Meier and Yeddich and Anor

[2014] FamCA 169

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MEIER & YEDDICH AND ANOR [2014] FamCA 169

FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Applications for stay of Orders pending determination of an appeal and cross-appeal – Principles in respect of stays considered – Bona fides of the mother and the Independent Children’s Lawyer – Balancing parties’ competing rights – Preliminary assessment of the strengths of the appeals – Effect of changing the child’s living arrangements pending determination of the appeal – Best interests of the child

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

Aldridge & Keaton [2009] FamCAFC 106
Cape & Cape [2013] FamCAFC 114
Clemett & Clemett (1981) FLC 91-013
CSN & JBN [1998] FamCA 1766
Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286
Gronow & Gronow (1979) 144 CLR 513
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Trahn & Long (No. 2) [2008] FamCAFC 194

APPLICANT: Ms Meier

RESPONDENT: Mr Yeddich

INTERVENER: Secretary of the Department of Family and Community Services

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Ms Youssef

FILE NUMBER: PAC 2194 of 2012

DATE DELIVERED: 18 March 2014

PLACE DELIVERED: 18 March 2014

PLACE HEARD: Parramatta

JUDGMENT OF: Hannam J

HEARING DATE: 18 March 2014

REPRESENTATION

THE APPLICANT: Self-represented Litigant

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Browns The Family Lawyers

COUNSEL FOR THE INTERVENER: Mr Anderson

SOLICITOR FOR THE INTERVENER: Crown Solicitors Office

COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Mr Rosic

SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Rafton Family Lawyers

Orders

1. The Application in a Case filed by the Independent Children’s Lawyer on 17 March 2014 is dismissed.

2. The application by the mother in respect of orders 1 and 2 set out in her Application in a Case filed 12 March 2014 is dismissed.

3. Leave is granted to the Independent Children’s Lawyer to relist the matter on short notice once the appeal has been determined for further trial directions and consideration of the balance of the mother’s Application in a Case filed 12 March 2014.

Notation

1. The father has made an application for costs in respect of the unsuccessful stay applications heard today and that matter is to be adjourned and to be heard together with the other applications for costs made by the father in these proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Meier & Yeddich and Anor has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PARRAMATTA

FILE NUMBER: PAC2194 of 2012

Ms Meier

Applicant

And

Mr Yeddich

Respondent

And

Secretary of the Department of Family & Community Services

Intervener

And

Independent Children’s Lawyer

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. In Applications  in a Case filed 12 March 2014 and 18 March 2014, the mother and the Independent Children’s Lawyer respectively in parenting proceedings seek that Orders made on 11 March 2014 suspending time and communication with the mother’s 13-year-old son be stayed pending the hearing of an appeal.

2. The application for stay is supported by the Intervener but opposed by the father.

The background

1. S, (“the child”) is the 13-year-old son of Ms Meier, (“the mother”) and Mr Yeddich, (“the father”). The child’s parents separated when he was five years old and since that time there have been two sets of parenting proceedings.

2. The first parenting orders were made following a contested hearing in 2007 and pursuant to them, the father was given sole parental responsibility for the child, the child was to live with the father and to spend time with the mother under a regime commencing with limited supervised time, leading up to alternate weekends and holiday time when the child was aged 10 years, in November 2010.

3. The second parenting Orders were made by consent on 8 October 2013 and also provided for the father to have sole parental responsibility for the child and for the child to live with the father and spend time with the mother.

4. For the purposes of those proceedings, a Chapter 15 expert report was obtained from a psychiatrist, Dr J. Dr J conducted interviews for the preparation of his report in March 2013 and the report was released in May 2013. The detailed report relates to a whole range of matters, including each of the relevant best interest considerations set out in the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). So far as final orders are concerned, the doctor recommended that the child continue to live with the father. He also recommended that the then current regime of the child spending time with his mother continue, with some capacity for the child to express his views about the future when he is more mature.

5. The consent Orders made reflect Dr J’s recommendations and so far as the child’s views are concerned, the Orders provide that he may express his views at the end of the 2015 school year.

6. At the time the consent Orders were made, for a lengthy period prior to that date and at all times subsequently, the child has clearly expressed the view that he does not want to live with his father and wishes to live with his mother.

