HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Barwick C.J., McTiernan, Windeyer, Owen and Gibbs JJ.
MERCHANT v. THE QUEEN
28 May 1971
Vehicles and Traffic
Vehicles and Traffic—Driving with prescribed concentration of alcohol in blood—Admissibility of certificate—Conditions precedent thereto—Proof that prescribed device used—Motor Traffic Act, 1909-1968 (N.S.W.), s. 4E.
Decisions
May 28.
The following written judgments were delivered: -
BARWICK C.J. This is an application for special leave to appeal against a judgment and order of the Supreme Court of New South Wales sitting as a Court of Criminal Appeal (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 816 . The Supreme Court answered unfavourably to the applicant a question asked of it in a case stated for its opinion by a chairman of Quarter Sessions. (at p415)
2. The applicant was convicted at the Central Court of Petty Sessions, Sydney of driving a motor vehicle upon a public street whilst there was present in his blood the prescribed concentration of alcohol in contravention of s. 4E (1) of the Motor Traffic Act, 1909-1968 (N.S.W.) (the Act). He appealed to a Court of Quarter Sessions against this conviction. After evidence had been taken in the appeal, a case was stated for the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeal. The salient facts of that case were that the applicant having been involved in an accident with his car was required by a constable of police to submit to what was described as "an alco test". This was achieved by the applicant breathing into a tube attached to a bag which had been contained in a green plastic box marked "Alco Test R. 80". It was described by the constable as "the approved device". The result of the test was regarded by the constable as unfavourable to the applicant in relation to the alcohol content of his blood whereupon he was arrested. A police sergeant of the Breath Analysis Section thereupon subjected him to a breath analysis test. The time when the applicant was so subjected to breath analysis was within two hours of his having driven his car. According to the certificate to which I shall refer the breath analysis test showed that the applicant's blood contained more than the prescribed concentration of alcohol specified under the Act. (at p416)
3. Upon the hearing of the charge thereafter laid against the applicant and in respect of which he was convicted and in the appeal against his conviction there was tendered and received in evidence a certificate which complied in all respects with the provisions of s. 4E (12) of the Act. The applicant submits that this certificate ought not to have been admitted in evidence and that in any case it was ineffective to establish the facts which it recited because all the "steps" for which s. 4E provides were not duly taken. The question asked in the case stated and answered in the affirmative by the Supreme Court was whether a certificate in the terms of s. 4E (12) of the Act…
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Details
- AGLC
- Merchant v The Queen [1971] HCA 22
- Case
- [1971] HCA 22
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered the appeal of Merchant against the conviction entered against him in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. Merchant had been convicted of the offence of receiving stolen property, contrary to s 179 of the New South Wales Crimes Act 1900. The Crown alleged that Merchant had received a quantity of stolen goods, knowing them to be stolen.
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial judge had erred in law by directing the jury that they could infer that Merchant had knowledge that the goods were stolen if they were satisfied that he had been reckless as to whether they were stolen. The Court was required to determine the precise meaning of "knowing" in the context of the offence of receiving stolen property and whether recklessness constituted sufficient knowledge for the purposes of the section.
The High Court held that the trial judge's direction to the jury was erroneous. The Court reasoned that the word "knowing" in s 179 of the Crimes Act 1900 required actual knowledge, or at least a belief on the part of the accused that the goods were stolen. Recklessness, which involves a failure to consider or inquire into the circumstances, was not sufficient to establish the requisite knowledge. The Court emphasised the distinction between knowing something and suspecting or being reckless as to its truth.
The appeal was allowed, the conviction was quashed, and a new trial was ordered in the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial judge had erred in law by directing the jury that they could infer that Merchant had knowledge that the goods were stolen if they were satisfied that he had been reckless as to whether they were stolen. The Court was required to determine the precise meaning of "knowing" in the context of the offence of receiving stolen property and whether recklessness constituted sufficient knowledge for the purposes of the section.
The High Court held that the trial judge's direction to the jury was erroneous. The Court reasoned that the word "knowing" in s 179 of the Crimes Act 1900 required actual knowledge, or at least a belief on the part of the accused that the goods were stolen. Recklessness, which involves a failure to consider or inquire into the circumstances, was not sufficient to establish the requisite knowledge. The Court emphasised the distinction between knowing something and suspecting or being reckless as to its truth.
The appeal was allowed, the conviction was quashed, and a new trial was ordered in the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
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