Michael and Repatriation Commission
[2005] AATA 1261
•1 December 2005
Administrative
Appeals
Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2005] AATA 1261
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No Q2005/413
VETERANS' APPEALS DIVISION ) Re WILLIAM MICHAEL (DECEASED) Applicant
And
REPATRIATION COMMISSION
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Dr EK Christie, Member Date1 December 2005
PlaceBrisbane
Decision For the reasons given orally at the hearing the Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and decides that the late Mr Michael was entitled to disability pension at 100% of the General Rate from 27 June 2002 to 1 January 2003.
The Tribunal raises the possibility of an Act of Grace payment in the factual circumstances.
…………[Sgd]………………….. EK Christie
Member
CATCHWORDS
VETERANS’ ENTITLEMENTS – disability pension – entitlement to general rate - entitlement to special rate – the “alone” test - Act of Grace Payment.
Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 ss 24, 175
Forbes v Repatriation Commission (2000) 101 FCR 50
Flentjar v Repatriation Commission (1997) 48 ALD 1Re Starcevich and Repatriation Commission (1986) 10 ALN 202
Re Doyle and Repatriation Commission (1986) 47 ALD 187
Jackman v Repatriation Commission [1997] FCA 564
Cavell v Repatriation Commission (1988) 9 AAR 534
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 2 ALD 60
Re Robertson and Repatriation Commission (1999) 50 ALD 668
Re Hornery and Repatriation Commission [1998] AATA 602.
Fox v Repatriation Commission (1997) 45 ALD 317WRITTEN REASONS FOR ORAL DECISION
20 December 2005 Dr E K Christie, Member 1. This is an application by Mrs Katherine Michael, as the legal representative of her late husband, for a review of the decision made by the Veterans’ Review Board dated 10 March 2005, that increased disability pension from 80% to 90% of the General Rate with effect from 27 June 2002 .
2. At the hearing, Mrs Michael represented her late husband. The respondent was represented by Mr J Kelly, a Departmental Advocate.
3. The Tribunal had before it documents lodged pursuant to section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (the ‘T’ documents) and the various documents tendered by the parties.
Facts
4. The late Mr Michael was born on 21 May 1949. He volunteered, at the age of 19, and served with the Australian Army in South Vietnam from February 1970 until March 1971.
5. During the period Mr Michael rendered operational service in South Vietnam, he served as a rifleman in a Company of Pioneers.
6. The late Mr Michael commenced employment with the Brisbane City Council (BCC) as a town planner in 1979.
7. The late Mr Michael was diagnosed with a cerebral tumour on 29 October 2001. He had surgery a few days later, followed by chemotherapy. Following surgery, he suffered from a loss of balance and required a walking stick for support. His prognosis, initially, was satisfactory and he returned to work with the BCC on 11 February 2002 on a rehabilitation program. In May 2002, rails and home aids were installed in his home following several falls.
8. Because of an increase in tumour size, his prognosis deteriorated and ultimately, the late Mr Michael ceased work on 27 September 2002, being granted a voluntary medical redundancy.
9. Mr Michael died on 1 January 2003. The Death Certificate recorded the cause of death as being (a) Pneumonia – 2 days and (b) Right Temporal Lobe Glioblastoma – 14 months.
10. Mr Michael had the following conditions accepted as “service related”:
(a)Post Traumatic Stress Disorder;
(b)Sensori-Neural Hearing Loss;
(c)Otitis Externa;
(d)Solar Keratosis; and
(e)Basal Cell Carcinoma
11. There was no evidence before the Tribunal as to the date that the late Mr Michael’s PTSD was accepted as a “service related” medical condition. Following the hearing, the Respondent responded to a Tribunal request and advised that the late Mr Michael’s PTSD was accepted as a “service related” medical condition as of 21 April 2000.
12. The late Mr Michael had no rejected injuries or diseases.
Issues to be Decided
13. The parties agreed at the commencement of the hearing that the only issue for the Tribunal to decide was whether the late Mr Michael was entitled to pension at the “Special Rate” at some period before his death. In turn, it was further agreed by the parties that the resolution of this issue only related to the application of the “alone test”, in sub-section 24(1)(c), to the late Mr Michael’s factual circumstances.
