Metcalfe and Slocombe (Child support)

[2019] AATA 260

Metcalfe and Slocombe (Child support) [2019] AATA 260 (15 January 2019)

DIVISION:Social Services & Child Support Division

REVIEW NUMBERS:  2018/AC015229 and 2018/AC015258

APPLICANT:  Mr Metcalfe

OTHER PARTIES:  Child Support Registrar

Miss Slocombe

TRIBUNAL:Member Y Webb

DECISIONS DATE:  15 January 2019

DECISIONS:

1. Care percentage decision

The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and, in substitution, decides that the care percentages in relation to the child were 57% to Mr Metcalfe and 43% to Miss Slocombe from 12 December 2017.

1. Date of effect decision

The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and, in substitution, decides that special circumstances prevented Mr Metcalfe from lodging his objection within 28 days and in accordance with paragraph 87AA(2)(b) Mr Metcalfe’s time to lodge an objection is extended to 23 July 2018 and therefore the percentages of care of 57% to Mr Metcalfe and 43% to Miss Slocombe have a date of effect of 12 December 2017.

CATCHWORDS

CHILD SUPPORT – percentage of care – whether there was a change to the likely pattern of care – existing percentage of care determinations revoked and new determinations made - decision under review set aside and substituted

CHILD SUPPORT – date of effect of objection decision – whether there special circumstances that prevented the objection being lodged in time - special circumstances exist - decision under review set aside and substituted

Names used in all published decisions are pseudonyms. Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been removed from this decision and replaced with generic information so as not to identify involved individuals as required by subsections 16(2AB)-16(2AC) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988.

REASONS FOR DECISIONS

BACKGROUND

1. This review is about the percentages of care of Mr Metcalfe and Miss Slocombe in relation to their daughter (“the child”) in the period from 12 December 2017 and whether there were special circumstances which prevented MrMetcalfe from lodging his objection to the care decision within 28 days of that decision.

2. The child is nine years old and there are no court orders or written parenting plans in relation to the care of the child.

3. From 22 October 2013 the percentage of care reflected on the assessment for the child has been 72% care to Miss Slocombe and 28% care to Mr Metcalfe. 

4. Miss Slocombe and Mr Metcalfe had a private collect arrangement in place in relation to child support but the Child Support Agency records show that the Child Support Agency confirmed in writing on 26 March 2018 that it had accepted Miss Slocombe’s request for the  Child Support Agency to collect child support..

5. On 12 December 2017 Miss Slocombe contacted the Department of Human Services (“Child Support Agency”) and advised that the care of the child had changed and that Mr Metcalfe’s care was one night per fortnight on a Saturday.  The Child Support Agency calculated that this would mean that Miss Slocombe had 93% care and Mr Metcalfe had 7% care.

6. The Child Support Agency attempted to contact Mr Metcalfe but was unable to reach him.

7. On 20 January 2018 the Child Support Agency decided to accept Miss Slocombe’s request for a change of care and determined that Miss Slocombe had 93% care and Mr Metcalfe 7% care of the child.

8. On 23 July 2018 Mr Metcalfe objected to that decision.  Mr Metcalfe contended that since 2016 he had had the care of the child from Wednesday afternoon until Sunday afternoon and that Miss Slocombe had care from Sunday afternoon to Wednesday morning.  He also contended that he often had more care than eight nights per fortnight at Miss Slocombe’s request.

9. On 20 September 2018 an objections officer decided that Mr Metcalfe objection should be partly allowed and reverted the care back to what it had been for some years prior to Miss Slocombe’s application for a change of care: that is, 72% care to Miss Slocombe and 28% care to Mr Metcalfe.

10. However, the objections officer decided that this would only apply from 23 July 2018 when Mr Metcalfe lodged his objection.  The officer did so on the basis that there were no special circumstances which prevented Mr Metcalfe from lodging his objection within 28 days of the original decision made on 20 January 2018.

11. Mr Metcalfe requested review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal of the two decisions: the one regarding care on 15 October 2018 and the one regarding the date of effect on 18 October 2018.

12. Mr Metcalfe and Miss Slocombe both attended the hearing on 15 January 2019 in person and both gave sworn evidence.

13. The Tribunal had before it the Child Support Agency papers comprising 134 pages.  In addition, Mr Metcalfe provided additional documents marked Exhibit A1–A68.

