Medlow and Medlow
[2016] FamCA 411
•26 May 2016
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| MEDLOW & MEDLOW | [2016] FamCA 411 |
| FAMILY LAW – CONTEMPT – Where the disqualification application is dismissed – Where the application for summary dismissal is dismissed – Where it is found that a prima facie case has not been established – Where the contempt application is dismissed |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 112AP |
| Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 Iberian Trust Ltd v Founders Trust and Investment Co Ltd [1932] 2 KB 87 Johnson v Johnson (2008) 201 CLR 488 LGM & CAM (Contempt)(No 2) (2008) FLC 93-355 May v O'Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654 Rand & Rand (2010) FLC 93-444 Redland Bricks Limited v Morris [1970] AC 652 Redwing Ltd v Redwing Forest Products Ltd (1947) 177 LT 387 |
| APPLICANT: | Ms Medlow |
| RESPONDENT: | Mr Medlow |
| FILE NUMBER: | SYC | 7742 | of | 2010 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 26 May 2016 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Sydney |
| PLACE HEARD: | Sydney |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Rees J |
| HEARING DATE: | 17 May 2016 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: | Mr Richardson SC |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | Barkus Doolan |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Mr Gould |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Watts McCray Lawyers |
Orders
IT IS ORDERED
That the Application–Contempt filed by the wife on 29 September 2015 is dismissed.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Medlow & Medlow has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
FILE NUMBER: SYC 7742 of 2010
| Ms Medlow |
Applicant
And
| Mr Medlow |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Property settlement proceedings between Ms Medlow (“the wife”) and Mr Medlow (“the husband) are awaiting determination.
In those proceedings, relevantly to the present application, orders were made on 14 January 2011 restraining the husband from dealing with his assets. Further orders were made on 11 September 2014 which had the effect of allowing the husband specified, limited dealings with real estate.
On 29 September 2015, the wife filed an application seeking orders, pursuant to s 112AP of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), that the husband be dealt with on five charges of contempt. That application was listed for hearing on 17 May 2016.
This litigation has a lengthy history. The husband is engaged in civil litigation in the Supreme Court of New South Wales and is also defending serious criminal charges.
In property settlement proceedings between the parties, which have been on foot since 2010, a number of orders have been made for the preservation of property pending determination of the matter and, inter alia, releasing funds, on an interim basis.
On 8 March 2016, the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia (the Full Court”) delivered judgment in an appeal. The orders which are said, in these proceedings, to have been breached, and the circumstances of one of the breaches, were the subject of some discussion in the judgment of the Full Court.
When the matter came before me on 17 May 2016 for hearing, Senior Counsel for the wife sought to tender the judgment of the Full Court. The tender was opposed by Counsel for the husband. In the course of discussion about the proposed tender, I indicated that I had read the judgment of the Full Court. Counsel for the husband then made an application that I disqualify myself from further hearing the matter. After hearing submissions, I declined to do so. Following are the reasons for that decision.
DISQUALIFICATION APPLICATION
The basis of the application as enunciated by Counsel for the husband was apprehended bias. It was asserted that parts of the judgment of the Full Court touch upon the factual issues to be determined in the present proceedings although I was not referred to specific findings of fact or discussion in the judgment. Counsel for the husband submitted that a reasonable bystander would be left with an apprehension that, as a result of reading the judgment of the Full Court, I would take into account, and I infer give weight to, unspecified matters in the judgment of the Full Court that may be prejudicial to the husband.
The matters to be considered in such an application were discussed by the High Court in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 where the plurality said:
The apprehension of bias principle admits of the possibility of human frailty. Its application is as diverse as human frailty. Its application requires two steps. First, it requires the identification of what it is said might lead a judge (or juror) to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits. The second step is no less important. There must be an articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits. The bare assertion that a judge (or juror) has an "interest" in litigation, or an interest in a party to it, will be of no assistance until the nature of the interest, and the asserted connection with the possibility of departure from impartial decision making, is articulated. Only then can the reasonableness of the asserted apprehension of bias be assessed.
