ME

[2013] WASAT 200

JURISDICTION     :   STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

STREAM:   HUMAN RIGHTS

ACT: GUARDIANSHIP AND ADMINISTRATION ACT 1990 (WA)

CITATION:   ME [2013] WASAT 200

MEMBER:   MR J MANSVELD (SENIOR MEMBER)

HEARD:   30 AUGUST 2013

DELIVERED          :   23 SEPTEMBER 2013

PUBLISHED           :  10 DECEMBER 2013

FILE NO/S:   GAA 1140 of 2013

GAA 1141 of 2013

MATTER:   ME

Represented Person

Catchwords:

Guardianship and administration ­ Capacity ­ Neuropsychological assessment ­ Ongoing need for guardian and administrator ­ Public Advocate and Public Trustee reappointed

Legislation:

Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA), s 4, s 43, s 43(1), s 64, s 64(1), s 90, s 113, Sch 1 Pt B

Result:

Ongoing appointment of guardian and administrator

Summary of Tribunal's decision:

In 2012 guardianship and administration orders were made for a 56­year­old woman who was impaired in her decision­making.  The Public Advocate was appointed her guardian to decide her accommodation and support services.  The Public Trustee was appointed her administrator.

In 2013 these orders were reviewed by the Tribunal.

The woman and her partner were of the view that she was capable of making her own decisions and arranged a fresh assessment of her capacity by a neuropsychologist.

The Tribunal was satisfied on the basis of the neuropsychological assessment and other evidence that the woman remained a person for whom guardianship and administration orders could be made.

The Tribunal also decided that the woman remained in need of guardianship and administration orders and confirmed the orders made in 2012.

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Represented Person       :     In person

Solicitors:

Represented Person       :     N/A

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

EE and ME [2012] WASAT 147

REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL: 

Introduction

1. On 30 August 2013 I made the following orders for ME (represented person), a 56­year­old woman currently residing in a nursing home.  I confirmed an order made on 14 June 2012 appointing the Public Trustee as the plenary administrator of her estate with all the powers and duties conferred by the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) (GA Act). I made the order reviewable by 30 August 2015.

2. The other order I made on 30 August 2013 confirmed an order also made in 2012 appointing the Public Advocate as the represented person's limited guardian with the following functions:  to decide where she is to live, whether permanently or temporarily; to decide with whom she is to live; and to determine the services to which she should have access.  That order too is reviewable by 30 August 2015. 

3. I delivered oral reasons on 23 September 2013. The following reasons are taken from the transcript, with editing for purposes of correcting minor errors and to improve clarity. The names of the parties have been anonymised as required by the confidentiality provisions of the GA Act (s 113 and Sch 1 Pt B).

Relevant legislation

1. With reference to the statutory provisions which underpin my reasons, I state the following. 

2. Under s 90 of the GA Act, upon review of guardianship and administration orders, the Tribunal has the full range of powers to amend, revoke, substitute and make new orders that are required to be done in the judgment of the Tribunal as to the represented person's best interests. The principles of the GA Act apply; they are set out in s 4 and I will state briefly what they are.

3. The primary principle is that the Tribunal must make a decision in what it considers to be the represented person's best interests. 

4. The principles state that orders should not be made if there is a less restrictive alternative to the making of orders; that is, less restrictive of the represented person's freedom of decision and action.  There is a presumption that she is able to make her own decisions and manage her own affairs unless the Tribunal is satisfied on all the evidence that that presumption should be put to one side. 

5. As far as guardianship orders are concerned, if a limited order is sufficient to meet the represented person's needs then a plenary order should not be made.  In any case any order the Tribunal makes must refer to the particular need that the Tribunal determines from time to time and the order should be limited to that need.  Although ultimately the best interests of the represented person is the overriding principle, the Tribunal, in all of these matters, is to take into account the represented person's wishes.

The represented person's capacity 

1. The review of the guardianship and administration orders made in 2012 was first heard by me on 24 June 2013.  At that hearing the represented person's partner (CC) and the represented person sought an adjournment to arrange for a further capacity assessment to be undertaken by the represented person and an adjournment was granted for that purpose.  Out of that process an assessment was undertaken by Dr EV, a clinical neuropsychologist. 

2. In June and July 2012 I had made guardianship and administration orders.  My reasons for the 2012 decisions were published as EE and ME [2012] WASAT 147.

