JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
LOCATION: PERTH
CITATION: MELLOS -v- SHEPPARD [2005] WADC 77
CORAM: DEPUTY REGISTRAR HARMAN
HEARD: NOT APPLICABLE
DELIVERED : 26 APRIL 2005
FILE NO/S: CIV 610 of 2003
BETWEEN: PAUL MELLOS
Plaintiff
AND
GAIL PATRICIA SHEPPARD
Defendant
Catchwords:
Practice - Western Australia - practice under the rules of the Supreme Court of Western Australia - taxations of costs-objections in relation to getting up case for trial and preparing for and attending taxation.
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Review not successful
Representation:
Counsel:
Plaintiff: Nil
Defendant: Nil
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: S C Nigam & Co
Defendant: Peter Momber
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
May v Vincent Smith As Administrator for Cole Engineering Pty Ltd (Under Administration) & Anor [2001] WASC 352
Case(s) also cited:
Nil
DEPUTY REGISTRAR HARMAN: The plaintiff has an order for his costs of the action. Thereby he is entitled to recover the reasonable cost of services necessarily provided by his solicitor. He objects to determinations made at taxation in relation to the services getting up case for trial and preparing for and attending at the taxation.
As to the first of those items, the first ground of objection is as follows:
"The taxing officer has erred in principle in failing to give any, alternatively, adequate reason for determining the amount allowed."
It is an unusual feature of this case that prior to the objection being filed I had communicated the relevant decision to the parties in writing. That communication is in the form of the decision delivered on 7 February 2005 and the particular observations are at par 15. In articulating the test that had been applied in coming to the determination and the considerations of a general nature that bore upon its application I did not intend to provide reasons for the determination. Accordingly, I would accept that no reason has been provided.
Commencing at par 5 of that decision I had canvassed the significance of O 66 r 54 (2) and had come to the conclusion that it was such that the parties then had no entitlement to reasons. According to the rule, reasons are required to be provided either at the point of signing the certificate or at the conclusion of review. The plaintiff having objected, the certificate will not be signed prior to the conclusion of the process of review. The parties are then entitled to reasons. There being no entitlement at the point that the ground was expressed it follows that the allegation that the failure to provide reasons amounts to an error cannot be sustained.
The second ground of objection is that:
"The taxing officer has erred in principle in not making any or any adequate provision in determining an allowance for getting up for the time spent by Mr Nigam, Ms Laslett and clerks/paralegals (in excess of 100 hours in total)."
(The notice then expresses 11 parts of what the plaintiff would contend constituted the provision of the service "getting up case for trial".)
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- Case
- [2005] WADC 77
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues in this case revolved around the proper assessment of costs for services provided in presenting the case, the distinction between general activity and preparing for trial, and the appropriate quantum of costs. The plaintiff argued that the taxing officer had erred in principle by not considering the time spent by the plaintiff's solicitors in preparing for trial and by giving undue regard to the quantum of the settlement. The plaintiff also objected to a specific item of $5800, claiming it was an excessive amount.
The court addressed the objections by explaining that there is a distinction between activity undertaken in relation to a case and preparing for trial. The court found that the plaintiff's arguments were unconvincing and did not reflect a proper understanding of the principles involved. The court also found that the objection to the $5800 item was not well-founded and that the determination of the reasonable cost of services was appropriate. The court concluded that the taxing officer had discharged their responsibilities in an appropriate manner.
The final orders of the court upheld the determination of the taxing officer, dismissing the plaintiff's objections. The court found that the taxing officer had appropriately assessed the costs and that there was no error in principle or in the quantum of the costs allowed. The court emphasised that the proper assessment of costs should be based on the reasonable cost of the services provided, not on the time spent or the settlement amount.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As to the proposition that "in excess of 100 hours" of time devoted to the process is an indicator of value, as Templeman J accepted was the case in May v Vincent Smith As Administrator for Cole Engineering Pty Ltd (Under Administration) & Anor [2001] WASC 352 at par 20, there is a distinction to be drawn between activity undertaken in relation to a case and "getting up the case for trial". Conceivably one explanation for the plaintiff seeking to so justify the claim is that he has failed to appreciate distinction or perhaps its significance. The next ground of objection is as follows: "The taxing officer further erred in principle by having undue regard to the quantum of the settlement rather than the time necessarily spent by the plaintiff's solicitors in getting up the plaintiffs case for trial." The quantum at which the parties agree to compromise the positions they have taken in the litigation brought on the plaintiff's cause of action for damages for personal injury could not possibly inform a proper assessment of what is the reasonable cost for the provision of services in presenting the case. That being a fairly definitive statement on my part I find it inconceivable that I would have given any indication to the contrary at the taxation. How the plaintiff can justify what amounts to unsupported accusation is no more than troublesome. As was the case with the last ground of objection, otherwise the expression of the test of recovery expressed in this ground is wide of the mark. The next ground of objection is as follows: "Further, or alternatively, the taxing officer erred in allowing the item in the amount of $5800, the error being manifest from the allowance itself and being an allowance that no taxing officer, acting reasonably, would allow in that amount." I understand that this last ground of objection expresses the only valid basis for review as to quantum. In order to discern whether there was an error involves no more than the application of the test to the determination. It either survives the process or it does not. I recently responded to a similar objection in another case along the lines that I would leave it for others to judge whether against that test my determination reveals an error. Having noted a response to that statement, in this instance I will add to my response what I consider might have been taken to be part of its import. That is, in making the determination I discharged my responsibilities in an appropriate manner. In particular, that I determined the reasonable cost of the provision of the service in all of its parts. That concludes my response to the grounds of the notice in relation to the item "getting up case for trial". Before I move on I will canvass some recent history. The taxation the subject of the objection had been re-listed before me as a prior determination made in relation to the item had been set aside. Evidently that was because I had failed to articulate the fact that it had been made in an objective manner. As I indicated at par 11 of my reasons for decision of 7 February 2005, that was because I had not been asked to address any objection made along those lines. In the light of r 54 (2) and the fact that presently there is no such objection, in my opinion that should be the end of the matter. However, there is the prospect that history will be repeated and conceivably at the cost of the defendant. Accordingly, I will add some information.