Melounis & Melounis (No 5)
[2025] FedCFamC1F 235
•10 April 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Melounis & Melounis (No 5) [2025] FedCFamC1F 235
File number(s): SYC 7199 of 2019 Judgment of: ALTOBELLI J Date of judgment: 10 April 2025 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Interim Property – Where the Court is asked to determine whether one, or both, parties should receive $185,000 by way of interim property distribution – Where the parties agree that the applicant is entitled to a $185,000 interim property order – Where similar orders sought by the respondent are opposed by the applicant – Where the Court finds that any order made would be reversible – Where the Court finds that late or inadequate disclosure is not a bar to an interim property order – Where the interests of justice and equity deem that the respondent should receive an interim property distribution limited only to legal expenses – Where an interim property order is made in favour of the respondent. Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 65DAAA, 75(2), 79, 79A Cases cited: Baghti & Baghti and Ors [2015] FamCAFC 71
Melounis & Melounis (No 3) [2023] FedCFamC1F 849
Melounis & Melounis (No 4) [2024] FedCFamC1F 778
Melounis & Melounis [2022] FedCFamC2F 650
Ruslan & Ruslan [2024] FedCFamC1F 50
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 44 Date of hearing: 2 April 2025 Place: Sydney Solicitor for the Applicant: Ms Ralston of Coleman Greig Lawyers Solicitor for the Respondent: Mr Naddaf of Foye Legal Pty Ltd ORDERS
SYC 7199 of 2019 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MS MELOUNIS
Applicant
AND: MR MELOUNIS
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
ALTOBELLI J
DATE OF ORDER:
10 APRIL 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
Interim property orders
1.Both parties receive the sum of $185,000 from the Controlled Monies Account “COLEMAN GREIG LAWYERS PTY LTD CMA ATF [MS MELOUNIS] & [MR MELOUNIS]”.
2.For the purpose of facilitating Order 1, Coleman Greig Lawyers is hereby authorised to, within five business days from the receipt of these sealed Court Orders, transfer $185,000 to the trust account of the Respondent Husband’s legal representatives for the sole purpose of meeting current and future legal expenses associated with these proceedings.
3.For the purpose of facilitating Order 1, Coleman Greig Lawyers is hereby authorised to, within five business days from the receipt of these sealed Court Orders, disburse $185,000 to the Applicant Wife in the following manner:
(a)$70,000 to be transferred into Coleman Greig Lawyer’s trust account and held on behalf of Ms Melounis, to be used for payment of counsel’s fees of and incidental to the final hearing commencing 14 July 2025;
(b)$65,000 to be transferred into Coleman Greig Lawyer’s trust account and held on behalf of Ms Melounis, to be used for payment of solicitor’s fees of and incidental to the final hearing commencing 14 July 2025; and
(c)$50,000 to be transferred to Ms Melounis, as she directs, with such funds being eligible for use in payment of reasonable living expenses.
Costs
4.The costs of, and incidental to these proceedings is reserved and remitted for consideration by the trial judge at the conclusion of the final hearing.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Melounis & Melounis (No 5) has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ALTOBELLI J:
INTRODUCTION
This case concerns the financial arrangements between Ms Melounis (“the wife”) and Mr Melounis (“the husband”) (collectively “the parties”). The wife seeks, amongst other procedural orders, $185,000 by way of partial property distribution. The husband consents to the wife receiving those funds provided he also receives that amount. The wife opposes the husband receiving any funds. The Court must therefore decide what, if any, funds shall be distributed on an interim basis between the parties.
BACKGROUND
The wife is 41 years old and is an administrative worker. The husband is 48 years old and is both employed as a business manager and self-employed as a company director. The wife asserts that the parties commenced their relationship in 2006, whilst the husband asserts that the parties began their relationship in 2008. The parties commenced cohabitation in 2008 and were married in 2010. The husband contends that the parties separated on 8 September 2018, whilst the wife contends that final separation occurred on 17 October 2019.
For present purposes, nothing turns on these differences.
Litigation history
This matter has a substantial litigation history. Eighty orders have been made during the course of the matter. By virtue of the length and complexity of these proceedings, these reasons for judgment will only traverse materially relevant orders and determinations.
