. The Court did, however, uphold the order that the plaintiffs pay the first defendant's costs thrown away due to the withdrawal of the affidavits.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Did the plaintiffs' withdrawal of their affidavits warrant an indemnity costs order against them?
2. Was it appropriate to tax the costs immediately, or should the taxation be deferred until the conclusion of the proceeding?
3. Did the breakdown in communication between the parties' legal representatives justify any particular relief or penalty?
4. Considering the plaintiffs' health and financial circumstances, was making an indemnity costs order oppressive?
Held
1. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' withdrawal of their affidavits did not warrant an indemnity costs order against them. The application for such an order was refused.
2. The court decided that the taxation of the costs should not be immediate but deferred until the conclusion of the proceeding. The court found that immediate taxation could be oppressive and counterproductive.
3. The court acknowledged the breakdown in communication between the parties' legal representatives but did not find it warranted any particular relief or penalty beyond the existing order.
4. Considering the plaintiffs' health and financial circumstances, the court concluded that making an indemnity costs order would be oppressive. The existing order for the plaintiffs to pay the defendants' costs thrown away was deemed sufficient.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Supreme Court of the Northern Territory in Milatos v Clayton Utz was presented with the issue of whether the plaintiffs' withdrawal of their affidavits warranted an indemnity costs order against them. The court's reasoning was grounded in the principle that indemnity costs are typically awarded when a party, despite proper advice, proceeds with litigation that is unmeritorious. The first defendant argued that the withdrawn affidavits were so deficient that the plaintiffs, with proper advice, should never have filed them. However, the plaintiffs contended that they acted in good faith, attempting to disclose as much of their case as possible. The court found that while the affidavits were poorly prepared and excessive, they were not entirely devoid of useful information, and immediate taxation of costs could be counterproductive. Thus, the court declined to impose an indemnity costs order, focusing instead on the fairness and proportionality of the costs awarded.
The court also addressed the appropriateness of taxing the costs immediately. Under Order 63.04 of the Supreme Court Rules, costs for interlocutory matters are generally not taxed until the conclusion of the proceeding. However, the court has discretion to order earlier taxation if it appears appropriate. The first defendant cited the decision in Markorp Pty Ltd v King, where Mildren J allowed immediate taxation of costs due to the substantial nature of the costs involved. The plaintiffs argued against immediate taxation, citing potential oppressiveness given their health and financial circumstances. The court found that while the costs were substantial, imposing immediate indemnity costs could be oppressive. Instead, the court considered the already imposed order for the plaintiffs to pay the costs thrown away sufficient to address the matter.
The breakdown in communication between the parties' legal representatives was another significant issue. The court acknowledged the communication lapse, which led to the first defendant not being aware of the plaintiffs' intent to withdraw the affidavits until weeks before the hearing. This lapse resulted in unnecessary costs for the first defendant. However, the court did not find this breakdown to justify an indemnity costs order. Instead, it highlighted the need for better communication between legal representatives to avoid such situations.
Lastly, the court considered the plaintiffs' health and financial circumstances in deciding whether an indemnity costs order would be oppressive. The plaintiffs provided affidavit material detailing their difficult health and financial situations. The court found that imposing an indemnity costs order, especially payable immediately, would be oppressive given these circumstances. The court balanced the need for deterrence against the potential for oppression, concluding that the order already made for the plaintiffs to pay the costs thrown away was sufficient to achieve justice between the parties. The court's decision demonstrates a careful consideration of the principles of fairness, proportionality, and the specific context of the case.