14. At the commencement of the hearing, Mr Kelly, for the Respondent, stated that the late Mr Michael was entitled to disability pension at 100% of the “General Rate” from 27 June 2002 to 1 January 2003.
Examination of Evidence
§ Katherine Michael: Wife of the Late Veteran
15. Mrs Michael considered that the VRB process was unfair to her husband. The decision-making process failed to consider the full spectrum of her late husband’s medical conditions, and their impacts on him, over time. The ratings given to him did not truly reflect the true state of his health over time.
16. Mrs Michael said that she and the late Mr Michael had been together since 1979. From this time, her late husband had complained of headaches. Moreover, he never spoke of his experiences in Vietnam or to become involved in Anzac Day or other military remembrances. She said that from this time, there was a gradual and continual change in his emotional and behavioural problems. One early example was his fearful reaction to helicopters flying overhead.
17. A critical point arose following a severe rain storm in 1996 when her late husband became so disorientated and aggressive – to the extent that she felt that there was a need to protect their children for their emotional safety.
18. As a consequence of these significant emotional and behavioural changes, her late husband eventually accepted her suggestion that they contact “Relationships Australia” for professional assistance. Following this intervention, the late Mr Michael next sought professional assistance from the “Vietnam Veterans’ Counselling Service”, commencing 15 May 2000. From this date until 13 May 2002, the late Mr Michael had 15 appointments for counselling (T13, Folio 57).
19. Mrs Michael described the period 1996-97 as a period that was particularly difficult for her late husband. Not only was his position as a town planner downgraded following a BCC restructure, the restructuring set him off on a long and strenuous emotional journey.
20. Mrs Michael said that the primary reason that her late husband could continue practising his professional as a town planner, whilst suffering from PTSD, was because of considerable support from herself – as well as “workplace protection” provided by his colleagues. She described her late husband as having a stoic personality and would not give up working – including after being diagnosed with a brain tumour. His personality was such that he would work until “he dropped”.
21. Mrs Michael recounted an episode where her late husband thought the Viet Cong were present at a BCC staff meeting and had become disorientated and fearful of the situation that he believed he was in.
22. Mrs Michael concluded with the statement that, at no time, had her late husband ever informed his treating doctor, Dr Cross, about the emotional and behavioural changes that he experienced over time.
23. The Tribunal notes that Dr Cross retired due to ill health in 2002 (see Statement of Dr R Gooch: T13, Folio 52).
§ Other Evidence and Information Before the Tribunal
24. The following witnesses were not called to give evidence at the Tribunal hearing.
(a) Dr Alston Unwin (Consultant Psychiatrist)
25. On 30 May 2002, Dr Unwin states that the “natural history” of [Mr Michael’s] chronic PTSD had been caused by his active service in Vietnam (T5, Folio 20).
26. On 18 September 2002 (T15, Folio 67), Dr Unwin states:
“This is to state that I have treated and continue to treat Mr William Michael for his Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. I first saw him on 5th July 2000.
Mr Michael’s condition was caused by his service in Viet Nam(sic) and he coped with [PTSD] for many years – not confiding in anyone about it. For the last eighteen months I have counselled him to cease work as it was increasingly causing him problems at work and in his personal life….
During his working life he had many examples of problems which arose from his [PTSD] condition but it was the escalation and the specificity that forced me to come to the conclusion that to continue with work would be counterproductive to he and his employer. He was always a conscientious worker and did not wish to let his employer down …For many years through a process of denial and an unwillingness to give up employment he persisted in carrying out his work. In spite of THE many advices I gave him over the past year or so especially, he refused to cease his working life. More recently it became more and more obvious that my advice to cease work was accurate. The things that pushed him in this direction was his increasing PTSD symptoms especially the flashbacks which increasingly occurred at his workplace. Thought and image intrusions also markedly increased.” [Emphasis added]
(b) Michael Kerry, Divisional Manager BCC
27. On 11 September 2002 (T15, Folio 55), Mr Kerry confirmed that the late Mr Michael had taken considerable leave over the past two (2) years to assist in coping with a Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, and that they had first discussed the difficulties he was having as a result of the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in mid 2001.