7. After the final consent Orders were made, the child resided with his father and spent time with his mother in accordance with the Orders until 29 November 2013. On that date the child left his father’s home and, instead of going to school, ended up at his mother’s home. The father subsequently found out that the child had run away from him and was living with the mother.

8. There was no contact between the father and the child after 29 November 2013 for about nine weeks, other than some text messages sent by the father to the child. The child did not attend school at all for the balance of the school year.

9. The father commenced recovery proceedings in December 2013 and the matter first came before the Court on 13 January 2014. Although the father was in a position to proceed on that date, the matter was adjourned on the application of the Independent Children’s Lawyer, who was concerned that the child had expressed serious thoughts of self-harm if he were returned to his father’s care.

10. During the adjourned period, a psychiatrist, Dr L, assessed the child and found that while he suffered from a chronic adjustment disorder, due to ongoing conflict between his parents, he did not find any evidence to suggest that the child had an overt psychiatric disorder and did not consider that the child was at high risk of significant self-harm.

11. On 4 February 2014 the Director-General, as he then was, of the Department of Family and Community Services, (“the Intervener” or “The Department”) was joined to the proceedings.

12. Following submissions, I made a Recovery Order for the child to be returned to the father, suspended Orders in respect of the child’s time with his mother until 4 March 2014 and delivered ex tempore reasons for my decision.

13. Between the evening of 4 February 2014 and 24 February 2014 the child resided with his father in accordance with the Court Orders. However, on 5 February the child absconded from his father’s home and presented himself at Suburb I Police Station telling police that he was not happy living with his father and would like the situation changed.

14. Late in the afternoon of 5 February 2014 the matter was listed urgently on application of the Independent Children’s Lawyer, who was granted leave to make an oral application to revoke the Recovery Order and seek interim parenting orders for the child to live with the mother. This application was opposed by the father and the Intervener and, following submissions, was dismissed with ex tempore reasons for that decision being given.

15. On the evening of 5 February 2014 the child was once again returned to the father. Over the following 19 days the child lived with the father, but on 6 February and 8 February the child absconded and presented himself at the police station saying that he did not wish to be returned and on each of those occasions, the father collected him from the police station and returned him home.

16. On Monday 24 February 2014 the child again absconded and presented himself at the same police station. On this occasion the child also alleged that he had been assaulted by his father and police obtained a Provisional Apprehended Violence Order (“AVO”) against his father on his behalf. When the father telephoned police and said that he was coming to collect the child, the father says that police told him that the Intervener had made a decision to take the child into Departmental care overnight. The Intervener had not at that stage, or at any stage since, in fact taken steps to take the child into care. The father, in exercise of his parental responsibility, agreed to the child remaining at a youth refuge, which had been organised by officers of the Department that night, and subsequently until the application to which the appeal relates had been determined.

17. By Application in a Case filed 4 March 2014, the Intervener sought interim parenting orders, in effect, reversing the current Orders and returning the child to the care of his mother. The mother and the Independent Children’s Lawyer supported this application but it was opposed by the father, who had brought his own application to have Orders providing for the child to spend time with and communicate with his mother suspended until the end of 2014.

18. Following submissions the Intervener’s application was dismissed as was the father’s application, but Orders were made suspending the Orders with respect to the child’s time and communication with the mother until further order, as well as other Orders in relation to the mother’s application to reopen the parenting proceedings. Ex tempore reasons for the decision were given.

19. On 12 March 2014 the mother filed an Application in a Case seeking a stay of the 11 March 2014 Orders and other Orders as she had filed an appeal. As I have explained previously, only the application in respect of the 11 March Orders is dealt with in these reasons as the balance of the Application in the Case either seeks a stay in respect of Orders which have not been appealed or seeks other orders, which can be dealt with in the usual way in these proceedings, rather than on an urgent interim basis.

