Meadis and Meadis & Ors (No. 2)
[2020] FamCA 880
•22 October 2020
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| MEADIS & MEADIS AND ORS (NO. 2) | [2020] FamCA 880 |
| FAMILY LAW – COSTS – costs application arising from a review of an exercise of power by a Senior Registrar and de novo hearing – where the wife seeks the husband pay her costs on an indemnity basis – where the husband opposes the wife’s application – where the husband has filed an appeal and seeks a stay of any costs order pending the outcome of the appeal – where the husband’s conduct in the proceedings has unnecessarily prolonged proceedings and occasioned trauma to the wife – where the wife made a written offer to settle her costs application – the offer of compromise was refused by the husband – where the husband was wholly unsuccessful in the proceedings – circumstances of an exceptional kind justifying the making of an indemnity order for costs – the husband ordered to pay the wife’s costs on an indemnity basis as sought by the wife. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 117A Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) rr 19.08, 19.18, Schedule 3 Pt 2. |
| Acland & Grohl [2019] FamCAFC 69 Colgate-Palmolive Co Ltd v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225 D & D (Costs) (No. 2) (2010) FLC 93-435 D & D (Costs) (No.2) (2010) FLC 93-435 Kohan & Kohan (1993) FLC 92-340 Limousin & Limousin (Costs) (2007) 38 Fam LR 478 Meadis & Meadis & Ors (Unreported, Family Court of Australia, Snr Reg Fitzgibbon, 21 October 2019) Meadis & Meadis & Ors [2020] FamCA 543 Munday v Bowman (1997) FLC 92-784 Ragata Developments Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation [1993] FCA 115 Tetijo Holdings Pty Ltd v Keeprite Australia Pty Ltd (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, 3 May 1991 |
| APPLICANT: | Mr Meadis |
| FIRST RESPONDENT: | Ms Meadis |
| SECOND RESPONDENT: | Mr G Meadis |
| THIRD RESPONDENT: | Ms H Meadis |
| INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Joliman Lawyers |
| FILE NUMBER: | MLC | 11834 | of | 2016 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 22 October 2020 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Melbourne |
| PLACE HEARD: | Melbourne |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Hartnett J |
| WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS RECEIVED: | 31 August 2020; 4 and 14 September 2020 |
REPRESENTATION
| THE APPLICANT: | In person |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Harris Lieberman Solicitors |
Orders
Within 7 days hereof the Applicant husband (‘the husband’) pay the costs of the Respondent wife (’the wife’) of and incidental to the hearing on 26 June 2020 of the review applications on an indemnity basis and fixed in the sum of $6,677.
The operation of order 1 above be stayed pending the hearing and determination of the husband’s appeal from the orders made 16 July 2020.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Meadis & Meadis has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
FILE NUMBER: MLC 11834 of 2016
| Mr Meadis |
Applicant
And
| Ms Meadis |
First Respondent
And
| Mr G Meadis |
Second Respondent
And
| Ms H Meadis |
Third Respondent
And
| Independent Children’s Lawyer |
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Background
Following an interim hearing on 26 June 2020, the Court made orders on 16 July 2020 dismissing the Applications in a Case filed by the Applicant husband (‘the husband’) on 13 November 2019 and 21 November 2019; dismissing the Application in a Case filed by the Second and Third Respondents on 6 March 2020; and affirming the orders made by Senior Registrar Fitzgibbon on 21 October 2019 and 13 November 2019.
The First Respondent wife (‘the wife’) subsequently sought orders against the husband and the Second and Third Respondents for her costs of and incidental to the interim hearing on 26 June 2020. The wife and the Second and Third Respondents were able to reach an agreement as to the payment of the wife’s costs such that on 12 August 2020 an order was made by consent in Chambers as follows:-
Within 28 days of the date of this order the Second and Third Respondents pay the costs of the First Respondent wife of and incidental to the interim hearing on 26 June 2020 fixed in the sum of $5,000.
