MEN v The State of Western Australia [No 2]
[2020] WASCA 138
•28 AUGUST 2020
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: MEN -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [No 2] [2020] WASCA 138
CORAM: QUINLAN CJ
MITCHELL JA
BEECH JA
HEARD: ON THE PAPERS
DELIVERED : 28 AUGUST 2020
FILE NO/S: CACR 107 of 2020
BETWEEN: MEN
Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
FILE NO/S: CACR 108 of 2020
BETWEEN: TNN
Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: TROY DCJ
File Number : IND 1380 of 2018
Catchwords:
Criminal law and sentencing - Charge of engaging in conduct knowing that it may result in a child suffering harm contrary to s 101(1)(a) of Children and Community Services Act 2004 (WA) - Charge supported by seven particulars any one of which sufficient to sustain conviction - Jury found that six particulars were made out against each appellant - Sentencing judge sentenced appellants on basis that six particulars were made out against each appellant - Conviction appeals by appellants partly successful - Finding by appeal court that it was only open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt in relation to five particulars against the mother and three particulars against the father - Sentence appeals commenced following result in conviction appeals - Concession by respondent that sentencing judge sentenced appellants on erroneous factual basis - Appellants resentenced
Legislation:
Children and Community Services Act 2004 (WA), s 101
Result:
Appeals upheld
Appellants resentenced
Category: D
Representation:
CACR 107 of 2020
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | No appearance |
| Respondent | : | No appearance |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Butcher Paull & Calder |
| Respondent | : | Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) |
CACR 108 of 2020
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | No appearance |
| Respondent | : | No appearance |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Monaghan Lawyers |
| Respondent | : | Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Kentwell v The Queen [2014] HCA 37; (2014) 252 CLR 601
MEN v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 118
NTH v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 22
RMM v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 183
RMM v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 183 (S)
SJMD v The State of Western Australia [No 2] [2018] WASCA 99
SV v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 123
The State of Western Australia v TIK [2009] WASCA 122
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT:
Introduction
These appeals against sentence arise from this court's decision to partially uphold the appellants' appeals against conviction.[1] As in the conviction appeal, we will refer to the male appellant as the father and the female appellant as the mother, in order to preserve the complainant's anonymity.[2]
[1] MEN v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 118.
[2] In these reasons, we will use the terminology and abbreviations used in the conviction appeal.
The appellants were charged with three counts, in an indictment in the following terms:
(1)Between 1 February 2016 and 11 September 2017 at [an outer southern suburb of Perth] [the mother] and [the father], being persons having the care or control of a child, namely [the complainant], engaged in conduct knowing that it may result in the child suffering harm as a result of emotional abuse or neglect as defined in section 28(1) of the Children and Community Services Act 2004.
(2)In the alternative to Count (1), between the same dates and at the same place [the mother] and [the father], being persons having the care or control of a child, namely [the complainant], engaged in conduct reckless as to whether such conduct may have resulted in the child suffering harm as a result of emotional abuse or neglect as defined in section 28(1) of the Children and Community Services Act 2004.
(3)Between 1 May 2017 and 11 September 2017 at [an outer southern suburb of Perth] [the mother] and [the father] unlawfully detained [the complainant].
The State particularised the conduct it relied upon in relation to counts 1 and 2 as follows:
1.The father and mother repeatedly physically assaulted the complainant, with and without objects.
2.The father and mother required the complainant to periodically be locked in a sea container.
3.The father and mother required, directed or permitted the complainant to largely live outside the family dwelling, including:
(a)requiring her to eat meals outside - near or in the shipping container;
(b)subjecting her to excessive exclusion from the dwelling, including after school or on the weekends, and including as a result of punishment and/or chores;
(c)failing to provide adequate bathing or toilet facilities or enable an acceptable level of personal hygiene; and
(d)denying her access to household amenities (such as television and computers).
4.During 2016, the father and mother continually required or permitted the complainant to attend school wet with urine, or smelling of urine.
5.The father and mother excluded the complainant from many family, recreational or social outings.
6.The father and mother did not permit the complainant to talk to her sister, M.
