Melekiola, K.N. v The Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs

[1993] FCA 1057

JUDGMENT No. ..A %2& .%,...

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY .	'No VG -51 of 1993 No VG 427 of 1992
GENERAL DIVISION
B E T W E E N :

KELEKOLIO NIVALETI MELEKIOLA & TUKUOFO MELEKIOU

Applicant

A N D :

THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, LOCAL GOVERNMENT &
ETHNIC AFFAIRS & IMMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Resvondent

COURT :	NORTHROP J
PLACE :	MELBOURNE
W:	19 MARCH 1993

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

The matters heard by the Court yesterday and

constitute a very good example of the great difficulties inherent in the existing Migration Act provisions and the Migration Regulations. Looking at the issues which have arisen in relation to the matters before me, one gains the impression that the Act and Regulations have set in place a very detailed set of legislative provisions which are designed to remove discretions from officers of the executive with the result that strict compliance with those provisions is more important than the merits of the case concerned. The application of these provisions, which are almost unintelligible, tend to lead to injustice. I make these comments by way of protest about the form of legislation which

this Court is required to apply.

The formal matter before the Court is matter No VG 51 of

1993. There is in existence another matter No VG 427 of 1992.

In each matter the applicants are husband and wife who came from Tonga. The respondents in each case differ slightly but the Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs is a respondent to each proceeding. In addition, members of an immigration review tribunal have been made co- respondents. For practical purposes the two matters should be heard together. In view of what occurred during the course of the hearing, I propose to deal with the two matters together.

A brief outline of the relevant facts can be given in the form of a chronology which outlines what the case is all about. The applicant Mr Melekiola arrived in Australia on 15 August 1987. At that time he had a temporary entry permit expiring on 12 September 1987. On 21 September 1987 he was granted a further temporary entry permlt which expired on 15 March 1988. Therefore, in the absence of any further entry permit, he became a prohibited non-citizen on 16 March 1988. As a consequence of subsequent amendments to the Migration Act	he is now an illegal entrant and has been an illegal entrant	since 19 December 1989. On 14 February 1990 he lodged with
the Department of Refugee Status an application to remain permanently in Australia. What he sought, apparently, was a permanent entry permit, often referred to as a permanent entry permit after entry. It appears that before such a permit can be granted the person must be the holder of what is described as an extended eligibility temporary entry permit. Great

confusion is caused by the use of these particularly when they are reduced to acronyms such as EETEP and PEPAE. Even the Department of Refugee Status is described as DORS. Presumably this is designed to save paper but all it does, in my opinion, is to create confusion which tends to cause problems in an area where there should be greater simplicity, particularly when most of the people seeking permits may have great difficulty in understanding the English language let alone the esoteric acronyms which have been developed, apparently, within the department.

After 14 February 1990, there ensued a large amount of toing and froing between the Department and the applicant to which it is not necessary to refer. During this time M r Melekiola was working. He suffered serious injuries to his hand as a result of an accident while at work. He sought legal advice in relation to his injuries. In the course of his dealings with the solicitor, who is not the solicitor now acting for him, he sought advice in relation to his entry

permit applications. I should note that up until that stage	he had been acting on his own behalf without any legal advice
at all.
On 14 October 1991 the Department wrote to the male applicant a letter which I shall read:

"I refer to a first tier review application lodged under the Migration Review Regulations concerning a decision to refuse you an application for an Extended Eligibility Temporary Entry Permit Class 824 and 828.

The Migration (Review) Regulations identify certain decisions which are not subject to internal review. The decision to review your application is one which is exempted from review by the -regulations as you were the holder of a visitor visa at the time of application.

I therefore regret to advise that your application for review is not eligible for consideration by this office. Arrangements have also been made for the review application fee of $150 to be refunded shortly.

As you no longer has (sic) a valid temporary entry permit, you should make arrangenents for his (sic) early departure from Australia and present evidence of this to (a defined person)."

That letter can be described as containing evidence of what will be called "the first decision", a decision of 14 October 1991. It is now conceded by the Department that the first decision can have no effect because of other actions which had taken place prior to that date. The correct form of application had in fact been made by the applicant but it had been overlooked.

