MEC Resources Ltd and Industry Innovation and Science Australia [2023] AATA 399 (15 March 2023)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number: 2021/3080
Re:MEC Resources Ltd
APPLICANT
AndIndustry Innovation and Science Australia
RESPONDENT
Decision
Tribunal:Deputy President Boyle
Date:15 March 2023
Place:Perth
The Respondent’s decision of 23 April 2021 to affirm a decision of 3 February 2021 under s 47 of the Pooled Development Funds Act 1992 (Cth) to revoke the Applicant’s Pooled Development Fund registration declaration is set aside and in substitution it is decided not to revoke the Applicant’s Pool Development Fund registration declaration under s 47 of the Pooled Development Funds Act 1992 (Cth).
...............[Sgd].........................................................
Deputy President Boyle
Catchwords
POOLED DEVELOPMENT FUNDS - Pooled Development Funds Act 1992 - Revocation of registration declaration under s 47(1) – ultimate sanction of revocation of registration not appropriate – claimed breaches do not subvert the objects of the Act – no other power applicable in present case – breaches occurred when Applicant under different management – procedures for compliance now in place – procedural fairness –ground for cancellation argued not referred to in SFIC - revocation order set aside and substituted
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 37, 41(2)
Industry Research and Development Act 1986 (Cth) ss 6, 21(2)
Pooled Development Funds Act 1992 (Cth) ss 3, 4, 10, 11, 14(1), 18, 19, 19(1), 19(2), 20A, 20A(2), 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 25(1), 26, 27, 27A, 28, 28(2A), 33, 35, 35(1), 35(4), 42, 42(2), 42(2)(a), 42(3)(a), 46(2), 47, 47(1)(a), 47(3)(a), 55, 56
Tax Agent Services Act 2009 (Cth) ss 60-125(2)
Venture Capital Act 2002 (Cth)
Cases
Austcorp No 500 Pty Ltd v Innovation Australia [2010] AATA 270
Bartlett v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2003) 54 ATR 261
Evans v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 89 ATC 4540
MEC Resources Ltd and Innovation and Science Australia [2021] AATA 4030
Rio Tinto Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2004] FCA 335
Saffron v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 22 ATR 131
Secondary Materials
Explanatory Memorandum, Pooled Development Funds Bill 1992 (Cth)
Commonwealth, Second Reading Speech of the Explanatory Memorandum of Pooled Development Funds Bill 1992 (Cth), House of Representatives, 26 May 1992, 2757 (Mr Free, Minister of Science and Technology)
REASONS FOR DECISION
Deputy President Boyle
15 March 2023
the application
The Applicant seeks the review of the Respondent’s decision of 23 April 2021 to affirm a decision of 3 February 2021 under s 47 of the Pooled Development Funds Act 1992 (Cth) (PDFA) to revoke the Applicant’s Pooled Development Fund (PDF) registration declaration.
The application for review is made under s 56 of the PDFA.
background
The following facts are taken from paras 3.1 – 3.28 of the Respondent’s Statement of Findings of Fact and Reasons[1] which the Applicant said are “broadly agreed”.[2]
[1] R3, T2/11-8.
[2] A1, [6].
The Applicant is an Australian public company. The Applicant became a registered PDF on 19 September 2005.[3]
[3] R3, T3/22.
On 20 August 2020,…
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- Case
- [2023] AATA 399
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the revocation of the Applicant's PDF registration was an appropriate sanction, and whether the Applicant had been afforded procedural fairness. Specifically, the Applicant argued that the revocation was the "ultimate sanction" and should only be applied as a last resort, that the alleged breaches did not subvert the objects of the PDFA, and that a new ground for cancellation, relating to sections 20A and 20B of the PDFA, had been introduced late in the proceedings, thereby breaching procedural fairness.
The court reasoned that the power to cancel a PDF's registration under section 47(1) of the PDFA was discretionary and that revocation should be considered the ultimate sanction, to be applied only when other avenues were unavailable or insufficient. It found that the claimed breaches, particularly those concerning reporting obligations, did not subvert the fundamental objects of the PDFA, which were to foster equity capital for small and medium-sized Australian enterprises. Furthermore, the court noted that the breaches occurred under previous management and that the Applicant had since implemented new compliance procedures. The court also found that the introduction of the section 20A and 20B breach argument in the Respondent's closing submissions, without prior identification in the Respondent's Statement of Findings of Fact and Contentions or initial submissions, constituted a breach of procedural fairness.
Consequently, the court set aside the revocation order. The court substituted an order that the Applicant's registration declaration as a PDF be revoked, but that the revocation be suspended indefinitely, provided the Applicant complied with certain conditions, including ongoing reporting and adherence to the PDFA.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Applicant’s submissions in reply dated 5 May 2022 were to the following effect:(a)Section 47 of the PDFA uses the word “may” and the power to cancel the PDF status is therefore discretionary. Cancellation of PDF status is the last resort.(b)Even if directions under Division 3 of Part 4 are not available in respect of the reporting breaches, but investment breaches can be dealt with in this manner, then it could not be said that the ultimate sanction is appropriate as suggested by the Respondent as a consequence of the reporting breaches.(c)The position of the Respondent is fundamentally at odds with the purpose and objectives of the PDFA.(d)The assertion that the Applicant’s response to the claims now made of breaches of ss 20A and 20B is suggestive of a company paying lip service to compliance is without basis.(e)The Applicant is taken by surprise by the Respondent raising a claimed breach of ss 20A and 20B as they were not identified as a reason for the cancellation of the PDF status and were not referred to in the Respondent’s SFIC. The new case put by the Respondent in submissions on Section 20A(2) ought not to be allowed and the Respondent’s submissions in that regard ought properly to be withdrawn or ignored by the Tribunal as a clear and apparent breach of procedural fairness.considerationProcedural fairness The precise basis of the Applicant’s complaint in relation to the Respondent raising the claim of a breach of s 20A of the PDFA was not clear to me. I sought clarification of the Applicant’s complaint at the time of the oral closing submissions on 9 June 2022. The following exchange occurred:TRIBUNAL: But I am just trying to understand what your – the applicant’s position is, is it that you were unaware, the applicant was unaware, that part of the matters to be resolved was whether or not there’d be any breach of section 20A. Or is it your case that whilst you were generally aware of that, there was insufficient detail of the particulars of the breach to enable the applicant to properly respond to that case?MR HOUWELING: Well both…. What occurs from time to time is that a broader context may be put and that, of itself, can’t be objectionable. But where that’s expressly relied upon, and then used for the purposes of coming to – as if it’s the case that is then being put, that is a change of position.Put differently, the case as put needed to be met on the basis of provisions other than section 20A and 20B. But in the general characterisation of the way within which it seemed that the applicant, or the respondent, rather, was putting its case, we needed to address those provisions more broadly.Now what we distil from the materials that are before us, is that the respondent puts its case on the basis of section 20A and we say that that is not the basis on which this tribunal ought properly A, to have regard to the evidence in respect of 20A and the conclusions that are then suggested are appropriate. We would have more to say in respect of the way within which they are framed.And B, we say that section 20A was not the case as put by the respondent in the beginning or at any stage. And so, to raise it in its closings, in effect, we may do so, or it may be done so, for the purposes other than for the tribunal to rely upon. But as I understand it, the position as put by the respondent is to rely on section 20A.Not in the SFIC, not in its opening or in its initial submissions, statements of findings, of reasons, et cetera.