Medlon and Medlon (No 3)
[2013] FamCAFC 115
•31 July 2013
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| MEDLON & MEDLON (NO. 3) | [2013] FamCAFC 115 |
| FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – APPLICATION IN AN APPEAL – DISQUALIFICATION – where the wife seeks that the appeal judge disqualify himself – where the husband opposes the application – where the test of apprehended bias is not satisfied – application dismissed. FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – ORAL APPLICATION FOR COSTS – where the husband seeks his costs of and incidental to the wife’s application – where the wife seeks leave to file an updated Financial Statement – application adjourned. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) |
| Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 IOOF Australia Trustees Ltd v Seas Sapfor Forests Pty Ltd [1999] SASC 249 Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls (2011) 282 ALR 685 Re J.R.L.; Ex parte C.J.L. (1986) 161 CLR 342 |
| APPLICANT: | Ms Medlon |
| RESPONDENT: | Mr Medlon |
| FILE NUMBER: | ADC | 491 | of | 2010 |
| APPEAL NUMBER: | SOA | 88 | of | 2012 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 31 July 2013 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Adelaide |
| PLACE HEARD: | Adelaide |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Strickland J |
| HEARING DATE: | 31 July 2013 |
| LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: | Federal Magistrates Court |
| LOWER COURT JUDGMENT DATE: | 30 October 2012 |
| LOWER COURT MNC: | [2012] FMCAfam 1479 |
REPRESENTATION
| THE APPLICANT: | In person |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Ms Nelson QC |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Moore Law |
Orders
Paragraph 1 of the application filed by the wife on 5 July 2013 be dismissed.
Paragraphs 2 to 8 inclusive of the application filed by the wife on 5 July 2013 be adjourned to 10:30am on Monday 12 August 2013.
The oral application for costs made on behalf of the husband be adjourned for further consideration to 10:30am on Monday 12 August 2013.
On or before the close of business on Friday 9 August 2013 the wife file and serve a financial statement.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Medlon & Medlon has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| IN THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT ADELAIDE |
Appeal Number: SOA 88 of 2012
File Number: ADC 491 of 2010
| Ms Medlon |
Applicant
And
| Mr Medlon |
Respondent
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The application before the court today is the application in an appeal filed by Ms Medlon (“the wife”) on 5 July 2013. It is supported by an affidavit filed on the same date.
The first order sought in that application is in effect that I be disqualified from hearing the proceedings due to an appearance of bias. When this matter was last before the court, namely, on 19 July 2013, it was agreed that that aspect of the application had to be dealt with first before anything else was heard. The opportunity was then taken to utilise the listing that had previously been arranged for today, to hear that part of the application.
I ascertained from the wife at the commencement of the hearing today what documents she relied upon in relation to that application. As I have said there is an affidavit filed on 5 July 2013, and the wife identified paragraphs 2, 3 and 22 of that affidavit as being relevant to the application before the court today. She also said she relied on the transcripts of the hearings conducted by me on
8 May 2013 and 28 June 2013, and on my ex tempore reasons for judgment delivered on those dates.
On the husband’s side there is an affidavit filed by Mr Grant, solicitor, and in paragraphs 3 and 4 of that particular affidavit the application that I be disqualified was addressed. In paragraph 3 Mr Grant indicates that he has been instructed by his client to oppose the order sought and says that there is “no basis for it”. In paragraph 4 the matters deposed to in paragraph 2 of
the wife’s affidavit are responded to and I will return to that later in these reasons.
There have been many submissions made by the wife today. I do not propose to address all of them because I do not consider many of them to be relevant to the application that is before me, but at this stage I need to address certainly one submission in respect of which I made a ruling earlier today.
The wife has submitted that there is no power in this court to hear this application, and indeed ever since March 2013, it has not been open to this court to hear and determine any applications that have been filed in these proceedings. It seems her reason for putting that submission is that she says that until and unless her appeal is reinstated, there is no power in this court to hear any application in these proceedings. As I indicated to the wife quite early in her submissions, and I repeat now, that is simply misconceived.
