Menon v Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Energy
[2004] QLC 41
•21 May 2004
LAND COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Menon & Ors v Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Energy [2004] QLC 0041 PARTIES: Beatrice L and Prem K Menon and Ronald Ross-Gilder
(applicants)v. Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Energy
(respondent)FILE NO: AV2003/0589 DIVISION: Land Court of Queensland PROCEEDING: Appeal against annual valuation under Valuation of Land Act 1944 DELIVERED ON: 21 May 2004 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARD AT: Brisbane MEMBER Dr NG Divett ORDER: The appeal is dismissed, and the unimproved value of Lot 4 on RP 89614 as determined by the Chief Executive in the sum of One Hundred and Twenty Thousand Dollars ($120,000) is affirmed. CATCHWORDS: Valuation – Factors in valuation – Restrictions on use – Vegetation Protection Order – Impact upon adjoining property – Importance of appropriate investigation APPEARANCES: Mr PK Menon for appellants
Mr GJ Smith for respondent
Background:
This matter relates to land at 177 Royal Parade, Alderley and described as Lot 4 on RP 89614, Parish of Enoggera. The subject land has an area of 607 m² and is located about 6 kilometres radially north of the Brisbane Central Business District. Access is good to Royal Parade, which is bitumen sealed with concrete kerbing and channelling, and an earth formed footpath. All normal urban utility services are available. The subject land is included in the Low Density Residential area of the Brisbane City Plan 2000 of 30 October 2000, and effective at the date of valuation of 1 October 2002. The key issues are the impact of a Vegetation Protection Order and comparison of sales.
On 24 February 2003 the Chief Executive issued a valuation of the subject land at $120,000. Following an objection the Chief Executive confirmed that figure on 8 July 2003. The appellants have now appealed claiming the unimproved value should more properly be $100,000.
Prem Kumar Menon appeared and gave evidence on behalf of the appellants. Mr GJ Smith, Senior Legal Officer appeared for the respondent, calling evidence from Douglas Buchanan, the senior departmental registered valuer now accepting responsibility for the valuation, which had formerly been undertaken by another registered valuer no longer available to defend the valuation. This matter was heard consecutively with two other appeals by the appellants in AV2003/0588 and AV2003/0587.
History of the Valuation –
Mr Menon agrees that similar issues as those now raised had been the subject of a former appeal to this Court for the preceding valuation at 1 October 2001. In that matter the Chief Executive had initially valued the subject land at $109,000. Following an objection conference that figure was reduced to $107,000. The appellants then appealed that reduced figure, and following a further reduction to $100,000 under s.68 of the Act, the matter was withdrawn by the appellants. Mr Buchanan now advises that recognition of those previous reductions had been maintained in the current valuation at $120,000. Mr Menon argues that the unimproved value of the subject land should have remained constant for the current matter at $100,000.
Nature of the Land –
It is agreed that the subject land is a regular shaped rectangular parcel located at the foot of rising land to the rear. The land is slightly above road level, and faces towards the north-west. The land has drainage problems from surface water flows from the rear, and the topography generally falls gently across Royal Parade towards Kedron Brook to the north-west.
The visual impact of the subject land is dominated by a large tree, possibly a fig tree, which is on the adjoining property to the north-east (Lot 5 on RP 89614). The large tree is near the eastern boundary of the subject land, and the very large tree canopy extends well across the eastern part of the subject land. (Exhibit 3, page 3 photograph). Mr Menon gave evidence of problems with pruning and lopping of the tree, intrusion of the tree roots towards the dwelling on the subject land, and nuisance from fruit bats in season. Mr Menon sees the tree as a disability to his free use of the subject land.
The key issue for the appellants in respect of that large tree is that the tree is currently protected by a Vegetation Protection Order (VPO), which is discussed later. While Mr Menon has not discussed the difficulties he is currently facing with his neighbour in respect of the impact of that tree, he has had discussions with officers of the Brisbane City Council in respect of the VPO. Mr Menon advises that as a result of his inquiries, the Brisbane City Council arborist has inspected the tree, and advised about which particular branches may be touched, and the extent of lopping that could occur.
Mr Menon does not argue that the tree presents any physical danger to persons, but that the invasive nature of the canopy and tree roots were causing problems upon his land. Mr Menon also accepts that the legal responsibility for the maintenance of that VPO rests with the owner of Lot 5. However he argues that any part of the tree which exists upon the subject land is a cost incumbent upon the appellants to pay. For that reason he argues that the existence of the tree is a disability over which he has little control.
