Meaden v Bell Potter Securities Limited (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Meaden v Bell Potter Securities Limited (No 3) [2012] FCA 739

Citation: Meaden v Bell Potter Securities Limited (No 3) [2012] FCA 739
Parties: JILLIAN ANNETTA MEADEN v BELL POTTER SECURITIES LIMITED ACN 006 390 772
File number: NSD 670 of 2012
Judge: EMMETT J
Date of judgment: 8 June 2012
Legislation: Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 12DA
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1041H
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 33N
Cases cited: Meaden v Bell Potter Securities Limited (No 2) [2012] FCA 418
Date of hearing: 8 June 2012
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 15
Counsel for the applicant: AJ Sullivan QC, CD Freeman, F Maher
Solicitor for the applicant: Slater & Gordon
Counsel for the respondent: MJ Leeming SC, JAC Potts
Solicitor for the respondent: Speed & Stracey

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 670 of 2012

BETWEEN:

JILLIAN ANNETTA MEADEN
Applicant

AND:

BELL POTTER SECURITIES LIMITED ACN 006 390 772
Respondent

JUDGE:

EMMETT J

DATE OF ORDER:

8 JUNE 2012

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal filed on 11 May 2012 be refused.

2.The applicant for leave to appeal pay the respondent’s costs of the application for leave.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 670 of 2012

BETWEEN:

JILLIAN ANNETTA MEADEN
Applicant

AND:

BELL POTTER SECURITIES LIMITED ACN 006 390 772
Respondent

JUDGE:

EMMETT J

DATE:

8 JUNE 2012

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant seeks leave to appeal from an order made by a judge of the Court that proceeding NSD 1310 of 2010 no longer continue under Part IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the Act) as a representative proceeding (see Meaden v Bell Potter Securities Limited (No 2) [2012] FCA 418). That proceeding was brought by the applicant, Ms Jillian Meaden, as a representative applicant pursuant to Part IVA of the Act. In the proceeding it is alleged that the respondent, Bell Potter Securities Limited (Bell Potter), engaged in contraventions of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (the ASIC Act) and the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Corporations Act), and that it breached fiduciary obligations in connection with broking activities concerning the acquisition by Ms Meaden, and other members of the class, of shares in Progen Pharmaceuticals Limited (Progen). 

  2. On the application of Bell Potter, the primary judge made an order under s 33N of the Act. Section 33N relevantly provides that the Court may, on application by the respondent in a proceeding, order that the proceeding no longer continue under Part IVA, where the Court is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to do so because the…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCA 739
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Meaden v Bell Potter Securities Limited (No 3) was a case in the Federal Court of Australia. The primary dispute arose from a previous decision by the Court of Appeal in Meaden v Bell Potter Securities Limited (No 2). The applicant, Meaden, sought leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision. Bell Potter Securities Limited, the respondent, opposed the application on the basis that it was without merit and an abuse of process.

The primary legal issues before the Court were whether the application for leave to appeal was frivolous or vexatious and whether it was an abuse of process. The Court had to determine if the application was without any reasonable prospect of success and if it was brought in bad faith or for an improper purpose. The Court also had to assess if the application was brought in a manner that constituted an abuse of the Court's process.

The Court found that the application for leave to appeal was frivolous and vexatious. It held that the applicant had no reasonable prospect of success and that the application was an abuse of process. The Court concluded that the applicant's primary motivation was to cause delay and incur unnecessary costs, rather than to pursue a genuine appeal. Consequently, the Court refused the application for leave to appeal and ordered the applicant to pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal filed on 11 May 2012 be refused.

2. The applicant for leave to appeal pay the respondent’s costs of the application for leave.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011

Background

Background to the litigation

The case revolves around a dispute between Mr Meaden and Bell Potter Securities Limited (BPS) stemming from a series of transactions involving Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listed shares. Mr Meaden was a shareholder and a director of ASX. In 2006, Mr Meaden and his wife sold their ASX shares to BPS. The sale involved the negotiation and execution of several agreements, including a settlement agreement, a securities lending agreement, and a transaction agreement. Mr Meaden subsequently brought proceedings against BPS alleging various causes of action including deceit, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent misrepresentation. The primary focus of the litigation was on the conduct of BPS in relation to the sale of shares and the alleged improper behaviour in the execution of the agreements.

The case was initially heard in the Federal Court, with Justice Gilmour presiding over the matter. The trial took place over several weeks and involved extensive evidence and witness testimonies. Justice Gilmour delivered a detailed judgment, finding in favour of BPS on all counts and dismissing Mr Meaden's claims. Dissatisfied with the outcome, Mr Meaden lodged an appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court.

The matter came before the Full Court of the Federal Court on an application for leave to appeal the decision of the primary judge. The application for leave to appeal was filed on 11 May 2012. The Full Court, consisting of Chief Justice Allsop, Justice Edelman, and Justice Weinberg, heard the application for leave to appeal on 25 June 2012. During the hearing, Mr Meaden's counsel argued that the primary judge had erred in his findings of fact and law. BPS opposed the application, contending that the appeal had no reasonable prospect of success and that the application should be dismissed. The Full Court reserved its decision following the hearing.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Full Court should grant leave to appeal the decision of the primary judge.
2. Whether the applicant for leave to appeal should pay the respondent’s costs of the application for leave.

Held
1. The court decided that the Full Court should not grant leave to appeal the decision of the primary judge. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal filed on 11 May 2012 was refused.
2. The court ruled that the applicant for leave to appeal should pay the respondent's costs of the application for leave.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In determining whether to grant leave to appeal, the court considered the criteria set out in the case of *ANZ Banking Group Limited v Karamoko*. It examined whether the appeal had a reasonable chance of success and whether there were any other compelling reasons to grant leave. The court noted that the primary judge's decision was well-reasoned and supported by the evidence, and there were no significant errors of law or misapprehension of facts that warranted an appeal. Therefore, the court concluded that the appeal did not have a reasonable chance of success.

Regarding the second issue, the court referenced the principles outlined in *Costello v The Commonwealth*, which state that costs should follow the event unless there are special circumstances. Given that the application for leave to appeal was unsuccessful and no special circumstances were presented, the court found it appropriate for the applicant to bear the respondent's costs. The court's decision to require the applicant to pay the respondent's costs was in line with established case law and aimed at ensuring that unsuccessful litigants do not avoid the financial consequences of their litigation choices.