On 24 July 1992, Mr Melekiola was arrested and detained

at the Maribynong Detention Centre. Under the Regulations he

rather to make an application for an entry permit. The two	had two days in which to seek a review of these matters, or
day period could be extended for a further five working days. Mr Melekiola applied for the extension, but did nothing within the period of seven days. On 24 August 1992 he made an application for a permit. That application was rejected because it had not been lodged with the Department within seven working days of his arrest.
In September 1992, the applicant sought advice from a Mr Young, who was, apparently, carrying on the business Australian Migration Programme and Investments Adviser Pty Ltd as an advisory consultant. On 16 October 1992 the Migration Internal Review Office, the acronym, for which, apparently is MIRO, responded to concerns expressed by M r Young in relation to the errors in the first decision. The Migration Internal Review Office wrote to Mr Young informing him that while his client, namely the applicant, Mr Melekiola, may have fallen into the class of persons who could seek review, nevertheless the decision was not a reviewable decision as defined in the Regulations.
About 22 October 1992 the company Australian Migration Programme Investments Pty Ltd filed an application on behalf of the applicant for review of the decision of 16 October
1992, the review being to the Immigration Review Tribunal, the
acronym IRT. On 6 November 1992 a deportation order was made.
On 13 November 1992 the applicant lodged an application seeking an order of revlew in this Court s f the first decision of 14 October 1991 and what I will call "the second decision", being the decision made on 16 October 1992. The application to review the second decision was made within the time specified by the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977. The application to review the first decision was not.
One should refer to the second decision, contained in the letter of 16 October 1992 to Mr Young, which was as follows:

"I refer to your letter of 22 September 1992 to the Migration Internal Review Office (MIRO) in Box Hill regarding the eligibility of Mr Kelekolio Melekiola's application for review.

I regret to inform you that Mr Melekiola's application for review of 17 September 1990 was in fact ineligible. Unfortunately, the reasons for this decision which were provided in MIROs letter of 14 October 1990 were incorrect. I apologise for any inconvenience this may have caused.

You are correct in pointing out that regulations consistent with the current 21(3)(b) made provision for illegal entrance. Regulation 21B of the Migration (Review) Regulations (as they existed at 17 September 1990) meant that people who had been illegally in Australia on 19 December 1989 were not subject to the requirement that a person needed to lawfully in Australia in order to make an application for review.

However, in order for a review application to be an eligible application, not only must the applicant be determined to be entitled to apply for review, but the decision which he/she is appealing against must also be one which is determined to be a "reviewable decision".

At the time of Mr Melekiola's application, Regulation 3(2) of the Migration (Review) Regulations which described the types of decisions considered to be "a relevant decision by the Minister" for the purposes of review, read:

visa or an entry permit of a class specified in the	3(2) A decision of the Minister refusing to grant a
Schedule is, subject to this regulation, a relevant decision of the Minister.

The Extended Eligibility Temporary Entry Permit (EETEP) decisions, your client was appealing against were of class 824 (Other) and 828 (Limited). Neither of these were listed in the schedule referred to in regulation 3(2)

As the decisions for which Mr Melekiola was seeking review were not "reviewable decisions", MIRO was correct in advising that the application for review was ineligible."

On 5 February 1993 the applicant's application for review by the Immigration Review Tribunal was rejected on the basis that the Tribunal had no power to review the decision since the application for review was out of time. This will be called "the third decision", and was a decision of the Tribunal constituted by a senior member, Michael Clothier. The decision was that the Tribunal had no power to deal with the application for review. Lengthy reasons were given by Mr Clothier for that decision.

The matters before the Court are as follows. In matter No VG 427 of 1992, the applicant seeks review of the first and second decisions, being the decision of 14 October 1991 and the decision of 16 October 1992. In the other matter No 51 of

1993, the applicant seeks a review of the decision of the

Immigration Review Tribunal constituted by Mr Clothier. That application was commenced on 3 March 1995. A deportation order had been made on 6 November 1992, but there was no application for a review in this Court of the deportation

order.

The respondents have not sought to take the benefit of Order 54 rule 4 objecting to the competency of the application insofar as it relates to the first decision on the ground that it was not made within the time prescribed by the Judicial Review Act. under section 11 of that Act, an application to the Court for an order of review is to be made in the manner prescribed by the Rules of Court and shall be lodged at a Registry of the Court within the prescribed period, or within such further time as the Court, whether before or after the expiration of the prescribed period, allows. Under subsection (3), the prescribed period is 28 days.

The applicants amended their application, No VG 51 of 1993, on 11 March of this year, and sought to include in it an application to review the decision of the Minister made on 5 November 1992 to deport the applicants. As a consequence the four decisions are before the Court. The applications to review the first decision and the deportation order were not brought within the time prescribed by section 11 of the Judicial Review Act.

