the goods which were unloaded, and he directed where the cases
were to be placed in a shed on the wharf.
For the prosecution it was alleged that the defendant went on the top of a stack of cases in the shed and opened one of them with a dog-hook, and that he had no authority to do
The defendant's evidence was that he went on the stack to look for certain cases of goods at the request of a carter, and that while there he saw that the lid of the particular case was slightly open, and that he gave it a few knocks with his dog- hook to close it.
On the first hearing the police magistrate dismissed the information, and on order to review Madden C.J. held that the evidence established an "interference" with the goods, and he remitted the case to the magistrate for rehearing Whitton V. McNeill 1. On the rehearing, at the conclusion of the evidence, the police magistrate found that " what the defendant did was, with respect to the case in question, to hammer down with his dog-hook part of the case that was open," and he said that he was bound to hold that that was an "interference" with the goods within the meaning of sec. 33 of the Customs Act 1901- 1910. He therefore convicted the defendant, and imposed a fine of £5.
From that decision the defendant now appealed by way of order to review.
Mitchell K.C. (with him Eager), for the appellant. What, according to the finding of the magistrate, the appellant did in respect of these goods was not an "interference" within the meaning of sec. 33 of the Customs Act 1901-1910. [He was stopped.]
Starke, for the respondent. The prohibition in sec. 33 is abso- lute, and no wrongful intention is necessary Murphy v. Stokes 2. Any unauthorized meddling with goods in such a way that the Customs may lose control of them is an is interference."
1(1915) V.L.R., 539 ; 37 A. T., 58. 25 W.A.L.R., 162.