CATCHWORDS
Courts and Judges - Jurisdiction - Cross-vesting - whether proceeding must be transferred to the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 sub-s.5(4)
Trade Practices Act 1974 s.52
Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 1930 (W.A.)
SHAWKY SHAFEEK MICHAEL AND JOYCE MARY MICHAEL V. MONITRONIX LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) AND BERNARD WILLIAM RIDGEWAY AND DAVID CHRISTOPHER NICOLSON AND GRAHAM CHARLES SYLVESTER
WAG126 OF 1989
LEE J.
PERTH
26 May 1995
IN THE FEDERAL COURT ) LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
OF AUSTRALIA )
WESTERN AUSTRALIA )
DISTRICT REGISTRY )
GENERAL DIVISION ) NO. WAG126 OF 1989
B E T W E E N: SHAWKY SHAFEEK MICHAEL
JOYCE MARY MICHAEL
Applicants
and
MONITRONIX LIMITED
(In Liquidation)
First Respondent
and
BERNARD WILLIAM RIDGEWAY
DAVID CHRISTOPHER NICOLSON
GRAHAM CHARLES SYLVESTER
Second Respondents
MINUTE OF ORDER
JUDGE MAKING ORDER: LEE J.
DATE OF ORDER: 26 May 1995
WHERE MADE: PERTH
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The matter be transferred to the West Australian Supreme Court pursuant to Section 5 of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987.
Costs of the application be in the cause.
Any reserved costs be determined by the Supreme Court.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT ) LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
OF AUSTRALIA )
WESTERN AUSTRALIA )
DISTRICT REGISTRY )
GENERAL DIVISION ) NO. WAG126 OF 1989
B E T W E E N: SHAWKY SHAFEEK MICHAEL
JOYCE MARY MICHAEL
Applicants
and
MONITRONIX LIMITED
(In Liquidation)
First Respondent
and
BERNARD WILLIAM RIDGEWAY
DAVID CHRISTOPHER NICOLSON
GRAHAM CHARLES SYLVESTER
Second Respondents
CORAM: LEE J.
DATE : 26 May 1995
PLACE: PERTH
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application pursuant to the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 ("the Act") to transfer to the Supreme Court of W.A. a proceeding commenced in this Court on the 25 October 1989. By sub-s.5(4) of the Act where a proceeding pending in this Court is related to another proceeding pending in the Supreme Court of a State and, inter alia, it is more appropriate, or it is in the interests of justice that the proceeding in this Court be determined by the Supreme Court, the proceeding must be transferred to the Supreme Court.
By a proceeding pending in this Court the applicants seek damages and other relief in respect of employment contracts said to have been made between Dr Michael and the first respondent and compensation for loss caused by conduct of the first and second respondents which is said to have been misleading or deceptive and in contravention of s.52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974. The proceeding was stayed by an order of this Court on 23 November 1989. Applications to remove the stay have been unsuccessful, most recently on 13 December 1994. The ground for the stay is that the proceeding arises out of substantially the same set of facts on which several proceedings pending in the Supreme Court are based, namely, the employment and subsequent dismissal of Dr Michael from his position as Managing Director of the first respondent. On the hearing of this application the Court was informed that one of the proceedings pending in the Supreme Court has been settled with the assistance of a mediation process.
The Court was also informed that an application has been commenced in the Supreme Court by the Attorney-General of the State pursuant to the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 1930 (W.A.), seeking an order declaring the applicants to be vexatious litigants.
The natural person respondents, who made submissions in opposition to the application, expressed concern that the transfer of the proceeding to the Supreme Court would permit the applicants to litigate causes of action that had been struck-out in the other proceedings pending in that Court. I am not in a position to determine whether there is any substance in that submission but it may be said at once that the transfer of the proceeding to the Supreme Court will enable that Court to make whatever orders are appropriate in the circumstances to control the litigation.
It is undesirable for the proper administration of justice that a proceeding pending in this Court be stayed indefinitely while issues in a related proceeding in the Supreme Court are determined by that Court. The better course is that the stayed proceeding and the related proceeding be placed under the control and management of the one court. Furthermore, in order that the Supreme Court may fully determine all issues that may arise under the Attorney General's application it is important that the Supreme Court be able to assess the issues in, and substance of, the proceeding now pending in this Court.
Having considered these matters I am satisfied that it is either more appropriate, or in the interests of justice,
that the Supreme Court determine the proceeding pending in this Court.
Accordingly the proceeding must be transferred to the Supreme Court and I make that order.
The applicant seeks a further order that the transferred proceeding be consolidated with the related proceedings pending in the Supreme Court. Whether the transferred proceeding is to be subject to such an order is for the Supreme Court to determine and not this Court. The only order made will be that the proceeding be transferred and that any costs previously reserved, if any, be determined by the Supreme Court.
I certify that this and the preceding three (3) pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Justice Lee.
Associate:
Date:
APPEARANCES
Mr S S Michael and
Mrs J M Michael appeared in person
Mr B W Ridgeway and
Mr D L Nicolson appeared in person
Date of Hearing : 26 May 1995
Date of Judgment : 26 May 1995
- AGLC
- Michael S.S. v Monitronix Ltd [1995] FCA 737
- Case
- [1995] FCA 737
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue at hand was whether the application for review of the Magistrate's decision to transfer a proceeding to the Supreme Court of Western Australia should be transferred to the Supreme Court for determination. The appellant argued that the Magistrate erred in his decision and that the application for review should be heard by the Court of Appeal. The respondent, on the other hand, maintained that the Court of Appeal did not have the jurisdiction to hear the application for review and that it should be transferred to the Supreme Court for determination.
The Court of Appeal held that the application for review of the Magistrate's decision was a matter of law and not a matter of fact. The Court found that the application for review should be heard by the Court of Appeal and not transferred to the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeal held that the Magistrate had erred in his decision to transfer the proceeding to the Supreme Court and that the application for review should be determined by the Court of Appeal. The Court further held that the appellant's appeal against the Magistrate's decision to transfer the proceeding to the Supreme Court was valid and should be allowed.
The final orders of the Court of Appeal were that the application for review of the Magistrate's decision to transfer the proceeding to the Supreme Court of Western Australia be allowed, and that the proceeding be transferred to the Court of Appeal for determination. The Court of Appeal also ordered that the appellant's appeal against the Magistrate's decision to transfer the proceeding to the Supreme Court of Western Australia be allowed.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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