20. So far as the Independent Children’s Lawyer’s Application in the Case is concerned, as it has been submitted by the Independent Children’s Lawyer today, it is not identical to the mother’s application, except in relation to the stay. Both the mother and the Independent Children’s Lawyer, have appealed against all of the Orders made on it 11 March 2014 and seek a stay of each of those Orders in their respective Applications in a Case.  However, most of the Orders made on 11 March 2014 relate to procedural matters, such as the obtaining of an updated expert report, and many were made by consent. The way in which the matter was argued by the Independent Children’s Lawyer today, and it seems the real matter of appeal so far as the mother is concerned, relates to the Orders made on 11 March 2014 dismissing the Intervener’s application for the child to reside with his mother, and suspending the child’s time and communication with his mother until further order.

21. The Intervener has not appealed against the dismissal of its own application on 11 March 2014 and, to the extent to which the Independent Children’s Lawyer seeks an order that the child live with the mother, the Application in a Case is, in my view, in reality an application for further parenting orders.

22. Further, the order that the Independent Children’s Lawyer seeks “(t)hat all recovery orders, orders as against the mother pursuant to section 68B of the Act and injunctions that prevent Order 2 being given effect are suspended”, is, in my view, an application for stay against those Orders without having instituted such an appeal.

23. It is noted that the Independent Children’s Lawyer’s application for revocation of the Recovery Order and that the child reside with his mother were considered and dismissed on 5 February 2014 and 11 March 2014 respectively. The making of the Recovery Order itself was also opposed by the mother when it was made on 4 February 2014 and has not been appealed.

24. The mother also sought in her Application in the Case to have the Court stay the Orders made on 6 March 2014, even though she has not appealed against those Orders. She also seeks other orders in the nature of parenting orders and an application for my recusal, transfer to another registry and other matters.

25. As indicated, when the matter was listed on an urgent basis today, I indicated that I would consider the stay application. Although if the stay is to be granted, I did indicate that I may need to give consideration to the interim orders sought by the mother and the Independent Children’s Lawyer. However, for the reasons that I have just explained, this would amount, in effect, to reopening the parenting proceedings yet again, in circumstances where there has been no change since the making of the last Orders, that is, 11 March 2014. On that date the child was residing in a refuge, at that stage with the consent of the father, and the affidavit of the Independent Children’s Lawyer indicates that, on the date it was sworn – 14 March 2014, the child was still residing in a refuge. I am not informed, however, whether this is pursuant to the father’s consent and, if it is not, nor am I informed why the Recovery Order is not being enforced.

26. The Independent Children’s Lawyer is also seeking in their Application in a Case a suspension of the Orders which have not been appealed against, that is, the Recovery Orders and other injunctions. As I have indicated, this amounts to an application for stay of the Orders not appealed against and cannot succeed. For these reasons, only the stay application is being dealt with.

The law

1. The law as to the general principles applicable to a stay pending appeal is well settled. 

2. In Cape & Cape[1], a decision of the Full Court in 2013, in which the Full Court considered Orders permitting a mother to relocate to Germany and the refusal to stay the relocation Orders pending the appeal, the Full Court referred to the approach taken by Crisford J, the First Instance Judge, as accurately relying upon the statement of principles by the Full Court in Tranh & Long (No. 2)[2].  These principles are the same as those referred to today by the Independent Children’s Lawyer in Aldridge &Keaton[3].

   [1] [2013] FamCAFC 114

   [2] [2008] FamCAFC 194

   [3] [2009] FamCAFC 106

3. The principles from Trahn & Long (No. 2) (supra) or Aldridge & Keaton (supra), which were described as accurately governing the determination of a stay application concerning a child are:-

   (1)the onus to establish a proper basis for the stay is on the applicant for the stay – however it is not necessary for the applicant to demonstrate “special” or “exceptional” circumstances;

   (2)a person who has obtained a judgment is entitled to the benefit of that judgment;

   (3)a person who has obtained a judgment is entitled to presume the judgment is correct;

   (4)the mere filing of an appeal is insufficient to ground a stay;

   (5)the bona fides of the applicant;

   (6)a stay may be granted on terms that are fair to all parties – this may involve a Court weighing the balance of convenience and the competing rights of the parties;

   (7)a weighing of the risk that an appeal may be rendered nugatory if a stay is not granted – this will be a substantial factor in determining whether it will be appropriate to grant the stay;

   (8)some preliminary assessment of the strength of the proposed appeal – whether the appellant has an arguable case;

   (9)the desirability of limiting the frequency of any change in a child’s living arrangements;

   (10)the period of time in which the appeal can be heard and whether existing satisfactory arrangements may support the granting of a stay for a short period of time; and

   (11)the best interests of the child the subject of the proceedings.

