Milam v University of Melbourne

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Milam v University of Melbourne [2019] FCA 171

File number: VID 82 of 2019
Judge: ANASTASSIOU J
Date of judgment: 19 February 2019
Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – investigation into the Applicant – whether investigation in compliance with Enterprise Agreement – whether s 50 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) applies – whether conduct misconduct or serious misconduct – injunction granted
Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)
Cases cited:

ABCC v CFMEU (2009) 189 IR 37

Aktiebolaget Hassle v Biochemie Australia Pty Ltd (2003) 57 IPR 1; [2003] FCA 496

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57

Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148; [1986] 60 ALJR 679; [1986] 67 ALR 553

Hexal Australia Pty Ltd v Roche Therapeutics Inc (2005) 66 IPR 325; [2005] FCA 1218

Samsung Electronics Co Limited v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238

Sigma Pharmaceuticals (Aust) Pty Ltd v Wyeth (2009) 81 IPR 339; [2009] FCA 595

Tidy Tea Ltd v Unilever Australia Ltd (1995) 32 IPR 405

United Motor Search Pty Ltd v Hanson Construction Materials Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 1104

Date of hearing: 7 and 12 February 2019
Date of last submissions: 7 February 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: Fair Work Division
National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 25
Counsel for the Applicant: MR C. Tran
Solicitor for the Applicant: Maurice Blackburn Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: MR P. O’Grady QC with MS L. Hilly
Solicitor for the Respondent: Corrs Chambers Westgarth

ORDERS

VID 82 of 2019
BETWEEN:

JENNIFER MILAM

Applicant

AND:

UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE (ABN 22 052 110 775)

Respondent

JUDGE:

ANASTASSIOU J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 FEBRUARY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The parties provide minutes of orders to give effect to these reasons by no later than 2 pm on 22 February 2019.

2.If agreement cannot be reached concerning the terms of the orders the application will be listed for further hearing on 25 February 2019 at 10:15 am.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ANASTASSIOU J:

  1. The Applicant is a Professor and Head of School in the Faculty of Arts at the Respondent, the University of Melbourne. In this proceeding the Applicant alleges that the Respondent breached certain obligations owing to her under the University of Melbourne Enterprise Agreement 2013 and consequently s 50 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The Applicant’s claims arise out of a preliminary investigation by the Respondent in connection with certain behaviour the Respondent alleges constitutes misconduct or serious misconduct on the part of the Applicant within the meaning of Part I of the Enterprise Agreement.

    Background

  2. The Applicant was appointed by the Respondent in December 2017 and commenced her four year term in January 2018.  The Faculty of Arts has four Heads of School and a Director of the Asia institute, who are collectively responsible for its management.  In…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 171
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the Applicant, a Professor and Head of School at the University of Melbourne, sought urgent interlocutory orders to restrain the Respondent from enforcing the findings of an investigation conducted by an external investigator. The investigation was initiated by the Respondent in connection with allegations of misconduct or serious misconduct on the part of the Applicant. The Applicant alleged that the investigation was not conducted in accordance with the terms of the Enterprise Agreement and that the Respondent breached s 50 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth).

The legal issues before the Court were whether the investigation complied with the Enterprise Agreement, whether s 50 of the Fair Work Act applied, and whether the conduct in question amounted to misconduct or serious misconduct. The Applicant argued that the investigation was not conducted in accordance with the Enterprise Agreement and that the Respondent's actions breached s 50 of the Fair Work Act. The Respondent argued that the investigation was conducted properly and that the Applicant's suspension was justified.

The Court found that the investigation did not comply with the Enterprise Agreement and that s 50 of the Fair Work Act applied. The Court also found that the conduct in question did not amount to misconduct or serious misconduct. The Court granted the Applicant's application for interlocutory orders, restraining the Respondent from enforcing the findings of the investigation and suspending the Applicant. The Court held that the Applicant had made out a prima facie case and that the balance of convenience favoured the grant of an interlocutory injunction.

The Court's final orders were that the parties provide minutes of orders to give effect to these reasons by no later than 2 pm on 22 February 2019. If agreement cannot be reached concerning the terms of the orders the application will be listed for further hearing on 25 February 2019 at 10:15 am.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The parties provide minutes of orders to give effect to these reasons by no later than 2 pm on 22 February 2019.