(c) Peter Cummings, Manager, City Planning, BCC
28. On 27 September 2002, Mr Cummings stated that:
“the late Mr Michael had told me that he was undergoing analysis and treatment for post traumatic stress disorder in early July 2000. He explained that as a result of experiences in Vietnam, that ‘his past was catching up with him’. He made references to his Vietnam experiences and I was able to gain some insight into how and why Bill felt as he did. Physically Bill appeared quite shaken at this time and I suggested he take sick leave.”
In addition, Mr Cummings wrote that:
“Bill did not wish that his [PTSD] condition be widely known”.
(d) Jurgen Hanisch, Principal Program Officer, BCC
29. In a document dated 11 September 2002 (T13, Folio 54) Mr Hanisch recalled past conversations in “late 2000” with the late Mr Michael concerning his work performance.
30. His statement contains the following record:
“During conversations which we have held since August of that year [2002] you advised me that you were undergoing treatment for post traumatic stress disorder. You explained that this was the reason for your diminished ability to perform your duties at work. I also recall that annual leave which you took since that time was due to your need to be absent from work due to post traumatic stress order. Further, you advised me prior to the CHOGM meeting originally programmed, that your doctor had advised you to leave Brisbane for the duration of CHOGM. You advised me at the time that your doctor was concerned that the expected military presence in the City would be hazardous for your condition.”
The Tribunal’s Decision Making Powers
31. There are a number of decisions possible in this application for review: whether the disability pension should be increased beyond 80% of the General Rate, or whether the late Mr Michael was entitled to the disability pension at the Special Rate – in either case, for some defined period of time? Accordingly, the question for the Tribunal to decide was whether the decision under review was the preferred decision: see Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 2 ALD 60 at 68.
Legal Principles
32. The Tribunal has considered and applied the following case law authorities for the issue to be decided: the requirements of the “alone test” contained in subsection 24(1)(c) of the Veterans Entitlement Act 1986 (the ”VE Act”). The first limb of section 24(1)(c) reads:
“(c)the veteran is, by reason of incapacity from that war-caused injury or war-caused disease, or both, alone, prevented from continuing to undertake remunerative work that the veteran was undertaking…” [Tribunal emphasis].
33. With respect to the requirements of subsection 24(1)(c), Nicholson J referred to the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Flentjar v Repatriation Commission (1997) 48 ALD 1 at pages 4-5 where the Court said that the issues before the Tribunal were:
“1.What was the relevant ‘remunerative work that the veteran was undertaking’ within the meaning of s 24(1)(c) of the Act?
2.Is the veteran, by reason of war-caused injury or war-caused disease, or both, prevented from continuing to undertake that work?
3.If the answer to question 2 is yes, is the war-caused injury or war-caused disease, or both, the only factor or factors preventing the veteran from continuing to undertake that work? [Tribunal emphasis].
4.If the answers to questions 2 and 3 are, in each case, yes, is the veteran by reason of being prevented from continuing to undertake that work, suffering a loss of salary, wages or earnings on his own account that he would not be suffering if he were free of that incapacity?”
34. The question of a combination of war service conditions and non-war caused conditions and undertaking remunerative work, was next considered by Nicholson J in Forbes v Repatriation Commission (2000) 101 FCR 50 at page 57:
“As in the case of the present applicant, it is possible that the war-caused condition will be far and away the more dominant of the causes of the preventative effect where there is also present a non war-caused condition having such effect in combination. The result is that the presence of the latter will deny to a veteran qualification for the special rate of pension. Parliament has sought to ameliorate this position by the provisions in s 24(2)(b), to which reference has been made. To date, the applicant has been unable to qualify pursuant to that provision. Whether he can qualify pursuant to that provision in the future remains a question for consideration” [Tribunal emphasis].
35. With respect to the third question identified in Flentjar, Burchett J in Cavell v Repatriation Commission (1988) 9 AAR 534 agreed with the following statement by the Tribunal, in terms of it clearly revealing an application of the statutory test, in an unexceptional manner, to the material in evidence before the Tribunal:
“that it followed from the use of the word ‘alone’ in s.24, that any factor having employment consequences which played a part in the applicant’s inability to work or to obtain and hold remunerative employment, is sufficient to displace the applicant’s case for pension at the special rate.”
36. If a veteran falls within section 24(2)(b), the veteran is relieved from the “alone” requirement in section 24(1)(c). However, the Tribunal must also be satisfied that the veteran would, but for the incapacity, be continuing to seek or to engage in work and that war caused incapacity “is the substantial cause of his or her inability to obtain remunerative work’”: see Hornery and Repatriation Commission [1998] AATA 602.
