SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeals: Civil)
MCLACHLAN & SOUTH OZZ SHELTER v HAMILTON
[2020] SASC 126
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Peek
7 July 2020
CHARITIES - ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL BY COURT - PARTIES - OTHER PARTIES - RIGHTS - TO BRING PROCEEDINGS
CHARITIES - ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL BY COURT - PARTIES - ATTORNEY-GENERAL - WHEN NECESSARY OR PROPER PARTY
CHARITIES - CHARITABLE PURPOSES - OTHER PURPOSES BENEFICIAL TO PUBLIC - GIFT FOR ANIMAL WELFARE
Appeal against a decision of a Magistrate.
The first appellant (McLachlan) owned land at Moorook where she (with other volunteers) conducted activities directed to the welfare of dogs and cats. The site of those activities is referred to as “the shelter”. The respondent (Hamilton) volunteered to assist McLachlan by creating and operating a website at Adelaide to solicit public donations to help fund those activities. The dispute concerns monies donated by members of the public through the website into Hamilton’s bank account. McLachlan and the second appellant (South Ozz Shelter) allege that between 24 May 2010 and 31 July 2013 $114,579.77 was paid into Hamilton’s bank account of which she wrongly retained more than $75,000.
The Magistrate held that the payments into Hamilton’s bank account were gifts for a charitable purpose and that Hamilton was a charitable trustee of the legal rights to require the bank to pay the total credit funds to herself or to someone nominated by her (the bank account legal rights). Accordingly, neither appellant had standing in the Magistrates Court to enforce the terms of the trust because s 60 of the Trustee Act 1936 requires that applications in relations to alleged breaches of charitable trusts must be made to the Supreme Court.
On appeal, the appellants contend that the Magistrate should have found that Hamilton held the bank account legal rights as constructive trustee on behalf of either McLachlan or South Ozz Shelter as the true trustee of any charitable trust and that the Magistrates Court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the proceedings.
Held, dismissing the appeal:
1. The bank account legal rights were impressed with a charitable trust for the purpose of funding activities at the shelter and Hamilton held those legal rights as trustee of a charitable trust.
Trustee Act 1936 (SA) s 60; referred.
Attorney-General (NSW) v Adams (1908) 7 CLR 100; Attorney-General (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co (Ltd) (1940) 63 CLR 209; Attorney-General (Qld) (Ex rel Nye) v Cathedral Church of Brisbane (1977) 136 CLR 353; Attorney-General SA v Bray (1964) 111 CLR 402; Black v S Freedman & Co (1910) 12 CLR 105; Eurella Community Services Inc v Attorney General for the State of NSW [2010] NSWSC 566; Joyce v Ashfield Municipal Council (1959) 4 LGRA 195; Latimer v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2004] 1 WLR 1466; [2004] 3 NZLR 157; McGarvie Smith Institute v Campbelltown Municipal Council [1965] NSWR 1641; Raftland Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2006) 227 ALR 598; Shaw…
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- Case
- [2020] SASC 126
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court's reasoning focused on the nature of the donations and the trust, if any, under which they were held. The court found that the funds were deposited into an account solely controlled by Hamilton and that the plaintiffs did not have any legal or equitable title to the funds. The court held that the donations were intended for the benefit of the shelter and its animals, rather than for the plaintiffs. The court further concluded that the plaintiffs did not have standing to recover the funds because they were held on trust for the charitable purpose of the shelter. The court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that Hamilton held the funds under a charitable trust or that she was unjustly enriched by retaining them.
