| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
PROBATE LIST
S CI 2014 03825
IN THE MATTER of the will and estate of ALICE HALL, deceased
- and -
IN THE MATTER of s 2 of the Charities Act 1978
| MELBA SUPPORT SERVICES INC | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| DIANNE BELL | First Defendant |
| - and - | |
| DAVID BARRETT JONES and HOWARD ANDREW JONES (who are sued as trustees of the estate of ALICE HALL, deceased) | Second and Third Defendants |
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JUDGE: | McMillan J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | Written submissions filed 9 September 2014 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 16 September 2014 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Melba Support Services Inc v Bell [No 2] | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2014] VSC 446 | |
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Costs — Unsuccessful applicant for cy-près order seeking costs — Application refused — No point of principle — Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005, r 63.21
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | No appearance | Beaumont Lawyers |
| For the First Defendant | No appearance | |
| For the Second and Third Defendants | No appearance |
HER HONOUR:
In this matter, the plaintiff sought orders that the funds remaining in the estate of Alice Hall (‘the deceased’), being $38,186.07 held by the second and third defendants as trustees, be distributed to the plaintiff by way of an order in the nature of cy-près.
On 9 September 2014, I refused that application, holding that an order that the estate be distributed cy-près was not available, and that the deceased did not evince a general charitable intention.[1] I ordered that the proceeding be otherwise dismissed, directed the plaintiff’s solicitor to provide a draft form of order, and directed that any application or submissions in relation to the costs of the proceeding be dealt with on the papers.
[1]Melba Support Services Inc v Bell [2014] VSC 425 (16 September 2014) [69].
That day, the plaintiff filed written submissions seeking its costs of and incidental to the proceeding. The plaintiff’s costs of and incidental to this proceeding are $12,353.20. The plaintiff submitted that it was entitled to those costs in the absence of a good reason to the contrary, relying on the following authorities.
Rule 63.21 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 provides:
The costs of an inquiry to ascertain the person entitled to any legacy, money, share or other property shall be paid out of the property, unless the Court orders otherwise.
Dal Pont’s Law of Costs, referring to this rule, provides:
Costs of inquiries to ascertain the person entitled to a legacy, money or share are payable out of that legacy, money or share unless the Court orders otherwise. In otherwise ordering, the Court’s chief inquiry is to the testator’s intention.[2]
[2]G E Dal Pont, Law of Costs (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2009).
For that proposition, Dal Pont cites Re Vincent,[3] where Parker J gave effect to a testator’s wishes that costs of an inquiry to establish eligibility should come out his residuary estate. I note that in…
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- AGLC
- Melba Support Services Inc v Bell [No 2] [2014] VSC 446
- Case
- [2014] VSC 446
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the cy-près order should be refused. It found that the application did not raise a point of principle of general public importance. It also held that the applicant was not entitled to costs under r 63.21 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 as the application was not frivolous. The court found that the application was a genuine attempt to obtain relief but was ultimately unsuccessful because it did not meet the requirements for a cy-près order.
The court found that the application did not raise a point of principle of general public importance. The court held that the application was not frivolous, and therefore the applicant was not entitled to costs. The court found that the application was a genuine attempt to obtain relief but was ultimately unsuccessful because it did not meet the requirements for a cy-près order. The court concluded that the application did not raise a point of principle of general public importance and was not frivolous. The court therefore refused the cy-près order and dismissed Bell's application for costs.
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Background
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Decision
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