In the present instance, there was no identification of what, in the Full Court judgment, might lead me to decide the matter other than on its legal and factual merits. Thus it was not possible to determine the reasonableness of the asserted apprehension of bias.
In Johnson v Johnson (2008) 201 CLR 488 the plurality in the High Court said:
… It has been established by a series of decisions of this Court that the test to be applied in Australia in determining whether a judge is disqualified by reason of the appearance of bias (which, in the present case, was said to take the form of prejudgment) is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide.
… two things need to be remembered: the observer is taken to be reasonable; and the person being observed is “a professional judge whose training, tradition and oath or affirmation require [the judge] to discard the irrelevant, the immaterial and the prejudicial”.
Whilst the fictional observer, by reference to whom the test is formulated, is not to be assumed to have a detailed knowledge of the law, or of the character or ability of a particular judge, the reasonableness of any suggested apprehension of bias is to be considered in the context of ordinary judicial practice. The rules and conventions governing such practice are not frozen in time. They develop to take account of the exigencies of modern litigation. At the trial level, modern judges, responding to a need for more active case management, intervene in the conduct of cases to an extent that may surprise a person who came to court expecting a judge to remain, until the moment of pronouncement of judgment, as inscrutable as the Sphinx. In Vakauta v Kelly Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ, referring both to trial and appellate proceedings, spoke of “the dialogue between Bench and Bar which is so helpful in the identification of real issues and real problems in a particular case”. Judges, at trial or appellate level, who, in exchanges with counsel, express tentative views which reflect a certain tendency of mind, are not on that account alone to be taken to indicate prejudgment. Judges are not expected to wait until the end of a case before they start thinking about the issues, or to sit mute while evidence is advanced and arguments are presented. On the contrary, they will often form tentative opinions on matters in issue, and counsel are usually assisted by hearing those opinions, and being given an opportunity to deal with them.
… No doubt some statements, or some behaviour, may produce an ineradicable apprehension of prejudgment. On other occasions, however, a preliminary impression created by what is said or done may be altered by a later statement. It depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. The hypothetical observer is no more entitled to make snap judgments than the person under observation.
Counsel for the husband did not set out the circumstances in which it was asserted that the fair minded lay observer might conclude that a “professional judge” might, by reason of having read a published judgment of the Full Court, fail to bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the determination of matter before the Court.
I am comfortably satisfied that a fair minded reasonable observer, understanding the context of these proceedings and the evidentiary onus born by the applicant, would not apprehend that I would fail to bring an impartial mind to the issue to be determined in the present proceedings.
SUMMARY DISMISSAL
Counsel for the husband then made an application for summary dismissal of the contempt application. After hearing submissions, that application was dismissed. The submissions which were advanced by Counsel for the husband were, in essence, the same submissions that were advanced in support of the submission that the wife had not established a prima facie case.
In circumstances where the matter was listed for hearing and both parties were represented by Counsel and Senior Counsel prepared for the matter to be heard, the safer course of action was to hear the contempt application up to the issue of whether a prima facie case had been established.
THE ORDERS
The terms of the relevant order made 14 January 2011 are set out below:
1.11unless otherwise agreed in writing by husband and wife further encumbering, charging, selling, dealing with or transferring any interest in any real property including rights as a mortgagee, whether such real property be owned by the husband personally, or by any of the companies or trusts.
The terms of the relevant order made on 11 September 2014 are reproduced below:
(1)Pending further order, orders are made in terms of the orders sought at paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the Application in a Case filed 21 August 2014 as follows:
4.That upon settlement of the sale of (the relevant property), and in addition to paragraph (1) 6 of the Orders dated 18 July 2014 but particularly (1) 6.4 of those Orders, the further amount of $1,250,000 be received by the Husband, such that the amount the Husband is to receive in total pursuant to those orders and these Orders is the amount of $2,900,000.
5.That the Husband be at liberty to apply the funds to be received in accordance with paragraph 4 herein, and paragraph (1) 6.4 of the Orders dated 18 July 2014, and that for the purposes of this Order, paragraph 5.5 of the Orders dated 8 April 2014 be and is hereby varied to read as follows:
“5.5Such other purposes, at the Husband’s discretion.”