The court's decision was that the plaintiffs' claims were without merit. The court found that the funds were held on trust for the charitable purpose of the animal shelter and that the plaintiffs did not have standing to claim the funds. The court rejected the plaintiffs' contentions that the funds were held under a charitable trust or that Hamilton was unjustly enriched. The court's final orders were that the plaintiffs' claims be dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
The primary dispute in the case concerns the legitimacy of the expenses Ms Hamilton incurred and her entitlement to reimbursements. Ms Hamilton asserts that the donations were meant to benefit the shelter and its animals, not the plaintiffs, and therefore, the plaintiffs lack standing to recover the funds. She further argues that the plaintiffs have no legal or equitable claim to the funds in the Progress Saver Account. Ms McLachlan does not claim any interest in the funds herself, but the plaintiffs allege that Ms Hamilton stole the funds from South Ozz Shelter, was unjustly enriched, or holds the funds in trust for the shelter. The Magistrate has already ruled on several objections and clarified the scope of the pleadings, ensuring that the dispute over the ownership and purpose of the donated funds is well-defined.
This matter before the court is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, which originally dealt with the claim by McLachlan and South Ozz Shelter against Hamilton. The plaintiffs sought the return of funds they alleged Hamilton had misappropriated from a bank account used for donations to their animal shelter. The case was initiated in the Federal Circuit Court, where the plaintiffs filed their initial claim, and later amended it to its third iteration. The primary dispute centred on the ownership and intended use of funds received through the donations, with Hamilton asserting that the funds were intended for the shelter's purposes rather than the plaintiffs'. After the Federal Circuit Court made its determination, Hamilton appealed to the Federal Court, challenging the lower court's findings and conclusions. The appeal focused on procedural and pleading issues, including whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring the action and whether the pleadings were sufficient to define the issues. The appeal also considered the substantive matters of whether the funds were held in trust for the shelter or the plaintiffs and whether the funds were misappropriated.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: PEEK J, JJ J
More recently, in the NSW Supreme Court decision in Eurella Community Services Inc v Attorney General for the State of NSW, the short facts were that a public fundraising campaign raised funds to acquire ‘Eurella House’ and it opened on 24 October 1953 operating as a school for “retarded” or “sub-normal” children. Slattery J stated:[12]55 To answer the question posed, it is necessary to decide whether the funds raised by the appeal in 1953 were “a gift to an institution impressed with a trust for the application thereof to particular purposes” or “an absolute gift to such an institution as a result for instance of appeal by the institution for funds based on its need for moneys in order to carry out a particular project or purpose”: Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v The Corporation of the Lesser Chapter of the Cathedral Church of Brisbane (1976) 136 CLR 353, per Jacobs J at 371. Both sides put submissions about the application of Jacobs J’s reasoning in the Brisbane Cathedral Case to the present proceedings. ……61 The plaintiff’s submission that the property was purchased with a deposit from the Branch failed to account for how little the Branch actually contributed compared with the support from the public appeal. Even though the appeal began after the exchange of contracts that does not strengthen the inference that the fundraising was for the Branch. The lack of reference to any trust in the appeal materials is not remarkable. Donors gave money directly to the Branch to gain a tax deduction but that is not an answer to the Attorney General’s argument that when that money was received it was already impressed with a trust. Although the funds raised were used to repay the ANZ bank loan the stated purpose of the fundraising was more than just paying off this bank loan. 62 I conclude therefore that the funds raised for the purchase of Eurella House were impressed with a charitable trust.[12] [2010] NSWSC 566.Consideration of the appellants’ contentions on appeal I will consider the appellants’ contentions in the order: 28A and 28C; 28B; 28D; 28E; 28F; 29 as identified at [14].Contentions 28A: “Hamilton did not hold the funds under a charitable trust” and 28C: “The funds were donated for the Shelter.” I reject these contentions. I consider the determinations of the Magistrate above to be correct. The subject funds were all donated by members of the public via a website created and maintained solely by Hamilton[13] into Hamilton’s bank account which had been opened by Hamilton, was only ever operated by her; and of which she was the only signatory and only authorised operator. The total credit funds in Hamilton’s bank account from time to time were her “legal property” in the sense that she alone had the right to require the bank to pay over those funds to herself or to some person nominated by her (the bank account legal rights). [13] McLachlan stated in evidence that she had never seen the website or had anything to do with it.