Meait, Youssef Atonios v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

[1998] FCA 570

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY	NG 1093  of   1997

BETWEEN:	YOUSSEF ANTONIOS MEAIT APPLICANT
AND:	MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS RESPONDENT
JUDGE:	HILL J
DATE OF ORDER:	11 MAY 1998
WHERE MADE:	SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY	NG 1093 of 1997

BETWEEN:	YOUSSEF ANTONIOS MEAIT APPLICANT
AND:	MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS RESPONDENT

JUDGE:	HILL J
DATE:	11 MAY 1998
PLACE:	SYDNEY

EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Before the Court is an application for an order of review brought by Youssef Antonios Meait in effect by way of an appeal against the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal to refuse his application to remain in Australia under a protection visa.  The decision sought to be reviewed was made on 8 December 1997. 

The applicant is a citizen of Lebanon who arrived in Australia on 25 November 1995.  He sought to persuade the Tribunal that it should be satisfied that he is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol.  Article 1A(2) of the Convention defines a refugee as any person who:

“owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country;  or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”

The grounds of review in this Court are very limited.  They are more limited than ordinarily would be the case in judicial review.  The Court has no power itself to find facts and is prohibited from reviewing a decision of the Tribunal even if that decision is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could possibly have come to it.  This appears to be the situation which the Government favours.  However, if it could be shown that an error of law was committed then, of course, this Court can intervene.

The application for review set out five grounds.  It is unnecessary for me to consider whether all of those grounds might be available in an appropriate case.  Suffice it to say that the applicant put his case in two ways.  Firstly, it was submitted that the Tribunal had made an error of law because it had not considered his case on the basis that his fear of persecution was well founded because he was a significant political figure with widespread political contacts.  To understand how that submission is put it is necessary to say more about the Tribunal's reasons. 

The case that appears to have been made on behalf of the applicant was that he was in danger of persecution for reasons of his political opinion having regard to the fact that the Syrians, who are apparently occupying forces in Lebanon, knew that he was a significant political figure, with widespread political contacts and influence, opposed to a continuing Syrian presence in Lebanon and due to the fact that he had rejected Syrian overtures to him to support them. 

The Tribunal concluded that it was not satisfied that the evidence established that there was a real chance he would be persecuted for a Convention reason in Lebanon.  They did so essentially for two reasons.  The first was that, while they were prepared to accept that the applicant was a significant political figure or had many political contacts with significant Lebanese political figures, they did not believe that he had been approached by the Syrians to support them.  They came to this conclusion because they did not believe the evidence which the applicant had given.  In part this arose because the Tribunal believed that he had tried to strengthen his case by backdating evidence which reflected badly on his credibility.  Accordingly, the Tribunal said:

“The Tribunal also does not believe there is any credible evidence to link the beating he received with the attempts by the Syrians to recruit him to their cause.  The Tribunal is not satisfied that the Syrians have an interest in him.”

Absent any suggestion to the contrary that appears to be the case that the applicant put to the Tribunal. 

The Tribunal also disbelieved evidence which the applicant had given concerning the events surrounding his departure from Lebanon. 

The submission seeks to say that the Tribunal should not only have considered the three cumulative factors which the applicant had put forward in support of his claim, but should have separately considered the matter that the Syrians knew he was a significant political figure with widespread political contacts and influence opposed to the continuing Syrian presence in Lebanon and that its failure to consider that matter separately from the cumulative matters, which included the rejection of Syrian overtures to him and to support them, might have brought about the result that the Tribunal would decide differently.

It seems to me there is a logical difficulty with this submission. If the applicant put his case, as it appears to be on the basis of three cumulative factors, and the Tribunal found that those three factors together did not establish a real chance of persecution for Convention reasons, to say that it might come to a different conclusion if only two of those factors exists is a very difficult proposition.  In my view there is no support for a finding that the Tribunal erred by not considering separately two of those factors when it considered all three and rejected them.  It may be that if the Court itself had been in the situation of having to decide the matter it might have come to a different conclusion, but the Court is limited to judicial review.

The second submission is that the Tribunal applied what is said to have been a wrong hypothesis because it concluded that it was not satisfied that the applicant had a “well-founded fear of persecution” in Lebanon, inter alia, because he was a person who could call upon a high level of political contacts to protect him should his interests need protection.  One must say in fairness to the Tribunal that this does not seem in fact to be the only reason that it took into account.  It said also that it noted evidence that Lebanon was increasingly moving towards a political democracy and it noted also that the majority of Lebanese citizens opposed the Syrian presence in that country. 
It concluded, having regard also to the fact that the applicant had been outside Lebanon for some two years and had not maintained contact with continuing political developments in Lebanon, that the applicant was a person who was unlikely to face any harassment or deprivation of human rights such as would constitute persecution.  With respect to the submission, it is in this guise, either as counsel for the Minister submits an attempt to have this Court decide a factual matter which the Tribunal itself has the sole ability to decide or, alternatively, the Tribunal's findings reflect the way the case was argued before the Tribunal – in any event on behalf of the applicant. 

The alternative ground in one sense might well be said to be unnecessary once it is found that the applicant was not in danger of persecution, in any event, by reason of his political opinion, the knowledge of the Syrians about his political matters, his opposition to the Syrian presence and his rejection of Syrian overtures.  In my view it cannot be said that the Tribunal in any way erred in law in concluding as a matter of fact that it was not likely that the applicant would be singled out for persecution by the Syrian authorities.  No doubt political influence is not an irrelevancy to this question. 

Counsel for the applicant suggested that the Tribunal would err if it found that he was not likely to be persecuted if found to be wealthy.  That may well be a quite illogical conclusion if it were ever adopted but, given that the Tribunal in any event appears to have rejected his claim that he had a “well-founded fear of persecution” in the first place, the additional ground of political contact hardly seems to constitute an error of law.  For these reasons the application must be dismissed.

I certify that this and the preceding three (3) pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Hill

Associate:

Dated:            11 May 1998

Counsel for the Applicant:	Mr A J O'Brien
Solicitor for the Applicant:	Harrisons The Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent:	Mr P Braham
Solicitor for the Respondent:	Australian Government Solicitor
Date of Hearing:	11 May 1998
Date of Judgment:	11 May 1998