7.The father and mother verbally abused the complainant, by threatening her and calling her names.
The father and the mother were each convicted of counts 1 and 3 on the joint indictment (count 2 having been in the alternative to count 1). Special verdicts were sought from the jury[3] as to the conduct they relied upon to arrive at their verdict of guilty on count 1. The jury found that all of the conduct alleged at [3] above, with the exception of particular 6, was established as against each of the appellants.
[3] See Criminal Procedure Act2004 (WA), s 113(2).
The trial judge sentenced the appellants to 4 years' immediate imprisonment on count 1, with a concurrent sentence of 12 months' immediate imprisonment on count 3. His Honour sentenced the appellants on the basis of the jury's verdicts and special verdicts, as he was obliged to do. Thus, the judge sentenced on the basis that particulars 1 ‑ 5 and 7 had been established.
The father and mother each appealed against their convictions on both counts 1 and 3 on the ground that the verdicts were unreasonable and could not be supported by the evidence. We upheld each ground as it related to count 3, but not as it related to count 1. In relation to count 1, we found that the evidence was incapable of establishing the father's guilt in relation to particulars 2, 4 and 7, and that the evidence was incapable of establishing the mother's guilt in relation to particular 2. The evidence was, however, capable of establishing, beyond reasonable doubt, particulars 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 against the mother and particulars 1, 3 and 5 against the father. As proof of any one of the particulars was sufficient to sustain the verdicts on count 1, the verdict on that count was not disturbed.[4]
[4] MEN v The State of Western Australia [8], [9], [421], [425], [675], [705].
Following publication on 28 July 2020 of our reasons in MEN v The State of Western Australia, the appellants filed notices of appeal against sentence. Both appellants contend that, in light of our decision in the conviction appeal, they were sentenced on a factual basis that was not open on the evidence and that a different sentence ought be imposed.
On 30 July 2020, we granted an extension of time to appeal and, with the parties' consent, ordered that the appeal be determined on the papers.
The respondent concedes that, in light of the decision in MEN v The State of Western Australia, the appeals against sentence should be upheld and a different sentence imposed.
For the reasons that follow, we would uphold both appeals and resentence as follows:
(1)The father is sentenced to a term of 18 months' immediate imprisonment, taken to have commenced on 4 September 2019, with an order for eligibility for parole.
(2)The mother is sentenced to a term of 2 years' immediate imprisonment, taken to have commenced on 4 September 2019, with an order for eligibility for parole.
The facts found by the trial judge
The complainant was born on 12 May 2005. She grew up in the Philippines.
In 2014, the father and mother were living in a country town in the south west (the Country Town). They had three adult children who had grown up and moved away. They had adopted a Filipino daughter, M, in 2010. In the period leading up to September 2014, the father and mother underwent various processes so that they could adopt another child.
In early September 2014, the father, the mother and M travelled to the Philippines to collect the complainant, with the intention that she would come and live with them in Australia and eventually be adopted by them. They all flew back on 5 September 2014 and resumed living in the Country Town. At that stage, the complainant was 9 years old.
In adopting the complainant, the judge found that the appellants' intentions were honourable and altruistic.[5] Having successfully adopted M, the appellants wished to provide the same positive and beneficial environment to another child from a similar disadvantaged background.[6]
[5] ts 1418.
[6] ts 1419.
The complainant lived with the appellants for about 17 months before the offending conduct began.[7]
[7] ts 1418.
Towards the end of their time living in the country town, the appellants bought a 10‑acre semi‑rural property in an outer southern suburb of Perth (the Property).
In or around early 2016, the family moved to the Property. The father continued to work in the Country Town, travelling there for the working week and returning to the Property each weekend.
The judge found that when, as time went by, the appellants encountered significant difficulties with the complainant, rather than seek assistance from the Department of Child Protection, the appellants resorted to the criminal conduct the subject of the conviction.[8]
[8] ts 1419.
By their special verdict as to particular 1, the jury were satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that each of the appellants repeatedly physically assaulted the complainant with and without objects. His Honour observed that each of the appellants was to be sentenced on the basis that they struck the complainant with their hands, a rubber hosepipe and a tennis racquet. There were no discernible injuries caused, apart from a lump on the complainant's head, although the complainant did say that it always hurt.[9]
[9] ts 1419 - 1420.