The husband and the wife were unable to reach an agreement and as such the orders made on 12 August 2020 also provided that:-
Within 21 days of the date of this order the First Respondent wife and the Applicant husband file and serve written submissions, not exceeding 10 pages in length, as to the First Respondent wife’s claim for costs against the Applicant husband in respect of the hearing which proceeded on 26 June 2020.
The written submissions of the wife were filed on 31 August 2020. In those written submissions the wife sought the following order:-
That the Applicant Husband pay the costs of the Respondent Wife of and incidental to the hearing on 26 June 2020 of the review applications fixed in the sum of $6,677 with such costs to be paid from the husband’s share of monies to which he was entitled pursuant to orders made in the Federal Circuit Court on 14 January 2019 from NAB account no: …96.
On 4 September 2020, the Court received a letter from the husband dated 27 August 2020, wherein the husband requested he be afforded further time to consider and respond to the written submissions of the wife which he had, at that time, not yet received. The husband also enclosed what he claimed to be a “generic statement”, which in reality was a document of written submissions as to the wife’s application for costs in compliance with the orders made 12 August 2020. The Court acceded to the husband’s request and on 9 September 2020 made a further order as follows:-
Within 7 days of the date of this order the Applicant husband file and serve written submissions, not exceeding 5 pages in length, in reply to the First Respondent wife’s written submissions filed 31 August 2020.
The amended written submissions of the husband were received and filed by the Court on 14 September 2020. In those written submissions the husband sought orders as follows:-
1.That the Court reserves its decision regarding costs until the Court of Appeal decides case SOA67 of 2020 from MLC 11834/2016.
OR ALTERNATIVELY
2.That the respondent mother’s application for costs be determined at an appropriate amount fixed by Her Honour; and
3.That the cost orders of Her Honour are stayed for a period of 28 days; and
4.That should an appeal be lodged against Her Honour’s decision in relation to costs that these orders are stayed until the resolution of that appeal.
OR ALTERNATIVELY
5.That the respondent mother’s application for costs be dismissed.
(as per original)
The husband’s position was best summarised by the first line of his submissions that “[t]he circumstances of this case do not justify an order for costs being made in favour of [the wife] at this time.”[1]
Section 117 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
[1] Written submissions of the husband filed 14 September 2020, page 2.
Section 117 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (‘the Act’) provides the Court with power to make orders in relation to costs. Section 117(1) creates a statutory presumption that each party to proceedings under the Act “shall bear his or her own costs”.[2] This presumption is subject to s 117(2) of the Act, which empowers the Court to “make such order as to costs…as the court considers just”[3] if it is “of opinion that there are circumstances that justify it in doing so.”[4] Section 117(2A) provides that in “considering what order (if any) should be made” for the payment of costs, “the court shall have regard to” the matters identified in ss 117(2A)(a) to (g) of the Act. Rule 19.08 of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) (‘the Rules’) similarly empowers the Court to make an order for costs.
[2]Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 117(1).
[3]Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 117(2).
[4]Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 117(2).
The husband submitted that with regard to s 117 of the Act and its content, there are insufficient grounds to deviate from the presumption that each party bears their own costs of the proceeding.[5]
[5] Written submissions of the husband filed 14 September 2020, page 2.
Section 117(2A)(a): the parties’ financial circumstances
The wife earns a gross income of $1,502 per week and supports the three children of the marriage with limited financial support from the husband in the sum of $36.25 per month.[6] The husband submits that the wife is financially supported by her partner, Mr F with whom she lives. Mr F has of course no obligation to support the three children of the parties’ marriage. Mr F appears as the signed guarantor on the wife’s disclosure statement and costs agreement dated 20 May 2018 which was annexed to the wife’s written submissions (“the wife’s costs agreement”).[7] To that extent Mr F is providing some form of financial support to the wife. There is otherwise however, no evidence as to what support Mr F provides to the wife or the wife may provide to Mr F. There is evidence of the wife’s limited financial position in the absence of contribution by the husband.
[6] Written submissions of the wife filed 31 August 2020, paragraph 2.
[7] Written submissions of the wife filed 31 August 2020, page 24.
