Midson, Peter Mark v The Queen - [1998] TASSC 26

26/1998

PARTIES: MIDSON, Peter Mark

v
R

TITLE OF COURT:  COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL (TAS)
JURISDICTION:  APPELLATE
FILE NO/S:  CCA 125/1997
DELIVERED:  2 April 1998
HEARING DATE/S:  5 March 1998
JUDGMENT OF:  Cox CJ, Crawford and Slicer JJ

CATCHWORDS:

Criminal Law - Jurisdiction, practice and procedure - Judgment and punishment - Sentence - Factors to be taken into account - Parity - Generally - Correction by Court of sentence which though justifiably above statistically established range was still in the circumstances manifestly excessive.

Harland-White v R 1/1998, Hrvojevic v R 24/1979, referred to.
Veen v R (No 2) (1987 - 1988) 164 CLR 465, applied.
Aust Dig Criminal Law [835]

Criminal Law - Appeal and new trial and inquiry after conviction - Appeal and new trial - Appeal against sentence - Appeal by convicted persons - Application to reduce sentence - When granted - Particular offences - Property offences - Burglary and stealing - Substantial antecedents - Whether three years' imprisonment is manifestly excessive.

Aust Dig Criminal Law [1012]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Appellant:  In person
             Respondent:  D J Bugg QC
Solicitors:
             Appellant:  In person
             Respondent:  Director of Public Prosecutions

Judgment category classification:
Court Computer Code:
Judgment ID Number:  26/1998
Number of pages:  7

Serial No 26/1998
File No CCA 125/1997

PETER MARK MIDSON v THE QUEEN

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

COX CJ
CRAWFORD J
SLICER J
2 April 1998

Orders of the Court

Appeal allowed.

Sentence quashed.

Substitute a sentence of imprisonment for two years six months to commence at the expiration of all sentences to which the appellant was liable immediately prior to the imposition of the sentence appealed from.

Order that the appellant not be eligible for parole in respect of the substituted sentence before the expiration of two years thereof.

COX CJ

The appellant was sentenced to three years' imprisonment when he pleaded guilty to one count of stealing petrol worth $43.40 on 30 September 1997 and to one count of aggravated burglary and one count of stealing cash in excess of $10,000 on 6 October 1997. On the earlier occasion he stole the petrol from his employer, a company which conducted a service station at Brighton and the manager of which had terminated his employment there that day upon learning from the appellant that he was a convicted person on parole. The principal offences were committed in the company of other persons who entered the premises with safe-breaking equipment secure in the knowledge supplied by the appellant that the office area was not monitored by security surveillance. There the other offenders broke open a safe and stole $10,561. The appellant's part was to supply transport to the burgled premises for his co-offenders and the equipment they were to use and to return when summoned on his mobile telephone in order to facilitate their get away and the disposal of the safe-breaking equipment. He received about $3,500 of the stolen money and went Interstate where he spent it. The other offenders have not been…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Midson, Peter Mark v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Midson, Peter Mark v The Queen [1998] TASSC 26
Case: [1998] TASSC 26
Decision Date: 2 April 1998

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Midson, Peter Mark v The Queen was heard by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Tasmania. The appellant, Peter Mark Midson, had been sentenced to three years' imprisonment for stealing petrol, aggravated burglary, and stealing cash in excess of $10,000. The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive, particularly considering the appellant's relatively minor role in the commission of the principal crimes. The Court had to decide if the sentence was disproportionate to the gravity of the offence, especially given the appellant's substantial criminal history and his role in the commission of the crimes.

The Court found that the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge was indeed manifestly excessive. The judges considered the appellant's role in the commission of the crimes, which was limited to providing information, transportation, and assistance in the disposal of safe-breaking equipment. The Court also took into account the appellant's plea of guilty and his extensive criminal history, which included multiple convictions for burglary, stealing, and other acts of dishonesty. The Court held that a sentence significantly higher than the statistically established range was justified, but in light of the appellant's plea of guilty and his limited role in the commission of the crimes, some reduction was called for.

The Court of Criminal Appeal allowed the appeal and substituted a sentence of two years and six months' imprisonment, to commence at the expiration of all sentences to which the appellant was liable immediately prior to the imposition of the sentence appealed from. The Court also ordered that the appellant not be eligible for parole before the expiration of two years of the substituted sentence. This decision demonstrated the Court's commitment to ensuring that sentences imposed on offenders are proportionate to the gravity of the offence, while also taking into account the offender's criminal history and role in the commission of the crime.

Orders