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Meyer (a pseudonym) v The Queen

Meyer (a pseudonym) v The Queen

Case [2018] VSCA 140 31 May 2018

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SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

S APCR 2017 0102

CONOR MEYER (a pseudonym)[1]	Applicant
v
THE QUEEN	Respondent

[1]To ensure that there is no possibility of identification, this judgment has been anonymised by the adoption of pseudonyms in place of the name of the applicant.

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JUDGES:	MAXWELL ACJ, PRIEST and KAYE JJA
WHERE HELD:	MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING:	23 April 2018
DATE OF ORDERS:	9 May 2018
DATE OF REASONS:	31 May 2018
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2018] VSCA 140
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM:	DPP v [Meyer] (Unreported, County Court of Victoria, Judge Gucciardo, 17 March 2017)

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CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal – Conviction – Indecent assault, sexual penetration of child under 16 – Two complainants – Whether verdicts unsafe and unsatisfactory – Unfavourable prosecution witness – Leave to prosecutor to cross-examine after defence counsel’s cross-examination – Aggregate of errors – Whether substantial miscarriage of justice – Duties of prosecutor – Leave to appeal granted – Appeal allowed – Evidence Act 2008 s 38, Criminal Procedure Act 2009 s 276.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Applicant	Mr C T Carr	Sarah Pratt and Associates
For the Respondent	Mr B L Sonnet	Mr J Cain, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions

MAXWELL ACJ:

Summary

I have had the advantage of reading in draft the reasons for judgment of Priest and Kaye JJA. I gratefully adopt their Honours’ comprehensive account of the evidence given at the applicant’s trial and of the issues raised by the grounds of appeal.

Their Honours would allow the appeal, but only on the basis of the ‘aggregate of errors’ relied on under ground 4. For reasons which follow, I respectfully disagree. In my opinion, there was no miscarriage of justice and the appeal against conviction should be dismissed.

As will appear, I do not regard any of the matters which are now the subject of specific complaint (and which together comprise the ‘aggregate’) as having caused any material prejudice to the defence case. In almost each instance, I regard the course taken by defence counsel as a powerful indicator of the absence of prejudice. None of the matters now the subject of complaint prompted defence counsel to take any of the following steps:

·apply for a discharge of the jury;
·apply for the judge to disqualify himself;
·seek pursuant to s 12 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 a specific direction about the matter; or
·take exception to any aspect of the charge.

In James v The Queen, I referred to a series of decisions in the High Court and in this Court which

emphasise that, in the appellate consideration of whether the course of a trial has occasioned a miscarriage of justice, very great significance is attached to informed decisions made by defence counsel about the best way to conduct the trial in the interests of the accused. As will appear, the proposition which underpins those decisions is that, in an adversarial system, the making of such decisions on behalf of an accused is itself…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Meyer (a pseudonym) v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Meyer (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2018] VSCA 140
Case: [2018] VSCA 140
Decision Date: 31 May 2018

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Meyer v The Queen, the appellant, referred to as Meyer, appealed against his conviction for indecent assault and sexual penetration of a child under 16. The case involved two complainants and was heard in the High Court of Australia. Meyer was convicted based on the testimonies of these two complainants and was sentenced to imprisonment. The appeal centred around the safety and satisfaction of the verdicts, particularly in light of the unreliability of the prosecution's key witness and procedural issues during the trial.

The legal issues the court needed to decide were whether the verdicts were safe and satisfactory, given the circumstances, and whether there was a substantial miscarriage of justice due to the cumulative effect of errors during the trial. The primary concern was the handling of an unfavourable prosecution witness, and whether the leave granted to the prosecutor to cross-examine after the defence counsel had already completed their cross-examination was appropriate. Additionally, the court examined the prosecutor's duties and the potential for an aggregate of errors to result in a miscarriage of justice.

The High Court found that the trial had indeed been affected by a series of errors, which cumulatively led to a substantial miscarriage of justice. The court concluded that the leave granted to the prosecutor to cross-examine after the defence counsel had already done so was improper. Furthermore, the unreliability of the prosecution's key witness and the manner in which the trial was conducted contributed to the unsafe and unsatisfactory nature of the verdicts. Consequently, the court granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal, setting aside Meyer's convictions. The court's decision was based on the interpretation of the Evidence Act 2008 and the Criminal Procedure Act 2009, highlighting the importance of adhering to procedural fairness in criminal trials.

Orders