ISSUES

1. The issues for the Tribunal to determine are:

   a)    What were the actual care arrangements in relation to the child in the relevant care period?

   b)    Should a new determination of a percentage of care for the child be made? If so, what is the percentage of care under the new determination and from when should it apply?

   c)  Were there special circumstances which prevented Mr Metcalfe from lodging his objection within 28 days of the decision of 20 January 2018?

CONSIDERATION

1. The legislation relevant to this review is contained in the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (the Assessment Act) and the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act1988 (the Registration and Collection Act).

2. Amendments to the Assessment Act and the Registration and Collection Act were made effective from 23 May 2018 and 1 July 2018 respectively but this matter predates those amendments and the legislation as it was prior to those dates applies.

3. Percentage of care determinations are made under section 49 and/or section 50 of the Assessment Act. Section 49 of the Assessment Act provides authority to make a determination in circumstances where a parent has no care of the child. Section 50 of the Assessment Act provides authority to make a determination of a percentage of care in situations where a person has a pattern of care. Where the Child Support Registrar is satisfied that a responsible person has had, or is likely to have, a pattern of care for the child during the relevant care period, the Registrar must determine that person’s percentage of care for the child during the care period. The percentage determined must be the percentage that corresponds with the actual care of the child that the Registrar is satisfied the responsible person has had, or is likely to have, during the relevant care period.

4. The pattern can be established either according to a ‘care arrangement’ (such as court orders) or the actual care that is taking place. Depending on whether a pattern has been established or not, the Tribunal can then proceed to determine the percentage of care applying the appropriate law (sections 49 and 50 of the Assessment Act).

5. In this case where the parents agreed there were no court orders or written parenting plans in place, the Tribunal is required to consider the actual care during the care period. The Assessment Act provides that the care percentage must be determined for a ‘care period’ which is effectively defined as ‘…such period…as the Registrar considers to be appropriate having regard to all the circumstances’. Usually (but not necessarily) the care period will be a 12-month period starting from the date the care of the child changed and reflecting the actual care that a person has, or is likely to have, during the care period.

6. Section 54A of the Assessment Act then provides that the Registrar may assess the level of care on the number of nights that a parent has during a care period.

7. In this case, Mr Metcalfe and Miss Slocombe did not contend that nights were an unsuitable measure of the care that they were providing to their daughter and the evidence in the Child Support Agency papers indicates that nights have been the measure of care in relation to date.  The Tribunal finds that nights are an appropriate method of ascertaining the actual care of the child in this case.

8. Hence, the Tribunal must form a view as to the likely pattern of care from the care period beginning 12 December 2017 (that being the date that Miss Slocombe asserted that there had been a change of care). The likely pattern of care may or may not be informed by care prior to, or after, that date.

Mr Metcalfe’s contentions

1. Mr Metcalfe stated (and reiterated in his written submission) that for many years now he has had at least 50% care of the child if not more.  He said that in June 2016 his mother (the child’s grandmother) and Miss Slocombe met and made a verbal agreement that the child would stay with him from Wednesday after school until Sunday afternoon when the child would return to Miss Slocombe’s care.  He stated that it was decided that he would also pay private school fees for the child as well as the school uniform costs.  Mr Metcalfe stated that at that time he was residing with his mother.  Later in 2016 he moved to his current address when he started residing with his partner.  He lives only about a minute away from his mother’s address.  He stated that since he moved into his own place with his partner the pattern has been unchanged although the child often stays with him additional nights so that he often has more than eight nights a fortnight of care.  Mr Metcalfe stated that his partner takes the child to school on Thursday and Friday mornings as he has his own concrete construction business and starts early. Occasionally his mother or stepfather may take the child to school.  His mother collects the child from school on Wednesdays, Thursdays and Fridays.  She had to make a special arrangement with her employer so that she finishes work earlier so that she can pick up the child from school on those days. 

2. Mr Metcalfe referred to the text messages between his partner and Miss Slocombe which he provided and which he said, supported his submission that the child is often in his care for additional nights above the eight nights a fortnight which is the regular and well-established pattern of care.  Mr Metcalfe also referred to the diary which he and his partner keep regarding the care of the child, a copy of which was provided to the Tribunal.