The matter first came before the Court on 25 November 2019 and was later listed for a three-day final hearing before Judge Morely commencing 14 September 2020. The final hearing was unable to conclude within the three allocated days and was further listed on 18 September, 6 November and 12 November 2020. On 14 December 2020, his Honour made orders in chambers reserving the final judgment after written closing submissions were received.
The final reasons for judgment were delivered on 24 May 2022 (Melounis & Melounis [2022] FedCFamC2F 650 (“Melounis”)). His Honour identified that the net matrimonial property pool, including superannuation entitlements, amounted to $1,934,582. Contributions were assessed as 55:45 in favour of the husband, with a five percent adjustment in favour of the wife under s 75(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”). The parents received an even split of the balance of the marital property pool as found by his Honour, and as annexed as schedule one to these reasons for judgment. In order to effectuate Judge Morely’s orders the matrimonial home located at F Street, Suburb D NSW (“the former matrimonial home”) had to be sold.
On 7 August 2023, the wife filed an urgent Application in a Proceeding enforcing the sale of the former matrimonial home. This matter was heard by Henderson J on 26 September 2023 and ex-tempore reasons for judgment were delivered on 27 September 2024 (Melounis & Melounis (No 3) [2023] FedCFamC1F 849 (“Melounis (No 3)”). In Melounis (No 3), the wife was made trustee for the sale of the former matrimonial home. When later sold, the proceeds from the former matrimonial home totalled $1,671,487.50 and were deposited in a controlled monies account in the parties’ joint names (“the controlled monies account”).
On 15 April 2024, the wife filed an Application in a Proceeding seeking, amongst other things, to use the funds within the controlled monies account to discharge a litigation loan in her name. Further, on 23 April 2024 the wife filed an Amended Application for Final Orders seeking to vary both property and parenting orders.
On 5 August 2024, $641,469.31 was ordered to be paid from the controlled monies account to discharge the wife’s litigation loan. On 15 November 2024, this Court delivered judgment permitting the wife to proceed with a parenting application pursuant to s 65DAAA of the Act (Melounis & Melounis (No 4) [2024] FedCFamC1F 778). On 6 December 2024, the matter was set down for final hearing commencing 14 July 2025 for an estimated duration of six days.
On 28 February 2025, the wife filed an Application in a Proceeding on 28 February 2025 for partial property orders which now forms the basis for these reasons for judgment.
COMPETING PROPOSALS
The wife in her Outline of Case Document filed 31 March 2025 (“the wife’s case outline”) seeks orders requesting $185,000 by way of interim property distribution from the controlled monies account and orders dismissing the husband’s response. The wife seeks that the partial property order be effectuated in the following manner:
a. The amount of $70,000, to be transferred into Coleman Greig Lawyer’s trust account and held on behalf of [Ms Melounis], to be used for payment of counsel’s fees of and incidental to the final hearing commencing 14 July 2025;
b. The amount of $65,000, to be transferred into Coleman Greig Lawyer’s trust account and held on behalf of [Ms Melounis], to be used for payment of solicitor’s fees of and incidental to the final hearing commencing 14 July 2025; and
c. The amount of $50,000, to be transferred to [Ms Melounis], as she directs.
The husband in his Outline of Case Document filed 31 March 2025 (“the husband’s case outline”) seeks an order that he also receive $185,000 from the controlled monies account by way of interim property distribution. He seeks that the funds received by both parties be placed into their respective legal representative’s trust accounts.
MATERIAL BEFORE THE COURT
In support of her case, the wife relies upon the following material:
(a)Outline of Case Document filed 31 March 2025;
(b)Application in a Proceeding filed 28 February 2025;
(c)Her affidavit filed 28 February 2025 (“the wife’s affidavit”);
(d)Financial Statement filed 28 February 2025 (“the wife’s financial statement”);
(e)Melounis & Melounis (No 3) [2023] FedCFamC1F 849; and
(f)Documents tendered during the proceeding and marked as Exhibits A1–A3.
