Mikayla Gambrill v Hanson Construction T/A Hanson Australia

[2021] FWC 2333

[2021] FWC 2333

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.394—Unfair dismissal

Mikayla Gambrill
v
Hanson Construction T/A Hanson Australia
(U2021/2856)

COMMISSIONER PLATT ADELAIDE, 28 APRIL 2021

Application for an unfair dismissal remedy – request for an extension of time – application granted.

Introduction

[1] The Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act) provides that an applicant for an unfair dismissal remedy made pursuant to s.394 of the Act must make an application within 21 days after the dismissal took effect. 1 However, the Fair Work Commission (Commission) may allow a further period for the application to be made in exceptional circumstances.2

[2] This decision concerns whether I should exercise my discretion to allow Ms Mikayla Gambrill a further period for her unfair dismissal application (Application) to be made against Hanson Construction T/A Hanson Australia (Hanson).

Background

[3] Ms Gambrill has lodged an application pursuant to s.394 of the Act in relation to the termination of her employment with Hanson which her form F2 Unfair Dismissal Application advised took effect on 12 March 2021.

[4] The application was lodged on 6 April 2021 by Ms Gambrill.

[5] The application recognised that it was made beyond 21 days from the date of dismissal.

[6] On 14 April 2021, the Respondent lodged a form F3 Employer Response which indicated that the dismissal occurred on 12 March 2021 and raised a jurisdictional objection on the basis that the application was lodged out of time and that the dismissal was one of genuine redundancy. This decision only deals with the extension of time issue.

[7] On 8 April 2021, I issued directions and advised that the extension of time issue would be considered at a telephone conference on 27 April 2021. Information about the extension of time issue and the factors that I am required to take into account in considering this matter were provided to the parties. Ms Gambrill was directed to provide a statement concerning the extension of time and any documents to be relied upon by 16 April 2021 (and serve same on Hanson).

[8] On 16 April 2021, my Associate sent an email to Ms Gambrill reminding her that her submissions were due later than day.

[9] Later on 16 April 2021, my Associate received an email from Nicole Thompson of Australian Dismissal Services, noting that she would be representing the Applicant, and that the directions of 8 April 2021 had gone to the Applicant’s junk mail. As such, the Applicant was not able to meet the deadline for submissions as directed. Ms Thompson requested an extension of time to file submissions until 19 April 2021.

[10] Given the circumstances, I granted the Applicant an extension of time to file submissions.

[11] On 19 April 2021, I received submissions, witness statements and a bundle of documents from Australian Dismissal Services on behalf of the Applicant, in relation to the extension of time issue.

[12] The Respondent did not provide any submissions in relation to the extension of time issue.

Hearing

[13] A hearing was conducted by way of telephone conference on 27 April 2021. A sound file record of the telephone conference was kept. Ms Amanda Millar as paid agent, sought leave to represent Ms Gambrill on the basis of s.596(2)(a) – complexity and efficiency.

[14] Mr Josh Maldon, representing Hanson, did not object to the Applicant being represented by Ms Millar.

[15] I granted permission to the Applicant to be represented in proceedings.

[16] Ms Millar generally relied on the Applicant’s written submissions. Her position is summarised as follows:

•  Ms Gambrill has dyslexia and needed support in completing her Application. She and her husband contacted the Fair Work Ombudsman, who recommended they contact a named Community Legal Service for advice. Ms Gambrill was not aware about the 21-day time limit for s.394 applications.

•  Ms Gambrill tried on multiple occasions to contact the Community Legal Service, without response.

•  In the week preceding the due date of the Application, Ms Gambrill, her husband and their baby all become ill with gastroenteritis. Medical Certificates were provided for Mr Gambrill and the baby.

•  Once Ms Gambrill and her other family members recovered from their illness, on 6 April 2021 Ms Gambrill contacted Peter Anderson of Australian Dismissal Services, who alerted them to the 21-day time limit.

•  Upon being alerted to the time limit, Ms Gambrill prepared and lodged the unfair dismissal Application on the same day.

[17] The Respondent chose to cross-examine Ms Gambrill but limited questions to issues concerning the merits of the case, namely whether Ms Gambrill was made aware that the reason for her termination was one of genuine redundancy. The Respondent did not provide any submissions which went to the issue of whether an extension of time should be provided.

Applicable Law

[18] Section 394(3) of the Act states that the Commission may allow a further period for an applicant to make an unfair dismissal application if the Commission is satisfied that there are “exceptional circumstances”, taking into account the following six criteria:

“(a) the reason for the delay; and

(b) whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect; and

(c) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and

(d) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and

(e) the merits of the application; and

(f) fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position.”