The Court accepts the submission of the husband that he will face a significant barrier in obtaining paid employment upon his release from prison.[8] It is likely that the husband will earn minimal income for some time. The husband has however funds available to him as a result of the orders made in the property proceeding between the parties, these being approximately $40,318.[9] The husband opposed the release of any of these funds to the wife in payment of any costs orders made against him. The husband submitted to the Court that the wife “has been directed to provide these funds to [his] parents (to whom [he] owe[d] a considerable debt for legal costs).”[10] Such direction is a direction emanating from the husband himself. The husband’s attitude to this litigation is that he shall incur no legal fees, but shall compel the wife to incur legal fees which he claims to have no capacity to pay (in the event that a costs order is made against him). The husband argues that the monies held in trust on his behalf, resultant from the earlier finalisation of competing property applications between the parties, should have already been paid out to him and are therefore not available for distribution to the wife. The Court at this stage will not make an order as to the source of any funds of any costs order made. Rather, the Court will make any costs orders payable by the husband by a due date and if not so paid, then enforcement of those orders arises. The Court does not have sufficient evidence before it as to whether the funds in trust should have been paid out to the husband at an earlier point in time as argued by the husband, or whether such funds legitimately remain as a source of costs orders made against the husband and/or security for costs. That is a matter for another day. The husband’s pursuit of proceedings to date has caused the wife to incur unnecessary legal fees. The wife has to date been required to apply her very limited income, together with ultimately her capital receipt by way of the final property proceeding orders, toward her ongoing, and mounting, legal fees.
[8] Written submissions of the husband filed 14 September 2020, page 2.
[9] Written submissions of the wife filed 31 August 2020, paragraph 3.
[10] Written submissions of the husband filed 14 September 2020, page 4
Section 117(2A)(b): legal aid assistance
No party to the proceeding is in receipt of assistance from Victoria Legal Aid or similar, other than the Independent Children’s Lawyer, who is not a party to the costs order proceeding.[11] However, the husband submitted that “clearly [his] financial circumstances would entitle [him] to receive a grant of legal assistance in parenting issues.”[12]
[11] Written submissions of the wife filed 31 August 2020, paragraph 4.
[12] Written submissions of the husband filed 14 September 2020, page 4.
Section 117(2A)(c): the parties’ conduct in relation to the proceedings
Interim parenting orders were made and reasons for judgment were delivered by Senior Registrar Fitzgibbon on 21 October 2019, following an interim hearing on 17 October 2019. Senior Registrar Fitzgibbon dismissed the applications of the husband and the Second and Third Respondents.[13] The wife was given leave to make an application for costs incidental to that hearing[14] and following submissions, orders as to costs were made in Chambers by Senior Registrar Fitzgibbon on 13 November 2019 being costs payable by the husband and the Second and Third Respondents to the wife.
[13] Meadis & Meadis and Ors (Unreported, Family Court of Australia, Snr Reg Fitzgibbon, 21 October 2019) [113].
[14] Order Snr Reg Fitzgibbon 21 October 2020, order 9.
On 26 June 2020, the applications before the Court filed on behalf of the husband were an Application in a Case filed 13 November 2019 seeking review of the orders made by Senior Registrar Fitzgibbon on 21 October 2019; and the Application in a Case filed 21 November 2019 seeking a review of the orders made by the Senior Registrar on 13 November 2019. Also before the Court was an Application in a Case filed by the Second and Third Respondents on 6 March 2020.
Amongst other orders, the husband sought in his Application in a Case of 13 November 2019 orders for the children of the marriage to spend time with him at K prison in L Town Victoria, where he is currently incarcerated.[15] This time was to be facilitated by the Second and Third Respondents whilst the children spent time with them.[16]
[15]Meadis & Meadis and Ors [2020] FamCA 543, [9].
[16]Meadis & Meadis and Ors [2020] FamCA 543, [55].
