JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
LOCATION: PERTH
CITATION: MELLOS -v- SHEPPARD [2004] WADC 147
CORAM: DEPUTY REGISTRAR HARMAN
HEARD: NOT APPLICABLE
DELIVERED : 21 JULY 2004
FILE NO/S: CIV 610 of 2003
BETWEEN: PAUL MELLOS
Plaintiff
AND
GAIL PATRICIA SHEPPARD
Defendant
Catchwords:
Practice - Western Australia - Practice under the Rules of the Supreme Court of Western Australia - Review of taxation of costs - Pre-trial conference - Rate of recovery - Listing conference - Preparation - Getting up case for trial - Time costing - Counsel fee on brief - Recovery where there is no trial
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Objections not sustained
Representation:
Counsel:
Plaintiff: No appearance
Defendant: No appearance
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: S C Nigram & Co
Defendant: Peter Momber
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
May v Vincent Smith as Administrator for Cole Engineering Pty Ltd (Under Administration) & Anor [2001] WASC 352
Case(s) also cited:
Nil
DEPUTY REGISTRAR HARMAN: Under an order for his costs the plaintiff is entitled to recover the reasonable cost of services that were necessarily provided to him for the purposes of the action. He has filed a notice of objection to particular determinations made in the course of taxing his bill of costs.
The first objection relates to the claim for the pre-trial conference. It is as follows:
"The taxing officer erred in principle in determining that although the plaintiff was represented by a senior practitioner at each of the pre-trial conferences and that each of the pre-trial conferences took the time as claimed in the plaintiff's bill, an allowance should only be made at the rate of $250.00 per hour rather than at the rate of $313.00 per hour without any reason for this reduction."
The error contended for relates to the determination of the rate of recovery.
On its terms r 53 does not provide jurisdiction to review all determinations of taxing officers, only those by which items or their parts are allowed or disallowed. According to r 42 the term "item" used in r 53 refers to a particular service for which a claim is made in a bill under an item in the scale: in this instance the pre-trial conference. Correspondingly the term "part of an item" refers to a particular part of a service, such as that part of the conference conducted other than in the presence of the Registrar. A determination in relation to whether recovery is available for the provision of a particular service is distinguishable from a determination of the value of that service. On a plain reading r 53 does not provide jurisdiction to review the process of valuation.
The only justification for finding jurisdiction to review determinations made in that process of which I am aware does not draw on the wording of the rule but rather that the rule does not provide for such review and it being considered that such determinations ought be amenable to appeal. Accordingly, judges have found jurisdiction in cases where they have…
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- Case
- [2004] WADC 147
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was tasked with determining whether the taxing officer's decisions were correct. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the costs for "getting up the case for trial" were appropriately disallowed and if the counsel fee on brief was correctly denied. The plaintiff argued that "getting up the case for trial" covered activities beyond those recoverable under other items, and that the taxing officer had incorrectly interpreted the term "preparation" as excluding costs before the trial had commenced. The plaintiff also contended that the counsel fee on brief should have been allowed since the trial had not commenced when the case settled.
The court examined the plaintiff's objections and found that the disallowance of costs for "getting up the case for trial" was justified. The court clarified that "getting up the case for trial" refers to activities directly related to the issues identified at the close of pleadings, and not merely general preparation. It was noted that there is a distinction between general preparation and the specific process of getting up a case for trial. The court further stated that the value of the compromise reached in the case did not reflect the value of the work done in getting up the case for trial. Regarding the counsel fee on brief, the court found that the disallowance was correct as the fee on brief was intended to cover preparation as part of the service for which recovery is available under item 14(a). The court also clarified that the term "preparation" was introduced to express the service in its parts and to facilitate reconciliation with the assumptions made by the Legal Costs Committee in calculating the maximum recovery.
The final orders of the court upheld the taxing officer's decisions on both the disallowance of costs for "getting up the case for trial" and the counsel fee on brief.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I might add that there is a popular misconception that "getting up case for trial" covers any activity undertaken which is not recoverable under any other item. Getting up case for trial is itself a process founded on the issues that emerge on the close of pleadings. Engaging in the process is distinguishable from what otherwise is mere activity. As Templeman J stated at par 20 in May v Vincent Smith as Administrator for Cole Engineering Pty Ltd (Under Administration) & Anor [2001] WASC 352, although there may be an overlap between the two, there is a distinction to be drawn between the general preparation of a case and "getting up a case for trial". I was aware of the quantum of the judgment. As much as the value of the compromise may not reflect the value of the claim it has nothing to say in relation to the work undertaken in getting up the case for trial. I would not have suggested that the value of "getting up the case" should somehow reflect the compromise reached in relation to the subject of the claim. The next ground of objection relates to the claim for counsel fee on brief. It was disallowed accordingly there is jurisdiction to review. The grounds of objection are as follows:"The taxing officer erred in principle in finding that there was no scope for any recovery for counsel's preparation in the circumstances of this matter where the trial had not actually commenced, the taxing officer's view in this regard being that the trial only commences when evidence is led at the trial. The taxing officer further erred in finding that the inclusion by the Legal Costs Committee of 'preparation' in the scale item 14(a) meant no more than the 'old concept of counsel fee on trial'." Item 14(a) is for "Fee on brief, i.e. first day of trial and preparation". There is no substance to any distinction that may be drawn between the terms fee on brief and fee on trial. Regardless of how the item is expressed fundamentally provision is made for recovery for the service provided by a practitioner in representing a party at trial. In this case settlement was achieved days prior to trial. In the circumstances I do not understand the significance of the reference to evidence being led. As a matter of principle, recovery depends upon a service for which a claim is made having been provided. Implicitly the plaintiff proposes that in undertaking preparation for trial a service is provided. That is not the case. Preparation is simply part of the service for which recovery is available under item 14(a). It is appropriate to consider that the change in the description of the service to which the plaintiff refers in the objection was intended to have some meaning. It is conceivable that by introducing the term "preparation" the Legal Costs Committee considered that it was providing for recovery for preparation independent of trial itself. In my opinion a more obvious reason for the change is that it simply expresses the service in its parts and facilitates reconciliation with the assumptions made by the Committee in calculating the maximum recovery available under the item. It is worth recording that the basis on which the Committee undertook its task of setting the scale would probably be of greater interest to a court in the context of considering an application under r 12 (1) than it would be at taxation.