3. I am struck by the similarity of the reasons for the making of the 2012 orders and of my reasons for the current orders. 

4. I will first turn to the question of the represented person's capacity. The question of capacity as it relates to guardianship and administration is found in s 43 and s 64 of the GA Act.

5. If I am to consider reappointing a guardian for the represented person I first need to be satisfied of one of three things: either that the represented person is incapable of looking after her own health and safety; or that she is unable to make reasonable judgments in respect to matters relating to her person; or that she is in need of oversight, care or control in the interests of her own health and safety or for the protection of others. As far as a financial or administration order is concerned, the GA Act says at s 64 that if I am to consider making an administration order I first need to be satisfied that by reason of a mental disability the represented person is unable to make reasonable judgments about all or any part of her estate.

6. The submission at the hearing on 30 August 2013 by both CC and the represented person was that the represented person is capable of managing her personal and financial affairs.  The represented person made statements such as 'I can make choices.  I am capable' and further that 'I will provide the medical evidence to prove my capacity'.  CC said that in his view the represented person has improved significantly since the initial orders were made in 2012 and that, as he put it, she is returning back to her normal self and she has the capacity to live her own life. 

7. I disagree with these views. 

8. It is instructive to go back to my reasons for the 2012 decisions.  At that time the Tribunal had the benefit of assessments from: Dr PC, consultant psychiatrist; RZ, clinical neuropsychologist; and occupational therapy assessments from 2010 and 2012. 

9. I will refer to the following paragraphs from my 2012 decisions ­ [80] to [88] ­ because, as mentioned, it is instructive as a context for my finding on 30 August 2013 that the represented person remains a person for whom orders could be made.

   The question of the represented person's capacity needs to be responded to in the context of the relevant provisions of the Act to which I have already made reference. Those sections are s 43(1)(b) for guardianship and s 64(1)(a) for administration.

   There are some differences of views as to the extent of the represented person's abilities or, to put it another way, the extent of her impairment, given the head injury sustained in 2009 and other conditions alluded to in the specialists' reports.

   On their face, there appear to be differences in the specialist assessments of the clinical neuropsychologist, RZ (2009) and the consultant psychiatrist, Dr PC (2012).  What can be drawn from the two assessments, however, is that the represented person presents as having what Dr PC states as a '... reasonable degree of comprehension of the issues involved in her personal health care, living situation and financial affairs' (report of 18 April 2012); however, the question is whether that 'comprehension' and the articulation of those issues extend to the ability to reach a thought through decision on her own, and to carry that decision through to a conclusion, again, on her own.  Dr PC appears to say 'no', whilst RZ appears to say 'yes'.  Both RZ and Dr PC accept the presence of some impairment; Dr PC assesses this as being a product of the represented person's brain injury, whilst RZ states that the test results do not fit the represented person into a head injury model.  Taking her assessment to its conclusion leads Dr PC to opine that the represented person is at risk of being swayed in her decisions by the opinions of others, whilst RZ does not have the same concerns; she finds the represented person not particularly vulnerable to coercion.  It should be said that RZ does not exclude the possibility of a head injury­related cognitive impairment, but, if so, would assess that as mild.  She opines that there may well be non­head injury­related factors in the represented person's clinical presentation.

   To reach a finding about the represented person's capacity through the differences expressed in the reports of Dr PC and RZ, I need to turn to the other evidence available to me.

   The first is to consider what has happened to the represented person since the accident in 2009.  It is common ground, I think, that after the represented person was discharged from hospital (rehabilitation), she went home under the care of her then spouse, M.  When he made a decision to leave the relationship, the ultimate outcome was that the represented person was placed in care in April 2011.  The importance of that decision is twofold.

   First, it acknowledges that, at the time, the represented person was considered not to be able to independently care for herself.

   Secondly, until recently (when CC entered her life), there is no evidence that the represented person challenged that decision or the decision that JE should manage her finances in the way that has been described.  I infer from these simple facts that the represented person was not able, on her own, to summons the necessary planning and organisational abilities to change her circumstances (assuming she wanted to) which, with the recent assistance of CC, she is now trying to do.  That says something about the limits of her abilities, and this is reinforced, in my view, by the evidence which demonstrates the high reliance the represented person places on CC (take, for example, the arranging of the stays at CC's home, the change to the banking arrangements, the referral to the new general practitioner, the advocacy role, and the referral to public housing.  All these, in my view, have been principally initiated by CC and organised by him).