3. Mr Metcalfe agreed that the child regularly stays over at his mother’s house about one night a week either on a Friday night or a Saturday night.  He stated that the child likes spending time with her grandmother and he supports it.  However, he stated that he still considers the child is in his care when she stays with her grandmother as he makes the decisions (with Miss Slocombe) about the care, education and welfare of the child.  In addition, he pays for many of the child’s requirements and he considers that he (and Miss Slocombe) at all times have legal responsibility for the child.

4. Mr Metcalfe stated that he provided letters from his partner, his neighbour and Miss Slocombe’s sister confirming that he has care of the child from Wednesday to Sunday every week (as a minimum) but he perceived that the Child Support Agency did not believe him and just changed the care back to what it was before Miss Slocombe contacted the Agency on 12 December 2017.

5. Mr Metcalfe stated that he does not believe it is fair that he has been billed for a large amount of child support when it does not represent the actual care that he was having and continues to provide to the child.

Miss Slocombe’s contentions

1. Miss Slocombe told the Tribunal that she and Mr Metcalfe each have 50% care of the child.

2. She stated that she was not truthful when she told the Child Support Agency on 12 December 2017 that the care was 93% to her and 7% to Mr Metcalfe.

3. She stated that she had recently told the Child Support Agency that the care was not 93% to her as she had previously asserted but that she had not heard from the Agency.

4. When the Tribunal asked Miss Slocombe why she told the Child Support Agency that her care was 93% if that was not truthful, Miss Slocombe stated that at the time she was angry with Mr Metcalfe.

5. Miss Slocombe stated that the care had been around 50% each to her and Mr Metcalfe since 2016.  She confirmed that she met with Mr Metcalfe’s mother and that they had a verbal agreement that Mr Metcalfe would have care of the child from Wednesday afternoon to Sunday afternoon every week and that she would have care for the other three nights per week. 

6. When the Tribunal suggested to Miss Slocombe that if the care was eight nights per fortnight to Mr Metcalfe and six nights per fortnight to her, this would work out to 57% care to Mr Metcalfe and 43% care to her, she agreed with those calculations.

7. Miss Slocombe stated that some of the time the child stays with Mr Metcalfe’s mother (the child’s grandmother).

8. Miss Slocombe agreed that the pattern of care has not changed since 2016 although she agreed that there have been times when Mr Metcalfe has had more care of the child.  She stated that she has had a number of health and personal issues and that has led to her requesting that Mr Metcalfe have more care of the child than eight nights per fortnight.  She did not keep a diary but she stated that she did not disagree that on occasions she had texted Mr Metcalfe’s partner about the care of the child, including asking Mr Metcalfe’s partner if the child could stay over on some additional nights.  She did not dispute the text messages which Mr Metcalfe provided.

9. Miss Slocombe told the Tribunal that the care pattern is the same in school holidays as it is in school term times.  Mr Metcalfe agreed that was the case.

The Tribunal’s consideration

1. Mr Metcalfe could not be contacted in relation to the decision made on 20 January 2018 to change the percentages of care to 93% to Miss Slocombe and 7% to Mr Metcalfe.

2. It appears – from the somewhat confusing records of the Child Support Agency – that Mr Metcalfe was contacted by telephone on 8 March 2018 and that at that time he informed the Agency that the care of the child was 50% to himself and 50% to Miss Slocombe. 

3. There was a further telephone discussion between the Child Support Agency and Mr Metcalfe on 21 July 2018 and on 23 July 2018 and throughout these discussions Mr Metcalfe maintained that he had at least 50% care of the child.

4. Mr Metcalfe provided a letter from his neighbour, [Mr A], dated [in] September 2018, stating that he lives next door to Mr Metcalfe and his partner and that he sees and hears the child every weekend and many weekdays, mainly on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday but often on other weekdays too.  He also stated that he sees the child’s mother “pull up across the road from our houses around 4-4.30 pm most Sundays” to pick up the child.  [Mr A] also referred to seeing Mr Metcalfe’s partner taking the child to school around the same time that he takes his own child to the same school.

5. Mr Metcalfe also provided letters from his partner, [Ms B], who stated that the agreement regarding care of the child is that “from Wednesday after school through to Sunday afternoon (the child) was to be at her father’s place and grandmother’s place”.  She stated that the private agreement was that no child support would be paid but that Mr Metcalfe would pay the private school fees and school uniform costs and that he would pay for any other financial needs of the child.  [Ms B] referred to the text messages between herself and Miss Slocombe which Mr Metcalfe provided dating from October 2017 to August 2018.  She stated that these show that Mr Metcalfe had the care of the child on a number of additional nights as well as the four nights per week which were agreed.