6.That the Husband shall by no later than 4.00 pm on the last Friday in each calendar month, ensure that documentary evidence as to the application of the funds to be received pursuant to the Orders dated 18 July 2014, be provided to the Wife.
(2)Unless they otherwise agree in writing the parties are to forthwith do all things and sign all documents to cause the following payments to the wife from the net proceeds of sale of the property at (omitted):
(a) $150,000 by way of interim property settlement; and
(b) $168,000 by way of interim spousal maintenance for the accommodation of the wife in Australia.
(3)Pending the determination of the wife’s application for leave to appeal and if leave is granted, the appeal in the Notice of Appeal EA 106/2014 filed 12 August 2014, the operation of order 1(5) herein is stayed.
(4)Pending the determination of the wife’s application for leave to appeal and if leave is granted, the appeal in the Notice of Appeal filed 12 August 2014, the operation of order 1.6.4 of the orders made on 18 July 2014 as otherwise amended by order 1 herein, is stayed to the effect that payments from the $2,900,000 fund established thereby shall, unless the parties otherwise agree in writing, only be paid out as follows:
(a)Forthwith to:
(i)[P] Business Advisers $26,175.35
(ii)The payees identified in the table “Lawyers Accounts Outstanding” in annexure I to the affidavit of the husband filed 3 September 2014 $82,529.73
(iii)The payees identified in the table “Criminal Legal Fees” in that annexure $1,040,110.00
(iv)The payees in accordance with the table “[Ms Medlow] Maintenance” in that annexure, save for the last item in the table.
(b)As and when they fall due:
(i)under the orders of 16 March 2011 or otherwise to the payees in accordance with the table in that annexure “[Mr Medlow and Mr E and F] General Accounts” at $42,260.18 per month; and
(ii)pursuant to the orders of 16 March 2011 to the wife for her maintenance at $81,000 per quarter but in the event that the husband is in default for 48 hours of his obligation to pay $81,000 each quarter to the wife, then forthwith on the first such default from the date of these orders, the balance of the 12 months maintenance owing from the date of this order, will fall due and will be forthwith paid to the wife by the husband.
(c)For legal fees for the husband’s criminal proceedings on invoice, on the due date, provided that the husband shall provide the wife with a copy of the applicable invoice as soon as practicable and in any event at least 14 days before the due date.
(5)The stays granted by these orders are conditional on the wife prosecuting her application for leave to appeal and if relevant her appeal, competently and with expedition.
(6)The parties are at liberty to otherwise disburse the proceeds of sale of the [Suburb C] property as agreed between them in writing.
(7)Leave is granted to the parties to apply on giving seven days notice to the Court and each other in relation to these orders.
THE LAW IN RELATION TO S112AP
The applications before the Court rely on the provisions of s 112AP of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the provisions being set out below:
FAMILY LAW ACT 1975 - SECTION 112AP
Contempt
(1) Subject to subsection (1A), this section applies to a contempt of a court that:
(a) does not constitute a contravention of an order under this Act; or
(b) constitutes a contravention of an order under this Act and involves a flagrant challenge to the authority of the court.
(1A) This section does not apply to a contempt that constitutes a contravention of a maintenance order if the order has been complied with before the matter of the contravention comes before the court.
(2) In spite of any other law, a court having jurisdiction under this Act may punish a person for contempt of that court.
(3) The applicable Rules of Court may provide for practice and procedure as to charging with contempt and the hearing of the charge.
(4) Where a natural person is in contempt, the court may punish the contempt by committal to prison or fine or both.
(5) Where a corporation is in contempt, the court may punish the contempt by sequestration or fine or both.
(6) The court may make an order for:
(a) punishment on terms;
(b) suspension of punishment; or
(c) the giving of security for good behaviour.
(7) Where a person is committed to prison for a term for contempt, the court may order the person's discharge before the expiry of that term.
(8) To avoid doubt, the serving by a person of a period of imprisonment as a result of a contempt of a court arising out of a failure by the person to make a payment in respect of the maintenance of another person does not affect the first-mentioned person's liability to make the payment.
