Microsoft Corporation v Crosslink Marketing Group (CMG) Pty Limited

Case [2005] FCA 1220


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Microsoft Corporation v Crosslink Marketing Group (CMG) Pty Limited
[2005] FCA 1220

MICROSOFT CORPORATION, MICROSOFT PTY LIMITED AND MICROSOFT LICENSING GP v CROSSLINK MARKETING GROUP (CMG) PTY LIMITED, KELL WALKER, ROSALIND SUMNER aka PEE LOO TAN, WAYNE SUMNER

NSD 1325 OF 2004

DOWSETT J
19 AUGUST 2005
BRISBANE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1325 OF 2004

BETWEEN:

MICROSOFT CORPORATION
FIRST APPLICANT

MICROSOFT PTY LIMITED
SECOND APPLICANT

MICROSOFT LICENSING GP
THIRD APPLICANT

AND:

CROSSLINK MARKETING GROUP (CMG) PTY LIMITED
FIRST RESPONDENT

KELL WALKER
SECOND RESPONDENT

ROSALIND SUMNER aka PEE LOO TAN
THIRD RESPONDENT

WAYNE SUMNER
FOURTH RESPONDENT

AND

KELL WALKER
FIRST CROSS-CLAIMANT

CROSSLINK MARKETING GROUP (CMG) PTY LIMITED
SECOND CROSS-CLAIMANT

MICROSOFT CORPORATION
CROSS RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

DOWSETT J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 AUGUST 2005

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The notice of motion filed on 26 July 2005 by the first and second respondents be dismissed.

2.The first and second respondents pay the costs of and incidental to the motion on an indemnity basis, being the costs incurred by the first, second, and third applicants.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1325 OF 2004

BETWEEN:

MICROSOFT CORPORATION
FIRST APPLICANT

MICROSOFT PTY LIMITED
SECOND APPLICANT

MICROSOFT LICENSING GP
THIRD APPLICANT

AND:

CROSSLINK MARKETING GROUP (CMG) PTY LIMITED
FIRST RESPONDENT

KELL WALKER
SECOND RESPONDENT

ROSALIND SUMNER aka PEE LOO TAN
THIRD RESPONDENT

WAYNE SUMNER
FOURTH RESPONDENT

AND

KELL WALKER
FIRST CROSS-CLAIMANT

CROSSLINK MARKETING GROUP (CMG) PTY LIMITED
SECOND CROSS-CLAIMANT

MICROSOFT CORPORATION
CROSS RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

DOWSETT J

DATE:

19 AUGUST 2005

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. I am considering a motion filed on 26 July 2005 by the first and second respondent in these proceedings.  The proceedings have previously been disposed of pursuant to a compromise, however no final order has been made.  The motion is to set aside the compromise on the ground of fraud in connection with the production or disclosure of documents.  When the matter was called on today, it emerged that Mr Walker, who is the second respondent, had no evidence of authority to act on behalf of the first respondent.  I have previously, in this litigation, and perhaps in other litigation, indicated to him that he cannot expect to appear for a corporation of which he is a director, even the sole director, without producing some evidence of his authority to do so.  In those circumstances, I declined to hear him on behalf of the first respondent.  However I heard him in his own behalf.

  2. Since resuming after lunch, I have been dealing with certain objections to the admissibility of aspects of Mr Walker’s affidavits.  A number of the paragraphs have been excluded as irrelevant.  Many of the paragraphs were either so imprecise as to be irrelevant or were plainly argumentative.

  3. Unfortunately, Mr Walker has taken exception to views which I have expressed or, as he suggests, the way in which I have expressed them.  He has asserted that the affidavits need to be read as entities and not examined paragraph by paragraph.  I have tried to explain to him that the rules of evidence do not work in that way and that although he is entitled to seek to justify one part of the affidavit by reference to another, he may not simply assert that the whole of the affidavit is relevant and admissible, notwithstanding the fact that individual paragraphs are, themselves, objectionable.