At the hearing of the review applications on 26 June 2020, the Second and Third Respondents advised the Court they no longer consented to the facilitation of the children’s time with the husband in prison, nor did they consent to the facilitation of any telephone calls between the children and the husband.[17] The husband continued to press this part of his application even though, as set out in the wife’s submissions, “such an order could not be practicably implemented.”[18] Otherwise, on the overwhelming evidence before the Court, the orders as sought by the husband could not be made. The state of the evidence did not deter the husband.
[17]Meadis & Meadis and Ors [2020] FamCA 543, [57].
[18] Written submissions of the wife filed 31 August 2020, paragraph 11.
The wife incurred further costs in engaging counsel, having her solicitor prepare documents, and having both her counsel and solicitor, but in particular her counsel, being required to re-read a number of documents and transcripts.[19] The preparation was not insignificant.
[19] Written submissions of the wife filed 31 August 2020, paragraph 11.
The husband submitted that although he agreed the wife incurred further costs in engaging counsel for the second hearing (26 June 2020), the costs proposed by the wife were excessive. In the husband’s submissions, he took issue with the necessity of counsel re-reading 473 pages of transcript, in particular arguing that as the same counsel appeared on both occasions, “it would be reasonable to assume [counsel] would have been able to rely on their previous notes and knowledge of the case.”[20] The Court rejects this submission. There was a period of approximately eight months between the interim hearing of the Senior Registrar and the de novo hearing of the review. The transcripts were a necessary part of that review. The proceeding is a parenting proceeding with a complicated context which required counsel to be thoroughly prepared. That same level of preparation was undertaken by counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyer. The quantum of costs claimed by the wife’s solicitor and counsel are reasonable in all the circumstances.
[20] Written submissions of the husband filed 14 September 2020, page 4.
The wife engaged counsel for the purposes of the judicial duty list hearing on 12 February 2020, at which time the matter was adjourned with costs reserved. The fee for the brief to appear was $2,200.[21] Counsel’s fees for work done in relation to the interim hearing on 26 June 2020, which totalled $7,900, was as follows:[22]
[21] Written submissions of the wife filed 31 August 2020, page 25.
[22] Written submissions of the wife filed 31 August 2020, page 27 and page 29.
Date
Description
Fees
26/06/2020
Preparation 5 hours @ $500 per hour.
2,500.00
26/06/2020
Settle Case Outline 2 hours @ $500 per hour.
1,000.00
Work done in relation to Hearing date of 26 June 2020
Total Payable
$3,500.00
The amount of GST included in the above supply is $318.18
…
Date
Description
Fees
26/06/2020
Brief to appear.
4,400.00
Total Payable
$4,400.00
The amount of GST included in the above supply is $318.18
The wife’s total cost to engage counsel for both 12 February 2020 and 26 June 2020 was in the sum of $10,100. The wife submitted these “costs were only incurred solely because of the review applications filed by the husband and the Second and Third Respondents.”[23]
[23] Written submissions of the wife filed 31 August 2020, paragraph 14.
Although the husband submitted to the Court that the wife should have utilised her lawyer, and not engaged counsel to appear at the judicial duty list hearing of 12 February 2020, this is not a matter for the determination of the husband, but rather for the determination of the wife and her solicitor. It was neither an unnecessary nor disproportionate disbursement in particular given the issues before the Court. The conduct of both the wife’s lawyer and counsel was also proper and reasonable.[24] Additionally, the husband’s submissions that counsel’s fees for the interim hearing of 26 June 2020 were excessive, are not accepted by the Court. They were reasonable and proportionate. It is acknowledged that counsel’s fees exceeded the Schedule 3 Pt 2 of the Rules costs allowable for counsel’s work done and services performed. The upper end of the range on item 201 is $411.85 per hour. Counsel charged $500 per hour. Furthermore, the upper end of the range for the judicial duty list hearing, being item 204, is $1,979.86. The upper end of the range for the hearing at item 205 is $3,000.33. The range in quantum for counsel’s work pursuant to Schedule 3 Pt 2 of the Rules was set out in the wife’s costs agreement but that agreement noted that the disbursements incurred by the wife may exceed those amounts.
[24]Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) r 19.18(3)(d).