The judge found that the appellants would strike the complainant repeatedly, that is, more than occasionally, and that their conduct was a wholly inappropriate disciplinary measure.[10]
[10] ts 1420.
The judge noted that the prosecution accepted that the physical abuse was at a reasonably low level.[11]
[11] ts 1420.
Given our decision in the conviction appeal as to the sea container allegations, it is not necessary to outline the judge's findings as to particular 2, concerning the sea container.
Particular 3 was that each of the appellants required, directed or permitted the complainant to largely live outside the dwelling.
The judge referred to the complainant's evidence that she would be told to run around the paddock and would have to do a number of menial chores.[12] His Honour also referred to the independent evidence of the neighbours, Mr and Mrs D and Ms H.[13]
[12] ts 1421.
[13] ts 1421 - 1423.
The judge was satisfied that both appellants regularly required the complainant to run laps around the perimeter of the property on her own, to remain outside in the rain for up to two hours on her own and to do tough physical work such as weeding and removing rocks outside.[14] The judge was evidently also satisfied as to the complainant's evidence that the mother would provide the complainant with water out of a bucket to wash herself.[15]
[14] ts 1423.
[15] ts 1423.
The judge found that, while the property contained computers and televisions, they were not available to the complainant - she was deliberately excluded from that, something which did not merely happen occasionally.[16]
[16] ts 1423.
Particular 4, which we found in the conviction appeal was capable of being proven against the mother but not the father, was that the mother continually required or permitted the complainant to attend school wet with urine or smelling of urine. The judge referred to, and evidently accepted, the evidence of Mr B and Ms W.[17]
[17] ts 1423 - 1425.
Particular 5 was that the appellants excluded the complainant from many family, recreational and social outings. The judge found that that encompassed ice skating, visiting friends, riding horses and things like that, saying that it occurred from 2016, in contrast to what had happened before.[18] The judge referred to, and evidently accepted, Mr B's evidence that the complainant was not allowed to go on school‑based excursions and M's ice skating teacher's observation that she never saw any other child attend lessons at the ice skating rink with M.[19]
[18] ts 1425.
[19] ts 1425.
Particular 7 was that the appellants verbally abused the complainant by threatening her and calling her names. We have found that that particular was not capable of being made out against the father.
The judge said that the complainant gave vivid descriptions about being called names and being threatened by the mother, referring in particular to an occasion on which the mother said to the complainant, 'I want to kill you right now. I'm so close to killing you. I'll shoot you and your head will go in a thousand pieces'.[20]
[20] ts 1425 - 1426.
The appellants' personal circumstances
The father was 62 years old at the time of sentencing and is now 63. The mother was 59 years old at the time of sentencing and is now 60.
The appellants have been married for 36 years. They have been loving and supportive parents to their natural children, whose letters of support speak eloquently of their appreciation for their parents.
The appellants have willingly provided foster care for more than 20 years. They have adopted M, evidently successfully and without incident.
Neither appellant has any criminal record. Evidence given at trial and a number of letters of support provided to the sentencing judge (and copies of which have been provided to us) speak extremely highly of the appellants' character and their conduct and contribution to the community. The judge found that the appellants were of 'extraordinarily positive good character' and had made laudable contributions to the community through the foster care that they had extended.[21]
[21] ts 1417.
The judge found that the risk of reoffending in any way was extremely low.[22]
[22] ts 1426.
Sentencing remarks
The judge said that, given their continued denial of any culpability, he was not able to find that the appellants were remorseful or possessed insight into their offending, so the mitigation that might have flowed from a guilty plea was not present in their case.[23]
[23] ts 1426.
The judge found that the appellants' offending conduct was multifaceted, in that it had a number of aspects, and it was prolonged.[24]
[24] ts 1418.
It remains the case that the appellants' offending was multifaceted, although the effect of our decision in the conviction appeal is to reduce the number of facets of the offending conduct - in the case of the mother, to five of the particulars, and, in the father's case, to three.