(9) In this section:
"order under this Act " means an order under this Act affecting children or an order under this Act within the meaning of Part XIIIA.
The procedure is governed by Rule 21.08:
RULE 21.08 PROCEDURE AT HEARING
21.08 At the hearing of an application mentioned in item 1A, 2, 3, 4 or 5 in Table 21.1, the court must:
(a) inform the respondent of the allegation;
(b) ask the respondent whether the respondent wishes to admit or deny the allegation;
(c) hear any evidence supporting the allegation;
(d) ask the respondent to state the response to the allegation;
(e) hear any evidence for the respondent; and
(f) determine the case.
Practically, because of the seriousness of the application and the possibility of the imposition of penalties for breach, which include fine and imprisonment, no affidavit material is filed by the respondent unless and until the applicant has established that there is a prima facie case to answer.
In May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654 the High Court, dealing with the concept of a prima facie case, said:
The question which is actually raised is whether, when the prosecution has made out what is called a "prima facie case" or a "case to answer", the burden of proof shifts to the shoulders of the accused person or defendant, with the consequence that, if he fails to displace that prima facie case by denial or explanation, he ought to be convicted.
…
When, at the close of the case for the prosecution, a submission is made that there is "no case to answer", the question to be decided is not whether on the evidence as it stands the defendant ought to be convicted, but whether on the evidence as it stands he could lawfully be convicted. This is really a question of law. Unless there is some special statutory provision on the subject, a ruling that there is a "case to answer" has no effect whatever on the onus of proof, which rests on the prosecution from beginning to end.
Whilst their Honours in the High Court were dealing with criminal charges, the same principles must apply in a contempt application.
In Iberian Trust Ltd v Founders Trust and Investment Co Ltd [1932] 2 KB 87 the Court held:
If the court is to punish anyone for not carrying out its order the order must in unambiguous terms direct what is to be done.
The same principle must apply to an order restraining a person from doing an act.
In Redland Bricks Limited v Morris [1970] AC 652 it was held that:
If, in the exercise of its discretion the court decides that it is a proper case to grant a mandatory injunction, then the court must be careful to see that the defendant knows exactly in fact what he has to do and this means not as a matter of law but as a matter of fact, so that in carrying out an order he can give his contractors the proper instructions.
In Redwing Ltd v Redwing Forest Products Ltd (1947) 177 LT 387 Jenkins J said at 390:
I cannot say I think that the undertakings contained in the order were clearly drawn and I cannot say I regard the questions of construction involved in them as entirely easy questions, but in my judgment, a Defendant cannot be committed for contempt on the ground that upon one of two possible constructions of an undertaking being given he has broken his undertaking. For the purpose of relief of this character I think the undertaking must be clear and the breach must be clear beyond all question.
In order to establish a prima facie case, the applicant must present evidence that could establish, the following:
· That the respondent has been personally served with the application.
· That the respondent knew that the order had been made and knew its terms.
· That the terms of the order are clear and unambiguous.
· That the order was operative at the time of the alleged breach.
· That the respondent breached the order.
· That the breach was a flagrant challenge to the authority of the Court.
The onus of proving each element of the offence, including that the contravention was a “flagrant challenge to the authority of the court” lies on the applicant. The standard of proof is the criminal standard.
THE CHARGES
The wife proceeded on her application filed on 29 September 2015 and relied upon an affidavit sworn by her on 28 September 2015 together with documents annexed and exhibited to that affidavit. Certain portions of that affidavit were objected to and struck out.
The husband was charged in accordance with the wife’s application as follows:
1.That on 8 October 2014 he paid the sum of $59,932.40 to American Express in deliberate breach of the injunction made on 11 September 2014.
2.That on 11 December 2014 he paid the sum of $65,669.50 to American Express in deliberate breach of the injunction made on 11 September 2014.
3.That on 24 November 2014 he paid the sum of $53,017.55 to Q & Company in deliberate breach of the injunction made on 11 September 2014.
4.That on 16 April 2014 he paid the sum of $16,678.24 to Q & Company in deliberate breach of the injunction made on 11 September 2014.
