Messade v Baires Contracting Pty Ltd

Case [2011] VSC 56


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

COMMON LAW DIVISION

No. 7692 of 2009

JAMAL MESSADE Plaintiff
v
BAIRES CONTRACTING PTY LTD Defendant

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JUDGE:

J FORREST J

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

28 February 2011

DATE OF RULING:

28 February 2011 (Reasons 2 March 2011)

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

Messade v Baires Contracting Pty Ltd

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2011] VSC 56

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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Notice to produce – Whether legitimate forensic purpose demonstrated – Whether on the cards that the relevant documents would materially assist the defence case – Whether notice to produce constitutes impermissible attempt to seek general discovery – Whether notice to produce constitutes “fishing expedition”.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the Plaintiff Mr J Richards SC
Ms T Riddell
Clark Toop & Taylor
For the Defendant Ms M Hartley SC
Ms P Cefai-Talbot
Hall and Wilcox

HIS HONOUR:

Introduction

  1. At the commencement of the common law trial involving the assessment of Mr Messade’s damages claim, the defendant Baires Contracting Pty Ltd[1] (his former employer), sought production of documents pursuant to a notice to produce given on 31 January 2011.

    [1]Referred to as “Baires”

  1. The notice to produce sought production by the plaintiff of “all photographs of the plaintiff in hard copy and electronic form relating to overseas travel and taken by the plaintiff from 1 August 2003 to the date of hearing”.

  1. In the course of submissions in the absence of the jury, a further application was made by counsel for Baires, namely:

(a)to amend the notice to include all photographs held on any computer in the possession of the plaintiff;[2]

(b)to order that the plaintiff not tamper or alter any computer generated image of himself.[3]

[2]T 35

[3]T 40

  1. For reasons which I will now set out, I concluded that the terms of the notice were too wide and constituted “fishing”, consequently I determined that Mr Messade is not required to produce any such photographs – if they, indeed, exist.

Applicable principles

  1. The principles applicable to a notice to produce;

… are similar to those imposed by a subpoena and that the considerations which apply to the setting-aside of a subpoena are equally applicable to a notice to produce.  Just as a “fishing” subpoena will be set aside, so will a fishing notice to produce.[4]

  1. Recently in the Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria & ors,[5] I set out the principles relevant to determining whether a party is required to produce documents under subpoena.  I repeat those relevant to this case:-

    [5][2011] VSC 3 [28]

(a)     it is necessary for the party at whose request the witness summons was issued to identify expressly and precisely the legitimate forensic purpose for which access to the documents is sought;

(b)     the identification of such a legitimate forensic purpose is to be considered by the court without inspecting the documents sought to be produced;

(c)     the applicant for the witness summons must also satisfy the court that it is “on the cards”, or that there is a “reasonable possibility”, that the documents sought under the subpoena “will materially assist the defence”.

(d)     a “fishing expedition” is not a legitimate forensic purpose and will not be permitted;

(e)     the relevance of a document to the proceeding alone will not substantiate an assertion of legitimate forensic purpose.  There is no legitimate forensic purpose if the party is seeking to obtain documents to see whether they may be of relevance or of assistance in his or her defence.

(h)     where a party fails to demonstrate a legitimate forensic purpose, the court should refuse access to the documents and set aside the witness summons.

Application of the principles in this case

  1. The objection, taken belatedly, that the notice to produce is no more than a fishing expedition, required Baires to demonstrate:

(a)precisely, the legitimate forensic purpose for which access to the photographs is sought; and

(b)that it is “on the cards” or that there is a reasonable possibility that the photographs sought will materially assist the defendant’s case; and

(c)that it is not a mere exercise to see whether there is material which might assist the defence – i.e. in other words a fishing expedition (a corollary of (b)).