   Finally, there is the represented person's own evidence which reveals a lack of a deep understanding of how the management of her financial affairs could be managed in an ongoing way, and a similar lack of understanding of all that is involved in arranging alternative accommodation.

   This view is further supported by the functional assessment undertaken in 2010 referred to earlier in these reasons where, after practical exercises assessed over several months, the represented person was found to have significant deficits in planning, attention to tasks, self­monitoring and problem­solving.  Importantly, her functional abilities fluctuated significantly depending on her levels of anxiety and physical fatigue, something which is still acknowledged as a problem for the represented person.  The 2010 functional assessment can be distinguished from the more positive 2012 occupational therapy assessment, in that it was undertaken as a means of judging the represented person's ability to function independently, whilst the recent assessment was undertaken in the context of her functioning within the confines of a highly structured nursing home environment.

10. Many of the features that existed in 2012 continue to exist, in my view, today.

11. For the 2013 review of the 2012 decision, the material available to the Tribunal as regards the represented person's capacity were two reports of Dr PD, general practitioner, one dated 19 May 2013, the other dated 4 June 2013.  In those reports, Dr PD mentions the diagnosis of a mental illness, referred to as a bipolar disorder, and the closed head injury which the represented person sustained in 2009. 

12. Dr PD is of the view that the represented person is extremely vulnerable and that, due to the effects of her closed head injury, she has no insight into her own mental health and has very poor judgment.  The represented person's personality and upbringing makes her eager to please and Dr PD states that her hypomania at the time of the reports affected her decision­making.  Dr PD concluded that, even though the represented person may present well to the Tribunal, she considered there was a huge risk of someone taking sexual or financial advantage of her.

13. The other report available to the Tribunal was from Dr SS, general practitioner, from July 2012.  That report mentions a change in medications for the represented person.  Dr SS states, based on the self­reporting of the represented person and CC, that the represented person had experienced a change in cognition, and that he would arrange a review with Professor SH, a professor of psychiatry, for his opinion of the represented person's mental state and to guide further clinical management. 

14. The Tribunal had the benefit of a report from Professor SH that he had addressed to Dr SS, and that report is dated 1 November 2012.  Professor SH was unable to make a definitive assessment or give a definitive opinion as to the represented person's cognitive state.  He does state in conclusion that the represented person:

    ... presents with an interesting pattern of normal childhood adolescence, significantly socially aberrant experiences in a well­known Cult in her adulthood, two significant suicide attempts and family disharmony and diagnostic problems at the interface of dementia/depressive pseudo dementia, which are difficult to tease out today. 

15. As already mentioned, Professor SH referred the represented person to the clinical neuropsychologist, Dr EV, who provided a report to the Tribunal dated 6 August 2013 and who also gave evidence at the hearing on 30 August 2013.  In her report, Dr EV states as follows in the area of the report headed 'Opinion and Formulation':

    [The represented person] is a 55-year-old right-handed woman who was neuropsychologically assessed on 20 July 2013 to provide an objective opinion about her current cognitive decision making capacity (ongoing need for administration and guardianship Orders). 

    Consistent with available history, the current assessment revealed the presence of specific cognitive deficits in aspects of higher­level executive functioning, memory and cognitive processing speed.  That is, her performances within these domains were well below expectation given her estimated premorbid capacity.  Other aspects of cognition would appear preserved. 

    The cause of [the represented person's] deficits are likely multifactorial (including contributions from premorbid personality characteristics, mood and psychiatric issues, and impact of acquired brain injury (ABI) from her suicide attempt in 2009).

    From review of available records and documents, it would appear that the presumption of capacity was previously dislodged due to her cognitive difficulties and history of poor functioning following her suicide attempt and head injury.  Ultimately, this resulted in the appointment of substitute decision makers. 

    Whilst improvements in her day-to-day functioning have been reported by [the represented person] and [CC], her neuropsychological profile remains largely unchanged since 2009.  I would agree with [RZ's] conclusion that [the represented person's] ABI is unlikely the sole explanation for her behaviour and deficits.  From the reported history, it would seem that she demonstrated very passionate, extreme and, most importantly, variable life choices pre-ABI. One might take this as an indicator that even prior to her suicide attempt and ABI, she was somewhat suggestible. 

    Regardless, the important questions remain does [the represented person] currently present as a woman who is:  (1) incapable of looking after her own health and safety, or is unable to make reasonable judgments about her person, or is in need of oversight, care or control? (2) by virtue of a mental disability, is [she] unable to make judgments about her estate? 