Now while Mr Menon was happy with the $9,000 allowed by the Chief Executive for the preceding year as acceptance of the impact of the VPO, he does not believe that the unimproved value of the subject land should increase further due to the ongoing presence of the VPO. Mr Menon agrees that the existence of the VPO, and its impact upon the subject land, is the key difference between the parties in this matter.
Mr Buchanan advises that there has been no reduction in the valuation of the adjoining Lot 5 as a consequence of the presence of the VPO, principally because the issue was not raised by that owner, and the VPO was therefore not known about at the time of that valuation of Lot 5. Mr Buchanan observes that some owners see a VPO as an asset, rather than a disability, so that the presence of a VPO does not automatically result in some reduction in an unimproved value of a parcel of land. He further advises that his inquiries of the Brisbane City Council confirm that certain lopping of branches and docking of tree roots are permissible under a VPO, but only on approval from the Council. Mr Buchanan advises that the unimproved value of the adjoining Lot 5 was of the order of $150,000. However that parcel is larger, faces east, and is a corner parcel.
In making his conclusion on the impact of the VPO upon the subject land, Mr Buchanan was aware of the previous discount of $9,000 in 2001, and he has allowed more in the current valuation. Mr Buchanan was also aware of decisions of this Court in respect of the impact of a VPO upon a parcel itself, noting allowances varying from 7%j to 12% in a valuation. He was not aware of any discounts allowed on land parcels adjoining a parcel with a VPO present, but he has allowed more than 10% in the current matter. Mr Menon offers an opinion that if the VPO did not exist on the adjoining parcel (Lot 5), then the value of the subject land could be $20,000 higher than its value with the VPO in existence. (Transcript 12). He also advises that root barriers placed by a previous owner of the subject land have now been penetrated by the large roots of the tree.
Comparison of Sales –
Mr Menon provides no sales of his own to support his estimate of the unimproved value. Mr Buchanan provides the following sales of vacant lands:
· Sale 1 – (45 Royal Parade – Lot 195 on RP 19258). This is a 473 m² parcel located about 600 metres south-west of the subject land. The sale has similar services and access, but is a more elevated parcel, rising steeply from the road to the rear. The sale has a westerly aspect and a narrower frontage, although it has a superior outlook over parklands and to the mountains. There is also surface runoff similar to the subject land, but the western outlook of the sale detracts from its aspects. Whilst smaller in size, overall the sale is seen as superior to the subject land due to its elevation, views and lack of any VPO on any adjoining property. The sale sold in November 2001 for $175,000, and was analysed at $170,000.
[13]
· Sale 2 – (76 Royal Parade – Lot 8 on RP 106642). This is a 708 m² parcel located about 500 metres south-west of the subject land, and with similar services and access. The sale is very steep, falling from street level, with a western aspect. The sale is more elevated and overlooks adjoining parklands and views westward to the mountains. The sale is superior to the subject land due to its elevation, views and lack of any impact from VPOs on adjoining parcels. The sale sold in June 2002 for $180,000, and was analysed at $175,000.
Mr Buchanan also provides the following sales of improved parcels as a check on his analysis of the vacant land sales:
· Sale 1 – (114 Mornington Street – Lot 65 on RP 89614). This is a 685 m² improved parcel with a low set rendered brick dwelling of age about 30 to 40 years, and of approximately 84 m² floor area. The sale is located about 120 metres east of the subject land. The sale is slightly more elevated, and is also subject to surface water runoff during heavy rains. The sale sold in March 2002 for $235,000, the added value of improvements was estimated at $52,800, and the land analysed at $182,200, and applied at $155,000 (85%). The sale supports an unimproved value of a slightly larger parcel than the subject land, without any impacts of a VPO at about $150,000.
[15]
· Sale 2 – (5 Coolalie Street – Lot 35 on RP 72533). This is a 604 m² improved parcel with a low set brick dwelling of age about 40 years, and located about 750 metres south-west of the subject land. Coolalie Street is a cul-de-sac, leading through Birrimba Street to the adjoining Raymont Road, which is a busy connecting road from Alderley to Grange. The sale is closer to bus services, and has less traffic due to the cul-de-sac. However it does experience traffic noise from Raymont Road. The old dwelling has an approximate floor area of 102 m², and the added value of improvements was analysed at $65,900. There are also some surface water runoff problems from higher grounds to the east of the sale. The sale overall is seen as superior to the subject land. The sale sold in May 2002 for $279,000, was analysed at $213,100, and applied at $165,000 (77%), which reflects a superior parcel with no impacts from an adjoining VPO.