6. Mr Metcalfe also provided a letter from his mother (the child’s grandmother) Mrs Metcalfe dated 10 August 2018.  She confirmed that Mr Metcalfe has care of the child for more than 50% of the time, including from every Wednesday afternoon to Sunday afternoon.  He also provided a letter from Mrs Metcalfe being a copy of the letter Mrs Metcalfe wrote to her employer dated 22 June 2016 requesting to finish half an hour earlier on Wednesdays, Thursdays and Fridays for the purpose of collecting her granddaughter from school.  Mr Metcalfe also provided a letter from Mrs Metcalfe’s employer: [Ms C] of [Company 1] dated [in] September 2018 confirming that the company had made adjustments to Mrs Metcalfe’s working hours so that she could pick up her granddaughter from school.

7. Mr Metcalfe also provided a letter from [Ms D], his sister, dated [in] August 2018, supporting Mr Metcalfe’s statements about the times when he has care of the child.

8. Mr Metcalfe also provided a letter from [Ms E], Miss Slocombe’s sister, dated [in] September 2018 which stated that she has been in the child’s life “since birth” and that she knows that the child “spends every Wednesday to Sunday night either with her dad, Metcalfe or her [nan]”.  She stated that there are additional nights that the child spends with her dad and that “Ms Slocombe usually only has (the child) one or two nights a week”.  She stated that she knows that Mr Metcalfe pays for the child’s school fees, uniforms, netball fees and netball uniform. 

9. The Tribunal accepts that all of these statements from third parties were written in good faith and that they are genuine.  The Tribunal gave only limited weight to the letters from Mr Metcalfe’s partner, relatives and neighbour on the basis that their relationship to Mr Metcalfe may have been a factor in the wording of their statements and their support for him but the consistency of their statements contributes to the Tribunal’s view that they most likely are accurate.  The Tribunal accepts the statements in the letters between the child’s grandmother, Mrs Metcalfe, and her employer regarding her working hours being adjusted so that Mrs Metcalfe can pick up the child from school on Wednesdays, Thursdays and Fridays.

10. The Tribunal accepts that the text messages are genuine and accurate and that they show that the child has spent additional nights in Mr Metcalfe’s care on occasions.  The Tribunal also accepts that the diary of care provided by Mr Metcalfe is reasonably accurate.  Importantly, Miss Slocombe did not dispute the text messages or the diary records.

11. Miss Slocombe on the other hand has not provided any third-party statements supporting her original contention that she had 93% care of the child.

12. The Tribunal is satisfied that even if Miss Slocombe had not advised that her claims of increased care were untrue, it would have been persuaded by Mr Metcalfe’s extensive evidence that his version of the care arrangements most likely was accurate.

13. However, the most compelling evidence came from Miss Slocombe herself who frankly admitted to the Tribunal that she had fabricated the claim of 93% care and agreed that the care was as described by Mr Metcalfe; that is that he has eight nights of care per fortnight and she has six nights of care per fortnight.  The Tribunal finds that this is the pattern of care for the child.  The Tribunal also finds that this translates to Mr Metcalfe having 57% care of the child and Miss Slocombe 43% care of the child from the care period beginning 12 December 2017.

14. The Tribunal was also satisfied that there were additional nights that the child spent in Mr Metcalfe’s care on some occasions.  However, the Tribunal is not satisfied that these form part of the regular pattern of care.  The Tribunal accepts that these additional nights of care have occurred when Miss Slocombe has been ill or has been dealing with or affected by personal issues or there are other unplanned and unexpected reasons.  The Tribunal is not persuaded that these are part of the regular pattern of care.  The care percentage determination anticipates that there may be some variation in the pattern of care from time to time without this being a change of care.  The Child Support Guide (at 2.2.3) for instance, states that the Registrar will consider that a pattern was not established in cases where a parent missed three consecutive care events (where a ‘care event’ means several consecutive nights of care).  The Tribunal accepts the statements of both parents that the regular pattern of care of eight nights per fortnight to Mr Metcalfe and six nights a fortnight to Miss Slocombe continues on an ongoing basis both in school terms and throughout school holiday periods (with some minor variations when the child may spend some holiday time with either parent).

