Medapati and Revanka (No 3)

In *Medapati & Revanka (No 3)* [2017] FamCA 1184, the Family Court of Australia considered an application by the respondent husband for the presiding judge to recuse himself. The dispute arose in the context of property adjustment and parenting proceedings between the husband and wife, who were Malaysian citizens residing in Australia. The husband alleged actual bias on the part of the judge, stemming from a comment made during a previous hearing on 18 April 2017 concerning the husband's investment acumen in relation to the parties' financial position. The husband also sought an adjournment to obtain a transcript of the previous proceedings to support his recusal application.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the judge should recuse himself due to alleged actual bias, and whether the husband's application for recusal should be adjourned to allow him to obtain a transcript of the prior hearing. The court was required to determine if the comment made by the judge constituted actual bias or, more relevantly, if it would lead a fair-minded and informed observer to apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the case.

Justice Forrest dismissed the husband's application for an adjournment, finding that the husband had sufficiently articulated the specific words he attributed to the judge and that the judge was aware of the context and content of his remark. Applying the principles established in *Johnson v Johnson* and *Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy*, the court considered the test for apprehended bias, which requires a fair-minded lay observer to reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the decision. The judge reasoned that his comment, made in response to the husband's own assertions about his investment skills and the parties' financial position, was a robust testing of argument rather than evidence of prejudgment or partisanship. The judge concluded that a reasonable observer, crediting the judge with the professional capacity to discard irrelevant and prejudicial matters, would not apprehend bias.

Consequently, the respondent husband's application for the judge to recuse himself was dismissed. The court also noted that judgment in relation to the applicant wife's separate Application in a Case filed on 11 May 2017 was reserved.