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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Adelaide No AlS of 1993 B e t w e e n -
BRIAN HERBERT MEDLIN
Applicant
and
STATE GOVERNMENT INSURANCE
COMMISSION
Respondent
Application for special leave
to appeal
DAWSON J TOOHEY J McHUGH J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
| Medlin | 1 | 26/8/93 |
FROM ADELAIDE BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA
ON THURSDAY, 26 AUGUST 1993, AT 10.48 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
| MR T.A. GRAY, QC: | May it please the Court, I appear with my |
learned friend, MR R.A. CAMERON, for the applicant.
(instructed by Paul Kirk, Roberts & Co)
| MR H.G. ROWELL: | May it please the Court, I appear for the |
respondent. (instructed by Stratford & Co)
DAWSON J: Yes, Mr Gray.
| MR GRAY: | If the Court pleases, this matter raises two |
special leave points, in our respectful submission.
Could I identify them shortly. The first is that the court, in dealing with an assessment of damages
and addressing the question of damages causation,
applied a pre-eminent cause test. We say in doing so, they erred. That is not the correct test in
the light of the decision of this Court in March v
Stramare.
The second special leave point relates to the
non-allowance for any damages for loss of any
capacity. The special leave point arises in this way: that this Court's decision in GrahaITI v Baker
was relied on by the trial judge in making his
assessment and apparently by the Full Court.
Graha1T1 v Baker's authority was questioned in the
case of Griffiths v Kerkemeyer, and there
Justice Mason, as he then was, and Justice Stephen specifically addressed the question of the
reasoning in Graham v Baker not standing against
the reasoning in Donnelly v Joyce in the Court ofAppeal or in the reasoning of the majority view in
Griffiths v Kerkemeyer.
This Court in Van Gerven reaffirmed the
application of the logic of Griffiths v Kerkemeyer
and Donnelly v Joyce and make it quite plain that
in regard to damages for a need occasioned by
reason of injury to be compensated regardless of
there being in actual fact an expense being
incurred. The question of law is as to whether Graham v Baker should be reviewed. That is, that when there is a case of loss of earning capacity
not productive of economic loss because, forexample, of a charitable employer, whether or not
damages should still be allowed. That is the
second of the special leave points.
The Court will find both those matters
addressed in the outline of argument that has been
submitted. Could I, if the Court pleases, turn
initially to the question of causation. In the
reasons for - - -
TOOHEY J: Could I just ask you this, Mr Gray, because I
think the question relates to both of what you
| Medlin | 26/8/93 |
describe as special leave points. Is causation and
loss of earning capacity related to that periodwhen it is said that the applicant…
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- Case
- [1993] HCATrans 248
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine two principal legal issues. The first concerned whether the courts below had correctly applied the test for causation in assessing damages, specifically whether they had erred by applying a "pre-eminent cause" test rather than the appropriate test as established in *March v The Ordinary*. The second issue related to the non-allowance of damages for loss of earning capacity, where the applicant argued that the trial judge, in relying on *Graham v Baker*, had incorrectly determined that no damages should be awarded for such loss when it did not result in actual economic loss, contrary to the principles affirmed in *Griffiths v Kerkemeyer* and *Van Gerven*.
The applicant contended that the courts below erred in their approach to causation by applying a "pre-eminent cause" test, which was inconsistent with the High Court's decision in *March v The Ordinary*. Regarding the loss of earning capacity, the applicant argued that the Full Court, by upholding the trial judge's reliance on *Graham v Baker*, had failed to award damages for a loss of capacity that was not productive of economic loss. This was said to be contrary to the reasoning in *Griffiths v Kerkemeyer* and *Donnelly v Joyce*, which established that damages for a need occasioned by injury should be compensated regardless of whether an expense was actually incurred. The applicant's argument was that even if the injury did not result in immediate economic loss due to a charitable employer, damages for the loss of earning capacity itself should still be allowed.
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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