This matter first came before me as a result of the wife filing an application in an appeal on 25 March 2013 seeking that her appeal, which at that time had been deemed abandoned, be reinstated. That application was listed by me for hearing on 8 May 2013. However, on that date that application was adjourned at the request of the wife, because she made what I treated as an oral application to restrain Ms Nelson QC from continuing to appear for the husband. That latter issue, subject to the wife filing an appropriate application supported by an affidavit, was listed for hearing on 31 July 2013. Subsequently, the wife filed the application that is before me today seeking that I be disqualified from hearing these proceedings, as well as seeking that
Ms Nelson be restrained. Thus, the position is that in the context of an application seeking reinstatement of her appeal the wife has sought that I be disqualified and that Ms Nelson be restrained from appearing for the husband.
As is obvious, and as even the wife agreed at a previous hearing, it is absolutely necessary to determine those applications before the application in an appeal seeking reinstatement can be heard, because I am the judge who is to hear that application for reinstatement and Ms Nelson is the senior counsel briefed to appear for the husband on that application. If I am disqualified, then that application for reinstatement will need to be referred to another judge of the Appeal Division. However, until and unless I am disqualified, I am seized of that application, it is a current application, and it is misconceived to suggest as the wife does, that because that application has not been determined there is no power to hear, for example, the application before me today.
I observe that the wife failed to accept that ruling and over my objections continued to make the same submission throughout the hearing.
The wife has also suggested today, and indeed I recall on the last occasion that the matter was before the court as well, that what should be happening in this case is the application seeking reinstatement should be heard. She professes to be confused as to why that has not taken place and suggests that it is part of some grand scheme to avoid that application being heard. What I pointed out to the wife on the last occasion, and I do again now, is that the only reason that application has not been heard and determined is the wife’s own application that I be disqualified, and that Ms Nelson be restrained from acting in the matter on the ground of conflict of interest. It is quite simple, and there is no mystery about that. It is perfectly obvious that both of those applications have to be heard and determined before the application in an appeal can proceed whereby the wife seeks reinstatement of her appeal.
The wife today has adopted the approach of taking the court to the transcripts of the hearings on 8 May 2013 and 28 June 2013. She has spent a significant amount of time in reading out various parts, indeed the majority of those transcripts, and at various points making comments in relation to what appears in the transcript. As the transcript of the hearing today will record, at various stages, I interrupted the wife in an attempt to ascertain the point of referring to all the transcript in the way that she was, given that the hearing was about an application for disqualification. The wife assured me that the necessity for that would become apparent as the hearing progressed. I indicated to her at the various points that I raised that issue, that up to then there had been nothing demonstrated to me which provided a basis for me to disqualify myself, and that remained the position at the conclusion of her submissions. I did so intending to prompt the wife to get to the point. However, the wife insisted on continuing to read out the transcripts unnecessarily, and make various comments along the way, taking a significant amount of time.
In relation to the comments that the wife made, they were invariably comments where the wife either sought to explain her own statements as recorded in the transcript, or to dispute the factual material recorded in the transcript. When she did this I interrupted the wife and put to her that comments like that were irrelevant to the application before me. The wife though took no notice of what I said in that regard and continued to make such comments. They were not only irrelevant but generally inappropriate and unhelpful, and they contributed to the hearing taking far longer than it should have, as did her insistence in reading out the majority of the transcripts.
I also observe, and the transcript of the hearing today will confirm this, that it became apparent that when the wife was allegedly reading from the transcripts of the previous hearings she did not always accurately repeat what was in those transcripts. I made a point of raising this during the hearing because I was concerned that someone reading the transcript of the hearing today might think that what the wife was putting, and allegedly reading, was in fact an accurate representation of what was in those transcripts, when it was not. There are also many examples of where the wife would read something out from a transcript but not read out the entire part, or not read out the next part, which in a number of instances resulted in an inaccurate picture being presented.
