Mid Coast County Council v Platz - [2011] NSWWCCPD 36

WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION
DETERMINATION OF APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION CONSTITUTED BY AN ARBITRATOR
CITATION:		Mid Coast County Council v Platz [2011] NSWWCCPD 36
APPELLANT:		Mid Coast County Council
RESPONDENT:		Peter Platz
INSURER:		StateCover Mutual Limited
FILE NUMBER:		A1-6985/10
ARBITRATOR:	Ms Elizabeth Beilby
DATE OF ARBITRATOR’S DECISION:		14 March 2011
DATE OF APPEAL DECISION:		14 July 2011
SUBJECT MATTER OF DECISION:		Section 40(2)(b) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987; ability to earn in some suitable employment; s 40(1) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987; exercise of discretion to determine proper quantum of weekly payments
PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER:		Deputy President Kevin O'Grady
HEARING:		On the papers
REPRESENTATION:		Appellant:	Bartier Perry Lawyers
Respondent:	White Barnes Solicitors
ORDERS MADE ON APPEAL:		The Arbitrator’s determination made in Certificate of Determination dated 14 March 2011 is confirmed. In addition the following order is made: “6. The respondent is to have credit in respect of any payment of wages or compensation made since 1 December 2009.” The appellant is to pay Mr Platz’s costs of the appeal.

BACKGROUND

Mr Peter Platz was employed by Mid Coast County Council (the appellant) in September 2000. He remained in that employ, latterly working as a maintenance operator in the appellant’s operations division, until he was stood down on full pay on 1 December 2009. His employment was terminated on 1 March 2010.
It is alleged in these proceedings that, before being stood down, Mr Platz had been subjected to bullying, harassment and victimisation by the actions of fellow workers in the course of his employment. That mistreatment had caused, it is further alleged, psychological injury which resulted in his incapacity for work.
At about the time he was stood down, Mr Platz consulted his general practitioner concerning disabling symptoms which included anxiety and depression. He has since consulted specialist psychiatrists Dr Klaas Akkerman and Dr Esther Jesudason. He has also undergone therapy conducted by Ms Robyn Kelly, psychologist.
A claim for compensation benefits was made by Mr Platz against the appellant on 9 December 2009. Liability in respect of that claim was disputed by the appellant and notice of such dispute was given to Mr Platz by its insurer, StateCover Mutual Limited, in correspondence dated 30 December 2009 and 27 January 2010. Those notices were stated to be given as required by the provisions of s 74 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (the 1998 Act).
Those notices were in substantially identical terms. The appellant disputed the injury as alleged in the claim form and asserted that “work was not a substantial contributing factor” to injury in terms of s 9A of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act). A large number of documents were enclosed with those notices. An Application to Resolve a Dispute was filed on behalf of Mr Platz with the Commission in August 2010. That Application claimed weekly payments and medical expenses. The dispute came before Arbitrator Elizabeth Beilby for conciliation/arbitration on 31 January 2011. The matter proceeded to hearing following which the Arbitrator reserved her decision. A Certificate of Determination issued on 14 March 2011.

THE DECISION UNDER REVIEW

The Certificate of Determination dated 14 March 2011 records the Arbitrator’s orders as follows:
“The Commission determines:
1. The applicant suffered a psychological injury pursuant to s 4 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act) on 1 December 2009.
2. The applicant’s employment was a substantial contributing factor to the injury pursuant to s 9A of the 1987 Act.
3.       There is an award for the applicant relative to his claim for weekly benefits as follows:
(a)From 1 December 2009 to 1 June 2010 pursuant to s36, at $1050 per week, and
(b)From 2 June 2010 to date and continuing, pursuant to s40, at the statutory maximum rate applicable for a single worker with no dependants.
4.       There is a general order that the respondent is to meet the applicant’s reasonably necessary s 60 expenses attendant upon his treatments for psychological injury upon production of accounts and/or receipts.
5.       The respondent is to pay the applicant’s costs as agreed or assessed. Such costs are certified as ‘complex’ for both parties. It is determined that a 30 per cent uplift is appropriate for both parties.
A brief statement is attached to this determination setting out the Commission’s reasons for the determination.”
The appellant filed this appeal with the registry on 7 April 2011.