The judge referred to the vulnerability of the complainant, observing that it was a fundamentally important factor in sentencing the appellants.[25] The complainant's vulnerability was accentuated by the fact she was young, was from a foreign country, was from an impoverished background, had virtually no relationship with her biological parents and had been traumatised in her early childhood by the biological parents' behaviour towards her and also through her experiences at an orphanage.[26]
[25] ts 1417.
[26] ts 1426.
The judge observed that the complainant was isolated.[27] His Honour characterised the appellants' conduct as a significant breach of trust in that the community, through the social services, had trusted the appellants to look after a young girl from a very troubled background.[28] The judge found that the appellants must have known that she was suffering emotional abuse or neglect from their conduct, albeit that this was not a case where significant pain or injury was inflicted on the complainant or where she suffered lasting or significant physical harm.[29]
[27] ts 1426.
[28] ts 1426.
[29] ts 1426.
The appellants' offending conduct inevitably had the result that the complainant was totally isolated from other members of the family and would have been socially isolated from other children. The appellants' treatment of her had an adverse impact on her ability to form relationships at school with other pupils and with her teachers.[30]
[30] ts 1426 - 1427.
The judge found that it was inappropriate to differentiate between the two appellants, regarding them as equally culpable. His Honour found that the mother's treatment of the complainant in the father's absence was known to the father, and that he behaved in a completely consistent way with his wife when he was back at the Property.[31]
[31] ts 1427.
The judge found that the offence in count 1 occurred over a substantial period of time. The complainant would have suffered emotional abuse and neglect, and on occasions would have been cold, wet, physically sore and completely isolated.[32]
[32] ts 1427.
As already noted, the judge imposed a term of 4 years' imprisonment on count 1 and 12 months' imprisonment on count 3, to be served concurrently. The judge ordered the appellants be eligible for parole.[33]
[33] ts 1429.
Ground of appeal
As already noted, each appellant contends that they were sentenced on a factual basis that, in light of our decision on the conviction appeal, was not open on the evidence.
Disposition - the appellants must be resentenced
The approach to be taken by a trial judge in sentencing following a conviction upon the verdict of a jury is well‑established. It has been summarised, for example, in RMM v The State of Western Australia.[34] In short, a judge is required to act consistently with the verdict of the jury. Otherwise, the judge is not required to sentence on a view of the facts most favourable to an offender, but should make his or her own findings as to the circumstances of the offence. Any finding of fact as to an aggravating matter must be arrived at by a sentencing judge beyond reasonable doubt.
[34] RMM v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 183 [197] ‑ [205].
The judge acted consistently with these principles, adopting the special verdicts of the jury as to the conduct the subject of particulars 1 ‑ 5 and 7.
However, the effect of our decision in the conviction appeal is that it was not open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to particular 2 against either appellant and as to particulars 4 and 7 as against the father. Consequently, without error on the part of the sentencing judge, the result is that the appellants were sentenced on an erroneous factual basis.
It is properly conceded, and it is quite plain, that the factual error as to the sea container allegation was material. Indeed, as we observed in the conviction appeal, the allegation as to the sea container was the most egregious aspect of the appellants' alleged offending. Consequently, this court must resentence the appellants in relation to count 1.
Resentencing
The factual basis for resentencing
The parties advance competing submissions as to the factual basis upon which this court should resentence the appellants. For example:
(1)the mother submits that she should be resentenced in relation to particular 3 on the basis of the complainant's account only to the extent that it was corroborated by evidence of other witnesses;[35]
(2)the respondent invites the court to resentence on the basis of this court's detailed outline of the evidence which it found was capable of sustaining each particular of count 1.
[35] Appellant's submissions in CACR 108 of 2020 [36].
We do not accept either of these submissions. Rather, we consider it appropriate to resentence on the basis of the facts found by the trial judge in relation to each particular. Of course, each appellant is only to be sentenced in relation to those particulars which, in the conviction appeal, we found the evidence to have been capable of sustaining - particulars 1, 3 and 5 against the father and particulars 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 against the mother.