What I perceive about the approach that the wife has adopted in pursuing this application, is that many of the complaints which she makes arising from the transcripts, are complaints against findings and ultimately the orders made by the court at the conclusion of those hearings. It is obvious to me that with many of those complaints the wife should have, if she was so minded, looked to appeal against the orders made. One of the particular orders that she is obviously unhappy about is the order that I made that she pay costs. She spent a significant period of time during the hearing referring to the transcripts and making comments as to what she says are the true facts, as opposed to what was revealed at the hearing. However that does not go to any issue of disqualification. The appropriate course for the wife in relation to those matters was to appeal, rather than bringing the application that she has. Just because she is unhappy with the findings and the orders made does not demonstrate that there is a reasonable apprehension of bias on my part.
I also note unfortunately that throughout the hearing at various times
the wife was disrespectful to senior counsel appearing for the husband, and on those occasions I was obliged to indicate to her that such comments were inappropriate and that she should not do that. Yet, again, the wife took no notice of those rulings, and continued to make such comments.
It seems that one reason why the wife thought it necessary to refer extensively to the transcripts of the hearings is that she alleges that I consistently interrupted her during those hearings, and that demonstrated bias and a lack of impartiality towards her. She also suggested that I was sarcastic in my remarks to her, and my tone, my manner and my behaviour revealed that I was not bringing an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the dispute. Finally, she alleged that I exhibited favouritism to the husband’s senior counsel which raised an appearance of bias on my part towards her.
Before I address each of those matters I want to refer to the legal principles that apply where disqualification is sought. The law concerning disqualification on account of apprehended bias is well settled. In the decision of Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 the High Court said this:
6Where, in the absence of any suggestion of actual bias, a question arises as to the independence or impartiality of a judge (or other judicial officer or juror), as here, the governing principle is that, subject to qualifications relating to waiver (which is not presently relevant) or necessity (which may be relevant to the second appeal), a judge is disqualified if a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide. That principle gives effect to the requirement that justice should both be done and be seen to be done, a requirement which reflects the fundamental importance of the principle that the tribunal be independent and impartial. It is convenient to refer to it as the apprehension of bias principle.
7The apprehension of bias principle may be thought to find its justification in the importance of the basic principle, that the tribunal be independent and impartial. So important is the principle that even the appearance of departure from it is prohibited lest the integrity of the judicial system be undermined. There are, however, some other aspects of the apprehension of bias principle which should be recognised. Deciding whether a judicial officer (or juror) might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of a question that has not been determined requires no prediction about how the judge or juror will in fact approach the matter. The question is one of possibility (real and not remote), not probability. Similarly, if the matter has already been decided, the test is one which requires no conclusion about what factors actually influenced the outcome. No attempt need be made to inquire into the actual thought processes of the judge or juror.
8The apprehension of bias principle admits of the possibility of human frailty. Its application is as diverse as human frailty. Its application requires two steps. First, it requires the identification of what it is said might lead a judge (or juror) to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits. The second step is no less important. There must be an articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits. The bare assertion that a judge (or juror) has an “interest” in litigation, or an interest in a party to it, will be of no assistance until the nature of the interest, and the asserted connection with the possibility of departure from impartial decision making, is articulated. Only then can the reasonableness of the asserted apprehension of bias be assessed.
…
19Judges have a duty to exercise their judicial functions when their jurisdiction is regularly invoked and they are assigned to cases in accordance with the practice which prevails in the court to which they belong. They do not select the cases they will hear, and they are not at liberty to decline to hear cases without good cause. Judges do not choose their cases; and litigants do not choose their judges. If one party to a case objects to a particular judge sitting, or continuing to sit, then that objection should not prevail unless it is based upon a substantial ground for contending that the judge is disqualified from hearing and deciding the case.
…
21It is not possible to state in a categorical form the circumstances in which a judge, although personally convinced that he or she is not disqualified, may properly decline to sit. Circumstances vary, and may include such factors as the stage at which an objection is raised, the practical possibility of arranging for another judge to hear the case, and the public or constitutional role of the court before which the proceedings are being conducted. These problems usually arise in a context in which a judge has no particular personal desire to hear a case. If a judge were anxious to sit in a particular case, and took pains to arrange that he or she would do so, questions of actual bias may arise.