1. In conclusion, therefore, the Tribunal finds that the percentages of care in relation to the child are 57% to Mr Metcalfe and 43% to Miss Slocombe with Miss Slocombe’s percentage of care rounded down in accordance with section 54D of the Assessment Act.

2. A care determination must be revoked if the Registrar is notified or otherwise becomes aware that the care of a child that is actually taking place does not correspond with the existing percentage of care for the child and the responsible person’s cost percentage would change if a new determination were made: section 54F of the Assessment Act.

3. In the administrative formula, a parent’s notional contribution to the costs of the child by provision of care is called the cost percentage. Section 55C of the Assessment Act details how the percentage of care affects the cost percentage:

Cost percentages
Item	Column 1 Percentage of care	Column 2 Cost percentage
1	0 to less than 14%	Nil
2	14% to less than 35%	24%
3	35% to less than 48%	25% plus 2% for each percentage point over 35%
4	48% to 52%	50%
5	more than 52% to 65%	51% plus 2% for each percentage point over 53%
6	more than 65% to 86%	76%
7	more than 86% to 100%	100%

1. Prior to 12 December 2017 Miss Slocombe had a care percentage of 72% and a cost percentage of 76%. Mr Metcalfe had a care percentage of 28% and a cost percentage of 24%. The Tribunal’s determination will mean that Miss Slocombe will have a care percentage of 43% and a cost percentage of 41%. Mr Metcalfe will have a care percentage of 57% and a cost percentage of 59%. Accordingly, the Tribunal is satisfied that if new determinations were to be made, both parents’ cost percentages would change. As all of the requirements of subsection 54F(1) of the Assessment Act are met (and as section 54G of the Assessment Act does not apply because the Tribunal’s determination has not resulted in either of the parties having less than regular care) the existing determinations of percentage of care must be revoked in accordance with section 54F which states:

   54F    Determination must be revoked if there is a change to the responsible person’s cost percentage

   (1)If:

   (a)a determination of a responsible person’s percentage of care (the existing percentage of care) for a child has been made under section 49 or 50; and

   (b)if section 51 or 52 applied in relation to the responsible person—the interim period for the determination has ended; and

   (c)the Registrar or the Family Assistance Secretary is notified, or otherwise becomes aware, that the care of the child that is actually taking place does not correspond with the responsible person’s existing percentage of care for the child; and

   (d)the Registrar is satisfied that the responsible person’s cost percentage for the child would change if the Registrar were to determine, under section 49 or 50, another percentage to be the person’s percentage of care for the child; and

   (e)section 54G does not apply;

   the Registrar must revoke the determination.

   Note: The Registrar must make a new determination under section 49 or 50 to replace the revoked determination: see paragraph 49(1)(b) or 50(1)(b).

2. Subsection 54F(2) of the Assessment Act specifies when the revocation of the determination takes effect. The date of effect depends on whether the Child Support Agency was notified of the care change within 28 days after it occurred. The Tribunal has found that the care change occurred on 12 December 2017. The Tribunal also finds that Miss Slocombe notified the Child Support Agency of the change on that same date. As the Child Support Agency was notified within 28 days after the change occurred, the revocation of the existing determination takes effect in accordance with paragraph 54F(2)(c) on 11 December 2017, being the day before the Child Support Agency was notified of the care change.

3. Neither section 51 nor 52 applies in this case because no “care arrangement” such as court orders exists. Having revoked the existing determinations, the Tribunal must now make new determinations of Mr Metcalfe’s and Miss Slocombe’s percentages of care under section 50 of the Assessment Act.

4. Section 54B of the Assessment Act sets out the date of effect of the new determinations of percentages of care. The percentage of care applies to each day in a child support period on and from the ‘application day’. In accordance with subparagraph 54B(2)(c)(ii) the application day for the new determinations of percentages of care is the day after the revocation of the existing determinations. The Tribunal has revoked the existing determinations with effect from 11 December 2017 with the change of care applying from 12 December 2017.

5. However, the date of effect of the new determination is subject to whether there was a delay in Mr Metcalfe lodging his objection to the original decision as detailed below.

Were there special circumstances which prevented Mr Metcalfe from lodging his objection within 28 days of the decision of 20 January 2018?

1. The legislation relevant to this question is contained in the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act1988 (the Registration and Collection Act).