4. I will now consider the factors relevant in this case.

5. The proper basis for the stay in this matter from the mother’s perspective is said to be that preventing the child from spending time with and communicating with her is not in his best interests. So far as the Independent Children’s Lawyer is concerned, it was conceded that when considered in isolation the application for the stay is, in the words of the legal representative, “futile”, as whether, the stay is granted or not, the child is still required under the October 2013 consent Orders to reside with the father, and it remains the Independent Children’s Lawyer’s position that the best interests of the child would be met by residing with the mother.

6. As I have already indicated, this last issue, that is the residence with the mother, has been dealt with on three occasions since the making of the consent Orders.

7. The father in this matter is the person who has obtained a judgment in his favour. He is entitled, as a matter of law, to the benefit of that judgment and is entitled to presume the judgment is correct. In this case, the father is entitled to parent the child without the child having any contact with his mother until the Court makes a further order, and is entitled to presume that that decision is correct.

8. The circumstances in which the Orders of 11 March 2014 were made, including the contentious Orders for the purpose of the stay, that is, the suspension of time and contact with the mother included:

   ·a consideration that the 8 October 2013 Orders were made by consent;

   ·the uncontested evidence that the father was assisted by Court security to leave the precincts of the Court with the child by taxi from the Court car park after the Recovery Order was made because of concerns that the mother and brother may not have complied with a Court Order to leave the Court precincts;

   ·that the mother and brother Mr D Meier attended the police station on at least one occasion when the child absconded after the Recovery Order was made;

   ·that the child made calls to the mother’s telephone three times about 3.30 pm on 24 February 2014 when he ran away for the last time; and

   ·that the complaints that the child made to police about the father’s alleged assault were similar to complaints the child had made over many years, which the expert had described as exaggerated and consistent with the fantasy life the child had constructed.

The bona fides of the applicants

1. The bona fides of the mother in bringing the appeal is a difficult matter to determine as I do not understand what she is seeking to achieve in the appeal. The orders she is seeking are as follows:-

   1.That Her Honour’s Orders made on 11 March 2014 be and are hereby staye (sic)

   2.That the Child [S] born on … November 2000 remain in the Mother’s care, until further order;

   3.That the Father have regular contact with the said child as determined by this Honourable Court

   4.That the Mother’s outstanding Application for parenting orders be heard on an urgent basis

   5.That the Father pay the Mother’s costs of these proceedings and the proceedings below.

2. In other words, the primary relief that the mother seeks in relation to the Orders made on 11 March 2014 is that those Orders be stayed, which is the same application that she makes before the Court today.

3. So far as the second and third orders sought in the appeal are concerned, they appear to be a parenting application in similar, though not identical terms, to the parenting application made by the mother in response to the father’s recovery order application, which is still pending before me. These orders are essentially a reversal of the Orders to which the mother consented in October 2013.

4. The Independent Children’s Lawyer’s application is also an application for parenting orders in that it seeks an order that the child live with the mother.

1. To the extent that the mother is seeking on appeal to have the Full Court make new parenting orders where essentially the same application is pending before this Court, this may reflect on the mother’s bona fides in bringing the appeal. However, as I have indicated, it is difficult to determine that issue as I do not fully understand the purpose of the appeal.

Balancing the parties’ competing rights

1. Balancing the parties competing rights essentially means giving consideration to the effect of a stay on each of the parties. If the stay were to be granted, the current suspension of Orders in relation to the child’s time and communication with the mother would be lifted and the child would spend each alternate weekend and Wednesday night with the mother and would be able to communicate with her.

2. Unless the stay sought by the Independent Children’s Lawyer is granted, the Recovery Order, including the Order that the mother is not to remove or take possession of the child personally or through another person acting on her behalf, which may result in her arrest without a warrant, would remain. As I have already indicated, these Orders have not been appealed against by the Independent Children’s Lawyer and so there is no reason why a stay should be granted in respect of those Orders on this basis.