[19] The test of “exceptional circumstances” establishes a “high hurdle” for an applicant. 3

[20] I have considered the provisions of s.394(3) of the Act in the context of the Full Bench decision in Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd⁴ which stated:

“[10] It is convenient to deal first with the meaning of the expression “exceptional circumstances” in s.366(2). In Cheval Properties Pty Ltd v Smithers a Full Bench of FWA considered the meaning of the expression “exceptional circumstances” in s.394(3) and held:

“[5] The word “exceptional” is relevantly defined in The Macquarie Dictionary as “forming an exception or unusual instance; unusual; extraordinary.” We can apprehend no reason for giving the word a meaning other than its ordinary meaning for the purposes of s.394(3) of the FW Act.”

[11] Given that s.366(2) is in relevantly identical terms to s.394(3), this statement of principle is equally applicable to s.366(2).

[12] The ordinary meaning of the expression “exceptional circumstances” was considered by Rares J in Ho v Professional Services Review Committee No 295, a case involving in s.106KA of the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth). His Honour observed:

“23. I am of opinion that the expression ‘exceptional circumstances’ requires consideration of all the circumstances. In Griffiths v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 372 at 379 Brennan and Dawson JJ considered a statutory provision which entitled either a parole board or a court to specify a shorter non-parole period than that required under another section only if it determined that the circumstances justified that course. They said of the appellant’s circumstances:

‘Although no one of these factors was exceptional, in combination they may reasonably be regarded as amounting to exceptional circumstances.’

24. Brennan and Dawson JJ held that the failure in that case to evaluate the relevant circumstances in combination was a failure to consider matters which were relevant to the exercise of the discretion under the section (167 CLR at 379). Deane J, (with whom Gaudron and McHugh JJ expressed their concurrence on this point, albeit that they were dissenting) explained that the power under consideration allowed departure from the norm only in the exceptional or special case where the circumstances justified it (167 CLR at 383, 397).

25. And, in Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513 at 573 [173] Callinan J referred with approval to what Lord Bingham of Cornhill CJ had said in R v Kelly (Edward) [2000] QB 198 at 208, namely:

‘We must construe “exceptional” as an ordinary, familiar English adjective, and not as a term of art. It describes a circumstance which is such as to form an exception, which is out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon. To be exceptional a circumstance need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare; but it cannot be one that is regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered.’

26. Exceptional circumstances within the meaning of s 106KA(2) can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. Thus, the sun and moon appear in the sky everyday and there is nothing exceptional about seeing them both simultaneously during day time. But an eclipse, whether lunar or solar, is exceptional, even though it can be predicted, because it is outside the usual course of events.

27. It is not correct to construe ‘exceptional circumstances’ as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural ‘circumstances’ as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of ‘exceptional circumstances’ in s 106KA(2) includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon. And, the section is directed to the circumstances of the actual practitioner, not a hypothetical being, when he or she initiates or renders the services.”

[13] In summary, the expression “exceptional circumstances” has its ordinary meaning and requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. It is not correct to construe “exceptional circumstances” as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural “circumstances” as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of “exceptional circumstances” includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.”

Consideration

Paragraph 394(3)(a) - reason for the delay

[21] The delay required to be considered is the period beyond the prescribed 21 day period for making an application. It does not include the period from the date of the dismissal to the end of the 21 day period. However, the circumstances from the time of the dismissal must be considered when assessing whether there is a credible reason for the delay, or any part of the delay, beyond the 21 day period. 5 In Diotti v Lenswood Cold Stores Co-op Society t/a Lenswood Organic,6the Full Bench explained the correct approach by reference to the following example:

“[31] For example if an applicant is in hospital for the first 20 days of the 21 day period this would be a relevant consideration if the application was filed 2 days out of time as occurred in this matter.”

[22] An acceptable explanation for the entirety of the delay is not required to make a finding of exceptional circumstances. However, in considering and taking into account the reason for the delay in accordance with s.394(3)(a) of the Act, it is relevant to have regard to whether the applicant has provided an acceptable explanation for the entirety or any part of the delay. The correct approach to be taken was explained by the Full Bench in Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors Pty Ltd t/as Richmond Oysters: 7

“[38] As we have mentioned, the assessment of whether exceptional circumstances exist requires a consideration of all the relevant circumstances. No one factor (such as the reason for the delay) need be found to be exceptional in order to enliven the discretion to extend time. This is so because even though no one factor may be exceptional, in combination with other factors the circumstances may be such as to be regarded as exceptional.

[39] So much is clear from the structure of s.366(2), each of the matters needs to be taken into account in assessing whether there are exceptional circumstances. The individual matters might not, viewed in isolation, be particularly significant, so it is necessary to consider the matters collectively and to ask whether collectively the matters disclose exceptional circumstances. The absence of any explanation for any part of the delay, will usually weigh against an applicant in such an assessment. Similarly a credible explanation for the entirety of the delay, will usually weigh in the applicant’s favour, though, as we mention later, it is a question of degree and insight. However the ultimate conclusion as to the existence of exceptional circumstances will turn on a consideration of all of the relevant matters and the assignment of appropriate weight to each.

