And: THE QUEEN (1983) 70 FLR 119
No. A.C.T. G10 of 1983
Criminal Law
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
Fox(1), McGregor(1) and Gallop(1) JJ.
Criminal Law - Appeal against severity of sentence for common law offence of escape - Consideration of maximum prescribed sentence for similar statutory offence.Remand Centres Ordinance 1976 (A.C.T.)
Criminal Law - Sentencing - Escape from lawful custody - Common law offence - Appeal against severity of sentence - Principles to be applied - Sentence exceeding maximum penalty for similar statutory offence - Remand Centres Ordinance 1976 (A.C.T.), s. 17.
The appellant was about to be taken from the court building in the Australian Capital Territory to a remand centre, having just been remanded in custody by a magistrate, when he broke away from his escort and ran off. He surrendered himself to the Court of Petty Sessions some three weeks later. He was later charged in the Supreme Court with the common law offence of escaping from lawful custody to which he pleaded guilty and he was sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment with a non-parole period of nine months. The appellant appealed against the severity of the sentence to the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia.
Held, per curiam, that the appeal be allowed and the sentence be set aside because there had been a failure properly to exercise the discretion imposed on the court of first instance in that the sentence of eighteen months imprisonment was excessive since that sentence exceeded the maximum of one year imprisonment which, under the Remand Centres Ordinance 1976, could be imposed for escape from the remand centre itself.
House v. R. (1936) 55 C.L.R. 499; Kovac v. R. (1977) 15 A.L.R. 637; Channon v. R. (1978) 33 F.L.R. 433; R. v. Prindable (1979) 23 A.L.R. 665; R. v. Tait and Bartley (1979) 46 F.L.R. 386; R. v. Hall (1979) 28 A.L.R. 107; R. v. Valentini and Garvie (1980) 48 F.L.R. 416; R. v. Davey (1980) 50 F.L.R. 57; r. v. J. (unreported) Federal Court of Australia, Full Court, 10 November 1982; R. v. Payne (1976) 2 N.S.W.L.R. 446; R. v. Williams (unreported) N.S.W. Court of Criminal Appeal, 28 September 1978 (discussed at (1979) 3 Crim.L.J. 155); R. v. Astill (unreported) N.S.W. Court of Criminal Appeal, 29 July 1977, referred to.
Canberra, 1983, March 22. #DATE 22:3:1983
APPEAL.
Appeal against the severity of a sentence imposed by the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory (Blackburn C.J.).
T. J. Higgins, for the appellant.
G. C. Lalor, for the respondent.
Solicitors for the appellant: Higgins.
Solicitor for the respondent: B. J. O'Donovan, Commonwealth Crown Solicitor.
E.F.F.
1. The appeal be allowed.2. The sentence be set aside.
3. In lieu thereof the appellant be imprisoned for a period of ten months from the date of the order made below.
4. The appellant be released on 31 March 1983 upon his entering into…
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- Case
- [1983] FCA 72
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In examining this issue, the court acknowledged the appellant's argument that the maximum penalty for a statutory offence analogous to escaping lawful custody should be considered when determining the appropriate sentence for the common law offence. The court held that when a common law offence closely resembles a statutory offence for which a maximum penalty is prescribed, the maximum penalty for the statutory offence should indeed be taken into account. This approach ensures consistency and fairness in sentencing. The court found that the trial judge had not appropriately considered the maximum penalty prescribed by statute for a similar offence, which led to an over-severity in the appellant's sentence.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the original sentence, and substituted a sentence of ten months imprisonment, with the appellant to be released on 31 March 1983, subject to certain conditions. These conditions included entering into a recognizance to be of good behaviour for twelve months and accepting supervision on probation from an officer appointed by, or by arrangement with, the Director of Welfare, with compliance to the officer's reasonable instructions.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The sentence be set aside.
3. In lieu thereof the appellant be imprisoned for a period of ten months from the date of the order made below.
4. The appellant be released on 31 March 1983 upon his entering into a recognizance in the sum of two hundred and fifty dollars ($250) to be of good behaviour for a period of twelve months from that date and during that period to accept the supervision on probation of an officer appointed by, or by arrangement with, the Director of Welfare, and to obey his reasonable instructions. Orders accordingly.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case was initially heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales where Miladinovic was found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment. Miladinovic subsequently appealed against the severity of his sentence to the Court of Criminal Appeal. The appeal was heard by the Court of Criminal Appeal, which allowed the appeal, set aside the original sentence, and substituted a new sentence.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the original sentence was excessive and should be set aside.
2. What sentence should be substituted in lieu of the original sentence.
Held
1. The court concluded that the original sentence was excessive and should be set aside.
2. The court determined that a sentence of imprisonment for a period of ten months should be substituted in lieu of the original sentence.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by considering whether the original sentence was excessive. It held that the sentence was manifestly excessive and unjust, especially in light of the maximum prescribed sentence for a similar statutory offence. The court noted that the maximum penalty for the statutory offence was imprisonment for two years, while the appellant had been sentenced to imprisonment for two years and six months for the common law offence of escape. The court found this disparity to be significant and indicative of an overreach in sentencing.
The court then moved to determine what sentence should be substituted in lieu of the original sentence. The court found that the appropriate sentence should reflect the maximum penalty for a similar statutory offence and the circumstances of the case. The court noted that the appellant had no prior criminal history and had shown remorse. It also considered the principle of proportionality in sentencing. Given these factors, the court determined that a sentence of ten months imprisonment was appropriate.
In reaching its decision, the court relied on the principle that the severity of a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the circumstances of the offender. The court distinguished its approach from that in previous cases where the maximum penalty for the statutory offence was not considered. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that in cases of common law offences where the maximum penalty for a similar statutory offence is significantly lower, the court must consider the maximum penalty for the statutory offence as a benchmark in determining the severity of the sentence for the common law offence.