SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Meshlawn P/L & Anor v State of Qld & Anor [2010] QCA 181
PARTIES:
MESHLAWN PTY LTD
ACN 010 947 458
(first plaintiff/first appellant)
SURFERS PARADISE ROCK AND ROLL CAFE PTY
LTD
ACN 050 412 612
(second plaintiff/second appellant)
v
THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(first defendant/first respondent)
HELEN RINGROSE AS CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THELIQUOR LICENSING DIVISION
(second defendant/second respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 9676 of 2009
SC No 3013 of 2006DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
20 July 2010
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
16 March 2010
JUDGES:
McMurdo P, Chesterman JA and Fryberg J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the order madeORDER:
Appeal dismissed with costs
CATCHWORDS:
STATUTES – ACTS OF PARLIAMENT – STATUTORY POWERS AND DUTIES – EXERCISE – LIABILITY – NEGLIGENCE – PARTICULAR CASES – where appellants owned and operated nightclubs at Surfers Paradise – where appellants had consistently been granted ‘extended hours permits’ under the Liquor Act 1992 (Qld) to operate their nightclubs until 5.00 am – where, in March 2004, the chief executive refused each appellant’s application to renew the permits – where appellants successfully appealed to the Commercial and Consumer Tribunal – where appellants commenced proceedings against the chief executive and the second respondent for damages for pure economic loss – where trial judge dismissed the claims – whether the relationship between the appellants and the chief executive was such as to give rise to a duty of care – whether the statutory right of appeal is consistent with the existence of a duty of care – whether the nature of the statutory power under s 121A is consistent with the existence of a duty of care – whether the chief executive breached the alleged duty – whether the trial judge erred in discounting his assessment of damages by 20 per cent
Liquor Act 1992 (Qld), s 3, s 3A, s 9(10)(b), s 21(1)(a), s 21(2), s 30, s 49, s 97, s 102, s 102B, s 116, s 117, s 118, s 118A, s 119, s 121, s 121(5)(g), s 121(6), s 121A, s 121A(3)
Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512, [2001] HCA 29, distinguished
Chambers v Goldthorpe [1901] 1 QB 624, cited
Coshott v Woolhara MC (1988) 14 NSWLR 675, considered
Elford v FAI General Insurance Company Limited [1994] 1 Qd R 258; [1992] QCA 41, cited
Fingleton v The Queen (2005) 227 CLR 166; [2005] HCA 34, cited
Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540; [2002] HCA 54, applied
Jones v Department of Employment [1989] QB 1, considered
Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; [1999] HCA 36, applied
Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330; [1998] HCA 3, distinguished
Rowling v Takaro Properties Ltd [1988] AC 473;
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- Case
- [2010] QCA 181
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues in this case revolved around whether the relationship between the appellants and the chief executive created a duty of care, whether the statutory right of appeal was consistent with the existence of such a duty, and whether the nature of the statutory power under section 121A was compatible with the existence of a duty of care. Additionally, the court needed to determine if the chief executive breached the alleged duty of care and whether the trial judge's discounting of the damages assessment by 20 per cent was an error.
The court found that the relationship between the appellants and the chief executive did not create a duty of care, as it was not proximate enough to warrant such a duty. The statutory right of appeal was deemed consistent with the absence of a duty of care. Furthermore, the statutory power under section 121A was considered to be discretionary in nature, reinforcing the conclusion that no duty of care was owed. The court also upheld the trial judge's discounting of the damages assessment, finding no error in this regard.
The appeal was dismissed with costs, meaning that the appellants were not successful in their claims against the chief executive and the second respondent.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed with costs
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter initially came before the trial judge in the Supreme Court of Queensland. The trial judge dismissed the claims made by the appellants. The appellants then appealed to the Court of Appeal, which heard the case and delivered its judgment.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the relationship between the appellants and the chief executive was such as to give rise to a duty of care.
2. Whether the statutory right of appeal is consistent with the existence of a duty of care.
3. Whether the nature of the statutory power under s 121A is consistent with the existence of a duty of care.
4. Whether the chief executive breached the alleged duty.
5. Whether the trial judge erred in discounting his assessment of damages by 20 per cent.
Held
1. The court held that the relationship between the appellants and the chief executive was not such as to give rise to a duty of care.
2. The court held that the statutory right of appeal under the Liquor Act 1992 (Qld) is consistent with the existence of a duty of care.
3. The court held that the nature of the statutory power under s 121A is consistent with the existence of a duty of care.
4. The court held that the chief executive did not breach the alleged duty.
5. The court held that the trial judge did not err in discounting his assessment of damages by 20 per cent.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the relationship between the appellants and the chief executive in the context of statutory duties and powers under the Liquor Act 1992 (Qld). It found that the statutory scheme governing the granting and refusal of extended hours permits did not establish a proximate relationship between the appellants and the chief executive that would give rise to a duty of care. The court considered the statutory right of appeal, noting that it did not negate the existence of a duty of care. It reasoned that the statutory power under s 121A, which allows for the refusal of permits, was exercised in a manner consistent with the statutory framework, thus not giving rise to a breach of duty. The court further held that the trial judge's assessment of damages was within his discretion, and there was no error in the 20 per cent discount applied to the damages. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that statutory powers and the right of appeal under the Liquor Act 1992 (Qld) do not create a proximate relationship that would result in a duty of care between nightclub operators and the chief executive.