Mr Menon concedes that generally in that area the property market had increased since the previous valuation of 2001. However he questions whether the north-western aspect of the subject land would provide any significant benefit, compared to the western aspect of the sales evidence. Mr Menon was also in agreement with Mr Buchanan that generally the more elevated parcels command higher prices, all else being equal. However he questions some of the values of improvements to the sales evidence analysed by Mr Buchanan. Mr Buchanan advises that the values noted in his analysis were derived from the recognised industry source of the current Rawlinsons Australian Construction Handbook 2002, to which appropriate depreciation allowances had been made in order to reflect the added value that the improvements brought to the sales.
Decision:
As noted in the accompanying decision in Menon v Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Energy (AV2003/0587), the broad legal principles and legislative directions covering this matter were explored, and I will not repeat those findings. However the current matter also includes considerations in respect of the impact of a VPO which requires further clarification.
Impact of Vegetation Protection Order –
The impact of a VPO upon the value of a parcel of land has been the subject of several decisions of this Court over the last few years. In the matter of Estate of Bressow v Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources (AV98-593), 23 December 1999, unreported, the Member noted the physical tree and a VPO could be seen either as an advantage or a disadvantage to a prudent owner, depending upon their perspective of the cultural or landscaping aspects of the VPO. However the Member noted that the VPO does in fact shift control of the tree so protected from the owner of the land to the Council, and “as such it must be seen as lessening the rights of the owner over the fig tree”. (p.16).
In Bressow the Member considered the findings of a previous decision in Mitchell v Chief Executive, Department of Lands (V93-699 and V94-582), 29 June 1995, unreported, where an allowance of 4% in the unimproved value was approved. He also drew analogy with the impact of a heritage restriction as examined in Roberts v Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources (1998) 19 QLCR 186, where the Land Appeal Court found in the absence of market evidence to guide it, that a discount of 10% in those circumstances was appropriate. While the Roberts matter dealt with an old heritage listed property at Melton Hill in Townsville, the analogy taken in the decision of Bressow lay in the fact that both a “heritage listing” and a “VPO” are historic listings of properties or distinctive vegetations which are imposed upon the land in the community interest, and both of which restrict the free and unencumbered use of a parcel of land. In Bressow the Member allowed a reduction of 7% in that matter.
The VPO in Bressow property was later revisited in a subsequent appeal where it was argued that the tree canopy and root structure had then increased so as to become a greater intrusion of the land. That later matter was discussed in Morris v Department of Natural Resources and Mines (AV2002/0180), 28 May 2003, unreported, where the learned Member, on that evidence, increased the reduction in unimproved value to 12%. In the Bressow and Morris matters, the VPO covered a very old and large white fig tree which was an intact specimen, possibly dating back to late 19th century. That fig tree had a height of 25 metres, a canopy width of 21 metres, and a trunk of 3 metres at breast height.
While there was no specific evidence in the current matter of the details of the VPO, the general conditions pertaining to the VPO in Bressow were probably similar, and are prescribed under Council Ordinance Chapter 22. Those Ordinances detailed the constraints placed upon the tree, how applications to interfere with the tree should be made, and the powers of the Council to decide on any application, and penalties for breaching the VPO. That VPO also exempted the Council from any claim for compensation as a result of a VPO under s.38 of Chapter 22. Based upon that evidence in Bressow the Member noted at p.4:
“While there is no specific power under chapter 22 to seek redress of their complaints in respect of the VPO, it may follow that there could be some overall right of appeal under s.4.1.27(1) of the Integrated Planning Act, but only where any VPO impacts a development application. However, for the purposes of this matter, any impact of the VPO upon the mind of a prudent purchaser wishing to purchase the subject land, should be weighed in any consideration of the unimproved value of the land.”
However all of the previous matters dealt with the value of a parcel of land where a VPO existed upon a tree located upon that parcel. The question here to be addressed is whether similar conclusions can be assumed, when the VPO exists only upon a tree on an adjoining parcel. The question also needs to be addressed specifically where a tree is so near the boundary of the subject land, that its canopy and root system actually intrudes into the subject land.