22The particular principle or principles which determine the grounds upon which a judge will be disqualified from hearing a case follow from a consideration of the fundamental principle that court cases, civil or criminal, must be decided by an independent and impartial tribunal.
23Bias, whether actual or apprehended, connotes the absence of impartiality. It may not be an adequate term to cover all cases of the absence of independence.
24In Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41 at 74, a case concerning a juror, Deane J identified four distinct, though overlapping, categories of case involving disqualification by reason of the appearance of bias: interest; conduct; association; and extraneous information. It is not necessary to decide upon the comprehensiveness of such categorisation, and its utility may depend upon the context in which it is employed. However, it provides a convenient frame of reference.
[Footnotes omitted]
I highlight paragraph 8 of those reasons, and I add that the requirements of a two step process in the application of the apprehension of bias principle has been confirmed in subsequent High Court decisions including one I mentioned earlier today in another context of Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls (2011) 282 ALR 685 at [63] and [67]. I mention this because it seems to me that the wife has not satisfied that test. Not only has she failed to identify conduct that might lead me, the judge, to be disqualified, but she has overlooked the second step entirely which is, and I repeat, “[t]here must be an articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits.”
The effect of the decision of Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, and the principles emanating from it are confirmatory of what was determined in an earlier decision of the High Court in Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488. The principle that sprang from Johnson v Johnson, and which was confirmed in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, is that the test to be applied in Australia in determining whether a judge is disqualified by reason of the appearance of bias, is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide. I note also that in the case of Johnson v Johnson, the High Court said this, at 493, and I consider this to be highly significant in this case:
12… The hypothetical reasonable observer of the judge’s conduct is postulated in order to emphasise that the test is objective, is founded in the need for public confidence in the judiciary, and is not based purely upon the assessment by some judges of the capacity or performance of their colleagues. At the same time, two things need to be remembered: the observer is taken to be reasonable; and the person being observed is “a professional judge whose training, tradition and oath or affirmation require [the judge] to discard the irrelevant, the immaterial and the prejudicial”.
[My emphasis]
I also refer to the High Court decision in Re J.R.L.; Ex parte C.J.L. (1986) 161 CLR 342, where Mason J said, at 352:
It needs to be said loudly and clearly that the ground of disqualification is a reasonable apprehension that the judicial officer will not decide the case impartially or without prejudice, rather than that he will decide the case adversely to one party. … [D]isqualification is only made out by showing that there is a reasonable apprehension of bias by reason of prejudgment and this must be “firmly established”.
[My emphasis]
I agree entirely with the submission of Ms Nelson that the mistake that
the wife has made in this case is that she has failed to appreciate the fact that the test is objective, and instead she has sought to apply a subjective test. For example, what I heard from the wife was that she did not consider that I acted appropriately, she did not consider that I had been impartial, and she considered that I had acted in a prejudicial way towards her. Unfortunately, that misconception is one which was apparent throughout the entirety of
the wife’s submissions.
I also observe that the wife attempted in her submissions to suggest that I was actually biased as opposed to there just being an apprehension of bias. However, this submission was inappropriate given that in her application and her supporting affidavit she only alleged the latter and there was no suggestion of the former. Again though, although I directed the wife to not raise this in her submissions, she ignored that direction.
I will now move to the specific issues that the wife raises and which she suggests should lead me to disqualify myself.
First and foremost there is the claim that throughout the hearings on 8 May 2013 and 28 June 2013, I consistently interrupted her.
I do not shy away from the fact that I did in fact interrupt her. It is quite apparent that I did so from the transcripts. But two points about that. One is that on both of those occasions the hearing was being conducted by telephone link with the wife. It is difficult to conduct hearings by way of telephone link because of course they are not face-to-face, and it is necessary at times to interrupt as a result of the hearing being conducted via that medium. That is a practical circumstance, but the second point I make is that it was necessary throughout those hearings to interrupt the wife in order to bring her back to the point, to the case at hand. Each and every one of those interruptions was absolutely necessary to achieve the purpose of an expeditious hearing and not allow the point of the hearing to be lost. I make no apology for having to do that, and decisions such as Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175 support that approach.