In support of his case, the husband relies upon the following material:
(a)Outline of Case Document filed 31 March 2025;
(b)Response to an Application in a Proceeding filed 27 March 2025;
(c)Further Amended Response to Final Orders filed 4 September 2024 (“the husband’s final orders application”);
(d)His affidavit filed 27 March 2024;
(e)Financial Statement filed 27 March 2025 (“the husband’s financial statement”);
(f)Amended Initiating Application of the Applicant filed 23 April 2024;
(g)Melounis & Melounis [2022] FedCFamC2F 650; and
(h)Documents tendered during the proceeding and marked as Exhibits R1–R3.
APPLICABLE LAW
Deputy Chief Justice McClelland recently set out the relevant principles that apply when considering whether to make an interim property order in Ruslan & Ruslan [2024] FedCFamC1F 50. This Court respectfully adopts these principles and extracts them below:
(1)The exercise of discretion: ss 79 and 80(1)(h) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) confer power on the Court to make orders for a partial distribution of property prior to the final hearing. That is:
(a) Section 79 confers a discrete power to make orders for property settlement and the Court may exercise that power through “a succession of orders until the power ... is exhausted” or until a final order dealing with all the known property of the parties is made…
(b) Section 80 is not, in itself, a source of jurisdiction for such an order to be made. Rather, the section is an “enabling provision” that provides various ways in which the general power in s 79 of the Act may be exercised in individual cases.... This includes, by s 80(1)(h), the making of “a permanent order, an order pending the disposal of proceedings or an order for a fixed term or for a life or during joint lives or until further order”.
(2)There are three stages to the hearing of an application for interim property adjustment orders:
(i)The first two stages were described in Strahan…, with the first being a “procedural step” which requires an analysis of whether the circumstances of the case triggers the Court’s power to invoke s 80(1)(h) of the Act to make an order for partial property adjustment. At this stage, the “overarching consideration” is the interests of justice: Strahan at [132].
(ii)The second stage is the “substantive step”, where the provisions of s 79 must be considered and applied, but with limitations, given that it is not the final hearing.
(iii)The third stage, although not necessarily to be considered in this order, is to assess whether the applicant for relief has discharged the persuasive burden referred to in Medlow & Medlow…, of establishing that there are sufficient assets available to satisfy the order sought without prejudicing the other party (“the Medlow onus”). In that respect, the Full Court said:
The onus was clearly upon [the applicant for relief] to establish that there were sufficient assets available for the interim distribution and that the effect of any interim order was capable of being reversed as part of the final hearing or at least would not defeat [the respondent’s] property claim. The onus was not on the [respondent] to adduce such evidence.
(iv)Moreover, the evidence required to discharge the Medlow onus is such that the Court should be “comfortably satisfied” of the sufficiency of assets to ensure that the applicant would receive, at final hearing, no less than the amount sought by way of interim property distribution….
(3)Even if there is sufficiency of evidence to discharge the Medlow onus, that is not the end of the matter. An applicant seeking orders for partial property distribution is required to show more “than the mere fact that upon a final hearing the applicant would receive the property being sought (or an amount in excess of the funds being sought) from the other party”...
(4)The overriding consideration at all stages of the process is that the Court is satisfied that it is “just and equitable” to make the order in the circumstances.... The determination of that issue should not be approached on the basis of an assumption “that one or other party has the right to have the property of the parties divided between them”…. This applies to an application for an order for a partial distribution of property in interim proceedings as much as it does to an application for the adjustment of property at the final hearing of the matter.
(5)In applying these considerations, the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction should be conducted with an appreciation that “as a generality, the interests of the parties and the Court are better served by there being one final hearing of s 79 proceedings”….
(6)Additionally…the Court, the parties and their legal advisers are required to have regard to the “overarching purpose” set out in s 67 of the FCFCOA Act, which includes the public interest of ensuring that disputes are resolved “as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible”. …it will usually be the case those principles are best served by one rather than a multiplicity of hearings…
(7)As a related issue, the manner in which the party seeking a partial property distribution has conducted the proceedings will also be relevant. Most relevantly, that includes the extent to which the party and or their legal advisers have complied with their obligations pursuant to ss 67 and 68 of the FCFCOA Act to promote the overarching purpose by keeping costs to a reasonable and proportionate amount. To do otherwise, simply provides additional resources to the party to engage in ongoing “lawfare” at a likely disproportionate cost to the parties and to taxpayers.