    Superficially, [the represented person] seems able to comprehend lifestyle and financial matters.  However, in my opinion, the extent of her memory deficits may make it difficult for her to retain all of the relevant information necessary for complex decisions.  Moreover, her impulsivity and difficulty with juggling alternate lines of thought may make it hard for her to reason through detailed decisions with a range of alternatives and possible outcomes.  Despite sound test results on a measure of abstract reasoning, certainly on this occasion she did not show adequate ability to fully identify, (particularly without prompting), and weigh up all of the possible options, nor appreciate the consequences of decisions about accommodation and broader life-style.  Her knowledge of her assets was reasonable, though again she required support to generate all of the relevant information, and she did not appear to integrate the information (which is important for reasoning).  Overall, her projective appreciation appeared influenced by a very strong and overwhelmingly positive world view.  Most strikingly, she seemed to struggle to appreciate, or reconcile how to manage, the impact of conflict between family and her partner on her current and future relationships with them. 

    [The represented person's] current financial affairs would appear to be quite straightforward, though she may receive a sum of money from an inheritance in the near future, which will add to the complexity of the decisions required.  As such, and given her reported vulnerability to exploitation, some degree of oversight for both lifestyle and financial matters would seem appropriate.

16. In her oral evidence Dr EV confirmed that she had received a referral from Professor SH.  She said that the assessment given to the represented person was a standard assessment, typically one that is provided by neuropsychologists. 

17. Dr EV assessed the represented person as having pockets of cognitive impairment in respect to her higher level executive functioning and that the represented person had memory problems and difficulties in the speed of processing information.  Dr EV went on to state that the deficit in executive function means that the represented person has difficulty in strategising the most efficient way of retaining information to learn and to inhibit or withhold urges.  The represented person has difficulty in juggling complex information and processing information quickly, and in weighing up complex information.

18. Dr EV found that the represented person displayed qualitative signs of impulsivity.  During the testing the represented person had difficulty in monitoring the tests and was unable to self­correct.  She had some difficulty in generating all of the risks of the potential accommodation options that were available to her, and needed prompting to generate the cost and benefits of such a decision.  Dr EV found that there were marked memory problems and, therefore, the represented person has difficulty in using past experiences to inform new decisions.

19. Dr EV was asked to compare her opinion with the opinion of the neuropsychologist RZ whose report has been earlier referred to.  Dr EV said that the assessment of RZ was somewhat tainted by the effects of a reduced effort by the represented person at the time, and so it was difficult to rely upon the conclusions drawn by RZ.  However, broadly speaking, the assessments were consistent as to the deficits from which the represented person suffers.  

1. Dr EV said that it was hard to determine how permanent these deficits might be because of their multifactorial nature, referring to a combination of personality traits, the acquired brain injury in 2009 and an ongoing mental illness.  Unlike RZ, Dr EV said that, on the basis of her assessment, she was of the view that the represented person is vulnerable to suggestion and exploitation because of her inability to retain information due to her memory impairment and the inability to test the reliability of the information that is presented to her.  Dr EV also mentioned that the represented person is vulnerable because of her overwhelmingly positive world view. 

2. In respect to her financial affairs, Dr EV found that the represented person required probing, or what she described as 'scaffolding', to be able to construct a sense of what her estate consists of.  In other words, the represented person required information that she could build upon in order to come to a description of her estate.  Dr EV also said that the represented person presents very well and that it is easy for someone to miss the subtleties of her deficits.

3. I accept the evidence of Dr EV for the following reasons. 

4. Her assessment of the represented person is the product of a detailed formal testing and was informed by earlier assessments and collateral information.  Dr EV had the benefit not only of the formal testing but also of other material that provided a history of the represented person's conditions.  Dr EV was aware of the orders that were made by the Tribunal in 2012.  She had a transcript of the 2012 hearing.  She had letters from CC and a letter from the Office of the Public Advocate.  She had the referral from Dr SS.  She had email correspondence that the represented person had forwarded to her for a period of time. 

5. I also accept the evidence of Dr EV because it is broadly consistent with the cognition and functional assessments available to the Tribunal in 2012 and to which I have earlier referred.  It is also consistent with the observations of Dr PD, particularly as it relates to the represented person's vulnerability to suggestion and influence.  The assessment of Dr EV is not inconsistent with the other evidence before the Tribunal: from the Public Advocate; the carers at the nursing home where the represented person lives; and her family. 