In his evidence Mr Menon advises that, following his application to Council in respect of what tree lopping could be undertaken, he was advised accordingly by a Council arborist who inspected the tree. The implications of that approach are placed in perspective in respect of the duty of care of the Council in the findings of a recent decision of the Court of Appeal in New South Wales in respect of a Tree Preservation Order (TPO). A TPO in New South Wales is similar in legal effect to a VPO in Queensland. Before exploring the matter of duty of care of the Council in respect of a VPO, I turn first to the legislative directions providing authority for the creation of a VPO in Brisbane.
The history of the legislation enshrining power for the Brisbane City Council to determine VPOs was explored by the Full Court of Appeal in Queensland in Bone v Mothershaw [2003] 2 QdR 600, from p.603 onwards. The matter dealt with lands at Runcorn in Brisbane, where about 32 hectares of land was covered by a VPO, and was subsequently cleared unlawfully. A fine of $20,000 was imposed upon the appellant. That history supports the findings of Bressow (supra), emphasising the particular sections of Chapter 22 of the Council Ordinance. Those sections in essence provide powers to consider the need to protect a tree (s.5); the issuing of a protection order (s.12); the prohibition for any person to destroy or interfere with that tree so protected (s.23(1)); and the penalties for such unlawful interference. The legislation to introduce VPOs came into force on 30 November 1991. The Council’s local ordinance in Chapter 22, s.5(d) providing for a VPO was lawfully established under s.36 (since repealed) of the City of Brisbane Act 1924, and is therefore lawful, and provides a serious consideration for any prospective prudent purchaser of land so impacted.
In Bone v Mothershaw the major thrust of the action was in respect of the authority of the Council to require rehabilitation of certain freehold land protected under a VPO which had been unlawfully cleared. The Court of Appeal upheld that neither Chapter 22, or a VPO made under that Council legislation, was invalid; and that such legislation could prohibit change to or use of freehold land without involving acquisition, or providing compensation. In that matter McPherson JA relevantly noted at para [25]:
“The present case is different. The Council has not taken any interest of Mr Bone, so as to attract the operation of the Acquisition of Land Act 1967 or otherwise. He retains unimpaired, for what it is worth, his estate in fee simple absolute in the land. He has been stripped of virtually all the powers which make ownership of land of any practical utility or value. There is, as is attested by an affidavit from the valuer provided at the hearing, no doubt that the value of the land has been greatly reduced. But the law provides no remedy for this action or its consequences when it is the result of legislation validly passed under law-making authority that by its terms of nature authorises or permits such an outcome.”
In his consenting decision in Bone v Mothershaw, the words of Williams JA in noting the concerns of the appellant, and also in light of the more recent findings of the New South Wales Court of Appeal, have some significance. Williams JA noted at para [33]:
“[33] Counsel for the appellant in this case essentially attempted to contend that the bylaw here was so unreasonable that it could not be said to be a law for the welfare and good government of the citizens of Brisbane applying the Lynch test. In particular he referred to the fact that by virtue of s.23(2)(d)(ii) the mowing of lawn could even constitute a breach of a Vegetation Protection Order. Also, the removal of a tree blown over in a storm and thereby creating a nuisance could not be removed without Council approval (of course upon payment of the prescribed fee) unless it had ‘become dangerous’. While the apparent unreasonableness of the bylaw in those regards is a matter of concern, the problems thereby identified are ultimately for the elected representatives of the community and not for the courts to resolve.”
Clearly the findings of Bone v Mothershaw direct that lands severely impacted by a VPO have suffered some diminution in value.
The matter of a duty of care by Council is not a matter for concern in this instance, but the importance of appropriate care and investigations in such matters is worthy of note. For instance in the recent decision of Timbs v Shoalhaven City Council [2004] NSWCA 81, 1 April 2004, the New South Wales Court of Appeal awarded damages in a case involving a large spotted gum tree under a TPO of some 30 metres in height, and located only 10 metres from the appellant’s dwelling. On two previous occasions in 1996 and January 1998 Mr Timbs has sought approval of the Council to remove the four similar trees which he felt were unsafe near his house. On both occasions his requests were refused. In July 1998 one of those trees was blown down in a storm, and demolished the dwelling, killing Mr Timbs.