37. The meaning of the term ”substantial cause” in section 24(2)(b) was considered in Fox v Repatriation Commission(1997) 45 ALD 317. Kiefel FCJ noted that this term “requires that, if the incapacity is not of itself productive of an inability to obtain work, it is nevertheless the operative factor which, more than any other explains it. That, something might be a “substantial cause” has regard to the situation where there may be a number of factors operating which are of sufficient causal significance to qualify as ‘substantial’...”
38. The above matters must be satisfied to the reasonable satisfaction of the Tribunal in accordance with the standard in subsection 120(4): Re Starcevich and Repatriation Commission (1986) 10 ALN 202; Re Doyle and Repatriation Commission (1986) 47 ALD 187. That meant, as Tamberlin J noted in Jackman v Repatriation Commission [1997] FCA 564:
“The AAT had to determine, to its reasonable satisfaction, whether the applicant’s war-caused disabilities were the only reason for him not being in remunerative employment. Burchett J in Cavell stated that this determination is not to be made upon ‘nice philosophical distinctions’, equally it is not to be made upon complex calculations of the probability that an intervening event may have occurred. The approach is to be guided by commonsense with an ‘eye to reality.”
Consideration of the Issues: Application of Facts to the Law
39. The Tribunal firstly considers the requirements of section 24(1)(c) and the “alone test” as defined in Flentjar’s case, Forbes’ case and Cavell’s case.
40. The relevant period to consider in relation to Flentjar’s case and entitlement to “Special Rate” is 21 April 2000 (the date PTSD was an accepted disability) and 27 September 2002 (the date the late Mr Michael ceased work).
41. During this period, the late Mr Michael continued work as a town planner with the BCC notwithstanding limitations in his capacity to perform and to work effectively in his profession (see paras 20, 27-30) as well as the reservations noted by Dr Unwin (see para 26). Mrs Michael’s evidence that described the late Mr Michael’s stoic personality, and his dedication and determination to continue working as a town planner, explains why he continued working with PTSD – possibly when other people with a similar condition would have ceased work. Dr Unwin had, in fact, recommended the late Mr Michael to cease work – but this was on 30 May 2002 following the cerebral tumour.
42. In its reasons for decision the VRB states:
“The evidence from the applicant [Mrs Michael] is that following surgery [October 2001] her husband suffered loss of balance, walked with the aid of a stick, had rails and aids installed in the home in May 2002 and when well enough to work was transported there by taxi. There is no suggestion that the need for these resulted from his post traumatic stress disorder”.
43. The Tribunal accepts this conclusion made by the VRB as it is consistent with the evidence and materials before the Tribunal.
44. Applying the above facts to the legal principles in the Forbes and Cavell cases, the Tribunal is reasonably satisfied that the late Mr Michael cannot meet the requirements of the “alone” test in section 24(1)(c) over the period 29 October 2001 (the date the cerebral tumour was diagnosed) and 27 September 2002. The impacts of his cerebral tumour (a non-accepted disability) and his PTSD both played a part in his inability to work and to cease work. That is, the late Mr Michael’s PTSD was not the only factor preventing him from undertaking work as a town planner.
45. Unfortunately the ameliorative provision [section 24(2)(b)] cannot apply to the late Mr Michael’s case as applying the legal principle in Fox’s case, the Tribunal can make no other conclusion than to find that it is “reasonably satisfied” that the late Mr Michael’s cerebral tumour was the “operative factor” – or the “substantial cause” of his inability to work and to cease employment as a town planner.
46. Based on the evidence before the Tribunal for the period 21 April 2000 (date of effect of PTSD) and 28 October 2001 (prior to the diagnosis of the cerebral tumour), the late Mr Michael continued work as a town planner. The effects of his PTSD on his ability to work as a town planner have been referred to in the decision (see para 41) and presumably considered in assessment under GARP. This being the situation, the Tribunal cannot vary the GARP assessment as there is no further evidence led, in this regard, which justifies any variation in this assessment, for this specific time period.