ISSUES IN DISPUTE

The issue in dispute is whether the Arbitrator erred in her determination as to Mr Platz’s entitlement to an award of weekly compensation pursuant to s 40 of the 1987 Act.

ON THE PAPERS REVIEW

Section 354(6) of the 1998 Act provides:
“(6) If the Commission is satisfied that sufficient information has been supplied to it in connection with proceedings, the Commission may exercise functions under this Act without holding any conference or formal hearing.”
Having regard to Practice Directions Nos 1 and 6, the documents that are before me, and the submissions by the parties that the appeal can proceed to be determined on the basis of these documents, I am satisfied that I have sufficient information to proceed ‘on the papers’, without holding any conference or formal hearing, and that this is the appropriate course in the circumstances.

THE ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS

The documentary evidence before the Arbitrator is summarised at [20] and [21] of her Statement of Reasons (Reasons). Oral evidence was given at the hearing by Mr Platz. That evidence, which is more fully addressed below, was limited to matters concerning his earnings generated by work performed since cessation of his employment with the appellant, as well as concerning his ability to earn generally since that time.
The proceedings were recorded and a transcript (T) has been produced and made available to the parties. That transcript includes a record of submissions put on behalf of each party by counsel then appearing.
It was stated at the hearing by counsel for the appellant that the “main issue” in dispute related to “capacity to earn” (T3). That statement concerned, as was subsequently made clear, the question of Mr Platz’s ability to earn in suitable employment for the purposes of determining any entitlement to weekly compensation pursuant to s 40 of the 1987 Act.
It was also made clear by counsel that the matters in dispute raised in the appellant’s s 74 notices remained in issue. Reliance was placed upon the appellant’s medical evidence in support of the contention that Mr Platz had not, at any relevant time, suffered a psychological injury.

THE EVIDENCE

Having regard to the fact that the appellant does not challenge the Arbitrator’s findings concerning the occurrence of injury, and those findings favourable to Mr Platz concerning the defence raised pursuant to s 9A of the 1987 Act, it is unnecessary to attempt a summary of Mr Platz’s factual allegations concerning the actions of his fellow workers and the appellant’s evidence relied upon to refute those matters.
The evidence relevant to incapacity tendered by Mr Platz included the following:
(a)     a number of WorkCover NSW medical certificates issued by Dr V Volceva, general practitioner, which certify that Mr Platz was unfit for work up to 31 December 2010. It should be noted that, as summarised below, Mr Platz stated that he had performed limited work in April 2010 and had commenced part-time work in June 2010;
(b)     Dr Klaas Akkerman, psychiatrist, in his report dated 26 March 2010 diagnosed an Adjustment Disorder with Anxious and Depressed Mood. The observation was made by that practitioner:
“He probably should be certified as fit for suitable duties in about approximately four weeks so that he can start looking for work again”;
(c)     Dr Leonard Lee, psychiatrist, in his report dated 12 May 2010 diagnosed Mr Platz suffering “with a major depressive episode”. The view is expressed (at page 5):
“His fitness for employment is diminished. His attendance would be erratic and his pace would be reduced and it is highly unlikely that he could perform his normal duties”;
(d)     Dr Esther Jesudason, psychiatrist, who commenced treating Mr Platz in September 2010, in her report dated 8 September 2010, expressed her diagnosis of Mr Platz’s condition as being “Major Depression with severe anxiety”. No opinion is stated by that practitioner concerning work capacity;
(e)     Ms Robyn Kelly, in her report dated 23 June 2010, records that Mr Platz had presented with “an acute stress reaction” to his employment situation. Symptoms were consistent with depression. Whilst no opinion concerning work capacity is expressed, Ms Kelly noted symptoms as including agitation, anxiety, depressed mood, inability to sleep and high levels of agitation. Ms Kelly’s clinical notes record persistence of these symptoms with slow improvement concerning his mood, and
(f)      Dr Doron Samuell in his report dated 18 January 2010 addressed to the appellant expressed the opinion that Mr Platz was “psychologically well” at the time of his examination which was conducted on 5 January 2010. Dr Samuell also stated his opinion that Mr Platz “is fully fit to resume work should he wish to do so”.