Section 117(2A)(e): whether any party wholly unsuccessful
Both the husband and Second and Third Respondents were wholly unsuccessful at the interim hearing on 26 June 2020.
The husband’s submission is that because he filed a Notice of Appeal on 5 August 2020 in relation to the outcome of the interim hearing “…the ultimate success (otherwise) of [his] application is yet to be determined.”[25] The Court accepts that the husband’s appeal in respect of this matter remains to be heard. In those circumstances the Court shall order a stay in respect of any payments which the husband may be ordered to pay until such time as the appeal judgment has been delivered by the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia.
[25] Written submissions of the husband filed 14 September 2020, page 3.
Section 117(2A)(f): offers in writing
The wife’s solicitors wrote to the husband on 21 July 2020 making an offer in writing such that the husband pay to the wife the sum of $5,000 in full satisfaction of her claim in respect of the costs of the review application. No response to that offer was received from the husband.[26]
[26] Written submissions of the wife filed 31 August 2020, paragraph 16.
The husband’s submission as to the offer made by the wife was that “… settling when the substantive decision is being appealed, would be inappropriate.”[27]
[27] Written submissions of the husband filed 14 September 2020, page 3.
The Court notes that the Second and Third Respondents made payment to the wife in the sum of $5,000 in response to the wife’s offer to them and there has been accordingly resolution of that part of the wife’s outstanding costs application.
Section 117(2A)(g): other relevant matters
This was a review application filed by the husband against a decision with which he did not agree and is but one of a number of review applications and/or appeals filed in the Court by the husband. Throughout each of those proceedings the husband has remained a litigant in person and he incurs no legal costs of the usual type wherein each party pay their own costs. Because of the trauma occasioned to the wife by the husband’s behaviours, such trauma being ongoing, the wife is not able to conduct a proceeding against the husband as a litigant in person. If the husband had any insight he would well understand this. He appears intent on destroying the wife financially. He appears intent on engaging in ongoing controlling behaviours which are a form of family violence directed against the wife. This costs order application is made in the context of the application for review hearing and the orders made and the reasons delivered subsequently on 16 July 2020. Those orders form a necessary background to this application and I refer to and adopt the reasons for judgment in the overall consideration of this application for costs and my consideration of what it is that are other relevant matters. The husband’s entirely unsuccessful pursuit of the wife, and the adverse financial and psychological impact that has on the wife, is an “other relevant matter”.
In his submissions, the husband indicated:-
…that if a decision was made to award costs at this time that this decision would also be appealed and an application for a stay on such an order would also be made (if it is not provided for in the order of Her Honour)…
That is not a surprising submission given the history of the husband’s litigious and mostly unsuccessful pursuit of the wife in the totality of his applications. It is difficult not to see his behaviour as vexatious.
Indemnity costs
Pursuant to s 117 of the Act, parties bear their own costs to proceedings and the Court may exercise its discretion in “exceptional”[28] circumstances which have a “special or unusual feature… to justify” [29] the making of an order for costs to be paid on an indemnity basis, having regard to the factors in s 117(2A) of the Act.[30] Such circumstances can exist where there is “[e]vidence of particular misconduct causing loss of time to the court and to other parties”.[31]
[28] Acland & Grohl [2019] FamCAFC 69, [4] citing Kohan & Kohan (1993) FLC ¶92-340, D & D (Costs) (No.2) (2010) FLC ¶93-435 and Limousin & Limousin (Costs) (2007) 38 Fam LR 478.
[29] Colgate-Palmolive Co Ltd v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225, [233]-[234]
[30] Colgate-Palmolive Co Ltd v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225.
[31] Munday v Bowman (1997) FLC ¶92-784 at p 84,660 citing Tetijo Holdings Pty Ltd v Keeprite Australia Pty Ltd (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, 3 May 1991).
The wife submitted that in circumstances where she provides solely for the parties’ three children and receives minimal financial assistance from the husband, and where the conduct of the husband was designed to cause financial stress to the wife, the Court should order the husband to pay the wife’s costs of and incidental to the interim hearing on 26 June 2020 on an indemnity basis fixed in the sum of $6,677.[32]
[32] Written submissions of the wife filed 31 August 2020, page 7.