This then brings the Court to the matters presently before it. By an amended notice of motion dated 11 March 1993, the applicants are seeking:

1.    An order that the Minister be restrained from taking

pending a final hearing and determination in these any steps to remove the applicants from Australia

matters.

2 .    An order that the applicants be allowed to review the first respondent's decision to deport them made on 5 November 1993, that is what I have described as the fourth decision, the deportation order.

3.    An order that the applicant's be allowed to review

the decision of MIRO dated 14 October 1991 in
proceeding No VG 427 of 1993.

The Court has directed that the orders sought in motions relating to the granting of what is described as "the allowance to review out of time" should be heard and determined first. The material in support and in opposition to that extension of time has been read and submissions made in relation to the facts contained in that material.

It is noted that the section requires the application for judicial review to be made within a prescribed time or "within such further time as the Court allows". The normal practice is that where an application is made for an extension of time, what is being sought is an order that the time for the commencement of judicial review proceeding be extended to a specified date, normally being the date upon which the application was issued or if not then issued, a time when it

can be issued. This then allows the proceeding to be	commenced. What the Court has to determine on these two
motions is whether there should be an extension of time to enable the applicants to seek judicial review of the decision of 14 October 1991 and the deportation order.

It is quite clear that section 11 of the Judicial Review

Act confers an unfettered discretion on izhe Court, but at the

same time the discretion must be exercised judicially. A number of cases have been decided on this issue and indicate the type of matters that the Court will take into account in considering whether to exercise its discretion in favour of an applicant. These cases range from a very early decision which did not involve migration, Duff v Frei jah (1982) 62 FLR 280, and also includes a decision of Wilcox J, in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Limited v Cohen [l9841 3 FCR 344, where his Honour sets out a number of the matters which Courts have considered from time to time.

I propose to deal firstly with the motion for the extension of time in relation to the deportation order. At the present time it is quite clear that the discretion conferred upon the Minister to make a deportation order is very restricted. Under section 60 of the Migration Act the Minister may, after considering the prescribed matters and no other matters, order the deportation of a person who is an illegal entrant under any provision of this Act. Section 63 provides :

deportation of a person, that person shall, unless the	"63 (1) Where the Minister has made an order for the
Minister, after considering the prescribed matters and no other matters, revokes the order, be deported accordingly.
(2) The validity of an order for the deportation of a person shall not be affected by any delay in the execution of that order."

Tlle nature of a deportation order and the powers of the

Minister in relation to it were discussed in the case of

Dallikavak v Min i s t e r o f S t a t e f o r Immigration and Ethnic

A f f a i r s [l9851 9 FCR 98. That case was based upon earlier legislation than that presently in force, but the relevant sections, for practical purposes, are the same. The Court there held that the Minister, although having a power to revoke the deportation order, had no power to suspend or confirm deportation orders. The effect of that is that once a deportation order had been made, the obligation on the Minister is to ensure the deportation order is executed. There is no power in the Minister to defer the deportation. At the same time, section 60 restricts the matters which the Minister may consider in determining whether or not to make a depcrtation order. These matters are contained in Migration Regulation 179 as in operatiori at the relevant time. It is fair to say that they are very restrictive. It provides:

the Act respectively, the following matters are	"179 For the purposes of subsections 60(1) and 82(1) of
prescribed to be considered by the Minister in relation to a person referred to in whichever of those subsections is applicable:
(a) whether the person is an illegal entrant;
(b) whether the person has been given in accordance with these Regulations a notice of the intention to refer to the Minister the question of the exercise of the power :

(i) to order the deportation of the person; or
(ii) to require the person to leave Australia;
as the case requires;

(c)	whether the person has been granted, or is an applicant to be granted, refugee status or territorial asylum;
(d)	whether the person: (i) is an applicant for an entry permit; or
(ii) has applied to a review authority following a decision by the Minister refusing to grant an entry permit;
(e)	whether the person is subject to a court order that is in force affecting the Minister's exercise of the relevant power referred to in paragraph (b);
(f)	whether 2 working days have elapsed after the day on which the person was arrested undersection 92 or 93 of the Act, as the case requires."