(8)The party seeking the relief carries the persuasive burden of satisfying the Court that the circumstances of the case are such that the Court should exercise its discretion in their favour…
(9)Circumstances in which the Court has made an order for partial property distribution include, but are not necessarily limited to, where one of the parties has a monopoly in terms of access to the finances and resources of the parties such that they have a significant advantage in the litigation and, conversely, the other party is significantly disadvantaged.
(10)It is unlikely that the Court would grant such relief in circumstances where to do so would “potentially defeat any party’s claim or legitimate expectations in a final hearing”.
…
(12)Finally, among the matters that the Court may take into consideration in the exercise of its discretion is the proximity of the final hearing dates and the complexity of the issues involved in determining the likely ability of the Court to, if necessary, ‘claw back’ the funds released by way of interim property settlement...
(References omitted)
OBSERVATIONS
The husband’s legal representative conceded that the wife’s application had merit and agreed with the Court’s summary of his position that “the facts support her application, the wife has a need, there are funds available and that granting her access to the funds is not going to change the Court’s ability to do a just and equitable under s 79 or s 79A of the Act at a later point”. Notwithstanding this, the husband opposed the wife’s application if his own interim property distribution application was contested or unsuccessful.
Further, and more generally, unlike other interim property distribution applications that come before this Court, the matter has already proceeded to final hearing. Typically, interim property applications are shrouded in uncertainty as little may be known or decided with respect to the parties’ contributions and balance sheet. This uncertainty permeates the jurisprudence surrounding interim property applications and necessitates an overtly cautious approach by the Court. In this matter, as the substantive application includes relief under s 79A of the Act, the Court has available to it previous findings of fact and a final balance sheet.
SUMMARY OF CONTENTIONS MADE
The wife
By way of broad overview, the Court adopts the five-point summary of the wife’s contentions as outlined by her legal representative during oral submissions:
·It is unknown at this stage whether the wife will further amend her Amended Application for Final Orders filed 23 April 2024 (“the wife’s final order’s application”) following the provision of disclosure from the husband;
·The wife’s position at the present time leaves very little by way of scope such that if disclosure is later provided, it may change her position on the quantum of money, if any, the husband should receive from the controlled monies account;
·That the Court cannot be confident that any order made today can be appropriately reversed;
·That the concept of whether an order is appropriate or not should be seen in light of the husband’s financial statement; and
·That Melounis (No 3) should cause the Court significant concern noting that the controlled monies account is the only asset of the parties that is outside the control of the husband, that any order made is not going to be easily reversed.
The husband
The husband’s oral submissions were undertaken in a more freeform manner relative to the wife. Nonetheless, for ease of comparison the Court has summarised the main contentions put forward on his behalf:
·Even if the wife was entirely successful in her final orders application there would be no issue of reversibility due to the quantum of the husband’s final entitlement from the controlled monies account;
·Given the findings in Melounis, the wife’s final position is unlikely to vary due to any lack of disclosure by the husband to the extent necessary to prejudice the husband’s case;
·Even if the Court was concerned about the husband holding significant assets in his sole name, given the findings in Melounis, the Court ought to have confidence in recalling such funds due to the relatively known asset pool; and
·That despite the husband’s business interests it would be inappropriate to make him entirely exhaust his personal savings, or to direct him to divert company proceeds for the purpose of personal legal proceedings.
DISCUSSION
The Court does not propose to respond to every submission made, as many were not essential to determine the matter (Baghti & Baghti and Ors [2015] FamCAFC 71 at [63]–[64]). Where required the Court will analyse the contentions and positions of both parties in greater depth below.
Final positions and reversibility
The wife contended that the Court should refrain from ordering any interim property distribution to the husband on the basis that there is inadequate scope between the parties’ final proposals for the Court to be “comfortably satisfied” that any interim distribution could be clawed back. In order to determine whether this is correct, the Court must analyse, at a high level, the effect of both parties’ final orders sought.
The current balance of the controlled monies account is $1,084,504.80 (the wife’s affidavit, paragraph 48).
