Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry

Adelaide No AlS of 1993

B e t w e e n -

BRIAN HERBERT MEDLIN

Applicant

and

STATE GOVERNMENT INSURANCE

COMMISSION

Respondent

Application for special leave
to appeal

DAWSON J TOOHEY J McHUGH J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Medlin 1 26/8/93

FROM ADELAIDE BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA

ON THURSDAY, 26 AUGUST 1993, AT 10.48 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR T.A. GRAY, QC:  May it please the Court, I appear with my

learned friend, MR R.A. CAMERON, for the applicant.

(instructed by Paul Kirk, Roberts & Co)

MR H.G. ROWELL:  May it please the Court, I appear for the

respondent. (instructed by Stratford & Co)

DAWSON J: Yes, Mr Gray.

MR GRAY:  If the Court pleases, this matter raises two

special leave points, in our respectful submission.

Could I identify them shortly. The first is that

the court, in dealing with an assessment of damages

and addressing the question of damages causation,

applied a pre-eminent cause test. We say in doing

so, they erred. That is not the correct test in

the light of the decision of this Court in March v

Stramare.

The second special leave point relates to the

non-allowance for any damages for loss of any

capacity. The special leave point arises in this

way: that this Court's decision in GrahaITI v Baker

was relied on by the trial judge in making his

assessment and apparently by the Full Court.

Graha1T1 v Baker's authority was questioned in the

case of Griffiths v Kerkemeyer, and there

Justice Mason, as he then was, and Justice Stephen specifically addressed the question of the

reasoning in Graham v Baker not standing against
the reasoning in Donnelly v Joyce in the Court of

Appeal or in the reasoning of the majority view in

Griffiths v Kerkemeyer.

This Court in Van Gerven reaffirmed the

application of the logic of Griffiths v Kerkemeyer

and Donnelly v Joyce and make it quite plain that

in regard to damages for a need occasioned by

reason of injury to be compensated regardless of

there being in actual fact an expense being

incurred. The question of law is as to whether
Graham v Baker should be reviewed. That is, that

when there is a case of loss of earning capacity
not productive of economic loss because, for

example, of a charitable employer, whether or not

damages should still be allowed. That is the

second of the special leave points.

The Court will find both those matters

addressed in the outline of argument that has been

submitted. Could I, if the Court pleases, turn

initially to the question of causation. In the

reasons for - - -

TOOHEY J: Could I just ask you this, Mr Gray, because I

think the question relates to both of what you

Medlin 26/8/93

describe as special leave points. Is causation and
loss of earning capacity related to that period

when it is said that the applicant…

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Details
Case
[1993] HCATrans 248
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Mr Medlin, sought special leave to appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia. The dispute concerned the assessment of damages for personal injuries sustained by Mr Medlin. The applicant argued that the courts below erred in their application of the principles of causation and in their assessment of damages for loss of earning capacity.

The High Court was required to determine two principal legal issues. The first concerned whether the courts below had correctly applied the test for causation in assessing damages, specifically whether they had erred by applying a "pre-eminent cause" test rather than the appropriate test as established in *March v The Ordinary*. The second issue related to the non-allowance of damages for loss of earning capacity, where the applicant argued that the trial judge, in relying on *Graham v Baker*, had incorrectly determined that no damages should be awarded for such loss when it did not result in actual economic loss, contrary to the principles affirmed in *Griffiths v Kerkemeyer* and *Van Gerven*.

The applicant contended that the courts below erred in their approach to causation by applying a "pre-eminent cause" test, which was inconsistent with the High Court's decision in *March v The Ordinary*. Regarding the loss of earning capacity, the applicant argued that the Full Court, by upholding the trial judge's reliance on *Graham v Baker*, had failed to award damages for a loss of capacity that was not productive of economic loss. This was said to be contrary to the reasoning in *Griffiths v Kerkemeyer* and *Donnelly v Joyce*, which established that damages for a need occasioned by injury should be compensated regardless of whether an expense was actually incurred. The applicant's argument was that even if the injury did not result in immediate economic loss due to a charitable employer, damages for the loss of earning capacity itself should still be allowed.

Orders

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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