Meyer v Falcone
[2002] FCA 751
•11 JUNE 2002
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Meyer v Falcone & Ors [2002] FCA 751
JOHN ANDREW MEYER v JEFFREY JAMES FALCONE and VIVIEN MAY FALCONE AND STOCKDALE & LEGGO AND A.D. PEARCE & CO
T37 OF 2001HEEREY J
11 JUNE 2002
HOBART
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
TASMANIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
T37 OF 2001
BETWEEN:
JOHN ANDREW MEYER
APPLICANTAND:
JEFFREY JAMES FALCONE and VIVIEN MAY FALCONE
FIRST RESPONDENTSSTOCKDALE & LEGGO (ACN 006 078 628)
SECOND RESPONDENTA.D. PEARCE & CO
THIRD RESPONDENTJUDGE:
HEEREY J
DATE OF ORDER:
11 JUNE 2002
WHERE MADE:
HOBART
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.This proceeding T37 of 2001 be cross-vested to the Supreme Court of Tasmania.
2.The applicant’s motion by notice dated 13 May 2002 is dismissed.
3.The applicant’s motion by notice dated 5 June 2002 is dismissed.
4.Costs are reserved.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
TASMANIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
T37 OF 2001
BETWEEN:
JOHN ANDREW MEYER
APPLICANTAND:
JEFFREY JAMES FALCONE and VIVIEN MAY FALCONE
FIRST RESPONDENTSSTOCKDALE & LEGGO (ACN 006 078 628)
SECOND RESPONDENTA.D. PEARCE & CO
THIRD RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
HEEREY J
DATE:
11 JUNE 2002
PLACE:
HOBART
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This proceeding was commenced in this Court on 16 October 2001. The applicant complains of representations which he says were made to him, and which he relied on in entering into a contract to purchase a rural residential property at St Marys in Tasmania. He says the representations were false. The respondents are the vendors, Jeffrey James Falcone and Vivian May Falcone, the vendor’s agents Stockdale and Leggo and a firm of solicitors, A.D. Pearce and Co, who apparently acted for both parties to the contract.
There have been a number of interlocutory proceedings. I need only mention at the moment an order made on 16 April 2002 which struck out the applicant’s statement of claim and ordered a further statement of claim to be filed and served by 14 May. I should add that at all times the applicant has been unrepresented. I did on 22 March 2002 issue a pro bono certificate under Order 80 of the Federal Court Rules for the preparation of a statement of claim, but apparently the applicant has not been able to make any satisfactory arrangement with a practitioner to act on his behalf.
This morning there are before me two notices of motion of the applicant, one dated 13 May 2002 and the other dated 5 June 2002. The first seeks an order allowing further time to deliver the statement of claim beyond 14 May, and also:
“An order of the Court to subsume matter number 144 of 2000, Launceston Registry, Supreme Court of Tasmania, and to adjudicate the claim for damages made by the vendor respondents and the counter claim of the applicant.”
Although I was at first disposed to grant a further extension of time for delivery of the statement of claim until the end of this month, further debate on the second of the orders sought by the applicant disclosed the unsatisfactory state of litigation between the parties.
From what I was told by counsel for the vendors, the Supreme Court action was commenced by them in late 2000. Their case is that upon the applicant’s failure to complete the purchase they treated that as a repudiation of the contract, resold the property at a loss, and are claiming damages of the order of $30,000, being the difference between the price on resale and the contract price.
The applicant has filed a counter-claim alleging misrepresentation and damages. The pleadings have closed and discovery has been completed. There have been four appeals by the applicant to the Full Court of the Supreme Court against interlocutory orders. All have been dismissed, either on the merits or for want of prosecution. The vendors’ counsel told me no there is no impediment to the action proceeding to trial. It seems obvious that what is essentially a dispute about the same matter should not proceed in two Courts, and indeed the applicant himself said that he wanted some consolidation.
The applicant’s arguments for the matter to proceed in the Federal Court rather than the Supreme Court were, first, that the Supreme Court was not a Court of Equity, secondly that he could not get damages awarded against the vendors and thirdly, because of the Closer Economic Relationship Agreement between Australia and New Zealand and he being a New Zealand citizen, the matter should proceed in the Federal Court. These grounds are self-evidently without foundation. The applicant also made some extravagant and scandalous allegations against judges of the Supreme Court. They are recorded on the transcript and I do not propose to repeat them.
I am satisfied that it is very much in the interests of all concerned that this matter be heard in the one court. The appropriate court is the Supreme Court, where this litigation was commenced, and which is the appropriate forum in any event, this dispute being essentially about the contract for the sale of real property in Tasmania. So I will make an order that the matter be cross-vested to the Supreme Court.
The motion by notice dated 13 May 2002 will be dismissed. The other motion before me this morning, the one by notice dated 5 June 2002, sought orders for summary judgment for the applicant and exemplary and punitive damages. That motion will also be dismissed. The costs will be reserved.
I certify that the preceding nine (9) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Heerey. Associate:
Dated: 13 June 2002
Counsel for the Applicant: Self represented Solicitor for the Applicant: Counsel for the First Respondents: Mr D Gunson SC Solicitor for the First Respondents: Gunson Williams Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr K Proctor Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Murdoch Clarke Counsel for the Third Respondent: Mr P Jackson Solicitor for the Third Respondent: Jackson and Tremayne Date of Hearing: 11 June 2002 Date of Judgment: 11 June 2002
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