47. As a result of these conclusions, the Tribunal has no option other than to find that:
(a)The late Mr Michael was not entitled to disability pension at the Special Rate from 29 October 2001 (the date that a CAT scan diagnosed a cerebral tumour that proved to be untreatable and terminal : see also the Report of Dr Gooch, 23 September 2002 at Folio 51). The cerebral tumour had employment consequences for the late Mr Michael - to continue work and then to cease work as a town planner; and
(b)There is no evidentiary basis to vary the rate of pension entitlement rate over the period 21 April 2000 to 28 October 2002.
48. Whilst this outcome may seem harsh, it would be more appropriate to describe the outcome as unfortunate. The legislation and the case law give the Tribunal no other option than to make such findings. There is no discretion in the legislation for the Tribunal to make any other decision based on the application of the law to the evidence before the Tribunal.
49. However, the Tribunal does raise for consideration by Mrs Michael and the Repatriation Commission, the Departmental Policy Guideline “Act of Grace Payments” (Part 3, Chapter 9).
50. The Departmental Policy Guideline states as follows:
“Section 3 Act of Grace Payments
What is an Act of Grace payment
An Act of Grace payment may be made where a person has suffered a loss. Although there is no legal liability on the Commonwealth to meet the loss, it is considered that the Commonwealth bears some responsibility for the loss…
Eligibility for an Act of Grace payment
Eligibility for an Act of Grace payment depends on the claimant’s circumstances and a wide range of matters may be taken into account to determine eligibility although there is no set eligibility criteria for an Act of Grace payment, claims may be considered where:
§a person received incorrect advice leading to detriment, but where there is no legal liability
§a matter is covered by legislation, but its application produces a result which is unintended, anomalous, inequitable or otherwise unacceptable
§it is considered desirable to apply the benefits of proposed legislation, or
§there are other special circumstances where there may be a moral obligation to make a payment
Request for an Act of Grace payment
Requests for ‘Act of Grace payments’ can arise from almost any aspect of Commonwealth administration and include payments normally paid under Part III (service pension) or Part IIIA (income support supplement) of the VEA.
Claims for Act of Grace payments
A claim for an Act of Grace payment should first be considered under the criteria for ‘compensation for detriment caused by administrative error’. If a claim satisfies that criteria it will be determined under the compensation for detriment provisions. Claims that do not satisfy the compensation criteria may be determined under the Act of Grace provisions.”
51. In relation to the Departmental “Act of Grace Policy”, the Tribunal considers that there is no issue for a claim under the Departmental Policy, “Compensation for Detriment caused by Administrative Error”, as there appears to be no departmental error or administrative procedures that normally would have applied to Mr Michael’s circumstances.
52. In any external consideration of the possibility for an Act of Grace Payment, due regard must be given to the following concerns raised by Mrs Michael in terms of whether the application of the VE Act has produced a result which “is unintended, anomalous, inequitable or otherwise unacceptable”:
· not only was she excluded from establishing that her late husband was entitled to pension at the Special Rate because of the operation of section 24 of the VE Act; but
· she is now also denied making an application for a widow’s pension because not one of the five factors that are required in the “Malignant Neoplasm of the Brain SoP (No. 17 of 2003)”, to establish a reasonable hypotheses connecting the death of her late husband from Malignant Neoplasm of the Brain and the circumstances of his operational service, cannot be supported by the factual evidence before the Tribunal
53. However, there is relevant information provided by Mrs Michael in her oral evidence, that may relate to the time of the “clinical onset of the onset of the symptoms of PTSD” in the case of the late Mr Michael.
54. In Re Robertson and Repatriation Commission (1999) 50 ALD 668, the Tribunal gave the following meaning to the phrase “clinical onset”:
“The ‘clinical onset’ of a disease occurs either when a person becomes aware of some feature or symptom which enables a doctor to say the disease was present at that time, or when a finding is made on investigation which is indicative to a doctor of the disease being present at that time.”
55. Based on the evidence and information before the Tribunal, it seems that the clinical onset of the late Mr Michael’s PTSD may have been much earlier than the date the condition was accepted (21 April 2000). Mrs Michael’s oral evidence suggests that clinical symptoms were present as early as 1996. (See paras 17-19) However, there is no medical evidence, before the Tribunal, in this regard as the late Mr Michael did not seek counselling until May 2000 (see para 18). In addition, the Tribunal has noted his stoic personality and traits of dedication and determination to continue working as a town planner over his entire working life. Unfortunately, because of Mr Michael’s death, it is not possible for a psychiatrist to obtain clinical history from him or his symptoms from 1996. Instead, Mrs Michael may need to consider whether she could provide a more complete “history” of her observations over time of her late husband. In this regard, that is, in order to better identify the time of clinical onset of PTSD.
