McNamara Business & Property Law v Kasmeridis

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Appeal from a Master: Civil)

MCNAMARA BUSINESS & PROPERTY LAW v KASMERIDIS

Judgment of The Honourable Justice White

29 October 2004

PROCEDURE - COSTS - AGREEMENTS AS TO COSTS

Appellant firm of solicitors had acted for respondents - Appellant sent respondents documents containing Terms of Engagement and Schedule of Fees - Respondents agreed to Terms and Schedule orally by telephone - Appellant rendered account based on Schedule of Fees provided - Respondents applied to Master for taxation of costs - Master found no agreement in writing - Master ordered fresh bill of costs, based on usual scale, be served and filed - Question whether appellant "made an agreement in writing" with respondents - Terms of agreement were in writing but appellant and respondents did not "make" an agreement in writing - Appeal dismissed.

Legal Practitioners Act 1981, s 42; Supreme Court Rules SCR 106.05; Attorneys and Solicitors Act 1870 (UK), s 4; Statute of Frauds, 1677 (29 Car II, c 3) s 4; Acts Interpretation Act 1915, s 4; Law of Property Act 1936, s 26, referred to.
Re Lewis; Ex parte Munro (1876) 1 QBD 724; Re Raven; Ex parte Pitt (1881) 45 LT 742; Clare v Joseph [1907] 2 KB 369; Pontifex v Farnham (1892) 62 LJQB 344; Chamberlain v Boodle and King [1982] 3 All ER 188; Jovetic v Stoddart & Co (1992) 7 WAR 208; Re Walsh Halligan Douglas' Bill of Costs [1990] 1 Qd R 288; Heppingstone v Stewart (1910) 12 CLR 126; O'Young v Walter Reid & Co Ltd (1932) 47 CLR 497; Reuss v Picksley (1866) LR 1 Exch 342; Brooks, Jenkins & Co v Torquay Corporate [1902] 1 KB 601; Wrathall v Fleming [1945] Tas SR 61; Holmes v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) (No 2) (1988) 88 ATC 4328; NM Superannuation Pty Ltd v Hughes (1992) 27 NSWLR 26, considered.

WORDS AND PHRASES CONSIDERED/DEFINED

"make an agreement in writing"

MCNAMARA BUSINESS & PROPERTY LAW v KASMERIDIS
[2004] SASC 336

Magistrates Appeal

WHITE J:         

Introduction

  1. This appeal from a decision of a Master raises an issue of some importance in relation to the taxation of a solicitor’s costs. The question is whether a legal practitioner has, for the purposes of s 42(6) of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981, made an agreement in writing with a client where the practitioner has proposed in writing the terms upon which they will act, but where the client, while continuing to instruct the practitioner, has not indicated in writing his or her accession to the proposal.

    The Legislation

  2. Section 42(6) and (7) of the Legal Practitioner’s Act provide as follows:

    “(6)   A legal practitioner may make an agreement in writing with a client for –

    (a)    payment of a specified amount by way of legal costs (which may – but need not – consist of a daily, hourly or other time-related rate for professional work carried out by the legal practitioner on…

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Details
Case
[2004] SASC 336
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

McNamara Business & Property Law, a firm of solicitors, appealed against the decision of the Master who had ordered that a fresh bill of costs be served and filed, following a taxation application made by the respondents. The firm had rendered an account for $20,613.50 in relation to an application to set aside a default judgment. The respondents disputed the amounts claimed and submitted that the Master should refuse to tax the Bill of Costs, as there was no written fee agreement between the parties. The Master ordered a fresh bill of costs to be served and filed based on the usual scale of costs, as he was not satisfied that an agreement in writing had been achieved by the solicitors.

The primary legal issue in this case was whether the appellant and respondents had made an agreement in writing for the payment of costs, as required by section 42(6) of the Legal Practitioners Act. The appellant submitted that an oral agreement was sufficient, while the respondents argued that a written agreement was necessary. The court had to determine whether an oral agreement could suffice as an agreement in writing for the purposes of the statute.