The Court of Appeal found that the Council was not bound to offer an opinion whether the tree in question was “dangerous”, and could therefore be removed. However it found that one of its officers had expressed that opinion, and on that advice, approval to remove the tree was refused. As that officer thus took it upon himself to express an opinion that the tree was safe, the duty of care was higher than that expected of a lay person, and thus required a reasonably informed diagnoses by that officer, or for him to refer the tree to a specialist. In the Timbs matter the Court of Appeal found that the inference was open that a reasonably informed diagnosis would have revealed the decayed structure of the roots and the tree would have been pronounced dangerous. In the current matter Mr Menon advises that a Council arborist personally inspected the tree and offered advice on appropriate lopping of the branches. There is no issue for consideration in this matter.
If I then consider whether the impact of a VPO could be extended to lands beyond which the tree in question stands, I need to consider the reasons for the VPO. The VPO was provided to protect the health, vigour and longevity of the tree. It is conceded that both the canopy and the root structure impact the adjoining subject land. In the location shown of the large tree it would be reasonable to conclude, as the tree is very near the side boundary, that the subject land would almost be as much impacted as the adjoining Lot 5. Certainly the photography and evidence shows that the tree canopy overhangs part of the existing dwelling on the subject land. The evidence is that the invasive root system also penetrates towards the foundations of the dwelling, in spite of attempts to place root barriers at some former time. Based on the experience of Bressow and Morris, I believe an allowance of between 7% and 12% would be appropriate.
Another matter of consideration is that while the subject land is to be valued as if it were a vacant parcel under s.3(1)(b) of the Valuation of Land Act 1944 (the Act), all of the surrounding developments, including the tree and the VPO are to be taken as they currently exist. That was clarified in the findings of the Privy Council in Tooheys Limited v. The Valuer-General (1925) AC 439, where Their Lordships said at 443:
“Now, what he has to consider is what the land would fetch as at the date of valuation if the improvements made had not been made. Words could scarcely be clearer to show that the improvements were to be left entirely out of view. They are to be taken, not only as non-existent, but as if they never had existed.”
In seeking further clarification of the meaning of “unimproved value” as it applies to the subject land under the Act, I note also the findings of the Privy Council in Tetzner v. Colonial Sugar Refining Company Limited (1958) AC 50, where Their Lordships said at 57:
“What in Their Lordships’ opinion is required in the present case is that the physical improvements, with any value which they attach to the land on which they are situated, be excluded from the valuer’s computation. The land will then be valued as land devoid of buildings but situated in the community with the amenities and facilities which have grown up around it.”
In simple terms the land is to be treated as if all the improvements had not occurred, while all the existing surrounding developments at the time of the valuation are to be considered extant. The VPO is therefore definitely an imposition upon the subject land.
Comparison of Sales –
In applying his estimate of the added value of the improvements upon his improved sales evidence, Mr Buchanan has followed well established valuation principles. The meaning of ‘added value” was addressed by the High Court of Australia in Morrison & Ors v Federal Commissioner of Land Tax (1914) 17 CLR 498, where Griffith CJ said at 503:
“… the term ‘value of improvements’ is defined to mean ‘the added value which the improvements give to the land at the date of valuation irrespective of the cost of improvements.’ … Any operation of man on land which has the effect of enhancing its value comes with the definition of ‘improvement’.”
It is the task of the valuer to ascertain the added value that any improvements bring to the sales for their highest and best use. In the current matter those sales are agreed to have a highest use for residential purposes, and Mr Buchanan’s adoption of a recognised industry standard in Rawlinsons’ Guide, provides a sound basis for this estimates. His application of depreciation rates based upon his wide valuation experience is consistent with guidance provided in King Ranch Pastoral Pty Limited v The Valuer-General (1968) 35 CLLR 255, where the Land Appeal Court, when accepting an experience valuer’s opinion, said at 259:
“… Mr Walker adopted a method of valuing based on knowledge and experience rather than one lacking precedent and authority.”
