Metera v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Metera v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1967

Federal Court Rules O 52 r 10(2A)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 476A(1)(b), 477A(2), 501(2), 501(6)

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24 cited

THOMAS MICHAEL METERA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP AND ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

NSD 1858 of 2008

BENNETT J
15 DECEMBER 2008
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1858 of 2008

BETWEEN:

THOMAS MICHAEL METERA
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BENNETT J

DATE OF ORDER:

15 DECEMBER 2008

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs in the amount of $1500.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1858 of 2008

BETWEEN:

THOMAS MICHAEL METERA
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BENNETT J

DATE:

15 DECEMBER 2008

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. The applicant seeks leave to appeal from a decision of a judge of this Court dated 4 November 2008 and the orders that his Honour made dismissing the applicant’s application with costs (Metera v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2008] FCA 1627). That application was an application for an extension of time in which to file and serve a notice of appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) which had been delivered on 31 July 2008. The decision of the Tribunal affirmed a decision of the delegate of the Minister to cancel the applicant’s Class TY Subclass 444 Special Category Visa under s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’).

  2. The primary judge noted that the applicant did not dispute that he did not pass the character test defined in s 501(6) of the Act. It was on the basis of that failure that the applicant’s visa was cancelled pursuant to s 501(2) of the Act.

  3. His Honour considered the basis upon which the application was brought and concluded that the Court would regard the application as one pursuant to s 476A(1)(b) of the Act. It followed that the application was made within the time limit prescribed by s 477A(2)(a) of the Act. Accordingly, his Honour was only required to consider under s 477A(2)(b) whether it would be in the interests of the administration of justice to grant an extension of time. In considering this issue, the primary judge turned to consider the draft grounds of appeal. There were two such grounds:

    1.did the Tribunal fail to take into account a relevant consideration; and

    2.did the Tribunal deny the applicant procedural fairness.

  4. The primary judge treated those two grounds as dealing with the…

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Details
Case
[2008] FCA 1967
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Metera v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the applicant, Mr. Metera, sought to appeal against the decision of the primary judge, which dismissed his application for judicial review of the decision of the Tribunal. The matter was brought before the court to determine whether the Tribunal was required to consider an Ombudsman report in making its decision, and whether the report could have created a legitimate expectation that the recommendations in the report would be taken into account.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal was obligated to consider the Ombudsman report and if the report could have generated a legitimate expectation that its recommendations would be adopted. The court was required to examine the scope of the Tribunal’s obligations and the extent to which the Ombudsman report could influence its decision-making process.

The court found that the Tribunal was not required to consider the Ombudsman report in making its decision, as the Tribunal's powers and functions were defined by statute and did not include a duty to take into account such reports. Additionally, the court held that the Ombudsman report could not have created a legitimate expectation that its recommendations would be followed, as there was no explicit promise or assurance to that effect. The court concluded that the primary judge's decision was sound and did not contain any errors that warranted reconsideration. Consequently, the appeal was deemed to have no prospect of success.

In light of the above, the court dismissed the application for an extension of time to file the application for leave to appeal and ordered that the applicant pay the first respondent's costs in the amount of $1500.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs in the amount of $1500.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

BENNETT J
His Honour concluded that the Tribunal was not required to take into account the Ombudsman report in making its decision and I see no error in that conclusion, nor in the conclusion that the report could not have given rise to a legitimate expectation that the recommendations in the report would be considered by the Tribunal.CONCLUSION The applicant has not demonstrated that the decision of the primary judge is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration by the Full Court, nor has he established any error in his Honour’s reasons. Accordingly, I consider that the appeal has no prospect of success. It follows that the application for an extension of time to file the application for leave to appeal should be refused. The applicant should pay the first respondent’s costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BENNETT J

Full text does not contain this section.