The evidence before the Arbitrator concerning Mr Platz’s earnings since his employment was terminated by the appellant may be summarised as follows:
(a)     Mr Platz’s statement dated 20 December 2010 records that he earned $192.51 net whilst performing stocktake work for Bunnings Group Ltd in April 2010. It is also stated that he had performed “sub contracting” work for Satori Plumbing Solutions. Other evidence establishes that Mr Damian Kinkade is the proprietor of that business. At [5] of his statement Mr Platz provides the following detail:
“I was paid $140.00 for my services on 3 June 2010, $105.00 for work done on 4 June 2010, $105.00 for 22 June 2010, $70.00 for 23 June 2010, $70.00 for 29 June 2010, $280.00 for 2 July 2010, $52.50 for 21 August 2010, $70.00 for 24 August 2010, $70.00 for 7 September 2010 and $105.00 for 20 September 2010”;
(b)     Mr Platz’s statement also contains detail of his earnings with Repco (later known as Exego Pty Ltd) since 24 September 2010 as a part-time customer service representative. His hourly rate was said to be $20.72, and
(c)     correspondence from Mr Kinkade dated 3 November 2010 includes a summary of earnings which update details until Mr Platz’s cessation of work. The following additional payments are noted:
(i)23 September 2010 $117.50
(ii)14 October 2010 $341.00.
It is also noted that Mr Platz had “taken care of” Mr Kinkaid’s business during “some periods” in the months of August, October and November 2010.
A schedule of earnings was filed with the Commission by Mr Platz under cover of an Application to Admit Late Documents dated 11 January 2011. The content of this document is addressed below.
In evidence before the Arbitrator Mr Platz stated that he was employed by “Repco” performing 15 hours each fortnight. The work arrangement was five hours on three days per week, one week on one week off, the hourly rate being $20.70.
Mr Platz gave evidence in response to questions put by his counsel that he did not consider himself able to work full-time on a 35 hour week at Repco. He stated that he felt capable of working “four or five hours a day for the week. That’d be great, 20 hours” (at T6).
Mr Platz stated that the work he had performed for Satori Plumbing Solutions had been on the basis of his being “on call”. He stated (at T7) that he stopped that work:
“[f]or the simple fact that harassment was coming on the phone at Damian’s business. I chose not to be a part of his work anymore because I didn’t want to bring his business into disrepute. So I stepped away from that and Damian took control of that. I just didn’t want his business to suffer because of me.”
Mr Platz, when cross-examined by counsel, agreed that between 20 and 24 August 2010 he had sent invoices to Satori Plumbing Solutions for three separate amounts, the total being $800. It was stated that an invoice for $665 represented “a couple of jobs adding up to that figure”.
It was accepted by Mr Platz, when questioned, that his work with Repco left time available to work doing “other things”. That acceptance was qualified by his statement “if I was able to find them, yes” (T9).
Mr Platz gave evidence during cross-examination that plumbing work such as he performed for Satori Plumbing Solutions was no longer available for him for the reason, as stated at T9:
“It’s not possible to do that anymore because all the plumbing and draining companies and firms in the area now have my name know [sic] as mud through bad mouthing from [the appellant]”.
Mr Platz stated in evidence that he was not qualified as a tradesman plumber. He also agreed that in October 2010 he performed work for both Repco and Satori Plumbing Solutions. The plumbing work was “something that was pencilled in before he commenced with Repco. The work needed to be done ‘around Repco’” (T10-11).

SUBMISSIONS BEFORE THE ARBITRATOR

The appellant’s arguments were advanced upon the basis that probable earnings, but for injury, were agreed as being $1050 per week (T15).
Mr Platz’s actual earnings as disclosed by the evidence were examined in the course of submissions. It was noted by counsel that “between 20, 21 and 24 August 2010 he had been paid $800.50” (T13). Having regard to that evidence it was argued that Mr Platz’s ability to earn should be determined as being $800 per week.
It was also argued that Mr Platz’s employment with Repco and in the plumbing business could “co-exist”. It was put that Mr Platz’s uncorroborated evidence concerning his name being “mud” in plumbing circles in his area should not be accepted. No argument was advanced to suggest that Mr Platz had no incapacity (T15). It was put that entitlement would be in the order of $200 - $250 per week (T15).
Counsel appearing for Mr Platz accepted that the schedule of wages filed on his behalf contained a “miscalculation”. It was argued that payment made in August for plumbing work was not payment for one week’s work but that it related back to work performed earlier.
Counsel argued that a “measured calculation” of Mr Platz’s ability to earn would be a determination that he was capable of 20 hours work per week and the hourly rate would equate to that paid by Repco, that is $20.70 per hour. If accepted, his ability to earn would be calculated at $414 per week which would have the result that he was entitled to an award pursuant to s 40 at the relevant maximum rate.
It is to be noted that the evidence, as acknowledged by both parties, demonstrated that Mr Platz performed some limited plumbing work in April 2010. It was put by the appellant’s counsel that Mr Platz’s incapacity could not “be total when he’s working”. No other argument was raised concerning precise dates relevant to total or partial incapacity.