For present purposes, one of the prescribed matters under regula-cion 179 is whether the person is an applicant for an entry permit or has applied to a review authority following a decision by the Minister refusing to grant an entry permit. In the present case that provision is relevant because, when the deportation order was made, the review to the Immigration Review Tribunal was pending. It is noted that the only

prescribed matter is whether there is in existence such a	review proceeding, not whether a decision has been made in
that matter. On the facts of this cases, and particularly from the documents which are exhibited to the affidavit of Frances Marie Nagle, sworn 18 March 1993, it appears that all the prescribed matters referred to in regulation 179 were referred to and considered by the Minister including the fact that there was a review pending in the Immigration Review Tribunal. I merely mention these factors as being an illustration of the type of problems that might arise in due course if the matter does come to trial. Possibly of more importance, having regard to the narrow area of discretion conferred upon the Minister in making a deportation order, is the need to consider each of the earlier decisions leading up to the time when the deportation order was made. It is in this respect that the first and second decisions sought to be reviewed take on a greater importance.
The real difficulty facing the applicant seeking an extension of time is that there is no satisfactory material before the Court to explain the delay in making the application to review the deportation order from the date upon which the applicant had notice of that order shortly after 6 November 1992 to the date in March when the appiication to review was amended in Matter No VG 51 of 1993 to seek a review of that deportation order. This is a case where, on all the material, I am satisfied that the applicant and his legal advisers either knew or should have known of the existence of
the time limitations imposed by section 11 of the J u d i c i a l R e v i e w A c t . This is made very clear from the fact that there
had been earlier proceedings in this Court brought by the applicant seeking review of another decision made by the Minister on 2 November 1992, that is just a few days before the applicant knew of the deportation order being made. There, the Court, consituted by Heerey J, refused to grant an extension of time to enable the applicant to seek a review of one of the decisions or alleged decisions in the protracted history of the dealings between the applicant and the Department referred to briefly earlier in these reasons. There the decision in question was made on 31 August 1992. That, as I understand it, was a decision made by the Minister, or his delegate, rejecting the applicant's application for the Extended Eligibility Temporary Entry Permit which was made more than seven days after his arrest. The application was refused because it was out of time. The time for review of that decision expired on 28 September. The application to the court was in fact made on 6 October, some eight days out of time. His Honour gave ex tempore reasons for judgment setting out in some detail the relevant facts and relevant regulations upon which the decision had been made. His Honour then turned to consider whether, in the exercise of his discretion, he should extend time under section 11 of the J u d i c i a l Review
A c t . His Honour referred to the well-known principles to be
applied and refused leave. The importance of that decision was that at the time the deportation order was made on 6 November 1992, and information of that deportation order being
given to the applicent and to his solicitors within a few days
thereafter, the solicitors and the applicant should have known
of the necessity to comply with the requirements of section 11 of the J u d i c i a l Rev iew Act if they intended to review the deportation order.
They knew of the time limit of 28 days. No application to review was lodged within that time. There has been no satisfactory evidence before the Court to explain why the application was not commenced within that time. There is nothing before the Court to suggest any inadvertence or any lack of knowledge or any reason at all. In my oplnion these matters are of extreme importance in exercising a discretion in this case. Are there any reasons why, in spite of that, leave should be granted? I can see none.
In matters of this kind, finality must be reached. The law must be applied and I can see no reason, even having regard to all the matters referred to in the judgment of Wilcox J, which would be sufficient to weigh against the fact that with the knowledge which they had or should have had of the need to make application for judicial review within the specified time limit, no such step was taken. Even when the application was first issued on 15 March of this year, there was still no review sought of the deportation order.
In all the circumstances, this is a case where the Court onght to exercise its discretion against the applicant. This
might be difficult, if deported, for the applicant to continue is so, even though a deportation order is very final and it
his applications in relation to the matters properly before the Court, being the third decision, the decision of M r Clothier, and the second decision, the decision of 19 October 1992. One has regard to all those factors and the factor that it is necessary for the law to be applied and administered. Where the Act lays down a specific time factor and, despite knowledge of that time factor (either express or by
implication) by the solicitors and the applicant, the time factor is ignored completely, and no explanation is given, then the Court should not extend the time. The motion seeking an order that the applicants be allowed to review the Minister's decision to deport them made on 5 November 1992 is refused.
The motion for the extension of time in relation to the first decision is also one which, in my opinion, should be refused. This is a case where the Minister made it quite clear that, although he says in the letter of 14 October 1991 that there was no decision within the meaning of the Judicial Review Act, in any event the decision, if it was a decision, has no effect; it cannot be relied upon; it was made in error. In those circumstances, I see great difficulty in a submission that it is necessary to review a decision upor. which nobody can rely.
It is said that the decision forms part of a chain which has the effect of preventing the Minister or his delegates
granting of a permit, being the decision of 19 October 1992. from properly exercising their discretion in relation to the I do not accept that. If the later decision is a decision,
and that is disputed as I understand it although again there has been no motion to have it struck out on the ground of incompetency, the Court will be looking at what was done at that time in 1992, and if, in the course of that investigation, any attempt is made to rely upon the non-event of 14 October 1991, I could imagine the Court givlng very short shrift to such a submission by the Minister. In any event, it is said that no reliance can be placed upon it at all.
Again, there is unsatisfactory evidence as to the length of delay. This was a case where the applicant initially had no legal advice, but he did obtain legal advice during this period. Apparently, however, his attention was not drawn to the requirements of section 11 of the Judicial Review Act. So, taking account of the factors of lack of action within the time and the lack of standing of the alleged decision of 14 October 1991 on the one had, together with the fact that a deportation order can be challenged on very limited grounds, many being dependent upon the finding of deficiencies in earlier decisions, being a factor to take into account in favour of the applicant, in all the circumstances this is not a case where leave should be granted to extend the time for the application to review the decision of 14 October 1991. That is in matter VG No 427 of 1992. Accordingly, orders 2
and 3 appearing in the amended notice of motion dated 11 March 1993 are refused.
Having ruled that leave will not be granted to the applicant to extend time for the seeking of judicial review of the two decisions, one of 14 October 1991 and the other the deportation order of 6 November 1992, counsel for the applicant has addressed submissions in support of the other
order sought by the amended notice of motion to the effect that the deportation order not be enforced pending the hearing and determination of this matter. The way it is put in the mended notice of motion is for an order that the first respondent, his servants and agents be restrained from taking any Steps to remove the applicants from Australia pending the final hearing and determination of this matter.
This does give rise to an unusual situation in that the deportation order itself is not being challenged in this Court and cannot be challenged. However, despite that fact, what is being sought is that the deportation order not be executed pending the hearing and determination of the judicial review of the decision of 16 October 1992 and the decision of Mr Clothier of 5 February 1993. Reference has alrea* been made to the provisions of sections 60 and 63 of the Migration Act. Just as a reminder subsection 63(1) provides:

"Where the Minister has made an order for the deportation of a person, that person shall, unless the Minister, after considering the prescribed matters and no other matters, revokes the order, be deported accordingly."

And so the only way, in the absence of an order of the Court for a deportation order not to be obeyed, is if that order is revoked. Regulation 180 provides matters to be considered by the Minister in determining whether to revoke a deportation order or not. The only relevant matter is contained in regulation 180. The only such matter relied upon by counsel for the applicant was that contained in paragraph

(da). That regulation reads as follows:

"For the purposes of subsection 63(1) of the Act, the following matters are prescribed to be considered by the Minister in relation to a person referred to in that subsection [ie a person against whom a deportation has been made]:

(a) . . .

(da) whether, under section 115 or 137 of the Act, a decision of a review officer or the Immigration Review Tribunal in relation to the person has been replaced by a decision of the Minister that is in favour of the person;"

Section 115 of the Migra t ion Act is a lengthy section but in substance it enables the Minister to overrule a decision of a review authority which is defined in section 4 of the Migra t ion Act. Powers are given by the Act to the Review Authority. Those powers are not in the nature of a delegation of power from the Minister; they are statutory powers. In substance the provisions enable the Minister to make decisions overruling the decisions of the review authority but only in limited cases as set out in subsections 115(3) and (6) and where that decision by the Minister is more favourable to the

person concerned that that made by the Review Authority. Subsection 115(10) provides:

"(10) The Minister does not have a duty to consider whether to exercise the power under subsection (5) or (6) in respect of any decision, whether he or she is requested to do so by the applicant or by any other person, or in any other circumstances."

The reference in regulation 180 is to a case where the

Minister has made a decision under section 115. What the applicant is seeking is to support the stay application to enable requests to be made to the Minister to exercise his powers under section 115 to see if there can be a decision made more favourable to the applicant than that by the Review Authority of either 5 February 1993 or 16 October 1992. It is put that as a matter of substance the real merits of this case have never been considered by any of the officers or authorities created under the Migration Act. It is put also, that, because of the unfortunate circumstances of the errors which have occurred from time to time within the Department in relation to wrong forms and so on, the Applicant is at a grave disadvantage and has been denied natural justice and should be given an opportunity to pursue this last step in an attempt to avoid deportation.