…

[44] As mentioned earlier, the ‘reasons for the delay’ is a factor to be taken into account in deciding whether there are exceptional circumstances. There is no statutory basis for the adoption of a decision rule whereby if the applicant does not provide a credible explanation for the entire period of the delay then the matter in s.366(2)(a) tells against the finding of exceptional circumstances. Common sense would suggest otherwise, it is plainly a question of degree and weight.

[45] What if the period of the delay was 30 days and the applicant had a credible explanation for 29 of those days? It seems to us that such circumstances may weigh in favour of a finding of exceptional circumstances. Of course, as mentioned earlier if there was a credible explanation for the entirety of the delay that would weigh more heavily in favour of such a finding. Conversely, if the applicant failed to provide a credible explanation for any part of the delay that would tend to weigh against a finding of exceptional circumstances.”

[23] In my view the Applicant has explained the delay. The combination of her medical condition and the need for her husband’s support, together with their incapacitation due to gastroenteritis reasonably prevented the timely lodgement of the application.

[24] The fact that the Applicant was unaware of the time limit and/or that she may not have been advised of this until engaging her representative is not a factor which supports the extension of time.

[25] In my view the Applicant has provided a credible reason for the delay in filing her Application. This factor weighs in favour of granting an extension of time.

Paragraph 394(3)(b) - whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect

[26] Ms Gambrill was aware of the dismissal on the date it occurred.

[27] This factor weighs against a finding that there are exceptional circumstances.

Paragraph 394(3)(c) - any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal

[28] Action taken by the employee to contest the dismissal, other than lodging an unfair dismissal application, may favour granting an extension of time. 8

[29] Ms Gambrill’s engagement with the Fair Work Ombusdman and seeking representation by the Community Legal Service is action taken to contest the dismissal and this factor is a consideration in favour of the granting of an extension of time.

Paragraph 394(3)(d) - prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay)

[30] Prejudice to the employer will weigh against granting an extension of time. 9 However, the “mere absence of prejudice to the employer is an insufficient basis to grant an extension of time”.10

[31] The employer must produce evidence to demonstrate prejudice. It is then up to the employee to show that the facts do not amount to prejudice. 11

[32] There is no submission that the granting of an extension of time represents prejudice to the Respondent.

Paragraph 394(3)(e) - merits of the application

[33] In terms of the merits of the application, there is insufficient evidence before me to make an assessment and, accordingly, I have regarded the merits as a neutral factor.

Paragraph 394(3)(f) - fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position

[34] The Full Bench in Perry v Rio Tinto Shipping Pty Ltd 12 considered this criterion and said:

“[41] Cases of this kind will generally turn on their own facts. However, this consideration is concerned with the importance of the application of consistent principles in cases of this kind, thus ensuring fairness as between the Appellant and other persons in a similar position. This consideration may relate to matters currently before the Commission or matters previously decided by the Commission.”

[35] I am not satisfied that the issue of fairness as between the Applicant and other persons in a similar position is a relevant consideration in this matter. Because it is not a relevant factor it is a neutral consideration in determining whether to grant an extension of time.

Conclusion

[36] Having taken into account each of the factors referred to in s.394(3)(a) to (f) of the Act, I am persuaded, on balance, that there are exceptional circumstances warranting the exercise of my discretion to allow a further period within which an application for an unfair dismissal remedy may be lodged by the Applicant.

[37] An Order¹³ reflecting this decision will be issued.

COMMISSIONER

Appearances (by telephone):

A Millar on behalf of the Applicant.

J Maldon on behalf of the Respondent.

Hearing (Conference) details:

2021.
Adelaide:
April 27.

Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer

<PR729003>

 1   Section 394(2)(a) of the Act. Note that the 21 days for lodgment does not include the date that the dismissal took effect by reason of the operation of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s.36(1) (item 6—where a period of time ‘is expressed to begin after a specified day’ the period ‘does not include that day’)

 2 Section 394(3) of the Act

 3   Lombardo v Commonwealth of Australia as represented by the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations[2014] FWCFB 2288 at [21]

4 [2011] FWAFB 975

 5   Shaw v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited T/A ANZ Bank [2015] FWCFB 287 at [12]; Ozsoy v Monstamac Industries Pty Ltd [2014] FWCFB 2149 at [31]; Diotti v Lenswood Cold Stores Co-op Society t/a Lenswood Organic [2016] FWCFB 349 at [29]-[31]

 6   [2016] FWCFB 349

 7   [2018] FWCFB 3288 at [35]-[45]

 8   Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd (1995) 67 IR 298 at 299-300

 9   Ibid

 10   Ibid

 11   Jervis v Coffey Engineering Group Pty Limited (unreported, AIRCFB, Marsh SDP, Duncan SDP, Harrison C, 3 February 2003) PR927201 at [16]

 12   [2016] FWCFB 6963

13 PR729004