CITATION: Megna & anor v Marshall & anor; Tory v Marshall & anor [2006] NSWSC 70 HEARING DATE(S): 2 February 2006
JUDGMENT DATE :
2 February 2006JUDGMENT OF: Brereton J EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT DATE: 02/02/2006 DECISION: Paragraphs [11] - [15] CATCHWORDS: FAMILY LAW – Binding Financial Agreements – setting aside – Jurisdiction – Jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act (Cth) – Costs – circumstances justifying a costs order in proceedings under Family Law Act. COSTS – Proceedings under Family Law Act – third party proceedings to set aside financial agreement. LEGISLATION CITED: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss 40(3), 60G, 90K, 117
Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth), s 4CASES CITED: Megna v Marshall [2005] NSWSC 1302
Megna v Marshall [2005] NSWSC 1347PARTIES: (10261/04)
Michael Megna (first plaintiff)
Russell James Lloyd (second plaintiff)
David John Marshall (first defendant)
Richard Martin Tory (second defendant)
(6166/05)
Richard Martin Tory (plaintiff)
David John Marshall (first defendant)
Shirley Irene Marshall (second defendant)FILE NUMBER(S): SC 10261/04; 6166/05 COUNSEL: (10261/04)
V Dominello (solicitor) (plaintiffs)
D J Marshall (in person) (first defendant)
A T S Dawson (second defendant)
(6166/05)
A T S Dawson (plaintiff)
D J Marshall (in person) (first defendant)
A Clachers (solicitor) (second defendant)SOLICITORS: (10261/04)
Etheringtons Solicitors (plaintiffs)
Osborne Bricknell Howell (second defendant)
(6166/05)
Osborne Bricknell Howell (plaintiff)
Thurlow Fisher (second defendant)
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISION &
EQUITY DIVISIONBRERETON J
Thursday 2 February 2006
JUDGMENT (ex tempore)10261/04 Michael Megna & 1 Ors v David John Marshall & 2 Ors
6166/05 Richard Martin Tory v David John Marshall & Anor
1 HIS HONOUR: In proceedings 6166 of 2005, by consent of the first defendant and without opposition on the part of the second defendant, I make orders in terms of paragraph 2 of the summons filed 9 December 2005, namely that the Financial Agreement between the first and second defendants, David John Marshall and Shirley Irene Marshall dated 3 September 2005 be hereby set aside.
2 In proceedings 10261 of 2004, I note the undertaking of Shirley Irene Marshall, by her solicitor, to the Court:
1) That she will not, without first giving notice in writing to the solicitors for each party to these proceedings of her intention to do so, commence proceedings for an adjustment of property interests against the First Defendant, David John Marshall.
- 2) That in the event that David John Marshall commences such proceedings against her, she will forthwith give notice in writing to the solicitors for each party to these proceedings of their institution.
3 I order that paragraph 1 of the Order made on 22 November 2005 be discharged, as against Shirley Irene Marshall.
4 It remains to deal with the question of costs.
5 On 22 November 2005, I delivered a judgment which sets out the relevant history of the matter and reserved costs of the application, expressing the view that they should probably be dealt with in the…
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- Case
- [2006] NSWSC 70
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues the court had to resolve included whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear the application to set aside the BFA, and if the agreement was indeed unfair and unjust. The court also considered whether the circumstances justified an order for costs under the Family Law Act. The court examined the nature of the jurisdiction conferred by the Cross-Vesting Act and whether it extended to setting aside BFAs. Additionally, the court assessed the fairness of the disclosure and whether the agreement should be enforced.
The court found that the Supreme Court did have jurisdiction to hear the application, as it fell within the ambit of the Cross-Vesting Act. The court further held that the BFA was not fairly and reasonably disclosed to the applicants, and it was unjust to enforce it. The applicants were awarded costs, as the court found the circumstances justified such an order under the Family Law Act. The court concluded that the agreement was not valid and enforceable, and it was set aside. The final orders included the setting aside of the BFA and the awarding of costs to the applicants.
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