Having presided over the trial, it was for the judge to determine the factual basis for sentencing, subject to acting consistently with the verdict of the jury and subject to the need for any finding of fact as to an aggravating matter to be arrived at beyond reasonable doubt. Not having seen and heard the witnesses, this court is not in a position to make those findings of fact. This court's analysis on the conviction appeal was directed to the different question of whether the evidence was capable of sustaining proof of a count, or particular, beyond reasonable doubt. Whether specific facts were proved beyond reasonable doubt could only be determined by the trial judge, who had seen the witnesses. As we have said, to the extent that we have found that the evidence was incapable of sustaining proof beyond reasonable doubt of a particular, that particular forms no basis of the resentencing. Otherwise, we would sentence on the basis of, and not go beyond, the findings made by the trial judge.
Statutory provisions and general principles
Section 101 of the Children and Community Services Act 2004 (WA) creates the offence of failing to protect a child from harm. It is in the following terms:
101. Failing to protect child from harm
(1)A person who has the care or control of a child and who engages in conduct -
(a)knowing that the conduct may result in the child suffering harm as a result of any one or more of the following -
(i)physical abuse; or
(ii)sexual abuse; or
(iii)emotional abuse as defined in section 28(1); or
[(iv)deleted]
(v)neglect as defined in section 28(1);
or
(b)reckless as to whether the conduct may have that result,
is guilty of a crime, and is liable to imprisonment for 10 years.
(2)In subsection (1) -
engage in conduct means -
(a)to do an act; or
(b)to omit to do an act;
harm has the meaning given to that term in section 28(1).
Section 28(1) of the Act provides definitions for 'emotional abuse', 'harm' and 'neglect', stating:
emotional abuse includes -
(a)psychological abuse; and
(b)being exposed to family violence;
harm, in relation to a child, means any detrimental effect of a significant nature on the child's wellbeing, whether caused by -
(a)a single act, omission or circumstance; or
(b)a series or combination of acts, omissions or circumstances;
neglect includes failure by a child's parents to provide, arrange, or allow the provision of -
(a)adequate care for the child; or
(b)effective medical, therapeutic or remedial treatment for the child.
As can be seen, the maximum penalty for an offence under s 101 is imprisonment for 10 years.
It has been recognised that in sentencing for an offence against s 101, emphasis must be given to general deterrence and the protection of vulnerable children.[36] Offending against this provision may often be difficult to detect.[37]
[36] SV v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 123 [167]; RMM v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 183 (S) [34].
[37] The State of Western Australia v TIK [2009] WASCA 122 [41].
Generally, intentional conduct is regarded as more serious than reckless conduct.[38] However, the consequences of the conduct will usually be of greater weight than whether the conduct was intentional rather than reckless.[39]
Aggravating factors
[38] TIK [41]; SV [133].
[39] TIK [41]; SV [146].
A number of features of the appellants' offending contributed to its seriousness.
The complainant was extremely vulnerable. She was young, aged about 11 or 12 years old at the time of the offending. She had suffered a traumatic and abusive childhood, as the appellants knew.
The appellants' offending was prolonged - it extended over a period of about 19 months. It ceased only when the complainant left the family home.
Their offending involved a breach of trust, given their position as putative adoptive parents, and then adoptive parents, of the complainant. In so observing, we recognise that breach of trust will ordinarily be a feature of all offences under s 101.
The appellants committed their offence with knowledge, not recklessness, of the fact that their conduct may result in the complainant suffering harm.
The appellants committed their offence knowing that they could have called upon the assistance of the Department of Child Protection if they so required.
The appellants' offending caused physical, emotional and psychological harm to the complainant, including by isolating her from other members of the family and being liable to make her socially isolated from other children.[40] While there was no specific evidentiary material as to the effect upon the complainant, it can safely be inferred that the complainant's extended period of being ostracised and mistreated will have adverse effects on her psychological and emotional wellbeing.
[40] ts 1426 - 1427.
As the mother's submissions properly accept, her offending 'involved physical and psychological abuse of an adopted child within her care and custody and amounted to a gross breach of trust.'[41] The same is true of the father's offending.
