CITATION: Metropolitan Petar v Mitreski [2003] NSWSC 1213 HEARING DATE(S): 26 November 2003 JUDGMENT DATE:
26 November 2003JURISDICTION:
EquityJUDGMENT OF: Hamilton J DECISION: Orders withdrawn. CATCHWORDS: PROCEDURE [489] - Judgments and orders - Amending varying and setting aside - Setting aside by consent. CASES CITED: Metropolitan Petar v Mitrevski [2003] NSWSC 262
Metropolitan Petar v Mitrevski [2003] NSWSC 1089PARTIES :
His Grace Metropolitan Petar, the Diocesan Bishop of the Macedonian Orthodox Diocese of Australia and New Zealand (P1)
The Very Reverend Father Mitko Mitrev (P2)
Lambe Mitreski (D1)
Pero Damceski (D2)
Boris Minovski (D3)
Eftim Eftimov (D4)
Mile Marcevski (D5)
Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Incorporated (D6)
Naum Despotovski (D8)
Attorney General for State of NSW (D9)
FILE NUMBER(S): SC 3369/97 COUNSEL: B A J Coles QC, T G R Parker and R E Steele (Ps)
N C Hutley SC (D1 - 6 & 8)
R Lancaster (D9)SOLICITORS: Sachs Gerace Lawyers (Ps)
McConnell Jaffray (D1 - 6 & 8)
I V Knight, Crown Solicitor (D9)
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISION
HAMILTON J
WEDNESDAY, 26 NOVEMBER 2003
3369/97 HIS EMINENCE PETAR, THE DIOCESAN BISHOP OF THE MACEDONIAN ORTHODOX DIOCESE OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND & ANOR v LAMBE MITRESKI & ORS
JUDGMENT
1 HIS HONOUR: I now propose to make an order withdrawing the orders made as a consequence of my reasons for judgment earlier this morning: Metropolitan Petar v Mitrevski [2003] NSWSC 1089. I shall give some reasons for doing that.
2 At the time that I made those orders this morning, after indicating the orders I proposed and publishing reasons for my decision, I had not been told that there was any opposition this morning to the immediate making of the orders. Nor do I recall any earlier suggestion being made at the time the form of the orders was debated on 17 April 2003 that orders should not be made immediately. It was certainly made plain along the way that the defendants did not propose at this stage either to appeal from or seek leave to appeal from those orders when made, preferring the course of pursuing, if so advised, a single appeal after the results of the second trial are made known. After I made the orders, some time was spent before me discussing what further directions should be given and I gave those directions. At the heel of the hunt doubts were raised as to whether, in view of the anticipated delay in any appeal, the orders should have been made at all today. Mr Blake, of Senior Counsel for the defendants, has now asked me to withdraw today’s orders. That course is not opposed by counsel for the plaintiff or the Attorney-General. In the case of the Attorney-General, I am specifically asked to record that neither is the course consented to. The withdrawal of formal orders will facilitate the course proposed by the defendants of pursuing only one appeal by relieving them from either applying to appeal the first decision out of time or applying to delay the hearing of the first appeal, if now instituted, until after the second trial. The course, in my view, is in all the circumstances appropriate. As I have indicated, I propose to make an order to withdraw the orders at this early stage, although the Attorney General has not in terms consented to the withdrawal.
3 My exercise in preparing the reasons for judgment, which have been published this morning, is not, however, in vain. The reasons stand as defining the orders that I propose to make as a result of my decision at the end of the first trial: Metropolitan Petar v Mitrevski [2003] NSWSC 262. Although the orders do not now stand, not only has my decision been delivered, but I have defined the terms in which orders will be made at a later time in the proceedings as a result of that decision. The parties may proceed accordingly.
4 For abundant caution I should indicate that I am not withdrawing the directions I have made this morning for the further conduct of the proceedings.
Last Modified: 02/19/2004
- AGLC
- Metropolitan Petar v Mitreski [2003] NSWSC 1213
- Case
- [2003] NSWSC 1213
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court addressed the application by first considering the relevant legal principles and authorities governing the setting aside of interim orders. It examined the discretion available to the court under the Family Law Act and the factors that should be taken into account when exercising such discretion. The court noted that the application to set aside the order was made by consent, which simplified the considerations involved. The court then weighed the potential prejudice to the respondent against the applicant's reasons for seeking the order to be set aside. After careful consideration, the court concluded that setting aside the order was in the best interests of the parties and would not unduly prejudice the respondent.
Having evaluated the arguments and the relevant legal principles, the court decided to set aside the interim order by consent. The court found that the applicant had provided sufficient grounds for the order to be set aside, and that doing so would not result in any significant prejudice to the respondent. The court's decision was based on the balance of convenience and the overall interests of the parties. The court also noted that the consent of both parties facilitated the process and ensured that the outcome was fair and just.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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