The wife annexed to her written submissions a document headed “Calculation of Costs on Indemnity Basis”[33] which provided that the total indemnity costs incurred by her were in the sum of $13,354.67. One half of that sum is the $6,677 in indemnity costs claimed by the wife. The wife also annexed to her written submissions a document headed “Calculation of Costs on Scale”[34] which provided on her calculations a sum to be paid of $11,800.25. One half of the wife’s indemnity costs claim is thus only $777.21 more than the scale costs as claimed by her.
[33] Written submissions of the wife filed 31 August 2020, Annexure A at page 8, page 9 and page 10.
[34] Written submissions of the wife filed 31 August 2020, Annexure B, at pages 11-14.
Rule 19.18 of the Rules is as follows:-
Method of calculation of costs
(1) The court may order that a party is entitled to costs:
(a) of a specific amount;
(b) as assessed on a particular basis (eg lawyer and client, party/party or indemnity);
(c) to be calculated in accordance with the method stated in the order; or
(d) for part of the case, or part of an amount, assessed in accordance with Schedule 3.
Example: For paragraph (1)(c), the stated method may be in accordance with Schedule 3 but with an additional percentage for complexity.
(2) If costs are payable under the Act or these Rules, or the court orders that costs be paid and does not specify the method for their calculation, the costs are to be assessed on a party/party basis.
(3) In making an order under subrule (1), the court may consider:
(a) the importance, complexity or difficulty of the issues;
(b) the reasonableness of each party's behaviour in the case;
(c) the rates ordinarily payable to lawyers in comparable cases;
(d) whether a lawyer's conduct has been improper or unreasonable;
(e) the time properly spent on the case, or in complying with pre-action procedures; and
(f) expenses properly paid or payable.
There is no doubt that the husband unwisely refused the wife’s offer to compromise her costs application.[35] There is also the fact that this proceeding was commenced, and continued for, what would appear to be an “ulterior or extraneous purpose”[36] namely that of causing financial hardship and emotional distress to the wife. The wife has entered into a costs agreement with her solicitor and the Court has before it the terms of that agreement. The terms do not preclude the quantums as claimed by the wife.
[35]Maitland Hospital v Fisher (No 2) (1992) 27 NSWLR 721, [724].
[36]Ragata Developments Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation [1993] FCA 115, [8] (Davies J)
The Court will make an indemnity costs order in a specified amount. The Court also considered the making of an order pursuant to r 19.18(1)(c) of the Rules. That consideration was as follows. The Court concluded that in an alternative approach it would add, in respect of counsel’s fees, an additional percentage to the scale cost amount. That additional percentage would be a 50 percent adjustment which the Court concluded was appropriate in the exercise of its discretion. The reason for that was that the matters before the Court are both complex and difficult. Counsel for the wife is a very senior junior. The judicial duty list hearing on scale would have seen an amount of $1,979.86 allowable before a percentage adjustment. A percentage adjustment of 50 percent in the exercise of the Court’s discretion is appropriate. That would result in a fee for counsel to appear of $2,969.79 being allowed. This amount obviously exceeds the $2,200 figure claimed. Likewise, the payment of counsel’s brief to appear at $4,400 is less than the amount of $3,000.33 with a 50 percent increase being a figure of $4,500.50. The charge for seven hours of preparation (including the settling of a case outline) at $500 per hour is $3,500. This is less than the amount of $411.85 per hour provided for in Schedule 3 Pt 2 of the Rules with a 50 percent increase being a figure of $4,324.43. The Court considers the time expended by counsel in respect of those tasks to have been not unreasonable. This outcome would have produced a greater costs sum to be paid by the husband than that which the wife sought. The Court has thus acceded to the wife’s claim for a specified amount by way of indemnity costs.
I certify that the preceding thirty-four (34) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Hartnett delivered on 22 October 2020.
Associate:
Date: 22 October 2020
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