2. Section 87AA of the Registration and Collection Act states, that where an objection is allowed and this has the effect of varying the determination to which the care percentage decision relates, or substituting a new decision, and in circumstances where the objection was lodged more than 28 days after notice of the care percentage decision was served, then the date of effect of the review decision is the day on which the person lodged the objection.

3. In Mr Metcalfe’s case, his objection to the decision of 20 January 2018 was partly allowed on objection and the care percentage decision has now been set aside on review  by the Tribunal with a new percentage of care substituted granting Mr Metcalfe 57% care of the child and Miss Slocombe 43%.  His objection to the original decision, however, was lodged on 23 July 2018 being approximately six months after the decision of 20 January 2018.  In accordance with paragraph 87AA(1)(c) the date of effect of the review decision is the day on which Mr Metcalfe lodged the objection: that being 23 July 2018.

4. However, subsection 87AA(2) provides a discretion to extend this 28-day period if the Tribunal is satisfied that special circumstances prevented the person from lodging the objection within this 28-day period.

5. Mr Metcalfe told the Tribunal that he did not receive any of the letters from the Child Support Agency regarding Miss Slocombe’s claim of a care change or the Child Support Agency’s letters regarding the outcome of her claim or any of the assessment letters at that time because the Child Support Agency apparently sent them to his old address.  He stated that Miss Slocombe did not tell him that she had made a claim for a care change and he had no knowledge of it.  He was not expecting to receive any letters from the Child Support Agency because he had a private collect arrangement with Miss Slocombe. 

6. Mr Metcalfe explained that when he moved house he paid Australia Post to redirect his mail for 12 months to his mother’s home where he was living.  As he received letters he advised the sender of his new address.  He did not receive any letters in that 12-month period from the Child Support Agency.  The Tribunal accepts that Mr Metcalfe took all reasonable steps to ensure that his mail was redirected and that he carefully advised the authors of all redirected mail of his change of address.  The Tribunal accepts Mr Metcalfe word in relation to the steps he took.  The Tribunal found all of Mr Metcalfe’s statements to be credible and trustworthy.

7. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the Child Support Agency made sufficient effort to contact Mr Metcalfe by telephone to advise him of the care change proceedings.  It appears that only one call was made on the phone number provided to the Child Support Agency by Mr Metcalfe.  However, the Child Support Agency reached Mr Metcalfe by telephone on 8 March 2018 which appears to have been in relation to collection of arrears of child support.  There also is a note that the Child Support Agency officer spoke to Mr Metcalfe on the telephone on 21 July 2018 and the notes record that Mr Metcalfe stated that he spoke to the Child Support Agency about care but was told that the Agency did not believe him.  It is not clear when that telephone call regarding care took place.

8. Miss Slocombe also told the Tribunal that she informed the Child Support Agency of Mr Metcalfe’s contact details, including his mother’s address and his current address when she made the care change claim.  This seems to be verified by the Child Support Agency notes on 12 December 2017.

9. On balance, and taking into account all of the circumstances, the Tribunal is satisfied that special circumstances existed which prevented Mr Metcalfe from lodging his objection within 28 days of the decision of 20 January 2018.  The Tribunal is satisfied that Mr Metcalfe was unaware of the care change claim and that if he had any knowledge of the decision made on 20 January 2018 he would have lodged his objection within 28 days.

10. In accordance with subsection 87AA(2) the Tribunal determines that special circumstances prevented Mr Metcalfe from lodging his objection within 28 days and concludes that the time to lodge his objection should be extended to 23 July 2018.  The Tribunal therefore decides, in accordance with paragraph 87AA(2)(b), that the date of effect of the care decision of the Tribunal (that is: 57% to Mr Metcalfe and 43% to Miss Slocombe from 12 December 2017) is 12 December 2017.

DECISIONS

1. Care percentage decision

The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and, in substitution, decides that the care percentages in relation to the child were 57% to Mr Metcalfe and 43% to Miss Slocombe from 12 December 2017.

1. Date of effect decision

The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and, in substitution, decides that special circumstances prevented Mr Metcalfe from lodging his objection within 28 days and in accordance with paragraph 87AA(2)(b) Mr Metcalfe’s time to lodge an objection is extended to 23 July 2018 and therefore the percentages of care of 57% to Mr Metcalfe and 43% to Miss Slocombe have a date of effect of 12 December 2017.