If the wife was entirely successful on her final orders application the husband would receive $400,000 with the wife receiving the balance in the controlled monies account; $684,504.80. The wife argues that the Court should additionally consider expenses that she incurred whilst trustee for the sale of the former matrimonial home; $27,000 (Melounis (No 3)), and potential costs orders that may be made in her favour against the husband pursuant to outstanding and reserved costs applications before the Court; $97,000. The Court observes that, even if it was to unequivocally accept these contentions the husband would still receive at least $270,000 from the controlled monies account.
Consequently, there is no risk that an interim property order of $185,000 would defeat the wife’s final proposal currently before the Court.
Similarly, as encapsulated at paragraph 50 of the wife’s affidavit, if the husband was entirely successful in his final orders application it would not render any interim property order irreversible:
If [Mr Melounis] is successful in his application and the final orders made 24 May 2022 are not set aside (including the order regarding the payment to [Mr G] from the proceeds), [Mr Melounis] stands to receive $706,264.75 from the proceeds and I stand to receive $228,753.44, based upon the initial sales proceeds. [Mr Melounis] will receive total $781,008.06 and I will receive $303,496.75 including interest that has been earned since 20 February 2025.
Consequently, the Court acknowledges that neither party would be irreversibly prejudiced by a reciprocal $185,000 interim property distribution.
The wife further contended that the Court should hold concern about the reversibility of any interim property distribution of any magnitude to the husband out of the controlled monies account as it is the only significant asset held by the parties in joint names.
Implicit within the wife’s contention is a suggestion that the husband may, following any interim property order, waste or abscond with the balance of the marital assets currently held in his sole name. Whilst the Court has regard to credit findings made about the husband by Henderson J in Melounis (No 3), the Court cannot without more assume that he will act mala fide. Whist the history of this matter bares on the exercise of discretion later discussed in these reasons for judgement, it does not determine it. The Court is not precluded from making an interim property order in favour of the husband, but it must be cautious about the way any such funds are allocated.
Disclosure
A key element of the wife’s case was that the husband had not been forthcoming with his disclosure and that the content of this disclosure may cause the wife to change her final orders sought.
The Court recognises that the husband failed to comply with orders of this Court dated 6 December 2024. She contends that he did not provide prompt and complete disclosure to the wife. By way of example, Exhibit A3 represents an omitted set of company accounts which the husband was requested to disclose, but did not ultimately do so until pressed during the hearing.
There was further argument during oral submissions about the husband’s relationship with the company BX Pty Ltd, and $107,000 held in the company’s accounts that were not previously disclosed. The husband’s non or late compliance with his disclosure obligations and orders of this Court would have likely rendered the wife’s preparation for the matter more difficult. It does not necessarily follow, however, that these assets would ultimately affect the assessment of contributions if the s 79A application were granted. For example, the wife would still need to establish that she has contributed to these assets.
The wife could have asked the Court for an adjournment to read any late provided documents and/or additional time to draft further procedural orders to compel production of any outstanding documents. She did not do so. She chose to run her case notwithstanding any ambiguity created by the husband’s late disclosure. As a result, the wife’s disclosure arguments ultimately devolve into an unparticularised assertion that the Court should not made an interim property order on the basis that she may later change her final orders sought once she has examined the documents lately produced, and only if they create a sound basis for amendment.
The Court is not constrained by the lack of preparedness of any party in this matter. Ambiguity may be a shield insofar as it protects the wife from allegations by the husband that her final position is nebulous or undefined. But ambiguity is not to be permitted as a sword insofar as it was wielded as an offensive tactic by the wife to convince the Court that it should not make an order it might otherwise make, just in case the wife later amends her final application in such a way that renders any interim property order irreversible.
The wife had the option to press for an adjournment that she elected to not to take. If the husband’s non-compliance was so fundamental to the determination of these proceedings, the wife’s legal representatives should have sought a brief adjournment.
The husband has now provided the disclosure sought. The asset pool is relatively known. Any consequences that arise from the husband’s disclosure may be relevant to the extant s 79A application and may be dealt with after a further s 79 application if the matter proceeds that far.
For current purposes, disclosure contentions will have minimal impact on how the Court determines these proceedings.