6. The manager of the nursing home gave evidence that in her experience with the represented person since the end of April 2013, although the represented person is able to perform her activities of daily living, she needs support to plan and organise matters.  A daughter of the represented person gave evidence that she had managed the represented person's finances for a period of time from 2009 to 2011 and had experienced the memory problems suffered by the represented person to which Dr EV refers and, in her experience, the represented person is not able to be proactive or to plan. 

7. I give no weight to the July 2012 report of Dr SS based as it is exclusively on the self-reporting of the represented person and CC.  As regards Professor SH's report, he made tentative statements but, as I have mentioned, referred the represented person to Dr EV and her assessment is before the Tribunal. 

8. On all the evidence that refers to the question of the represented person's capacity, I find as follows:

9. The represented person suffers from the effects of an acquired brain injury sustained in a suicide attempt in 2009.  She has a mental illness diagnosed as bipolar disorder which is treated but which is subject to relapse.  She has a number of deficits in cognition and function.  I accept that it is not possible to definitively say which of those deficits can be ascribed to the acquired brain injury, mental illness or premorbid personality traits but it is likely that it is a combination of all of these which contributes to or which causes those deficits, and those deficits can be summarised as follows:

10. The represented person has impairment in higher level executive functioning.  She has difficulties in processing information in a speedy way; difficulty in strategising the most efficient way of retaining information to learn; difficulties in withholding or inhibiting urges resulting in a degree of impulsivity; difficulty in juggling complex information and processing information quickly; and marked memory problems and therefore difficulty in using past experiences to inform new decisions. 

11. I find that the represented person has a vulnerability to suggestion and exploitation because she relies very much on the information that is presented to her at any one point.  She also has an ongoing need for probing and scaffolding of information to build on the existing information to come to a description of her financial affairs and other matters.

12. On the basis of these findings, I am satisfied that the represented person satisfies the requirements of s 43(1) of the GA Act as it relates to guardianship and s 64(1) of the GA Act as it relates to administration.

13. I am satisfied that the represented person is unable to look after her own health and safety.  She is unable to make reasonable judgments in certain aspects of her personal affairs, and she is in need of oversight and care as is demonstrated by the fact that she has spent a good deal of time in a supported environment in a nursing home, and even when she has lived with CC, she has required supervision, monitoring and also support.  I am also satisfied that she has a mental disability, that mental disability being the acquired brain injury and the mental illness, and because of the findings I have made in respect to her cognitive impairment, that she is unable to make reasonable judgments about all of her estate.

The need for orders 

1. I now turn to the ongoing need for orders.  I refer firstly to guardianship.  It is instructive again to refer to my 2012 reasons in respect to the making of guardianship orders, and I refer to [104] of those reasons in which I stated:

   I am satisfied, however, that there is sufficient evidence to warrant an order in respect to the decision about the represented person's future accommodation.  In that respect, I agree with the Public Advocate and the representatives from the nursing home that both the represented person and CC have an unrealistic view about the degree of independent living the represented person can sustain.  I do not agree with CC that the represented person would at this time be able to live fully independently.  The evidence indicates otherwise …

2. That is not to say that the represented person necessarily continues to require nursing home care and that point was confirmed in this hearing by the manager of the nursing home.

3. It is not as simple, as CC put it in 2012, that the represented person need only decide whether she lives with him or independently in, for example, public housing.  The level of support that the represented person requires and how that impacts on the accommodation options available to her is something that needs to be carefully assessed and planned.  I am not satisfied, as it currently stands, without a guardian in place, that this careful planning would occur.

4. I am satisfied that a guardianship order is still needed because both the represented person and CC continue to have an unrealistic expectation about the represented person's abilities.  I accept that the relationship between the represented person and CC is volatile and unstable and that the represented person is vulnerable to the suggestions of CC as to what accommodation is best for her.

5. I find that the represented person does not have the capacity to plan, in her own best interests, the accommodation that best meets her care needs because of her poor insight into those needs and, further, that she does not have the capacity to plan for a situation where her relationship with CC is interrupted, as it was when CC was imprisoned, or for the possibility that it may end.

6. The represented person has impulsive traits, and because of her memory problems, has difficulty in using past experiences to inform any new decision that she should make.  She is, therefore, vulnerable to the suggestions of others, particularly CC, who is in a position to command her attention on a regular basis.  I am not satisfied on the evidence that CC is able to separate his interests from the particular interests of the represented person and, further, that the represented person is able to protect her own interests.