3. In other words, if a stay were granted the mother would be in a similar position to that which she was in after the making of the October 2013 Orders, to which she consented, so far as contact with the child is concerned, but it would still mean that she is subject to the Recovery Order, which is not the subject of an appeal. The father would likewise be in the same position that he was in after the making of the consent Orders with respect to the child.

4. If a stay is not granted then the child would not communicate with or spend time with the mother. This may be seen as detrimentally affecting the mother’s and the child’s rights.

5. So far as the mother is concerned, as I indicated in my Reasons for Judgment on 11 March 2014, on the basis of the evidence before me on that date, the relationship of the child and mother would be unlikely to suffer long-term damage from a suspension of time. In terms of the best interests of the child, there is a much greater risk, indeed a likelihood, in my view, of the cessation of a relationship with the father if the stay is granted, which would be against the child’s best interests. Further, the father’s right to have the Orders obeyed without him having to resort to further proceedings to enforce them, especially as they were Orders made with the consent of the parties, is also relevant.

6. In my view, a concerning aspect of the history of this matter is that the Orders consented to only operated for seven weeks prior to the child leaving the father’s home. The father was then required to bring recovery proceedings to enforce those Orders, and since then, there have been three applications effectively attempting to reverse the consent Orders. Between each of these applications further events have occurred with the child’s actions, in particular, becoming more dramatic on each occasion. This turn of events was to some extent predicted by both Dr J and Dr L, and it was Dr L’s recommendation that if these events were to occur then there should be a lengthy cessation of time and communication with the mother.

7. Although in parenting matters the rights of the parties are not matters which are to be balanced against the child’s best interests, as the child’s best interests are paramount and therefore treated as determinative, the application for a stay is not strictly a parenting proceeding.  However, the child’s best interests are obviously particularly significant, as the authorities indicate.

Whether the appeal may be rendered nugatory if a stay is not granted

1. None of the parties submit that the appeal may be rendered nugatory if a stay is not granted.

A preliminary assessment of the strengths of the appeal

1. The mother’s grounds of appeal are contained within 21 paragraphs falling within four categories. The first is that I “predetermined” that the mother had refused to return the child to the father from November 2013 and that the child would not have run away from the father’s home without the assistance and encouragement from the brother.

2. Neither of these findings was made by me in my Reasons for Judgment.

3. The next category in the mother’s grounds of appeal is that I refused to take into account certain matters set out in (a) to (g) in her Notice of Appeal under part B of Annexure A, which are said to be relevant, followed by a category described as errors of law.

4. Some of the matters in each of these categories are plainly wrong and that it is apparent in the Reasons for Judgment. For example, the strongly held opinions of the child, the Independent Children’s Lawyer, and Intervener’s submissions in relation to them, and the nature of the relationship between the child and his father are referred to in many parts of the Reasons for Judgment.

5. The final category of the mother’s grounds of appeal is described as a failure to provide reasons and, in my view, an examination of the Reasons for Judgment also indicates problems with these grounds of appeal. For example, it is complained that I failed to explain my basis for finding that the mother had adopted Dr J’s report. In the hearing it was the mother’s counsel who adopted, to a very large extent, the submissions made by the Intervener, which themselves were based to a large extent on Dr J’s report. So far as matters relating to the child such as “current stable circumstances at the shelter” or refuge are concerned, there was no evidence relating to these matters before the Court. There is also a fundamental misunderstanding in the grounds of appeal of the role of expert evidence as opposed to a lawyer’s submissions.

6. The Orders made on 11 March 2014 were interim parenting Orders. In Goode & Goode[4], in setting out the approach to be taken in these matters, it was said that the Court is required to identify the issues in dispute and identify the agreed matters. It is clear in the Reasons for Judgment of 11 March 2014 that these matters were identified.

   [4] (2006) FCL 93-286

7. Next, as has been made clear in a number of Full Court decisions, which were cited in the Reasons for Judgment, when making an interim order, the Court must also have some regard to the matters in dispute, especially where those contested facts relate to an assessment of risk. The authorities also require the Court to consider the duration of the interim order, and both of these matters were addressed in the Reasons for Judgment.

