JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
LOCATION: PERTH
CITATION: MEO -v- FACIAL PLASTIC SURGERY PTY LTD [2025] WADC 88
CORAM: REGISTRAR NUNN
HEARD: DETERMINED ON THE PAPERS
DELIVERED : 27 NOVEMBER 2025
FILE NO/S: CIV 2398 of 2024
BETWEEN: MARGARET MEO
Plaintiff
AND
FACIAL PLASTIC SURGERY PTY LTD
First Defendant
JASON WAYNE OATES
Second Defendant
Catchwords:
Personal injury - Limitation period - Section 39(3)(b) of the Limitation Act 2005 (WA) - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Limitation Act 2005 (WA)
Result:
Application dismissed
Representation:
Counsel:
| Plaintiff | : | Ms V E Long-Droppert |
| First Defendant | : | Mr N Banks |
| Second Defendant | : | Ms E L Jack |
Solicitors:
| Plaintiff | : | Hammond Legal |
| First Defendant | : | Panetta McGrath Lawyers |
| Second Defendant | : | MDA National Insurance |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Bee v ACN 116 198 460 Pty Ltd [2016] WADC 152
REGISTRAR NUNN:
Introduction
Margaret Meo had a cosmetic facial treatment performed at Academy Face and Body, a plastic and cosmetic surgery clinic. It is run by Facial Plastic Surgery Pty Ltd (the first defendant) under the supervision of Dr Jason Oates, the sole director of Facial Plastic Surgery (the second defendant). For ease of reference, I will simply call the second defendant 'the clinic'.
The basis of her cause of action stems from an alleged injury caused by the treatment administered by the clinic's nurse practitioner, Ms Helen Cunningham.
Ms Meo has sued the clinic and Dr Oates but not Ms Cunningham. Ms Meo believed Ms Cunningham to be an employee of the clinic. Rather than pursue Ms Cunningham, Ms Meo has pursued the clinic as being vicariously liable for the acts of its employees, agents and servants. This purports to include Ms Cunningham.
The limitation period expired very soon after the writ was served but before any defence was received. The clinic has not yet filed a defence. Dr Oates has.
In his defence Dr Oates pleads that Ms Cunningham was not in fact an employee of the clinic but an independent contractor.
Ms Meo now applies outside of the limitation period for leave under s 39(3)(b) of the Limitation Act 2005 (WA) to bring an action against Ms Cunningham and to join her as a further defendant to the action.
The application is not opposed. At the first return date for the application, Ms Meo agreed the application could be determined on the papers. Written submissions and affidavits were received.
Ms Meo bases her application on the analogous authority of Ghiassi v Industrial People Pty Ltd [2012] WADC 23.
Notwithstanding that the application is not opposed I do not consider that the application can succeed for three reasons.
1.There is no satisfactory evidence that Ms Meo has suffered a personal injury to trigger the operation of s 39 of the Limitation Act 2005.
2.There is no satisfactory evidence as to when Ms Meo suffered any such personal injury or was aware of the first manifestation or…
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- Case
- [2025] WADC 88
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue the court had to address was whether the three-year limitation period for personal injury claims had expired, considering the date on which the plaintiff became aware of the injuries. The court also needed to assess the applicability of Section 39(3)(b) of the Limitation Act, which stipulates that the limitation period does not start until the plaintiff knew, or ought to have known, of the injury and its cause. This involved an analysis of the facts and circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's knowledge of the injuries and their cause, as well as any relevant equitable considerations.
The court found that the limitation period did not commence until the plaintiff was aware of the full extent of the injuries and their cause. Given the complex nature of the injuries and the subsequent medical assessments required, the court determined that the plaintiff's claim was not time-barred. The court emphasised that the limitation period is not triggered by a mere suspicion of injury, but rather by a concrete awareness of the injury and its cause. This ruling hinged on the specific facts of the case, where the plaintiff's delayed recognition of the full extent of the injuries justified an extension of the limitation period. The court's decision thus allowed the plaintiff to proceed with their claim, subject to further proceedings on the merits.
The final orders of the court were that the plaintiff's action was not statute-barred under Section 39(3)(b) of the Limitation Act 2005 (WA), and that the case would proceed to a determination of the merits. The defendant's application to dismiss the claim on limitation grounds was dismissed, enabling the plaintiff to continue with the litigation.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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