56. Assuming Mrs Michael may be able to provide such information, together with any complementary medical records, opinion or report, such information may well provide the basis for Mrs Michael to make an application for an Act of Grace Payment from a much earlier period of time e.g. 1996 onwards to the date that PTSD was accepted as a “service-related” condition. This matter is one for Mrs Michael to consider and to decide whether it should be pursued.
57. In terms of any long-term consequences on health [or “latent” effects] arising from field patrols undertaken by the late Mr Michael in Vietnam which led to exposure to “2,4,5-T/Dioxin” [‘Agent Orange’]” – as well as further exposure to dioxin on patrols through filling water bottles and then drinking water contaminated by dioxin, the Tribunal has carefully considered the following factors:
(a)The Statements of Principles that link “2,4,5-T/Dioxin” [‘Agent Orange’] exposure to a specific medical condition with the circumstances of operational service; and
(b)The medical evidence that is available to the Tribunal and that has been considered as part of the reviewable decision in relation to the preceding factor.
58. Statements of Principles apply for exposure to 2,4,5 – T by spraying or decanting these herbicides on at least 100 days, in circumstances likely to result in inhalation or absorption of the herbicide, at lease five years before the clinical onset” of Hodgkin’s disease [SoP 25 of 2000]. Myeloma [SoP 55 of 2003, Factor 5(b)]. In addition, SoP 37 of 2003 [Non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma] contains this factor. Other medical conditions related to 2,4, 5-T exposure include “chloracne” and “malignant neoplasm of the prostrate”.
59. Unfortunately, there is no medical evidence before the Tribunal that the late Mr Michael may have suffered from any of these conditions. Nor, in the evidence or materials before the Tribunal, any indication that these medical considerations have been the subject of any review by the Repatriation Commission or the Veterans’ Review Board.
60. In addition, the application of section 175(1) of the Veterans’ Entitlements Act requires the decision of the Repatriation Commission to be affirmed, varied or set aside by the Veterans’ Review Board, before an application can then be made to the Tribunal for a review of the decision of the Commission. In relation to the “Dioxin issue” and the late Mr Michael, this requirement has not been satisfied.
61. Accordingly, the Tribunal concludes that there are no legislative or policy grounds for Mrs Michael to seek entitlements or payments for dioxin exposure of her late husband, at this time.
62. The Tribunal considers, in relation to the Act of Grace policy – but in one specific regard only i.e. the actual date of the clinical onset of PTSD in the late Mr Michael’s case, that the application of the VE Act in Mrs Michael’s factual circumstances, may have led to a result that may warrant the description of an “unintended anomalous, inequitable, unjust or otherwise unacceptable result”. On consideration of the overall circumstances, it may even lead to a conclusion “that there is a moral obligation on the Commonwealth to make a payment”. However, any such consideration will be dependent on the results of any inquiry made by Mrs Michael [see para 55, 56].
63. The Tribunal emphasises that it has no power whatsoever to order that an Act of Grace Payment be made to Mrs Michael. The process for such a payment is for Mrs Michael to make a claim to the Repatriation Commission for an Act of Grace payment and to request that his claim be assessed under the specified eligibility criteria. The final authority to grant an Act of Grace payment does not rest with the Tribunal, but the Minister for Finance or their appointee.
64. For all of the above reasons, the Tribunal decides:
(i)That the late Mr Michael was not entitled to the disability pension at the “Special Rate”; and
(ii)In terms of entitlements under the “General Rate”, the decision under review is set aside and the late Mr Michael was entitled to disability pension at 100% of the “General Rate” from 27 June 2002 to 1 January 2003.
I certify that the 64 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Dr EK Christie, Member
Signed: Jeff Mills
Legal Research OfficerDate of Hearing 1 December 2005
Date of Decision 1 December 2005
Date of Written Reasons for the Decision 20 December 2005
For the Applicant Mrs K Michael
For the Respondent Mr J Kelly, Departmental Advocate
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