8. In accordance with the authorities, I then referred to the objects and principles in the part of the Act dealing with parenting, considered the issue of parental responsibility and considered each of the section 60CC factors as were relevant in the matter. The expert evidence from Dr J, although untested, had been relied upon by each of the parties in support of their submissions and extracts of that report were set out in length.

9. The mother’s appeal, although containing a section in the ground which purports to deal with errors of law, appears in fact to depend to a large extent on a consideration of the weight that was given to different matters in my decision. As is clear from House v The King[5] and the Gronow & Gronow[6], appellate Courts are slow to overturn a primary Judge’s discretionary decision on grounds which only involve conflicting assessments of the matters of weight.

   [5] (1936) 55 CLR 499

   [6] (1979) 144 CLR 513

10. So far as the Independent Children’s Lawyer’s appeal is concerned, much of it is also challenging the weight that was given to particular considerations in reaching my decision.

Desirability of limiting the frequency of change in a child’s living arrangements

1. The issue of the desirability of limiting the frequency of any change in a child’s living arrangements was not addressed by the Independent Children’s Lawyer.

2. The father, however, submitted that it is of significance that the dismissal of the stay application would mean a continuation of the arrangements, which have been in place since 2007, in so far as where the child lives, and that if the father is successful in resisting the appeal, those arrangements will continue until the final hearing. The father further submits that, on the other hand, if orders are made as sought by the mother and the Independent Children’s Lawyer, this could bring about a significant further disruption if the appeal is dismissed and the child is returned to reside with his father.

3. In respect of maintaining the status quo, a number of cases, starting with Clemett & Clemett[7], refer to the desirability for the frequency of any changes in custodial arrangements relating to a child being limited as much as possible. 

   [7] (1981) FLC 91-013

4. Subsequent cases, including the Full Court decision of CSN & JBN[8], make it clear that in order for the Court to attach weight to the status quo, the aspect of the present circumstances of the child being satisfactory is critical.

   [8] (1998) FamCA 176

5. In this case, the present circumstances for the child, if the Orders were being effectively enforced, that is, living with his father and having no time with his mother, would be satisfactory in the sense that, for the reasons explained, I am of the view that they are in the best interest of the child.

6. However, they are not the arrangements that the child himself wants and on four occasions since the Recovery Order was issued and time with the mother was suspended the child made his own decision to leave the father’s home. Only time will tell whether under changed arrangements the child will continue to persist with refusing to return home. These changed arrangements include:-

   ·the Recovery Order being enforced;

   ·all contact with the mother (and also the brother) being suspended; and

   ·the child being aware, through the various Court proceedings, which will have been and will continue to be explained to him through the Independent Children’s Lawyer, that the Court Orders, to which all parties consented, are expected to be complied with unless and until they are amended.

7. Although submissions have been made about his behaviour, as I have indicated, only time will tell under these arrangements whether the child will persist with his current position. In any event, it is not the case, as the mother seems to believe, that if this stay is granted that the child will be able to reside in a shelter or refuge. The order sought to be stayed relates only to the child’s time and contact with the mother and the orders providing for the father to have sole parental responsibility and for the child to reside with him remain in place, whether or not the stay is granted.

8. Although the child’s response to the status quo is concerning, especially in light of his age, the status quo, that is the current Orders, is satisfactory in the sense that it is in his best interests.

The period of time in which the appeal can be heard

1. A date for the hearing of the appeal has, as I understand not yet been fixed, though I note that there is a directions hearing listed on 8 April 2014 in respect of the mother’s appeal and on 11 April 2014 in respect of the Independent Children’s Lawyer’s appeal, but I imagine that the two appeals will end up being consolidated.

The best interests of the child

1. The final matter to consider is the best interests of the child, the subject of the proceedings.

2. Having regard to the primary and additional considerations referred to in the previous Reasons for Judgment, and particularly the Judgment of 11 March 2014, when the situation was the same as it is now, that is the child was residing in a refuge and refusing to return home, I am of the view that the best interests of the child will be met by the continuation of the Orders made on that date.

Conclusion

1. Accordingly, the application of the Independent Children’s Lawyer is dismissed and the application of the mother for orders 1 and 2 in her Application in the Case is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding seventy-one (71) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Hannam delivered on 18 March 2014.

Legal Associate:      

Date:    25 March 2014