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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Brisbane No B30 of 1989 B e t w e e n -
TERRENCE JOSEPH MELLIFONT
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special
leave to appeal
MASON CJ
DEANE J
McHUGH J
| Mellifont |
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 12 OCTOBER 1989, AT 12.20 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
| C2T 33/1/JM | 1 | 12/10/89 |
| MR W.J. CUTHBERT: | May it please the Court, I appear |
for the applicant. (instructed by P.T. Murphy)
| MR G.L. DAVIES, QC: | I appear with my learned friend, |
MR G. GIBSON for the respondent, may it please the Court. (instructed by the Crmm Solicitor for the State of Queensland)
| MASON CJ: | Mr Cuthbert. |
r1R CUTHBERT: | May it please the Court, this apulication arises because of what happened in a criminal |
| trial of my client on a charge of perjury. | |
| MASON CJ: | Yes, we have read the papers so we are familiar |
with the circumstances and what happened.
You can proceed directly to the special leave grounds.
| MR CUTHBERT: | Thank you, Your Honour. | I have a brief |
outline of sub~issions which I hand to the Court
and copies of the relevant Queensland statutes.
| MASON CJ: | Thank you. |
| MR CUTHBERT: | They are all photostats oecause unfortunately the COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY ACT is now out of |
| MASON CJ: | Yes. |
| MR CUTHBERT: | The three matters that the applicant contends |
raise matters justifying special leave to appeal are the question of the administration of oaths, the meaning of the word "testim:Jny" in the perjury
section of the CRIMINAL CODE, and finally the
use by the Full Court of section 29 of the
DISTRICT COURTS ACT in making the order which
is the subject-matter of the application.
(Continued on page 3)
| C2T33/2/JM | 12/10/89 |
| Mellifont |
MR CUTHBERT (continuing): In respect of the administration of the
oath, the Court would be aware from the record that
His Honour Judge Morley ruled that on an interpretation
of the COMMISSION.S OF INQUIRY ACT, particularly
section 6 being the relevant section, that on an
interpretation of the whole Act, there was a
legislative intention disclosed that the oath should
be administered by the commissioner. The oath not having been so administered, therefore there was no
properly administered oath.
The Full Court adopted what the applicant
contends are the rules of common law which govern
the administration of oaths at common law. The applicant contends that these have no role at all
to play in the instant case which should be governed
by the particular enabling statute. The reference in Coke shows, in the second book at
Cap. 47, page 479, he states that:
A new oath cannot be imposed upon any judge, commissioner, or any other subject without authority of parliament, as here it was; but the giving of every oath must be warranted by act of parliament, or by the common law time
out of minde. ·
Again, in his third book,…
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- Case
- [1989] HCATrans 226
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Court were threefold: first, whether the oath administered to the applicant was properly administered in accordance with the relevant legislation; second, the interpretation of the word "testimony" within the perjury provisions of the Criminal Code; and third, the propriety of the Full Court's use of section 29 of the District Courts Act in making its order.
The applicant contended that the oath was not properly administered because it was not administered by the commissioner as required by the Commissions of Inquiry Act. He argued that common law rules regarding the administration of oaths were irrelevant in this instance, as the oath arose from a specific statute, not the common law. The applicant submitted that the rules for administering oaths under a statute should be determined solely by that statute, and not by common law principles, citing historical authorities on the imposition of oaths. The Full Court, however, had apparently applied common law rules to the situation.
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Background
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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