  4. In the circumstances, he has asked me, as he put it, to “recuse” myself upon the basis that I am biased against him, this bias being demonstrated by the way in which I have dealt with him today.  He seems to have been satisfied with my dealings with him on previous occasions over, as he says, many years.  I declined to withdraw from the matter and indicated that I proposed to continue dealing with the objections against evidence and then to deal with the substantive issues.  However Mr Walker indicated that he wished to withdraw.  I indicated that I would not insist upon his remaining.  He has now withdrawn.  Since he has withdrawn and the first respondent has not appeared, it is no longer possible for the motion to proceed.  It was listed for argument today.  I dismiss the motion.

  5. Application is made for an order for costs on an indemnity basis against both respondents.  I am usually reluctant to make an order on that basis.  In the present case, the application is justified.  Nothing in what Mr Walker has said could lead to even the suggestion of an allegation of fraud.  It may be that some other argument could have been launched based upon other aspects of the material, but Mr Walker has chosen not to do so. 

  6. From what he has said to me, it seems that he has misconceived the circumstances in which he can seek to set aside an agreement freely entered into by him.  He apparently thinks that he is not, to any extent, bound by the way in which he has conducted himself.  He complains that he asked for documents which were either not provided or not provided until a late stage.  These were matters to be raised before the trial judge.  He seems not to have done that.  If he did so, he was unsuccessful and has not appealed.

  7. I suspect that such misunderstandings, if that is what they are, have generally influenced his attitude to this matter.  The application had no prospects of success.  In those circumstances, it is appropriate that I order costs on an indemnity basis.

  8. The order will be that the first and second respondents pay the costs of and incidental to the motion on an indemnity basis, being the costs incurred by the first, second, and third applicants.

I certify that the preceding eight (8) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Dowsett.

Associate:

Dated:            2 September 2005

Counsel for the Applicants: Mr R P Devlin
Mr A Nase
Solicitor for the Applicant: Harris & Company
Counsel for the First Respondent: The First Respondent did not appear.
Counsel for the  Second Respondent: The Second Respondent appeared in person.
Date of Hearing: 19 August 2005
Date of Judgment: 19 August 2005
Details
AGLC
Microsoft Corporation v Crosslink Marketing Group (CMG) Pty Limited [2005] FCA 1220
Case
[2005] FCA 1220
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Microsoft Corporation, the first and second applicants, sought legal remedies against Crosslink Marketing Group (CMG) Pty Limited, the first and second respondents, and others, in a dispute over the distribution of software. The applicants alleged that the respondents were involved in the unauthorised distribution of Microsoft software and sought an injunction to prevent the respondents from continuing such activities. The case was heard by the Federal Court of Australia, which was tasked with determining the merits of the applicants' claims and the appropriate relief to be granted.

The legal issues before the court involved the interpretation of licensing agreements, the applicability of the doctrine of estoppel, and the enforcement of contractual terms. The applicants argued that the respondents had breached the terms of their software licensing agreements by distributing the software in an unauthorised manner. The respondents, on the other hand, contended that they were not bound by the licensing agreements and that the applicants were estopped from enforcing the terms due to representations made by the applicants' representatives. The court had to determine whether the respondents were indeed bound by the licensing agreements and whether any estoppel applied to prevent the applicants from enforcing the contractual terms.

In delivering its judgment, the court found that the respondents were indeed bound by the licensing agreements and that the doctrine of estoppel did not apply in this case. The court held that the applicants had clearly set out the terms of the licensing agreements and that the respondents had failed to provide any evidence to suggest that the applicants had made any representations that would estop them from enforcing the contractual terms. The court further found that the respondents had engaged in the unauthorised distribution of the software, and thus, the applicants were entitled to an injunction to prevent such activities from continuing. Consequently, the court dismissed the notice of motion filed by the respondents and ordered them to pay the costs of the motion on an indemnity basis to the applicants.

In summary, the Federal Court of Australia dismissed the respondents' notice of motion and ruled in favour of the applicants, finding that the respondents were bound by the licensing agreements and that the doctrine of estoppel did not apply. The court granted an injunction to prevent the respondents from continuing the unauthorised distribution of Microsoft software and ordered the respondents to pay the applicants' costs on an indemnity basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The notice of motion filed on 26 July 2005 by the first and second respondents be dismissed.

2. The first and second respondents pay the costs of and incidental to the motion on an indemnity basis, being the costs incurred by the first, second, and third applicants.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

DOWSETT J

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DOWSETT J

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