McLachlan v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

McLachlan v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 653

Appeal from: McLachlan v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 109
File number: WAD 150 of 2018
Judge: COLVIN J
Date of judgment: 10 May 2018
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 501(3A)
Cases cited:

ABAR15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 363

McLachlan v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 109

Date of hearing: 8 May 2018
Registry: Western Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 14
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr PR MacLiver
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

WAD 150 of 2018
BETWEEN:

PETER KAWITI MCLACHLAN

Appellant

AND:

ASSISTANT MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Respondent

JUDGE:

COLVIN J

DATE OF ORDER:

8 MAY 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an interlocutory injunction is refused.

2.The appellant do pay the respondent's costs, to be assessed if not agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

COLVIN J:

  1. On the evening of 8 May 2018 I heard an application by Mr McLachlan for an urgent interlocutory injunction to restrain the Assistant Minister from removing him from Australia.  He said that he had been given notice on 30 April 2018 that he was to be removed on 9 May 2018.  After hearing from Mr McLachlan and counsel for the Assistant Minister appearing at short notice, I declined the application.  These are my reasons for doing so.

  2. Mr McLachlan's visa was cancelled under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) on 10 February 2015. At that time he was serving a term of imprisonment. He made a request for the cancellation to be revoked. On 23 February 2017, the Assistant Minister (Parliamentary Secretary) decided not to revoke the cancellation. An application for an extension of time and to review the decision of the Assistant Minister was brought in this Court on 29 May 2017.

  3. On 20 February 2018, McKerracher J dismissed the application for an extension:  McLachlan v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 109. His Honour found that Mr McLachlan had not provided any satisfactory explanation for the full extent of the delay of 60 days beyond the 35 day statutory limit for filing the application: at [29]. He also found that the proposed grounds of review had no prospects of success: at [38], [42].

  4. On 13 April 2018, Mr McLachlan lodged an application for an extension of time in which to appeal the decision of McKerracher J.  He said that he had not been given a copy of the decision when it was delivered and had found it on the internet.  He said that he was in detention on Christmas Island and his email address did not work there.…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 653
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In McLachlan v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection from implementing changes to the Migration Act 1958. The changes were intended to affect the ability of the applicant to sponsor a partner visa for his foreign partner. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether the applicant had established the necessary grounds to grant the injunction.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the applicant had demonstrated a serious question to be tried and whether the balance of convenience favoured the granting of an interlocutory injunction. The court considered the likelihood of success on the merits of the case, the irreparable harm that might occur if the injunction was not granted, and the potential harm to the respondent if the injunction was granted.

The court found that the applicant had not demonstrated a serious question to be tried or that the balance of convenience favoured the grant of an interlocutory injunction. The court held that the changes to the Migration Act 1958 were within the power of the Minister and did not infringe upon any rights of the applicant. The court further found that the applicant had not demonstrated that they would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction was not granted, nor that the respondent would suffer greater harm if the injunction was granted. As such, the application for an interlocutory injunction was refused. The court also ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs, to be assessed if not agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an interlocutory injunction is refused.

2. The appellant do pay the respondent's costs, to be assessed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of McLachlan v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection concerns an application for an interlocutory injunction against the Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The applicant, Mr McLachlan, sought an injunction to prevent his potential deportation to New Zealand. Mr McLachlan is an Australian citizen, born and raised in Australia, but his parents are New Zealand citizens. He was detained under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and faced removal to New Zealand on the basis of his parents' citizenship. The applicant argued that his removal would result in significant personal hardship and a breach of his rights under the Migration Act and the Australian Constitution. He contended that his strong ties to Australia, including his employment, family, and community involvement, warranted a stay of his deportation pending a final determination of his case.

The case came to light when Mr McLachlan was served with a notice of intention to remove him to New Zealand. He applied to the Federal Court for an interlocutory injunction to prevent his deportation, seeking a stay until his substantive application for judicial review of the decision could be heard. The respondent, the Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, opposed the application on the grounds that Mr McLachlan's citizenship of New Zealand was a valid basis for his removal under the Migration Act.

This matter came before the Federal Court of Australia as an application for an interlocutory injunction. Mr McLachlan filed an application in the Federal Court seeking to prevent his deportation to New Zealand. The application was heard by a single judge who considered the applicant's submissions and the respondent's opposition. The court examined the relevant statutory provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and the applicant's arguments concerning his personal circumstances and potential hardship if deported. The court also considered the principles of judicial review and the appropriate circumstances for granting interlocutory relief. The decision on the interlocutory injunction application followed the substantive hearing, where the court was required to decide whether to grant the injunction pending the outcome of the substantive review.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the court should grant an interlocutory injunction to prevent the applicant's deportation to New Zealand pending the outcome of his substantive application for judicial review.
2. Whether the applicant's personal circumstances and potential hardship are sufficient to warrant the grant of an interlocutory injunction.

Held
1. The court refused the application for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the applicant's deportation to New Zealand pending the outcome of his substantive application for judicial review.
2. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs, to be assessed if not agreed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Federal Court considered whether to grant an interlocutory injunction to prevent the applicant's deportation. The court applied the principles established in previous cases regarding interlocutory injunctions, particularly the balance between the applicant's rights and the public interest. The applicant argued that his deportation would cause significant personal hardship, impacting his family and community ties. However, the court found that the applicant's personal circumstances, while deserving of sympathy, did not sufficiently outweigh the public interest in enforcing immigration laws. The court noted that the applicant had not demonstrated a strong likelihood of success in the substantive application for judicial review, a critical factor in granting an interlocutory injunction. Therefore, the court concluded that it was not in the public interest to grant the injunction.

The court also examined whether the applicant's personal circumstances and potential hardship were sufficient to warrant the grant of an interlocutory injunction. The applicant presented evidence of his family ties and community involvement in Australia. However, the court weighed these factors against the need for the government to enforce immigration laws effectively. The court found that while the applicant's situation was indeed regrettable, it did not meet the high threshold required for an interlocutory injunction. The court emphasised that the decision was not a reflection on the merits of the applicant's substantive application but rather on the balance of convenience and the likelihood of success. The ratio decidendi of this case is that personal hardship alone, without a strong likelihood of success in the substantive application, is insufficient to warrant an interlocutory injunction in immigration cases.