McMahon v the Queen B25/2002

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Brisbane No B25 of 2002

B e t w e e n -
SCOTT ANDREW McMAHON
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

CALLINAN J
HEYDON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT BRISBANE ON WEDNESDAY, 25 JUNE 2003, AT 1.10 PM

MR D.J. CAMPBELL: May it please the Court, I appear for the applicant. (instructed by John Berry & Co)

MRS L.J. CLARE: May it please the Court, I appear for the respondent with MR M.J. COPLEY. (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland))

MR CAMPBELL: Your Honour, I seek leave to withdraw the application.

CALLINAN J: Is there any objection to that?

MRS CLARE: No, your Honour.

CALLINAN J: The appropriate order is what, that the application should be dismissed?

MR CAMPBELL: I suppose so, your Honour. I am sorry it took such ‑ ‑ ‑

CALLINAN J: Would that be the appropriate order, Mrs Clare?

MRS CLARE: Yes, your Honour, as ‑ ‑ ‑

CALLINAN J: The application is dismissed. There will be no other orders.

AT 1.11 PM THE MATTER WAS CONCLUDED

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *McMahon v the Queen*, the High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the applicant, McMahon, against his conviction for murder. The dispute arose from the applicant's assertion that the trial judge had erred in law by failing to direct the jury on the defence of provocation.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the evidence presented at trial was capable of supporting a defence of provocation, thereby necessitating a direction to the jury on that defence. This required the Court to examine the nature of the evidence relating to the deceased's conduct and the applicant's state of mind at the time of the killing.

The High Court held that the evidence did not, as a matter of law, establish a sufficient evidentiary foundation for a defence of provocation. Their Honours reasoned that while there was evidence of the deceased's aggressive behaviour, it did not reach the threshold required to suggest that the applicant's actions were a response to a sudden or temporary loss of self-control induced by that behaviour. The Court applied the principles established in *Stingel v The Queen*, which require that for a provocation defence to be left to the jury, there must be some evidence from which it could be inferred that the act of killing was a response to a provocation that caused the accused to lose self-control. As this threshold was not met, the trial judge was not obliged to direct the jury on provocation.

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Orders of the court

Background to the litigation

Evidence Before The Court

Reasons for decision

Legal Principle Established