5.That on 23 February 2011 he encumbered and or charged and or dealt with an interest in real property in deliberate breach of the injunction made on 14 January 2011.
The husband denied each allegation.
PRIMA FACIE CASE
As a preliminary matter, the Affidavit of Service of the application was tendered. The application was personally served.
Counsel were invited to make submissions on the issue of whether a prima facie case had been established.
The five charges advanced by the wife rely on two different orders. The first four charges arise out of orders made on 11 September 2014. The fifth charge arises out of orders made on 14 January 2011. It is convenient to deal with the first four charges together and with the fifth charge separately.
CHARGES ONE TO FOUR
Knowledge of the order
A submission was made by Counsel for the husband to the effect that the wife had not provided evidence that the husband was aware of the making of the relevant orders.
The Orders were made after judgment was reserved. It is common ground that the parties were not in Court when judgment was delivered but that the judgment was sent by email from the judge’s associate to the solicitors for the husband and the wife.
The husband was at all relevant times represented by solicitors and counsel.
The wife in her affidavit referred to correspondence from the husband’s solicitors directed to the wife’s solicitors referring to the relevant order.
Counsel for the husband submitted that the knowledge that the solicitors had of the order could not be imputed to the husband.
In LGM & CAM (Contempt) (No 2) (2008) FLC 93-355 the Full Court held that the Court could infer, from surrounding circumstances, that a party had knowledge of an order.
In the present case, annexed to the affidavit of the wife was a letter from the husband’s solicitor dated 16 September 2014, after the orders had been made, which states, inter alia:
So that there is no misapprehension about our client’s proposal, we confirm our client proposes:
1.That the sum of $2.9 million payable to our client pursuant to Order 1 of the Orders made on 11 September 2014 be deposited into our client’s nominated bank account so that our client may attend to payment of the amount set out in Order 4 of those Orders…
The Court is entitled to infer that, if the solicitors for the husband are instructed by the husband to make a proposal arising out of the making of orders, then the husband is aware that the orders have been made.
Also annexed to the wife’s affidavit was a letter from the wife’s solicitors to another firm of solicitors which stated, inter alia:
We refer to the above matter and confirm that Orders were made in the Family Court of Australia on 11 September 2014 in relation to, inter alia, the proceeds of sale of the property situated at [address]. We attach herewith a sealed copy of those Orders…
I am satisfied that the husband was aware that the orders had been made.
Clear and unambiguous
Counsel for the husband then submitted that the form of the orders was such that no finding of contempt could be made against the husband. Paraphrasing, it was submitted that the form is so convoluted, importing into the order the terms of two orders made previously and varying the terms of one of those orders, that the order could readily be misunderstood.
In order to deal with that submission, a careful examination of the relevant order is required. The full text of the order is reproduced at paragraph 17 of these reasons.
The first reading of the order complained of gives some substance to the complaint. The order is complicated to construe.
Order (1) 5. appears on its face to allow the husband to deal with the funds referred to in Order (1) 4. at his discretion. Order 5.5 made 8 April 2014, as it was first made, restrained the husband from applying funds other than “Such other amounts as are agreed to in writing between the Husband and the Wife”. The amendment made on 11 September 2014, to order 5.5 of the orders made on 8 April 2014, varied that restriction and allowed the husband to apply funds for “Such other purposes, at the Husband’s discretion”.
Order (1) 6. requires the husband to provide monthly reports.
Thus Order (1) appears to allow the husband to apply the funds received in accordance with Order (1) 4. at his discretion, provided he supplies monthly reports to the wife as to the application of the funds.
However, the construction of the Order does not stop there. It is necessary to continue on to Order (3) to see that the operation of Order 1(5) herein is stayed. But there is no Order 1(5). There is an Order (1) 5. Is that the Order which is stayed?
Order (4) then stays the operation of Order 1.6.4 made 18 July 2014. There is no Order 1.6.4 made 18 July 2014 although there is an Order (1) 6.4. Order (4) then restricts the payments which the husband is permitted to make during the currency of the stay to the specific items listed at (4)(a), (b) and (c).