Indeed, I made the comment during the hearing today that I deliberately sat back for significant periods of time and listened to the wife’s submissions without interrupting, and it confirmed in my mind the need to interrupt her because the submissions that she was making were, for the most part, irrelevant, unnecessary, and inappropriate, and that explains in large part why the hearing went for far longer than it needed to.
Thus, the fact that I have interrupted the wife does not in any way identify a circumstance that would give rise to an appearance of bias. It could not thereby be perceived by a reasonable observer that I might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the dispute. Accordingly, there is a failure by the wife to satisfy the first step set out in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, and as I have highlighted, there was no attempt by her to satisfy the second step; i.e., at no point does the wife articulate any logical connection between the “conduct” and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits.
I note that the wife suggests that I did not interrupt Ms Nelson when she was addressing me, and that demonstrates that my interruption of her, the wife, would be seen by a reasonable observer as an indication that I might be biased against her. However, there is a clear difference; unfortunately, although the wife is a legal practitioner, as a litigant, she has not been able to confine herself to the relevant, to the appropriate, and to the necessary in the applications that I have been hearing. It has been absolutely necessary to interrupt her to bring her back to the point. As an experienced senior counsel that has been unnecessary insofar as Ms Nelson has been concerned.
With regard to her claim of me being sarcastic towards her, the wife identified in paragraph 2 of her affidavit an exchange between us on 8 May 2013 where she suggests that I “expressed disdain and sarcasm to [her] responses”, and I was “flippant”. The exchange is as follows, and was in the context of attempting to ascertain her financial circumstances:
MS [MEDLON]: My financial circumstances are that I receive just over $1000 per week net.
MS NELSON: Sorry, I didn’t get that.
MS [MEDLON]: That I have remaining from that ---
HIS HONOUR: Miss Nelson didn’t hear what you said. I’m repeating it for her. You said $1000 net per week.
MS [MEDLON]: It’s over 1000 per week net.
HIS HONOUR: Over 1000. So, what – I mean ..... but 10,000?
MS [MEDLON]: Sorry? Just over ---
HIS HONOUR: Ms Medlon, how does it help me for you to say, “over a thousand”.
MS [MEDLON]: Just over 1000 per week net after tax.
HIS HONOUR: But what’s the figure? Does “over” mean it’s 1001 or $10,000? Do you see my point?
MS [MEDLON]: It wouldn’t be 10,000 if I’m on 80,000 gross a year.
HIS HONOUR: Look, I know. I said that as a facetious response by me, but it’s relevant.
MS [MEDLON]: It’s about 1000 – I think it’s about 1100.
HIS HONOUR: Okay. That’s better. Thank you. That helps me.
In expressing myself in that way I was clearly attempting to ascertain from
the wife a more precise figure as to her weekly income using what was obviously an upper range which was more than what it would be, but to make the point. Thus, again, this exchange cannot give rise to an apprehension of bias and the wife has not articulated why that would be the case, and/or revealed the connection required for the application of the second step set out in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy.
One other comment is warranted about paragraph 2 of the wife’s affidavit. There the wife deposed that I said to her “Oh, what would you know” when discussing the assets received by the husband. However, the wife was unable to take the court to where those words appeared in the transcript, and neither I nor Ms Nelson have been able to find them. It is concerning that the wife, a legal practitioner, has been prepared to swear in an affidavit that I used these words when the transcript does not support that. It adds to my concern about her preparedness to inaccurately repeat parts of the transcripts when reading those transcripts out during the hearing.
I also pause to note that although the wife relied on paragraph 22 of her affidavit she failed to refer to the contents of that paragraph in her submissions, and similarly, she failed to take the court to any part of my ex tempore reasons for judgment.