THE ARBITRATOR’S DECISION

The Arbitrator addressed the evidence concerning the allegation of injury and found (at [31] of Reasons) that Mr Platz had received a psychological injury and that his employment was a substantial contributing factor to that injury.
The certification as to unfitness by Mr Platz’s general practitioner, the observations of Ms Kelly and the diagnosis expressed by Dr Jesudason were accepted by the Arbitrator as establishing that he was totally incapacitated from 1 December 2009 until 1 June 2010. It is clear from the Arbitrator’s reasons that she concluded that he was partially incapacitated thereafter.
The Arbitrator rejected the appellant’s argument that the economic evidence established that Mr Platz earned $800 in a period of one week in August 2010. It was noted that his average weekly income between 3 June 2010 and 20 September 2010 was $71.16.
Following a summary of submissions put on behalf of each party, the Arbitrator accepted the evidence of Mr Platz concerning the state of his reputation and that plumbing work, as a result, was not reasonably open to him.
Following reference to relevant authority, it was observed that there was no evidence that Mr Platz was “idling, deliberately taking himself off paid work or that his actual earnings had been reduced by reasons unconnected to his injuries”. It was noted that Mr Platz “conceded, against interest, that if greater hours were available to him he would be able to perform these duties”. It was upon that basis alone that the Arbitrator found that Mr Platz “does have a greater capacity to earn that [sic, than] he is currently doing so” (Reasons [73]).
The Arbitrator, in accordance with the steps outlined by the Court of Appeal in Mitchell v Central West Area Health Service (1997) 14 NSWCCR 526 (Mitchell) proceeded to determine Mr Platz’s ability to earn as being $517.50 per week. That finding, subject to any discretionary adjustment to quantum of an award, entitled Mr Platz to an award at the relevant maximum rate pursuant to s 40. The Arbitrator found that there were “no relevant matters that warrant the exercise of discretion in s 40(1)” and proceeded to enter an award in terms as noted at [6] above.

SUBMISSIONS, DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

This appeal is governed by the provisions of s 352 of the 1998 Act as amended by the Workers Compensation Legislation Amendment Act 2010: Sch 6 Pt 19G cl 8 to the 1987 Act. The nature and scope of such an appeal is as provided by s 352(5):
“An appeal under this section is limited to a determination of whether the decision appealed against was or was not affected by any error of fact, law or discretion, and to the correction of any such error. The appeal is not a review or new hearing.”
The powers of the Commission upon conduct of such an appeal are defined by the provisions of s 352(7):
“On appeal, the decision may be confirmed or may be revoked and a new decision made in its place.
Alternatively, the matter may be remitted back to the Arbitrator concerned, or to another Arbitrator, for determination in accordance with any decision or directions of the Commission.”
The appellant suggests errors of “fact, law and/or discretion” have been made in the course of the Arbitrator’s reasoning concerning the proper construction and application of the provisions of s 40(1) and s 40(2) of the 1987 Act which provide:
“40 Weekly payments during partial incapacity – general
(cf former ss 9, 11)
(1)     Entitlement
The weekly payment of compensation to an injured worker in respect of any period of partial incapacity for work is to be an amount not exceeding the reduction in the worker’s weekly earnings, but is to bear such relation to the amount of that reduction as may appear proper in the circumstances of the case.
Note. Section 35 limits the maximum weekly payment of compensation under this section.
(2)     Calculation of reduction in earnings of worker - general
The reduction in the worker’s weekly earnings is (except as provided by this section) the difference between:
(a)  the weekly amount which the worker would probably have been earning as a worker but for the injury and had the worker continued to be employed in the same or some comparable employment, and
(b)  the average weekly amount that the worker is earning, or would be able to earn in some suitable employment, from time to time after the injury.
Note. The difference between (a) and (b) is the maximum amount of compensation payable to the worker. It is not a limit on the combined total of compensation and earnings.”