2. If agreement cannot be reached concerning the terms of the orders the application will be listed for further hearing on 25 February 2019 at 10:15 am.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Applicant is a Professor and Head of School in the Faculty of Arts at the Respondent, the University of Melbourne. In this proceeding the Applicant alleges that the Respondent breached certain obligations owing to her under the University of Melbourne Enterprise Agreement 2013 and consequently s 50 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The Applicant’s claims arise out of a preliminary investigation by the Respondent in connection with certain behaviour the Respondent alleges constitutes misconduct or serious misconduct on the part of the Applicant within the meaning of Part I of the Enterprise Agreement. Background The Applicant was appointed by the Respondent in December 2017 and commenced her four year term in January 2018. The Faculty of Arts has four Heads of School and a Director of the Asia institute, who are collectively responsible for its management. In the course of 2018 the Applicant raised concerns about certain governance matters in the Faculty. It is unnecessary at this stage for me to form any view as to the veracity or otherwise of those concerns. In August 2018 the Respondent, through its solicitors Corrs Chambers Westgarth, engaged Mr Brian Lacy AO to conduct a preliminary inquiry into matters concerning the interaction between certain senior academic staff of the Faculty.. The course of the preliminary inquiry is not presently relevant. It is sufficient for present purposes to note that on 31 January 2019 it culminated in the Respondent making a statement of preliminary allegations of misconduct and in the suspension of the Applicant on full pay pending further investigation of the preliminary allegations. The further investigation is to be conducted by another external investigator, Ms Jacqueline Parker of Gapacity Pty Ltd. The terms of the suspension and the preliminary allegations are contained in a letter from the Respondent dated 31 January 2019. This letter provided that: “During your suspension, you will not be required to perform the Head of School role… Where required, you may attend the University for the sole purpose of preparing for, and delivering, scheduled teaching activities. In all other circumstance [sic] you are requested not to attend any University workplace unless requested or authorised by me. You may, however, continue research work and other scholarly activities that do not require attendance at the workplace…” Before the Court is an application, on an urgent basis, for interlocutory orders restraining the Respondent from giving effect to, or taking any further step in furtherance of the findings of Mr Lacy AO’s inquiry, including the suspension of the Applicant. Principles The principles which guide the granting of an injunction are helpfully set out in the Respondent’s outline of submissions. It is convenient to reproduce those submissions (omitting footnotes): “The principles are well known. They were neatly summarised by Collier J in United Motor Search Pty Ltd v Hanson Construction Materials Pty Ltd.In Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill, the High Court explained principles relevant to the grant of interlocutory relief. In particular,1.There must be a serious question to be tried as to the applicant’s entitlement to relief; and2.The applicant is likely to suffer injury for which damages will not be an adequate remedy; and3.The balance of convenience favours the granting of an interlocutory injunction.(Gleeson CJ and Crennan J at [19].)As Gummow and Hayne JJ further explained, in order for an applicant for interlocutory relief to demonstrate that there is a “serious question to be tried”:1.1 It is sufficient that the applicant show a sufficient likelihood of success to justify the preservation of the status quo pending the trial: at [65].1.2The applicant need not demonstrate more than a 50% chance of ultimate success: at [68].1.3In that light the issue may be understood as whether the applicant has made out a prima facie case for relief: at [65], [70].1.4Whether the applicant shows a sufficient likelihood of success depends on the:1.4.1 nature of the rights asserted; and1.4.2practical consequences likely to flow from the interlocutory order sought. Particular considerations arise where the grant or refusal of an interlocutory injunction in effect would dispose of the action finally in favour of whichever party succeeded on that application: at [72].A more detailed account can be found in the Full Court decision in Samsung Electronics Co Limited v Apple Inc. There, the court said:As Sundberg J observed in Sigma Pharmaceuticals (Aust) Pty Ltd v Wyeth (2009) 81 IPR 339; [2009] FCA 595 at [15] (Sigma Pharmaceuticals), when considering whether to grant an interlocutory injunction, the issue of whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case and whether the balance of convenience and justice favours the grant of an injunction are related inquiries. The question of whether there is a serious question or a prima facie case should not be considered in isolation from the balance of convenience. The apparent strength of the parties’ substantive cases will often be an important consideration to be weighed in the balance: Tidy Tea Ltd v Unilever Australia Ltd (1995) 32 IPR 405 (Tidy Tea) at [416] per Burchett J; Aktiebolaget Hassle v Biochemie Australia Pty Ltd (2003) 57 IPR 1; [2003] FCA 496 at [31] per Sackville J; Hexal Australia Pty Ltd v Roche Therapeutics Inc (2005) 66 IPR 325; [2005] FCA 1218 at [18] per Stone J; and Castlemaine Tooheys at CLR 154; ALR 558 per Mason ACJ.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established