As to the wife’s claims that my tone, my manner and my behaviour indicate that I should disqualify myself, she has not done anything but speak in generalities in support of those claims. The wife has not taken me to any specific part of the transcripts and identified any behaviour or manner which would give rise to an apprehension of bias. Nor has she sought to establish the connection required to satisfy the second step articulated in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy. As to my tone, obviously nothing can emerge from the transcript, but there has been no attempt by the wife to specify precisely what is complained of, and again the requisite connection has not been established. Thus, there is no basis here for me to be disqualified.
The wife also submits that I have demonstrated favouritism to Ms Nelson, and that is evidenced by the fact that I have not interrupted Ms Nelson. However, how I have dealt with Ms Nelson as compared with the wife is a direct result of the wife not being able to confine herself to the relevant, the appropriate, and the necessary. There is no basis here for me to be disqualified.
Ms Nelson has referred me to a decision of IOOF Australia Trustees Ltd v Seas Sapfor Forests Pty Ltd [1999] SASC 249. I consider that to be a very helpful decision because it resonates with this case.
In a careful judgment, the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of South Australia, set out in some detail what a fair minded observer is to be taken to appreciate in the context of a disqualification application (paragraphs 188 – 194). For example, the observer:
a)Would not expect the judge to permit counsel to re-argue a point that had been earlier decided;
b)Would expect the judge to be concerned to do all that he reasonably could to conduct the proceedings efficiently and fairly, including by making rulings that the judge considers are conducive to the efficient and fair disposition of the case;
c)Would expect that the judge might become angry or irritated over the manner in which some submissions are put;
d)Would expect that rulings of the judge would be accepted.
Here, the wife failed to accept the discipline of the court, she failed to accept my rulings, she failed to comply with my directions, and she refused to acknowledge my obligation to control the proceedings. That inevitably led to my need to interrupt her and to stop her from putting submissions that were inappropriate, unnecessary and irrelevant.
I agree entirely with Ms Nelson’s submission that it would be an abdication of my judicial function to adopt an approach that I should disqualify myself when a party simply requests that I do so, because they perceive that I have been biased. What has occurred in this case is that the wife, as happens in litigation, is obviously unhappy with the decisions that I have made. But that is not a basis for me to disqualify myself.
In summary, the wife has failed to demonstrate any basis upon which I should disqualify myself. She has failed to satisfy the tests laid down by the High Court in Johnson v Johnson and Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy and Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls.
For those reasons I propose to dismiss paragraph 1 of the application filed by the wife on 5 July 2013.
I now have before me an application for costs by Ms Nelson on behalf of the husband. Unfortunately I have not been able to complete the hearing of that application. The wife quite properly has indicated that she wants to file a Financial Statement setting out her financial circumstances so that I can take that into account in determining whether I make a costs order, and if I do, what the amount should be. Therefore that application needs to be adjourned and I propose to adjourn it to 10:30am on Monday 12 August 2013. I propose to also order the wife to file and serve a Financial Statement by the close of business, on Friday 9 August 2013, and insofar as the Adelaide Registry is concerned that would be 4:30pm Adelaide time.
That has led me to look at where this matter should then go, and of course the balance of the application of the wife of 5 July 2013 now needs to be dealt with. The initial matter that the wife wants to pursue in that application is her application for leave to issue subpoenas. I have attempted to deal with that in the time we had available today, but that has not proved to be successful. There are issues that have been raised by both sides in relation to that application and I will need to devote more time than I now have to that. I propose to adjourn the balance of the application of 5 July 2013 to 10:30am on Monday 12 August 2013, and at that time, in addition to finalising the question of costs, to which I have just referred, I propose to address and hopefully finalise the application the wife makes for me to issue subpoenas.
I will not be dealing with anything else from that application but I will be looking on that date to list for hearing the balance of the application, including in particular, the applications that the wife makes for Ms Nelson and Ms Collie to be restrained from acting for the husband. I also indicate that in terms of the time that I am allocating to that hearing, on the basis of it commencing at 10:30am, I will rise no later than 12:45pm, and so that will be the maximum time I can allocate to those matters I will be dealing with on 12 August 2013.
I certify that the preceding forty-two (42) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Strickland delivered on 31 July 2013.
Associate:
Date: 7 August 2013
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