FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| MEDAPATI & REVANKA (NO. 3) | [2017] FamCA 1184 |
| FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application for recusal – Where the Respondent sought to adjourn the hearing of a recusal application to obtain further evidence and the application was dismissed – Where the Respondent sought for the judge hearing the matter to recuse himself – Where the Respondent alleged actual bias on behalf of the judge – Where the application is dismissed. |
| Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 Sun v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 81 FCR 71 Wentworth v Rogers [2002] NSWSC 1198 |
| APPLICANT: | Ms Medapati |
| RESPONDENT: | Mr Revanka |
| FILE NUMBER: | BRC | 2961 | of | 2016 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 15 May 2017 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Brisbane |
| PLACE HEARD: | Brisbane |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Forrest J |
| HEARING DATE: | 15 May 2017 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: | Mr Balzamo |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | Hunter Solicitors |
| THE RESPONDENT: | In Person |
Orders
The respondent husband’s application to adjourn his application for the Judge to recuse himself, is dismissed.
The respondent husband’s application for the Judge to recuse himself is dismissed.
Judgment in relation to the applicant wife’s Application in a Case filed 11 May 2017 is reserved to a date to be advised.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Medapati & Revanka has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
FILE NUMBER: BRC 2961 of 2016
| Ms Medapati |
Applicant
And
| Mr Revanka |
Respondent
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
On 18 April 2017, in proceedings that were commenced in 2016, I heard and determined some competing interim applications in property adjustment proceedings and parenting Orders proceedings as between the husband and wife in this matter. On that day the wife was represented by a firm of solicitors who are on the record currently representing her, namely Hunter Solicitors and Mr Balzamo of counsel. The husband was represented by Mr Kilmartin, solicitor from the firm Adams Wilson. The wife was present in court that day and the husband, who was out of the country at the time, attended the proceedings by way of a telephone connection between the courtroom and wherever he was located, which at the time I understood was somewhere in State X in the United States of America.
On that day because the husband was represented, he was told that he would not be able to speak to the Court through the phone but that his solicitor, Mr Kilmartin, would be…
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- Case
- [2017] FamCA 1184
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the judge should recuse himself due to alleged actual bias, and whether the husband's application for recusal should be adjourned to allow him to obtain a transcript of the prior hearing. The court was required to determine if the comment made by the judge constituted actual bias or, more relevantly, if it would lead a fair-minded and informed observer to apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the case.
Justice Forrest dismissed the husband's application for an adjournment, finding that the husband had sufficiently articulated the specific words he attributed to the judge and that the judge was aware of the context and content of his remark. Applying the principles established in *Johnson v Johnson* and *Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy*, the court considered the test for apprehended bias, which requires a fair-minded lay observer to reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the decision. The judge reasoned that his comment, made in response to the husband's own assertions about his investment skills and the parties' financial position, was a robust testing of argument rather than evidence of prejudgment or partisanship. The judge concluded that a reasonable observer, crediting the judge with the professional capacity to discard irrelevant and prejudicial matters, would not apprehend bias.
Consequently, the respondent husband's application for the judge to recuse himself was dismissed. The court also noted that judgment in relation to the applicant wife's separate Application in a Case filed on 11 May 2017 was reserved.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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