Meeta and Sibi

[2011] FamCA 944

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MEETA & SIBI [2011] FamCA 944

FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Interim property orders

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

APPLICANT: Ms Meeta

RESPONDENT: Mr Sibi

FILE NUMBER: MLC 9309 of 2011

DATE DELIVERED: 31 October 2011

PLACE DELIVERED: Melbourne

PLACE HEARD: Melbourne

JUDGMENT OF: Cronin J

HEARING DATE: 31 October 2011

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Mr Devries

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Aughtersons

THE RESPONDENT: In person

Orders

1. That BY CONSENT there be orders in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 and paragraphs 6 to 9 of the minutes of proposed orders marked Exhibit “A” sealed and attached hereto AND IT IS DIRECTED that such minutes remain upon the Court file.

2. That there be ORDERS OF THE COURT in terms of paragraph 4 and 5 of the attached minutes.

3. That the reasons this day be transcribed.

IT IS CERTIFIED:

1. That pursuant to Order 19.50 of the Family Law Rules 2004 it was reasonable to engage counsel to attend.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Meeta & Sibi has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Act.

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE

FILE NUMBER:  MLC 9309 of 2011

Ms Meeta

Applicant

And

Mr Sibi

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. This is an application filed by Ms Meeta on 14 October 2011.  I shall refer to her as the applicant.  The respondent is Mr Sibi and I shall refer to him as the respondent.  The application sought some interim orders which were predominantly of an injunctive nature but also some orders about discovery and also what might be euphemistically called a litigation funding order.  The latter is not being dealt with today.  Mr Sibi, the respondent, has indicated that he was only served late last week, and, quite properly, the applicant agreed to an adjournment for a month to enable him to file his material, but there have no doubt been some problems about service.  I am going to ask the respondent to file a notice of address for service before he leaves just so that at least the Court can contact him. 

2. In respect of a set of minutes that were handed to me, only two were contentious.  The first related to an injunction against the respondent that he be restrained from taking any actions to remove the applicant’s Mercedes-Benz motor vehicle, and I note that he has agreed until further order to pay all of the necessary payments associated with that motor vehicle.  The second order that he disputes is a wide-ranging injunction that he be restrained from effectively disposing, encumbering or reducing in value any assets that either he has an interest in or in which he and the applicant have an interest in.

3. The material upon which the applicant relied is mostly set out in a large affidavit filed on 14 October.  Although the language in the affidavit is extremely vague, I propose to work on the basis of paragraph 9 of that affidavit, which purports to allege, and I do not have any material from the respondent in relation to this, so I am not making any specific finding about it, that there was an altercation between the two of them as a result of which there were threats made leading to the State Court making a family violence order.  That apparently arose out of an argument on several occasions about the confiscation of a car.  It seems to me that although the material is somewhat slim, I am not doing any disservice to anybody nor prejudicing anybody by making an interim order only until the return date in four weeks time.  If, as the respondent says, something happens that may affect the applicant in the meantime, no doubt there will be some discussions through appropriate channels. 

4. Section 114 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) is designed to protect the parties and property. Based on the relatively slim material, I find that there is a necessity in this case to make an order to protect the property of the parties in the interim period of time. Section 114 says the Court should only make an order when it is proper to do so, and it seems proper in these circumstances to do so, particularly having regard to the respondent’s statement that he does not want to agree to an order without some legal advice, and I think that is an appropriate course of action. I will only make the order until 28 November.

ORDERS DELIVERED

I certify that the preceding four (4) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Cronin delivered on 31 October 2011.

Associate: 

Date:  14 December 2011