Further ambiguity is created by Order (5) which specifies that the stays referred to in Orders (3) and (4) are conditional upon the wife prosecuting her applications for leave to appeal and her appeal “competently” and “with expedition”. How is the husband to determine whether the wife’s appeal is being competently prosecuted?
I am not satisfied that the order made 11 September 2014 is so clear and unambiguous that its terms are readily understood.
The order was operative at the time of the alleged breach
More fundamentally, for the purpose of the establishment of a prima facie case, no evidence was led by the wife to the effect that her appeal was being competently prosecuted at the relevant time, that being the time of the asserted breach. If the appeal was not being prosecuted competently, then the stay ceased and the husband was at liberty to deal with the funds at his discretion pursuant to the amendment to Order 5.5 of 8 April 2014 made at Order (1) 5. of the subject Orders.
There was no evidence which could have demonstrated that the stay was operative at the relevant times.
I am not satisfied that the Orders made 11 September 2014 are sufficiently clear and certain that it can be established beyond reasonable doubt that they have been breached.
It would have been necessary for the wife to provide evidence that she was, at the time of the alleged breaches, competently prosecuting her appeal so as to demonstrate that the stay continued to operate. Absent that evidence, the wife was not in a position to argue that the stay was in operation and therefore that there was a breach.
No prima facie case has been established in relation to this charge.
FIFTH CHARGE
On 14 January 2011, orders were made restraining the husband to the following effect:
1.11unless otherwise agreed in writing by husband and wife further encumbering, charging, selling, dealing with or transferring any interest in any real property including rights as a mortgagee, whether such real property be owned by the husband personally, or by any of the companies or trusts.
On 23 February 2011, in the civil proceedings in the Supreme Court, the husband consented to an order in the following terms:
(a)that until further Order, [the husband] must not remove from Australia or in any way dispose of, deal with, or diminish the value of any of his assets in Australia (“[the husband’s] Australian Assets”) up to the unencumbered value of AUD$15,500,000 (“the Relevant Amount”), provided that if the unencumbered value of all [the husband’s] Australian Assets exceeds the Relevant Amount, [the husband] may remove any of those assets from Australia or dispose of, or deal with them, diminish their value, so long as the total unencumbered value of [the husband’s] Australian Assets still exceeds the Relevant Amount;
(b)that within 7 days from the date of this Order, [the husband] executes a Guarantee in the form attached to these Short Minutes of Order and provide the original of such Guarantee to the solicitors for [named person];
(c)for the purposes of this Order:
(i)[The husband’s] Australian Assets include all assets in which [the husband] has a vested ownership interest whether or not in the name of [the husband] and whether they are solely or co-owned (but excludes any asset of a trust where [the husband] is the discretionary object of that trust);
(ii)The value [the husband] has in an asset, is the unencumbered value of the interest [the husband] has individually in the asset; and
(iii)Unencumbered value means value free of mortgages, charges, liens or other encumbrances.
The wife asserts that the husband “dealt with” an interest in property by entering into those orders. Senior Counsel for the wife specifically withdrew the allegation that the husband “encumbered and or charged” real property.
The terms of the order to which the husband consented, specifically, that he not remove from Australia, dispose of, deal with or diminish the value of assets to the value of $15.5 million, do not constitute the giving of any security over those assets. Nor is any potential judgment creditor given any charge or priority over the wife in respect of any claim she may make in respect of those assets.
Whilst the husband’s consenting to the Supreme Court orders constitutes a “dealing” with property, giving the word its ordinary meaning, it is not a dealing which is inconsistent with the terms or intent of the orders made in the Family Court of Australia on 14 January 2011.
In those circumstances, the husband’s dealing with property could not be regarded as a flagrant challenge to the authority of the Court.
No prima facie case is established in relation to this charge.
There being no prima facie case for the husband to answer, the application is dismissed.
I certify that the preceding sixty-seven (67) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Rees delivered on 26 May 2016.
Associate:
Date: 26 May 2016
Key Legal Topics
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Family Law
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Civil Procedure
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