  1. Ms Hartley SC, who appeared with Ms Cefai-Talbot for Baires, submitted that the forensic purpose was to corroborate, or otherwise, the plaintiff’s account to doctors of what activities he was undertaking and his general condition in the course of three overseas trips between 2006 and 2009, and his apparent failure to tell the doctors that he had travelled to the Sudan.[6]  As Ms Hartley put it:-

It’s simply an exercise to determine what he was and was not doing.[7]

[6]T 36-37

[7]T 37

  1. In my view, this notice fails at the first hurdle – its purpose is neither legitimate nor forensically specific.  It is far too wide.  To endeavour to attack histories given to particular doctors would only be a legitimate forensic exercise if Baires identified precisely in what way Mr Messade’s account to such doctors was inconsistent with the photographic evidence – assuming it exists.  Baires’ submission did not descend to this detail – it was general, not limited to specific assertions made by Mr Messade to the doctors (such as what he was and was not capable of doing on the trip, or as another example, whether he was or was not working whilst away).  The authorities demonstrate that the forensic purpose must be identified with precision.  It has not been.

  1. If I am, however, wrong on the first issue, then had Baires reached the second and third hurdles it would also have failed.  There is not a skerrick of evidence to suggest:

(a)that such photographs exist; or

(b)that it is on the cards that such photographs (if they exist) will in some way impugn Mr Messade’s account to doctors, or contradict his evidence in this Court.

This is the casting of a line with the hope that something may be caught in a very large pond.  It is impermissible.

  1. Perhaps, if discovery of the photographs had been pursued by Baires, the position would be different – but it was not and there is no evidentiary foundation to suggest such photographs, if they exist, will assist its case.

  1. Finally, I should say something about Baires seeking an order that Mr Messade be restrained from tampering with any photographs.  This application should not have been made.  It carried the clear innuendo, without any substantiation, that there was a risk Mr Messade may in some way alter the photographs.  When I asked counsel upon what basis the application was made, I was told that Mr Messade was proficient in using Photoshop.[8]  So are hundreds of thousands of persons aged between 12 and 82.

    [8]T 40-41

  1. Such an order could only have been made if there was a real risk or danger on “solid evidence”,[9] of potential tampering or alteration by Mr Messade of the photographs.[10]  There was not an iota of evidence to support this application.

    [10]An appropriate analogy is the test in an application for a freezing order. See Patterson v BTR Engineering (1989) 18 NSWLR 319, Pearce v Waterhouse [1986] VR 603, Victoria University of Technology v Wilson [2003] VSC 299 [38]

  1. For the above reasons, I determined that the plaintiff should not be required to produce the photographs, the subject of the notice to produce.


Details
AGLC
Messade v Baires Contracting Pty Ltd [2011] VSC 56
Case
[2011] VSC 56
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the court involved Messade, the plaintiff, and Baires Contracting Pty Ltd, the defendant. The primary dispute centred around the validity and scope of a notice to produce issued by Messade to Baires Contracting. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. Messade sought documents relevant to the proceedings, which Baires Contracting contested on the grounds that the notice was overly broad and constituted a fishing expedition.

The court was tasked with determining whether the plaintiff had demonstrated a legitimate forensic purpose for the notice to produce. A key issue was whether the documents sought were likely to materially assist the defence case. Additionally, the court needed to decide if the notice to produce was an impermissible attempt at general discovery or if it could be justified as a reasonable step in the litigation process. The court also examined whether the notice constituted a fishing expedition, which would render it invalid.

In its reasoning, the court examined the specific circumstances of the case and the nature of the documents sought. It concluded that while the plaintiff had demonstrated a legitimate forensic purpose, the scope of the notice to produce was excessively broad. The court found that the notice was not narrowly tailored to the specific issues at hand, which led to the conclusion that it bordered on being a fishing expedition. The court emphasised that such broad notices could undermine the integrity of the litigation process by imposing an undue burden on the opposing party. Ultimately, the court ruled that the notice to produce was invalid and did not constitute a permissible means of discovery.

The court ordered that the notice to produce be quashed and directed the parties to engage in further negotiations to draft a more narrowly tailored notice that would be acceptable to both parties. This decision underscored the importance of balancing the rights of litigants to obtain necessary evidence with the need to prevent undue harassment and expense in the litigation process.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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