The court found that the terms of the engagement and schedule of fees were in writing, but the appellant and respondents did not make an agreement in writing as required by section 42(6) of the Legal Practitioners Act. The court concluded that the Master was correct in ordering a fresh bill of costs to be served and filed, based on the usual scale of costs. The oral acceptance of the Terms of Engagement and Schedule of Fees was insufficient to constitute a written agreement for the purposes of section 42(6). Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

The orders of the Court were as follows: 1. An extension of time to 20 August 2004 for the institution of the appeal was granted. 2. The appeal was dismissed. The parties would be heard as to costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Section 42(6) and (7) of the Legal Practitioner’s Act provide as follows:“(6) A legal practitioner may make an agreement in writing with a client for –(a) payment of a specified amount by way of legal costs (which may – but need not – consist of a daily, hourly or other time-related rate for professional work carried out by the legal practitioner on the client’s behalf); or(b)payment of legal costs in accordance with a specified scale; or (c) subject to any limitations imposed by the Society’s professional conduct rules or the regulations – payment of a contingency fee to be calculated on a basis set out in the agreement on fulfilment of a condition stated in the agreement.(7)The Supreme Court may, in proceedings under this section, rescind or vary an agreement under subsection (6) if it considers that any term of the agreement is not fair and reasonable.”Background Circumstances The appellant is a firm of solicitors which formerly acted for the respondents in relation to an application to set aside a default judgment entered in proceedings in the Magistrates Court. Mr Viscariello was the practitioner within the appellant firm who had the conduct of the respondents’ matter. The appellant rendered an account for $20,613.50 (inclusive of barrister’s fees and disbursements). The respondents applied, pursuant to s 42(1) of the Legal Practitioners Act, for a taxation of the appellant’s costs. In response to a direction from the Court, the appellant prepared a Bill of Costs in taxable form. That Bill was prepared using rates set out in a document entitled “Terms of Engagement” with an attached Schedule of Fees, both of which were sent with an accompanying letter by the appellant to the first respondent on 5 February 2004. The respondents disputed the amounts claimed in the Bill of Costs. They submitted that the Master should refuse to tax the Bill of Costs which had been lodged, and should instead direct the filing of a Bill of Costs prepared in accordance with the appropriate scale pursuant to the Supreme Court Rules, on the basis that there was no written fee agreement between the parties. After hearing some brief argument, to which I will return shortly, the Master ordered:“Fresh bill to be served and filed based on the usual scale of costs. I note that the present bill is a time cost one and as presently advised I am not satisfied that an agreement in writing has been achieved by the solicitors. It is for that reason that I am directing a fresh bill.” The letter of 5 February 2004 from the appellant to the first respondent stated that its purpose was to set out the terms upon which the appellant would act for the respondents. It said:“Enclosed are our Terms of Engagement and Schedule of Fees which together with this letter, set out the relevant terms and conditions on which we will act for you. Please note that our Terms of Engagement, Schedule of Fees and this letter constitute a solicitor and client agreement between you and this firm for the purposes of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981.”Neither the letter itself, nor the Terms of Engagement, sought a signature from the respondents nor other means by which they might indicate their formal acceptance of the terms proposed.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Master’s reasons were brief but in the context of the debate which had occurred before him, the Master’s reason for his decision were clear enough. The appellant understood why the Master had ordered a fresh Bill of Costs in taxable form to be filed and served. He took the view that an oral acceptance only of the Terms of Engagement and Schedule of Fees was insufficient to constitute that document an agreement in writing for the purposes of s 42(6). This ground of appeal is not made out.Conclusion For the reasons which I have given, I conclude that the Master was correct in deciding that the parties had not made an agreement in writing in respect of costs as contemplated by s 42(6). Accordingly the appeal should be dismissed. The orders of the Court are:1.An extension of time to 20 August 2004 for the institution of the appeal is granted.2.The appeal is dismissed.I will hear the parties as to costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established