The Land Appeal Court in King Ranch went on to say at 262:
“Now, in my firm opinion the valuers were entitled, when valuing the subject, to draw upon their knowledge of the values applied to these neighbouring lands and upon the experience gained by them in valuing these neighbouring lands. Further the Land Court was entitled to rely on such knowledge and experience. It is cogent evidence in determining what is an extremely difficult problem, having regard to the fact that there were no sales of comparable leasehold land on which reliance could be placed, and no sales of freehold land at all. In Bingham v. Cumberland County Council (1954) 20 L.G.R. 1 at pp. 18 and 19, Sugarman J. says, ‘In the absence of sufficient guidance to be had from sales, the valuer may find himself in a position resembling that to which Lord Romer referred in the Raja case (1939) A.C. at pp. 312 and 313, in which he will have no market value to guide him, and he will have to ascertain as best he may from the material before him what a willing vendor might reasonably expect to obtain from a willing purchaser for the land.’ The valuer in arriving at his opinion in these difficult matters may have to draw upon his general knowledge and experience, including perhaps experience in other situations which, although lacking in complete comparability, may yet provide an experienced valuer with guidance and suggestions as to the general approach which may be made and as to considerations which may become relevant.”
As Mr Buchanan is the only expert valuation evidence provided in this matter, the Court accepts his considered opinion on appropriate depreciation allowances to be made in his analyses of his sales.
While the judgment of an experienced valuer is a legitimate guide to his professional opinion of an area, it is always important to ensure that such judgment is supported by evidence in the marketplace. That was outlined in the text “Land Valuation and Compensation in Australia” (3rd edition) 1984, which read at 22:
“A registered or licensed valuer is regarded as a person who possesses special training. He is entitled to express opinions as to value or other matters appertaining to his vocation, but these cannot be more valid than the information and reasoning upon which they are founded. In general, opinion evidence is not admissible unless it is given by a witness called as an expert. Court judgments have emphasised that the weight of an expert’s opinion concerning the value of land depends upon the foundation upon which it rests.”
That was also followed in the decision of the Land Appeal Court in Santos Limited v Valuer-General (1988-89) 12 QLCR 231, which followed the principle that a value based upon sales was “to be preferred to a valuation based on opinions”. (p.235/6).
It is always therefore important to contrast the personal views and aspirations of the skilled person in land matters, with the views of the so called “hypothetical purchaser” in the marketplace. In the end it is the hypothetical vendor and purchaser who establishes the value of land. (See Spencer v The Commonwealth of Australia (1907) 5 CLR 418, where Griffiths CJ at 432 and Isaacs J at 441 set the principles which have ever since determined how a bona fide sale is to be assessed. In the end the value of a parcel, and the relative value of the locality, must be supported by the evidence of bona fide sales evidence in the free marketplace. On the evidence before me Mr Buchanan has fulfilled that responsibility.
If I consider then the sales I find the following comparisons:
SaleArea Value Comparison
1 (45 Royal Parade) 473 m² $170,000 Superior
2 (76 Royal Parade) 708 m² $175,000 Superior
1 (114 Mornington 685 m² $155,000 Slightly larger and similar
Street)without VPO
2 (5 Coolalie 604 m² $165,000 Superior without VPO
Street)
Subject land 607 m² $120,000 -
In his comparisons Mr Buchanan has compared his vacant land sales at analysed values, while he has compared his improved sales at applied unimproved values. I note that his applications of his improved sales represent conservatively Sale 1 (85%) and Sale 2 (77%). If I make similar conservative allowances for his vacant land sales, I could compare those parcels if I applied say 85% for Sale 1 ($144,500), and Sale 2 ($148,750). Based on those adjusted comparisons it would still be reasonable to accept an unimproved value of between $140,000 to $155,000, if there was no impact of the VPO upon the subject land.
Relativity –
While the matter of relativity was only addressed partly in the evidence, I am advised that the adjoining Lot 5 to the east has an unimproved value, as a north-eastern facing corner parcel of 688 m², but with an irregular shape, of about $150,000. On that basis I believe an unimproved value of say $140,000 for the subject land would be appropriate without any impact of the VPO, which has also not been applied to Lot 5 at this time. If I then apply the more recent decision of Morris (supra) of 12%, I could conclude a value of the subject land at $123,700 (say $123,000). On that basis I see no grounds for amending Mr Buchanan’s value of $120,000 in this matter.
Conclusion:
Having considered the whole of the evidence I am not persuaded that the appellants have proved their case. The appeal is dismissed, and the unimproved value of Lot 4 on RP 89614 as determined by the Chief Executive in the sum of One Hundred and Twenty Thousand Dollars ($120,000) is affirmed.
NG DIVETT
MEMBER OF THE LAND COURT
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