Michaela Barlow v The Law Society of the Act

[2013] HCASL 142

MICHAELA BARLOW

v

THE LAW SOCIETY OF THE ACT

[2013] HCASL 142
C8/2013

1. The applicant was admitted as a legal practitioner of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory in 2000 and was granted a restricted practising certificate.  In 2004, her application for an unrestricted practising certificate was refused by the respondent ("the 2004 decision").  In 2010, she made a fresh application, claiming that the 2004 decision was wrongly decided.  The respondent refused this application ("the 2010 decision"), and the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory.  Before the appeal was heard, the applicant made a third application, which the respondent refused on 31 August 2011 ("the 2011 decision").  The applicant amended her notice of appeal to include a challenge to the 2011 decision.

2. On 12 April 2013, the Full Court of the Supreme Court (Refshauge, Burns and Marshall JJ) dismissed the appeal.  With respect to the 2004 decision, their Honours held that the applicant had not satisfied the eligibility requirement in the Legal Practitioners Act 1970 (ACT) of having completed a prescribed course of training for the practice of law. She had not done so because the executive had not in fact prescribed such a course. It followed that the respondent had no power to issue an unrestricted practising certificate to the applicant in 2004, and it had not erred in refusing to do so. The applicant was also ineligible for the issue of an unrestricted practising certificate under the Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT) and its associated Regulation. Their Honours were not satisfied on the material before them that the applicant had attained the requisite level of professional skill and experience. Therefore, the respondent had not erred in making the 2010 decision or the 2011 decision.

3. On 15 May 2013, the Full Court ordered that the applicant pay the costs of the appeal, but not those in relation to an earlier hearing before Refshauge J which was aborted for procedural reasons.

4. The applicant requires an extension of time to file her application for special leave to appeal to this Court.  The application continues to press arguments advanced below and makes unparticularised assertions of bias against the Full Court and the respondent.  Nothing is raised which casts doubt on the correctness of the decision below.  The extension should not be granted.

5. Pursuant to r 41.10.5 we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application.

S.M. Kiefel
4 September 2013 P.A. Keane