MICHAEL MURRIHY and TEEKAY SHIPPING (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD

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Administrative Appeals Tribunal

DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2009] AATA 957

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL      )

)          No 2009/1829

GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION )
Re MICHAEL MURRIHY

Applicant

And

TEEKAY SHIPPING (AUSTRALIA)
PTY LTD

Respondent

DECISION

Tribunal Senior Member Bernard J McCabe

Date15 December 2009

PlaceBrisbane

Decision The Tribunal affirms the reviewable decision.

.....................[Sgd].........................

Senior Member

8.The word “injury” is defined in s 3 of the Act to mean:

(a)a disease; or

(b)an injury (other than a disease) suffered by an employee, being a physical or mental injury arising out of, or in the course of, the employee's employment; or

(c)an aggravation of a physical or mental injury (other than a disease) suffered by an employee (whether or not that injury arose out of, or in the course of, the employee's employment), being an aggravation that arose out of, or in the course of, that employment;

but does not include anything suffered by an employee as a result of reasonable disciplinary action taken against the employee, or failure by the employee to obtain a promotion, transfer or benefit in connection with his or her employment.

9.      The respondent says the meaning of the word “injury” is clear: one must have regard to what the employee was earning prior to the date on which the injury occurred. In this case, that was 6 January 2008. Mr Murrihy expressly abandoned any argument that he experienced an aggravation of an injury in November 2008. It follows that the events of November 2008 are irrelevant, at least for present purposes.

10. Ms Hartigan agreed the words of s 13 of the Act suggested that outcome if read in isolation. But she argued this interpretation was inconsistent with the policy evident in the Act. She cited a number of cases, including Re Spurr v Comcare [1999] AATA 43; (1999) 28 AAR 424 and Bortolazzo v Comcare [1997] FCA 515; (1997) 75 FCR 385 that held injured workers should not be worse off during the period of incapacity that follows a workplace injury. Given that policy, and given the beneficial nature of the Act, Ms Hartigan argued it was appropriate to interpret the word “injury” in a way that permitted the decision-maker to have regard to the FSO allowance. To do otherwise, she argued, would be to penalise the employee.

11. Ms Hartigan said the respondent’s approach to s 13 of the Act would produce perverse outcomes. She said the respondent’s interpretation of s 13 does not accommodate a situation like the present where the period of incapacity begins some time after the injury. In particular, Ms Hartigan argues the respondent’s interpretation of the section does not appear to contemplate the possibility of an employee’s pay changing in his favour during the intervening period. Ms Hartigan suggested that approach to the section is inconsistent with the policy of the Act.

12.     

I disagree. Firstly, I do not think there is any ambiguity in the word “injury” in


s 13. That…

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Details
Case
[2009] AATA 957
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this matter, Michael Murrihy, a seafarer, and Teekay Shipping (Australia) Pty Ltd were before the court in a dispute regarding workers’ compensation. The primary issue was the calculation of Murrihy's normal weekly earnings for the purposes of determining his incapacity benefits. The dispute centred on whether an allowance paid to Murrihy after his injury but before his incapacity should be included in the calculation of his normal weekly earnings. The case was heard and reviewed by the Tribunal.

The central legal issue the court had to address was the interpretation of the term “normal weekly earnings” as it pertains to seafarers under the Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the period for calculating these earnings begins at the time of the injury or at the time of incapacity. Additionally, the court had to consider the relevance of an allowance paid post-injury but before incapacity in the calculation of normal weekly earnings. This required a careful statutory interpretation of the relevant provisions and the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.

The court examined the statutory language and the purpose behind the Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act, referencing the principle in Mills v Meeking that the purpose of the Act cannot be used to construe the words of a provision in a way that is manifestly different from what Parliament intended. The court found that normal weekly earnings should be calculated from the time of the injury, not from the time of incapacity. The court concluded that the allowance paid post-injury but before incapacity should not be included in the calculation. Therefore, the Tribunal affirmed the reviewable decision, upholding the original determination regarding the calculation of normal weekly earnings.

Orders

Orders of the court

The Tribunal affirms the reviewable decision.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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