Whilst the appellant has recited one “ground” of appeal, it is reasonably clear that complaint is made concerning various matters to be found in the Arbitrator’s Reasons. The first complaint seems to challenge the Arbitrator’s suggested “finding” that Mr Platz “could no longer perform the duties of a plumber or plumber’s assistant or find or obtain work with local plumbing and drainage companies” (submissions 2.7.1). It is asserted that the evidence did not support such a finding.
It appears that this challenge suggests an error of fact. The submissions in support argue that the only evidence touching on this matter is the evidence of Mr Platz. It is put there was no “primary evidence in support” and that there was not “reliable and sufficient evidence”.
The relevant findings challenged by the appellant are to be found at [67] and [68] of Reasons where the Arbitrator stated:
“The respondent submitted that the applicant had provided insufficient evidence to show that he would be unable to obtain employment as an assistant plumber or like employment due to his name being ‘mud’, that is the applicant has not shown that this type of work was not reasonably accessible to him.

Whilst the evidence on this point is scarce, I accept the applicant’s evidence on this point. I had the opportunity to observe Mr Platz whilst he was cross-examined. I observed him to be a witness who answered questions put to him in a straightforward and direct manner. He was a witness who made admissions against interest. I accept his evidence, particularly in light of the complete absence of evidence to the contrary.”