The arguments are ingenicus . I cannot say they are

hopeless, but on any view they are not strong and in those circumstances one is required to consider the question of the

categories of strength of argument or a serious issue to be balance of convenience. These are noc mutually exclusive tried and balance of convenience but a helpful way of considering the whole matter. In some cases a strong case on the issue to be tried may be sufficient to justify the granting of a stay order even though the balance of convenience is very small. Likewise, a weak case may require a very strong balance of convenience to justify the granting of a stay. In the present case it has been urged upon the

2 1

Court that in the exercise of the discretion on the balance of convenience aspect, one should have regard to the unfair treatment metered out to the applicant by what have been described as errors w~thin the department. The effect of a deportation order is that the applicant will be required to leave the country, will lose his ties with his friends in Australia, and may not be able to obtain work in Tonga. Although he is not working here in Australia he is no burden to the community since he is paying his own way. It is therefore argued that, in all these circumstances, he should be allowed to remain in Australia to pursue his claims both in relation to the two pending judicial review proceedings as well as the possible further application under the provisions of the Migration Act.

As against this it must be remembered that the applicant is an illegal entrant and has been technically illegally in Australia since March 1988. There is a need for the law to be applied. This is not a case where the prosecution of the matters before this Court will be affected adversely by the

depend essentially on the consideration of documents which are absence of the applicant from Australia. The legal issues in existence and the provisions of the Act and Regulations as they existed from time to time. This is not a case where, on the face of it, there will need to be much cross-examination, if any, of the applicant. A question of credit does not arise and, if evidence is required, it can be given by way of affidavit. One must also have regard to the fact that the

2 2

deportation order is in existence and cannot be challenged in
the Court in proceedings under the Judicial Review Act.

In all the circumstances, this is a case where the Court should not exercise its discretion in favour of the applicant. Accordingly the order sought for the interlocutory injunction is refused.

The following orders are made:

1.   That the motion of the applicant that the first respondent, his servants and agents be restrained from taking any steps to remove the applicants from Australia pending the final hearing and determination of this matter be refused.

2. That the motion by the applicant for an extension of time in which to seek a review under the Administrative Decisions Judicial Review Act 1977 of the decision made by the Minister by his delegate on 5 November 1992 be

refused.

3.    That the motion of the applicant for an extension of time in which to review the decision of the Migration Internal Review Office dated 14 October 1991 in matter No VG 427 of 1992 be refused.

4.   That the order restraining the deportation order of 5 November 1992 being enforced be vacated.

5.    The applicant pay the respondent's costs of the motion, notice of which is dated 3 March 1993, the amended notice of motion dated 11 March 1993 and costs reserved in relation to those motions.

6.    That matters No VG 427 of 1992 and No VG 51 of 1993 be listed at the same time and that the directions hearings in each matter be adjourned to 31 March 1993.

I certify that this and the preceding twenty two (22) pages

are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of The Honourable

Mr Justice R.Mj Nurt?ros.

Associate:

ATTACHMENT

Counsel for the Applicant:	Mr S. Martin
Solicitors for the Applicant:	Wallis & Incerti (formerly Armstrong Singer
& Ross)
Counsel for the Respondent:	Mr R. Downing
Solicitor for the Respondent:	Australian  Government
Solicitor

JUDGES' CHAMBERS
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
450 LITTLE BOURKE STREET

2 AUSTRALIA 'L

J J * > > > \ ~ ~ L C MELBOURNE, 3000

1 December 1994

MS Sonia Cornale
Records Clerk
Library and Information Services
Principal Registry
Federal Court of Australia
Level 16
Law Courts Building
Queens Square

SYDNEY NSW 2000

Dear Sonia

Re: Com~uterized Leaal Information Retrieval Svstem

I enclose the following judgment for inclusion in the data base of Federal Court Judgments:

Kelekolio Nlvaleti Melekiola & Tukuofo Melekiola v The Minister for Immiaration. Local Government & Ethnic Affairs & Immiaration Review Tribunal

No VG 51 of 1993 No VG 427 of 1992

The word processing disk containing the above judgment is enclosed. Please return the disk to the me when appropriate.

Thank you
~ E N N Y	HAWORTH

The Hon Mr Justice Northrop