7. The represented person is in ongoing need of a guardian to determine what form of accommodation is in her best interests.  On the evidence of the Public Advocate, I am satisfied that the delegated guardian has made decisions to date that are protective, respectful of the represented person's right to live as independently as possible, and respectful, to the extent possible, of her wishes.

8. This arrangement should continue, as should the role of the Public Advocate, to determine the support services that the represented person will require from time to time, again because both the represented person and CC do not demonstrate insight into her care needs.  At the hearing, the Public Advocate, supported by the represented person's family, proposed that the guardian be given the additional functions of deciding the contact that the represented person should have with others and that of making her treatment decisions.

9. The function of contact was proposed, no doubt, to regulate the relationship with CC.  The evidence of incidents of domestic violence was cited to support the submission.  The domestic violence is a worrying development in the relationship between the represented person and CC, although the represented person made it clear in her evidence that she would stop the relationship if that should recur.  Concern was also evident in the impulsiveness in which the represented person established a new relationship with a resident at the nursing home when CC was in prison and just as quickly ended that relationship when CC was released. 

10. Despite those concerns, I continue to hold the view that it would be unnecessarily burdensome to overtly intrude into the represented person's relationship with CC, at least at this time.  I expect, however, that the guardian will monitor the situation and, if necessary, bring the matter back to the Tribunal if the circumstances warrant it.

11. I hold a similar view about intrusion into the represented person's medical affairs.  The Public Advocate's representative states that he relies on the assessment of Dr PD in his submission to include medical treatment in the guardianship order.  The represented person has a new treating general practitioner, Dr SS.  There is no evidence to indicate that Dr SS does not accept consent from the represented person.  I accept that with CC's help, the represented person sees Dr SS on a regular basis.  There is nothing to suggest that this will stop.

12. I am satisfied that currently the represented person's medical needs are being met and that there is no need for a guardianship order to include a treatment function.  I therefore confirm the order made in 2012 appointing the Public Advocate as the represented person's limited guardian to decide where and with whom she should live, both permanently and temporarily, and to decide the services to which she should have access from time to time.

13. I now turn to the need for an administration order. 

14. In her assessment, Dr EV states a process that she had to use to have the represented person give a description of her estate.  As I have already mentioned, the process is one of probing and providing what Dr EV called 'scaffolding'.  In other words, the represented person is not able to generate the description of her estate on her own.  She requires assistance and information to build a picture of her estate.

15. As Dr EV opines, this deficit alone may not be fundamentally fatal to the represented person managing a very simple estate; say, for example, a pension income.  However, this is not the situation for the represented person.  Her estate is not simple.  The Public Trustee's report shows that the represented person may be entitled to make a total and permanent disability claim on her superannuation.  This requires investigation and this is currently being undertaken by the Public Trustee.  The Public Trustee has calculated that the represented person's children owe her money.  Negotiation and collection need to occur, and this is a sensitive matter.  The represented person is now divorced from her former spouse and a property settlement needs to take place.  These are complicating factors in the represented person's estate.  A combination of the cognitive deficits outlined by Dr EV, in my view, precludes the represented person from managing these more complex matters.

16. The Public Trustee report of 17 June 2013 details a number of worrying aspects in the way CC has approached the represented person's estate: for example, CC's request to be paid the equivalent of the nursing home fortnightly bed fees to care for the represented person because he was providing, in his view, the same service as the nursing home; the allegation by CC against the represented person and her children concerning personal property missing from his home when he was in prison and his threat to bring the matter to the attention of the police; and the refusal of CC to make payments on the represented person's credit card arrears after having first agreed with the Public Trustee to contribute. 

17. For all these reasons, I find that the represented person remains in need of an administrator and that it cannot be CC.  In any case CC believes the represented person can make her own financial decisions.  I am not convinced CC can separate his financial needs from those of the represented person.  CC has not demonstrated financial stability or planning, due to his imprisonment, it is reported, for unpaid fines.  It is therefore my view that it is in the represented person's best interests that the Public Trustee remain as her plenary administrator, and I will confirm the order that was made in 2012, and, as with the guardianship order, set a review period of two years. 

I certify that this and the preceding [57] paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.

___________________________________

MR J MANSVELD, SENIOR MEMBER