Husband’s financial position
Lastly, the wife agitated that the Court should not order an interim property distribution in favour of the husband on the basis that he had not demonstrated a need to exhaust joint funds. The wife pointed to the husband’s significant recurring employment income and the funds residing in bank accounts connected to BX Pty Ltd as evidence of his capacity to pay for current and future legal representation.
The law is well settled in this regard. The husband does not need to demonstrate any form of special need to be eligible for an interim property order. The husband has provided evidence of significant legal costs he is anticipated to incur until the conclusion of these proceedings. He should not be made to completely exhaust his personal savings before coming to this Court for a remedy.
Further, the Court views that the husband should not be made to exhaust company funds in circumstances where he would otherwise receive the same amount from joint assets on a final basis. If the Court were to force the husband to use company monies this may open the company up to varying taxation or cash flow implications. The relevance, ownership and finances of BX Pty Ltd is a question better suited to any extant s 79A proceedings, not the current forum.
ORDERS FOR INTERIM PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION
The overriding consideration at all stages of the process is that the Court is satisfied that it is “just and equitable” to make an interim property order in the circumstances.
None of the wife’s actions constitute an absolute bar to relief. There is no contention by either party that the wife should not have an order made in her favour. The Court views that there is no issue of justice or equity in making an interim property distribution order for the wife in the quantum of $185,000.
Whilst many of the husband’s actions and explanations bring some doubt to the Court’s mind, they do not function as an absolute bar to relief. None of the contentions put forward by the wife, when fully explored, act against an interim property order in his favour. An interim property order in the quantum of $185,000 is appropriate for the husband.
The Court notes the credit findings of Henderson J in Melounis (No 3) and consequently views that it would be appropriate for the husband’s interim funds to be limited to the satisfaction of current and future legal expenses alone. As a method to ensure this, the husband’s $185,000 shall be deposited into the trust account of his legal representatives.
This matter has been long running and vigorously fought by both parties with steep legal costs to match. It would be inequitable and unjust for the parties to not receive funds at this stage to ensure that these proceedings can finally reach their conclusion.
I certify that the preceding forty-four (44) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Altobelli. Associate:
Dated: 10 April 2025
SCHEDULE ONE
Item Description Description Value Property Item 1 Joint F Street, Suburb D NSW $1,900,000 Item 2 Joint Bank H offset deposit account number …18 $32,887 Item 3 Husband NAB Classic Account number #...01 $9,868 Item 4 Husband Bank J account $189 Item 5 Husband Bank K account $4 Item 6 Husband Bank L $454 Item 7 Wife NAB Classic Account number #...22 $3,658 Item 8 Husband Company M shares x 9226 by $17.80
(as at 23/10/2020)$179,077 Item 9 Wife Company M shares x 9227 by $17.80
(as at 23-10-2020)$179,096 Item 10 Husband Motor Vehicle 1 $17,000 Item 11 Husband Electric bicycle $4,000 Item 12 Husband Two bicycles $3,000 Item 13 Husband Scooter $5,500 Item 14 Husband Boat and trailer $7,000 Item 15 Joint Household contents $5,000 Item 16 Wife Engagement ring $18,500 Item 17 Husband Funds in trust held by Fox & Staniland as at 14.9.2020 $34,630 Item 18 Wife Funds in trust held by Coleman & Greig as at 14.9.2020 $1,650 Item 19 Husband 1613 Company M shares vested on 15/11/2020 $34,641 Item 20 Wife Addback of family law legal fees paid by the wife $62,430 Item 21 Husband Addback of legal fees paid by the husband at 14.9.2020 $154,994 TOTAL $2,653,578 Liabilities Item 22 Joint NAB Variable Rate loan account (interest only) Account number #...66 $499,447 Item 23 Joint NAB Variable Rate loan account (principal and interest) Account number #...89 $476,234 Item 24 Husband Monies owed to Ms G pursuant to agreement of 15/2/2016 $95,000 Item 25 Husband Westpac Visa credit account $3,214 Item 26 Wife HECS debt $16,149 TOTAL $1,090,044 Superannuation Item 27 Husband Super Fund AM accumulation fund $299,998 Item 28 Wife Super Fund O accumulation fund $71,050 TOTAL $371,048
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