The Arbitrator makes clear in her Reasons that she accepts Mr Platz as a witness of truth. No express submission has been put to challenge that finding as to his credit. It is also noted by the Arbitrator that there was no evidence before her that contradicted Mr Platz’s evidence concerning the state of his reputation in the plumbing trade in his geographical area.
I accept the submission put by Mr Platz on this appeal that it was open to the Arbitrator to accept his evidence concerning these matters, notwithstanding the absence of corroboration. Whilst, as stated by the Arbitrator, the evidence was “scarce”, I reject the appellant’s argument that there was not “reliable and sufficient” evidence before her to conclude that employment opportunity in the plumbing business had been adversely affected because of the reasons given by Mr Platz in the course of cross-examination. I reject the appellant’s argument that factual error has been committed by the Arbitrator.
A further challenge is made suggesting the Arbitrator has erred in rejecting the appellant’s argument that Mr Platz has a “residual earning capacity of at least $800 per week”. This is, apparently, a suggested error by the Arbitrator in her determination of Mr Platz’s ability to earn in some suitable employment (s 40(2)(b)).
It must be kept in mind that the evidence in the present matter established Mr Platz’s actual earnings following injury. A concession was made by him in evidence that such earnings did not represent his ability to earn in his injured state in suitable employment. That evidence lead the Arbitrator to embark upon a determination of Mr Platz’s “ability to earn” in terms of s 40(2)(b). Such an approach was accepted as being proper by both parties at the hearing before the Arbitrator. Such is essentially a question of fact to be determined by the Arbitrator upon the evidence before her (Pira Pty Ltd v Tucker (1996) 14 NSWLR 26 (per Abadee AJA at 30)).
Entitlement to weekly compensation in circumstances such as the present is to be determined, as stated by Glass JA in Hill v Bryant (1974) 2 NSWLR 423, where the similar provisions of s 11(1) of the Workers Compensation Act 1926 (now repealed) were being considered (at 428):
“The inquiry to be undertaken in obedience to the section is designed to ascertain a weekly payment not to be exceeded, that maximum being the difference between two weekly amounts. The difference is obtained by subtracting from a sum hypothetically earned the larger of two other sums one actually received as earnings and the other hypothetically earned.”
The appellant asserts that the Arbitrator relied upon “speculative and unreliable” evidence and that she “dismissed demonstrated earnings which represented [Mr Platz’s] actual earnings and residual earning capacity of at least $800 per week” (submissions 2.9.5).
This argument reflects the appellant’s submission made before the Arbitrator noted at [27] above. That argument was rejected by the Arbitrator given her acceptance that the invoices totalling $800 rendered by Mr Platz in August 2010 were in respect of “cumulative work” and thus it was “misleading to assume that the payments received was [sic, were] on the basis of one week’s work” (Reasons [63]). Such conclusion was open to the Arbitrator on the evidence.
The Arbitrator’s finding as to Mr Platz’s ability to earn being $517.50 was founded upon acceptance by her that he was able to work 25 hours per week in suitable employment, a sales position, paid at the same hourly rate as he is being paid at Repco. The evidence permitted such a conclusion. Mr Platz’s actual earnings, calculated upon an average over the relevant period, had earlier been determined as being $71.16 per week. The Arbitrator’s treatment of the larger hypothetical figure as being relevant to the task before her was, in my opinion, correct and in accordance with those observations of Glass JA noted at [48] above. I conclude that the appellant’s submission concerning the manner of quantification of Mr Platz’s ability to earn should be rejected.
The third and final argument advanced on this appeal is that the Arbitrator’s reasoning concerning the determination of Mr Platz’s ability to earn was made in error given her failure to properly exercise her discretion to, as stated in Mitchell:
“decide whether and to what extent the reduction calculated [in accordance with step one, two and three] bears ‘such relation to the amount of that reduction as may appear proper in the circumstances of the case’ (s 40(1))”.
The argument I have attempted to summarise above appears to suggest an error of law on the part of the Arbitrator. The argument is not stated with precision; however, it seems to be suggested that the Arbitrator erred in not finding that Mr Platz had “deliberately taken himself away from paid work that could have returned or paid equal to or close to [Mr Platz’s] pre-injury probable earnings” (submissions 2.9.7). The argument proceeds, it seems, to assert that failure to take such a matter into account demonstrates failure to properly exercise discretion.
The appellant’s argument is misconceived. Leaving aside my earlier conclusion that no error had been demonstrated concerning the Arbitrator’s findings as to Mr Platz’s reputation and the resultant unavailability of such work, such matters relied upon by the appellant are only relevant, if at all, to the determination of Mr Platz’s ability to earn (step two of Mitchell). As was stated by the Court in Mitchell (at 534-535):
“self-induced diminution of earning capacity lies squarely within the exercise required to be carried out at what we have identified as the second stage. The matters to which Egan A-CCJ referred go directly to the ‘worker’s ability to earn in the general labour market reasonably accessible to the worker’ and are therefore required (by section 40(3)(a)) to be taken into account in the section 40(2)(b) exercise. In consequence, there can be no justification for taking them into account in the additional discretionary phase.”
The Arbitrator, at [78] of Reasons, has determined that no relevant matters “warrant the exercise of the discretion in s 40(1)”. The appellant has, in my opinion, failed to establish that her approach to that discretionary phase in the exercise of determining entitlement, represents, in any manner, a miscarriage of the discretion.
It may be seen that I have rejected each argument advanced challenging the Arbitrator’s manner of assessment of Mr Platz’s post-injury ability to earn and his entitlement to an award as quantified. In the circumstances the appeal fails and the Arbitrator’s determination is to be confirmed.
There are two short matters which require attention before finalisation of this decision. It will be recalled that the evidence revealed that Mr Platz performed limited work for Bunnings Group Ltd in April 2010 yielding $192.51. That was a time when, as found by the Arbitrator, Mr Platz was totally incapacitated. Neither party has raised this matter on appeal but counsel, as earlier noted at [31] above, did make brief reference to those circumstances. I conclude that, consistent with the principle of de minimus non curat lex, the law is not concerned with trifles, the Arbitrator’s finding of total incapacity at that time should remain undisturbed.
The second matter concerns the Arbitrator’s ruling at [49] of Reasons that the parties should resolve any question concerning “reimbursement” in respect of wages paid to Mr Platz. I consider it appropriate to make an order on this appeal that the appellant is to have credit in respect of any payment of wages or compensation made since 1 December 2009.

DECISION

The appeal is dismissed. The Arbitrator’s determination made in Certificate of Determination dated 14 March 2011 is confirmed.
In addition the following order is made:
“6. The respondent is to have credit in respect of any payment of wages or compensation made since 1 December 2009.”

COSTS

The appellant is to pay Mr Platz’s costs of the appeal.

Kevin O'Grady

Deputy President
14 July 2011

I, PENELOPE FLEMING, CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE AND ACCURATE RECORD OF THE REASONS FOR DECISION OF KEVIN O'GRADY, DEPUTY PRESIDENT OF THE WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION.

ASSOCIATE