Mitigating factors
[41] Appellant's submissions in CACR 108 of 2020 [51].
The trial judge described the appellants as being of 'extraordinarily positive good character'. They have never previously offended. As already noted, many people spoke extremely highly, in evidence at trial and in a number of letters, of the appellants' character and their conduct and contribution to the community.
The appellants have been loving and supportive parents of their four children and have successfully adopted M without incident. They have made a significant contribution to the community, including through their many years of fostering children.
The judge found that the appellants had an extremely low risk of reoffending.
Comparable cases
The parties drew the court's attention to four decisions of this court involving sentencing for offences under s 101: The State of Western Australia v TIK; SV v The State of Western Australia; RMM v The State of Western Australia and SJMD v The State of Western Australia [No 2].[42]
[42] SJMD v The State of Western Australia [No 2] [2018] WASCA 99.
The position remains that patterns of sentencing for offences under this provision are yet to emerge. Because s 101 encompasses a wide variety of conduct by an offender, and a wide variety of harm to a child, other cases will often provide limited assistance in discerning the appropriate sentence for a particular case. That is so in the present case. The few cases all involve offending of markedly different character which occurred in very different circumstances from the appellants' offending. Consequently, the cases provide little assistance in the present sentencing exercise.
The appropriate sentence
In our view, the appellants' offending is so serious that a sentence of imprisonment must be imposed - no other disposition would adequately reflect the seriousness of the offending.
We are also satisfied that the seriousness of each of the appellants' offending means that it is not appropriate to suspend the term of imprisonment.
The appellants have been in custody since they were sentenced on 4 September 2019. It is appropriate that the terms of imprisonment imposed upon them in resentencing be backdated to commence on that date.
It seems to us that, as the respondent submits, in light of our conclusions on the conviction appeal, the mother's criminality is materially more serious than that of the father. Particular 4 - requiring or permitting the complainant to attend school wet with or smelling of urine - and particular 7 - verbally abusing the complainant - were not capable of being made out against the father. Moreover, on the complainant's evidence, it was usually the mother who physically assaulted her.
The respondent notes that the sentencing judge imposed a 12 month term for count 3 (the conduct of which was coextensive with the conduct the subject of particular 2 of count 1). The respondent submits that a comparable reduction in sentence - namely 12 months - would be appropriate for the mother in light of this court's decision on the conviction appeal in relation to the sea container aspect of the case.
In pointing to the apparent contribution of the sea container particular to the judge's overall sentence on count 1, this submission has the wrong focus. Once material error has been shown, as it has here, the task of the appellate court in resentencing is to decide for itself the appropriate sentence - the task is not to discern the sentence that the sentencing judge would have imposed but for the error.[43]
[43] Kentwell v The Queen [2014] HCA 37; (2014) 252 CLR 601 [42]; NTH v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 22 [163].
In all the circumstances, we consider that the appropriate terms of imprisonment are, in the case of the mother, 2 years; and in the case of the father, 18 months.
There should be an order for eligibility for parole.
Conclusion
For the above reasons, we would make the following orders.
In CACR 107 of 2020 (the father's appeal):
(1)Leave to appeal on the sole ground of appeal is granted.
(2)The appeal is upheld.
(3)The sentence imposed by Troy DCJ on 4 September 2019 is set aside.
(4)In substitution, the appellant is sentenced as follows:
(a)On count 1, the appellant is sentenced to a term of 18 months' immediate imprisonment.
(b)The term of imprisonment is backdated to commence on 4 September 2019.
(c)The appellant is eligible for parole.
In CACR 108 of 2020 (the mother's appeal):
(1)Leave to appeal on the sole ground of appeal is granted.
(2)The appeal is upheld.
(3)The sentence imposed by Troy DCJ on 4 September 2019 is set aside.
(4)In substitution, the appellant is sentenced as follows:
(a)On count 1, the appellant is sentenced to a term of 2 years' immediate imprisonment.
(b)The sentence is backdated to commence on 4 September 2019.
(c)The appellant is eligible for parole.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
SL
Associate to the Honourable Justice Beech28 AUGUST 2020
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